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ENGLISH SUMMARY 
This dissertation considers the life and works of Walt Whitman within the context of literature as 
therapy. It offers several new ways of evaluating the therapeutic, autobiographical and self-
transcending aspects of Whitman’s poetry while seeking to clarify both (1) Whitman’s personal 
experiences as a beleaguered self reacting to life’s challenges through his poetry and (2) the general 
potentials of the written word for everybody who puts pen to paper. Poems and to a lesser degree 
other writings from across Whitman’s career are considered in the light of different theoretical 
contexts. These include existentialism, phenomenology, Franklean logotherapy and psychoanalysis 
(including trauma theory, analytical psychology, as well as insights from Freud, Kohut and Lacan). 
References are also made to the philosophy of religion. 
 Motivated to uncover fresh psychological insights about aesthetics and creativity 
while also presenting new arguments about Whitman, the dissertation rests on the foundational 
premise that text, self and world often mutually affect each other in ways that are best addressed 
from a psychological theoretical framework. 
 Carefully considering and learning from each of the theoretical and practical realms of 
knowledge, as well as from a wide range of poets, authors, essayists, literary scholars and 
biographers whose insights and life orientations complement Whitman’s, the dissertation achieves 
to extract ideas of practical value from Whitman’s experience which shed light on the fundamental 
problems of the human condition. That achievement is to some degree inevitable given the 
theoretical underpinnings, but it is also intentional insofar as it is my opinion that the majority of 
Whitman critics – excellent Whitman readers though they are – nevertheless fail to make their 
writing about Whitman begin where their reading of him stopped. In other words, it is my opinion 
that scholarly arguments, in order to not misrepresent Whitman’s works, need to reflect and take 
seriously the fact that they were read by and had an effect on a human being who necessarily has 
things in common with the poet. These commonalities, which I consider archetypal (as they are 
timeless and transcend nationality, race, gender, historical environment etc.) include the precarious 
predicament of being a vulnerable and mortal self in a world inherently (though not incessantly) 
indifferent or hostile to the safety and well-being of human beings. More specifically, the 
commonalities also include the fact that we all inhabit biological, social and psychological realms 
which continuously delight and afflict us as we cycle through epochs of youth, aging, 
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companionship, loneliness, robustness, frailty, sexuality, disease, triumph, shame, courage, fear, 
wonder and death – to name but a few archetypal experiences. The dissertation goes some way 
towards redressing the identified dearth in the indicated kind of scholarly approach. 
 It is a classic psychoanalytic insight that we may not consciously know or feel 
precisely “where we are” in the aforementioned biological, social and psychological realms at any 
one moment, but that our journey nevertheless affects us unconsciously (hence the psychoanalytic 
practices of dream analysis and automatic association, for instance). I explain how Whitman’s 
poetry – and literature in general – can aid readers psychologically and sensitize them towards a 
deeper understanding of and appreciation for the truth of their existence. And I present the general 
argument that aesthetic engagement may ground us existentially and lead us to realise the 
therapeutic and redemptive rewards of aesthetic and literary engagement. 
 I also delineate how – with reference not exclusively to Whitman but to any individual 
who utters a sincere thought reflecting their present mental and existential situation – how our 
experience of the exterior world is not a constant to which we must submit but is dependent on our 
thoughts and feelings about our situation and about ourselves. From an investigation and 
explanation of this psychological dynamic I turn to Whitman and explain that his Leaves of Grass 
can be thought of as the ongoing inauguration of carefully crafted symbolic selves uniquely 
possessing the wisdom, personal resources, courage or perspective on which actual survival in the 
world seems to be predicated. It is arguable that Whitman experimented with and managed to 
transform his actual character – and thus his life – by creating poetic instantiations of character 
(symbolic selves) and having them pervade and inhabit Leaves of Grass. 
 Although Whitman’s letters reveal that he was too complex a man to exclusively be 
the majestic “father-healer” he liked to see himself as – offering “prescription[s] of health and Eros” 
and “antidote[s] to disease and Thanatos”, as David Aberbach writes – he does appear to have 
managed, amid quite unpalatable circumstances, to nourish, construct, repair and raise his self to 
such degrees of existential serenity, confidence and courage that he felt not only “self-balanced”, as 
he put it, for virtually any contingency but was also occasionally seen as a religious leader of men. 
Because I consider it unwise idolatry to explain this wonderful gradual transformation by insisting 
that the historical Whitman was in some mysterious, unknowable way categorically different from 
almost all other people, I necessarily come to the conclusion that we ought to reflect deeply on the 
implications of his example for all of us. And I suggest that we should not be too quick to assume 
that we necessarily perceive the upper limits and capabilities of the human psyche. 
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 The road to serenity for Whitman was, despite his genius, long and troubled. His many 
worldly trials, including the countless tragedies he witnessed during the Civil War and his never 
fulfilled romantic life, would lend poignancy and interest to the story of his life even if he had not 
also spent his life creating a literary masterpiece which often hints autobiographically at the 
disappointment, heartache, regret and indifference he endured. Although there is ample scholarship, 
including monographs, offering analyses of Whitman by comparing him to Herman Melville, 
Friedrich Nietzsche and others (or by considering his debt to certain philosophers, the Bible or 
Swedenborg), few scholars have considered Whitman’s life and works in a Jungian light. I offer a 
much-needed analysis informed by one of Jung’s most compelling psychoanalytic concepts, namely 
the shadow aspects of the psyche. Such an analysis, which sees Whitman intuitively guided by his 
writing in the direction of a complete integration of his shadow, is indispensable insofar as it 
explains much of what could be called the “Whitman myth”, i.e. the curious fact that one humble 
man was able to span such vast emotional ranges that he could be said to be simultaneously 
America’s “prime celebrant” and “greatest elegist for the self”, as Harold Bloom puts it. 
 In brief, the dissertation argues that the central challenge in Whitman’s life was to 
locate a way of being a sustainable self in the world while also – privately – enduring his own 
psyche and despite countless crises desire his own continuation. As for the challenge to tolerate 
oneself, a considerable amount of evidence suggests that for most of his life Whitman was painfully 
troubled by his sexual longings, which is particularly evident from a handful of poems. Particularly 
interesting in the context of Jungian shadow analysis are a few moving and deeply agonized poetic 
passages in which shameful confession of secret deeds and thougths are worded by the poet as if 
something quasi-diabolic and criminal needed exorcizing. And yet, despite this, Whitman appears to 
have had enough empathy (a Kohutean concept) for the “multitudes” inhabiting and constituting his 
self to access vast reservoirs of redemption and fortitude and emerge “self-contained”, which – 
from the perspective of analytical psychology – suggests that his integration of the shadow was 
successful. I demonstrate in this context that, interestingly, Anne Gilchrist became aware that 
something resembling shadow integration was taking place in Whitman long before Jung presented 
his theory. 
 The dissertation stresses that we can and should try to learn from any lives that have 
confronted being in a profound way – and triumphed against heavy odds. Related to that is the force 
which the dissertation lends to the fact – largely forgotten or unrealized – that the human psyche is 
not merely a passive entity at the receiving end of a torrent of blunt worldly qualia and interior 
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psychic static. Rather, it is an actively cooperating and co-authoring aspect of our experience – 
whether the particular experience strikes us as momentous or trivial. It seems to me that generally 
that realization is only afforded those very few individuals who are shoved dangerously close to 
utter destruction but are then – by some miracle – saved: a death-and-rebirth archetype, I argue in 
here. At the end of the dissertation, I explore the implications of all these issues for the 
(unfortunately always pressing) challenge of treating what is currently called post-traumatic stress 
disorder. Whitman may not have been a starved prisoner of war or the survivor of a near-death-
experience (as that word is generally used), but in spite of that I maintain that his life does exhibit 
the kind of steady, tolerant, brave patience which seems to be the only attitude worth adopting in the 
face of particularly dismaying existential crises; and, rather uniquely, he spoke and wrote like no 
one else about his cycles through various psychic “micro-deaths and renewals”, as Jordan Peterson 
puts it. I therefore argue in this dissertation that there is good reasons to study Whitman’s life as 
well as his works – not because they are categorically the same “thing”, but because one grew out 
of and had an evident, discussable, remarkable and positive effect on the other. I therefore also 
argue that it is appropriate to heed – if possible – Whitman’s request that his verse be viewed not 
“as a literary performance, or attempt at such performance, or as aiming mainly toward art or 
ӕstheticism.” We may think we do justice to an aesthetic work by subjecting it to impeccably 
rational and clinically precise scrutiny, but the problem is that it is hard to remain alive to and 
resonate with the full humanity of the spirit in which the poem is composed if we do not meet that 
spirit halfway between it and our analytical principles. That is the spirit in which I here attempt to 
read and discuss Whitman’s life and works. 
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DANSK RESUMÉ 
Nærværende afhandling undersøger Walt Whitmans liv og værker inden for en kunstterapeutisk 
ramme og præsenterer adskillige nye måder, hvorpå Whitmans digtes terapeutiske, selvbiografiske 
og selvtranscenderende aspekter kan anskues. Afhandlingen søger at belyse (1) Whitmans 
personlige oplevelser som et lidelsesfuldt selv i poetisk kollision med livets udfordringer og (2) det 
skrevne ords generelle potentiale for den, der gør brug af det. Digte og i mindre grad andre tekster 
fra hele Whitmans karriere betragtes i lyset af forskellige teoretiske kontekster. Disse tæller: 
eksistentialisme, fænomenologi, logoterapi efter Viktor Frankl og psykoanalyse (herunder 
traumeteori og indsigter hentet hos Jung, Freud, Lacan og Kohut). Der refereres i øvrigt til teologisk 
filosofi. 
 Med afsæt i ønsket om at afdække psykologisk viden om æstetik og kreativitet samt 
præsentere nye argumenter til Whitman-forskningen hviler afhandlingen på den grundlæggende 
præmis, at tekst, selv og verden ofte gensidigt påvirker hinanden på måder, der bedst kan begribes 
fra en psykologisk forankret position. 
 Under omhyggelig inddragelse af og stillingtagen til de forskellige teoretiske og 
praktiske vidensdomæner herovenfor nævnt samt til en lang række digtere, forfattere, litterære 
forskere og biografører formår afhandlingen ud af Whitmans oplevelser at kondensere indsigt af 
praktisk værdi, der kaster lys på den menneskelige konditions fundamentale problemer. Et sådant 
resultat er til en vis grad uundgåeligt givet det teoretiske fundament, men det er også intenderet, 
eftersom det er mit synspunkt, at majoriteten af Whitman-forskere (om end de afgjort er kompetente 
Whitman-læsere) ikke i tilstrækkelig høj grad formår at lade deres skriftlige reception begynde, 
hvor deres læsning stoppede. Med andre ord mener jeg, at forskningsargumenter – for at yde 
Whitman retfærdighed – er nødt til at reflektere over og tage det faktum seriøst, at de nødvendigvis 
blev læst af og afstedkom en reaktion i et menneske, der har noget til fælles med digteren. Disse 
fælles livsbetingelser, som jeg betegner som arketypiske (eftersom de er tidløse og transcenderer 
nationalitet, race, køn, historisk miljø m.m.), involverer den prekære prøvelse, det er at være et 
sårbart selv i en verden, hvis indifference og fjendtlighed over for menneskelig tryghed og velvære, 
er immanente faktorer (om end ikke uafbrudte). Mere specifikt tæller fællestrækkene det faktum, at 
vores liv har rødder i biologiske, sociale og psykologiske domæner, der uafladeligt er til skiftevis 
behag og pinsel under vores eksistens’ uforudsigelige rute gennem epoker af ungdom, aldring, 
fællesskab, ensomhed, robusthed, skrøbelighed, seksualitet, sygdom, triumf, skam, mod, frygt, 
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undren og død – for nu blot at nævne nogle få arketypiske fænomener. Afhandlingen søger så vidt 
muligt at udligne den beskrevne forskningsmæssige forsømmelse. 
 Det er klassisk psykoanalytisk viden, at skønt mennesker måske ikke bevidst forstår 
eller erkender deres situation i de førnævnte biologiske, sociale og psykologiske domæner, så 
perciperes vores oplevelser alligevel på ubevidst plan (dette forhold er f.eks. centralt for freudiansk 
drømmetydning og fri association). Jeg forklarer, hvordan Whitmans poesi – samt litteratur generelt 
– kan assistere læsere psykisk og facilitere en rigere forståelse af deres eksistens betydning. Og jeg 
præsenterer det generelle argument, at æstetisk engagement kan forankre os i eksistentiel forstand 
og lede os mod en erkendelse af de litterære genrers terapeutiske og forløsende kompensation. 
 Med reference til (ikke blot Whitman, men til) enhver, der formulerer en inderlig 
reaktion og tanke i sin refleksion over herskende mentale og eksistentielle forhold skildrer jeg også, 
hvordan vores oplevelser af den eksteriøre verden ikke er en konstant mur, mod hvilken individet 
må kollidere og bøje sig, men derimod er fænomenologisk afhængig af vores tanker og følelser 
omkring vores situation – vores selv og væren. Jeg bevæger mig fra en undersøgelse af og 
forklaring på denne psykologiske dynamik til Whitman og forsvarer mit udsagn, at Leaves of Grass 
kan anskues som den kontinuerte indstiftelse af omhyggeligt komponerede symbolske selver ladet 
med den kvalitet, at de besidder netop den visdom, de personlige ressourcer, det mod og perspektiv, 
som konkret overlevelse i verden synes at afhænge af. Det kan anføres, at Whitman 
eksperimenterede med og formåede at forvandle sin faktiske person gennem skabelsen af poetiske 
destillater – symbolske selver – af eftertragtede karakteristika, som han lod tale og vokse i 
livsværket Leaves of Grass. 
 Skønt Whitmans breve afslører, at hans personlige kompleksitet forhindrede ham i 
udelukkende at optræde som den alfaderlige frelser, han yndede at betragte sig selv som – fuld af 
opskrifter på helse og eros og modgifte mod sygdom og død, som David Aberbach skriver [min 
egen oversættelse] – så må det indrømmes, at han synes at have formået (om end martret af svære 
eksteriøre omstændigheder) at nære, opbygge, reparere og rejse sit selv til en ro, selvsikkerhed og 
glæde, der ikke blot gjorde ham harmonisk afstemt (“self-balanced”) over for stort set enhver 
prøvelse, men som også til tider lod ham fremstå som en religiøs leder. Eftersom jeg betragter det 
som uforsvarlig idoldyrkelse at prøve forklare denne forunderlige gradvise forvandling ved at 
insistere på, at Whitman på mystisk vis var en kategorisk exceptionel anomalitet, kommer jeg til 
den konklusion, at vi bør reflektere dybt over implikationerne af Whitmans eksempel for os alle. Og 
jeg indikerer, at vi ikke for hurtigt må antage, at vi nødvendigvis besidder endegyldig information 
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om de øvre grænser for den menneskelige psykes kapacitet. 
 Vejen til ro, selvsikkerhed og glæde var for Whitman – hans geni til trods – lang og 
besværlig. Hans livs mange prøvelser, ikke mindst de tragedier han bevidnede under Den 
Amerikanske Borgerkrig og hans altid uforløste romantiske liv, ville lade hans livshistorie med en 
sjælden grad af patos – og ville også være af generel interesse, såfremt han ikke under sine prøvelser 
havde kreeret et mesterværk, der i høj grad selvbiografisk afspejler den skuffelse, smerte, 
fortrydelse og ligegyldighed, han led og overlevede. Skønt der foreligger betragtelig forskning 
(herunder monografier), der analyserer Whitman gennem sammenligning med Herman Melville, 
Friedrich Nietzsche og andre (eller evaluerer hans gæld til forskellige filosoffer, bibelen eller 
Swedenborg), har kun få forskere overvejet Whitmans liv og værker i jungiansk perspektiv. Jeg 
præsenterer en tiltrængt analyse med afsæt i et af Jungs mest tankevækkende koncepter, nemlig den 
menneskelige psykes skyggeafspekt. En sådan analyse, inden for hvilken Whitman fremstår 
intuitivt ledt via sin poetiske produktion mod fortløbende integration af sin skygge, er uvurderlig 
grundet dens samtidige forklaring på hvad man kunne kalde Whitman-myten, nemlig det 
bemærkelsesværdige faktum, at en og samme mand var i stand til emotionelt at spænde så vidt, at 
han kunne forfatte både den dybeste elegi og lystigste hyldest til det menneskelige selv – for at 
citere Harold Blooms vurdering. 
 Kort sagt argumenterer afhandlingen, at den centrale udfordring i Whitmans liv var 
tilvejebringelsen af en måde, hvorpå det blev muligt at være et bæredygtigt selv i verden samt 
udholde sin egen psyke og ville sin egen fortsættelse trods utallige kriser. Hvad sidstnævnte 
udfordring angår, så antydes det uimodsigeligt af en lang række kilder, at Whitman til tider var 
smerteligt plaget af seksuel længsel, hvilket er særligt tydeligt i en håndfuld digte. Særligt 
interessant i relation til jungiansk skygge-analyse er en lille serie dybt emotionelt plagede poetiske 
passager, hvori digteren i skamfuld bekendelse af hemmelige tanker giver indtryk af, at noget 
kvasidiabolsk og kriminelt bør eksponeres og uddrives. Men til trods for dette synes Whitman at 
have besiddet nok empati (et centralt teoribegreb hos Kohut) over for sin psykes underelementer (“I 
contain multitudes”) til at etablere indre kontakt til enorme reservoirer af psykisk lindring og styrke, 
hvilket vidner om, at hans skyggeintegration lykkedes. Jeg påviser i denne kontekst, at Anne 
Gilchrist, længe før Jung præsenterede sin teori, blev opmærksom på, at en proces ikke ulig 
skyggeintegration foregik i Whitman. 
 Afhandlingen understreger, at vi kan og bør prøve at lære fra ethvert liv, der har 
konfronteret væren på åndfuld, frygtløs, fornyende vis – og triumferet trods knusede vilkår. I den 
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sammenhæng støtter afhandlingen op om det (stort set overalt ignorerede og forsømte) faktum, at 
den menneskelige psyke ikke blot er en passiv enhed under bombardement af en strøm af hårde 
verdslige indtryk og psykisk baggrundsstøj. Derimod er psyken et dynamisk interagerende og “sam-
virksomt” aspekt af vores oplevelser – hvad end den specifikke oplevelse slår os som monumental 
eller triviel. Det forekommer mig, at denne indsigt generelt kun åbenbares for de ganske få 
individer, hvis fysiske og psykiske ruin kortvarigt er en overhængende risiko, men som så på 
mirakuløs vis undslipper katastrofen med livet i behold. Jeg betragter denne oplevelse arketypisk 
som “død og genfødsel” og belyser implikationerne af alle de ovennævnte overvejelser for det (altid 
aktuelle) problem, som post-traumatisk stress udgør for talløse overlevende og kriseofre. Ganske 
vist var Whitman hverken krigsfange eller overlevende af en eller anden nærdødsoplevelse i ordets 
typiske betydning, men på trods af dette fastholder jeg, at hans liv er eksempel på den omtalte art 
modigt accepterende tålmodighed, som synes at være den eneste attitude, det er værd at manifestere 
i mødet med særligt alvorlige eksistentielle kriser; dertil kommer det temmelig unikke, at han talte 
og skrev som ingen anden om sine ture gennem “mikro-død og fornyelse”, som Jordan Peterson 
kalder det. Jeg argumenterer derfor i afhandlingen, at der er gode grunde til at studere både 
Whitmans liv og hans værker – ikke fordi de er kategorisk sammenlignelige, men fordi sidstnævnte 
– værkerne – er vokset ud af førstnævnte og havde en evident, analyserbar, bemærkelsesværdig og 
positiv effekt på førstnævnte – digterens liv. Jeg tilføjer derfor også, at det er korrekt at udvise et 
minimum af respekt for Whitmans ytrede ønske, at vi ikke betragter hans vers som et litterært 
kunststykke eller som noget, der sigter mod kunst eller æstetik. Det er en moderne antagelse blandt 
forskere, at et æstetisk værk ydes størst retfærdighed ved at blive underkastet strengt rationel og 
klinisk præcis undersøgelse, men problemet med dette er, at det er svært at blive animeret af og 
forblive resonant med den ånd, der herskede under digtets skabelse, hvis den ånd ikke kommes i 
møde og træffes på halvvejen i vores analytiske udgangspunkt. Det er i denne ånd, jeg heri forsøger 
at læse og diskutere Whitmans liv og værker. 
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E P I G R A P H I C   P E R S P E C T I V E S 
 
1. 
– All works of culture should be How X Can Change Your Life . . . 
– More importantly that’s why they wrote it. 
—Alain de Botton and Chris Hedges (respectively), 2015 interview 
 
2. 
The true question to ask respecting a book is, has it helped any human soul? 
—Walt Whitman, “Democratic Vistas” (cf. Botton and Hedges above) 
 
3. 
These are really the thoughts of all men in all ages and lands, they are not original with me, 
If they are not yours as much as mine they are nothing, or next to nothing, 
. . . 
I do not say these things for a dollar or to fill up the time while I wait for a boat, 
(It is you talking just as much as myself, I act as the tongue of you, 
Tied in your mouth, in mine it begins to be loosen’d.) 
—Walt Whitman, “Song of Myself” 
 
4. 
When I read as I ought . . . [that is] with the total commitment required of any reader . . . 
mental objects rise up from the depths of consciousness into the light of recognition. 
[Reading] implied something resembling the apperception I have of myself, the action by 
which I grasp straightway what I think as being thought by a subject (who, in this case, is 
not I). . . . I am thinking the thoughts of another. . . . By I think [them] as my very own. . . . 
My consciousness behaves as though it were the consciousness of another. 
—Georges Poulet, “Phenomenology of Reading” (cf. Whitman above) 
 
5. 
We are floating in a medium of vast extent, always drifting uncertainly, blown to and fro; 
whenever we think we have a fixed point to which we can cling and make fast, it shifts and 
leaves us behind; if we follow it, it eludes our grasp, slips away, and flees eternally before 
us. Nothing stands still for us. This is our natural state and yet the state most contrary to our 
inclinations. We burn with desire to find a firm footing, an ultimate, lasting base on which to 
build a tower rising up to infinity, but our whole foundation cracks and the earth opens up 
into the depths of the abyss. 
—Blaise Pascal, Pensées 
 
6. 
I write poems because they solve a conflict, because I am ill at ease spiritually and want to 
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clarify my thoughts and feelings. I write poems because from some inner chaos, I am driven 
to create order. I write poems because I am flooded, overpowered by feelings which have 
been provoked by some aspect of life or nature. This great bulk of feeling can only be 
subdued or brought under control if I allow some intellectual craftsmanship to work on it, to 
produce a manageable thought which I can control in the place of the all-pervading 
emotions which control me . . . Much of my poetry springs from the inner need to set 
thoughts and feelings in order and to emerge triumphant from the difficulties . . . One of the 
functions of poetry is to restore an inner balance which has temporarily been lost. 
—Molly Harrower, The Therapy of Poetry (cf. Pascal above) 
 
7. 
The universal and ever-present urge to self-transcendence is not to be abolished by 
slamming the currently popular Doors in the Wall. The only reasonable policy it to open 
other, better doors . . . [some of which] will be social and technological in nature, others 
religious or psychological . . .  
—Aldous Huxley, The Doors of Perception (cf. Pascal above) 
 
8. 
[M]an’s unease with the material world promotes a tendency towards abstraction and 
spiritual concerns. 
—Susan Rowland (on a theoretical premise from Wilhelm Worringer), Psyche and the Arts: 
Jungian Approaches to Music, Architecture, Literature, Painting and Film (cf. Huxley 
above) 
 
9. 
[To] express for all mankind what all mankind feel without the power of expressing; to live 
the comprehensive life of the Philosopher, of the Poet, broad and vigorous, all lives in 
one,—reaching up into heaven, reaching down into hell, stretching backward over all the 
Past to gather up its results, throbbing with all the vital activity of the Present, making the 
Future glorious with more than hope,—this is the aim and the mission of Walt Whitman, 
this the felicity of his life as expressed in his poems. 
 —Walt Whitman, from an anonymous review of his own Leaves of Grass (May 19, 1860) 
 
10. 
Write books only if you are going to say in them the things you would never dare confide to 
anyone. 
—Emil Cioran, The Trouble with Being Born (cf. Whitman above) 
 
11. 
That is part of the beauty of all literature. You discover that your longings are universal 
longings, that you’re not lonely and isolated from anyone. You belong. 
—F. Scott Fitzgerald (to Sheilah Graham), Beloved Infidel 
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12. 
[J]ust as all neurotic symptoms and, for that matter, dreams are capable of being ‘over-
interpreted’, and indeed need to be, if they are to be fully understood, so all genuinely 
creative writings are the product of more than a single impulse in the poet’s mind, and are 
open to more than a single interpretation. 
—Sigmund Freud, The Interpretation of Dreams 
 
13. 
Once we have the idea of alternative selves, we will have questions about the limits of 
being, about what or who we can take ourselves to be. 
—Adam Phillips, Unforbidden Pleasures (cf. Freud above) 
 
14. 
Individual existence means limited existence—limited in space and time. The existence of 
the limits makes experience possible; the fact of them makes experience unbearable. We 
have been granted the capacity for constant transcendence, as an antidote, but frequently 
reject that capacity, because using it means voluntarily exposing ourselves to the unknown. 
—Jordan Peterson, Maps of Meaning: The Architecture of Belief 
 
15. 
We always have a choice about the contents and character of our inner lives. 
—Sharon Lebell (after Epictetus’s The Enchiridion), The Art of Living 
 
16. 
The mind is its own place, and in it self 
Can make a Heav’n of Hell, a Hell of Heav’n[.] 
—John Milton, Paradise Lost (cf. Lebell [Epictetus] above) 
 
17. 
[O]ne of the profoundest philosophical mysteries[ is] the power of the individual mind to 
create its own world, not in complete independence of what is called “the objective world,” 
but in a steadily growing independence of the attitudes of the minds toward this world. For 
what people call the objective world is really a most fluid, flexible, malleable thing. . . . To 
analyse this “objective” world is all very well, as long as you don’t forget that the power to 
rebuild it by emphasis and rejection is synonymous with your being alive. . . . What we do is 
important; but it is less important than what we feel; for it is our feeling alone that is under 
the control of our will. In action we may be weak and clumsy blunderers, or on the other 
hand sometimes incompetent and sometimes competent. All this is largely beyond our 
control. What is not beyond our control is our feeling about it. 
—John Cowper Powys, Autobiography (cf. Milton above) 
 
18. 
[According to Freud,] anxiety is a signal of danger, related to the infant’s terror at its own 
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helplessness. 
A potentially strong poet is hardly helpless, and she may never receive a signal of anxiety in 
regard to the literary past; but her poems will tally them. 
—Harold Bloom, The Anatomy of Influence: Literature as a Way of Life 
  
19. 
Because we are nothing special . . . it is the work of culture to make us feel special. . . . We 
make our lives pleasurable, and therefore bearable, by picturing them as they might be. 
—Adam Phillips, Missing Out: In Praise of the Unlived Life 
 
20. 
[Reason] may be considered as mind contemplating the relations borne by one thought to 
another, however produced; and [Imagination] as mind, acting upon those thoughts so as to 
colour them with its own light, and composing from them as from elements, other thoughts, 
each containing within itself the principle of its own integrity. 
—Percy Bysshe Shelley, “A Defence of Poetry” 
 
21. 
Paul Valéry was fascinated by the influence of his own mind upon Valéry, which we can 
read through his major poems. We are neither Shakespeare nor Valéry, but all of us suffer 
the mind’s force and violence upon ourselves. 
—Harold Bloom, The Daemon Knows: Literary Greatness and the American Sublime (cf. 
Shelley above) 
22. 
[T]he dividing line between fantasy and reality is not so easily drawn. It is certainly possible 
to disappear voluntarily into the mists of delusion; to withdraw into the comforts of denial 
from a world terrible beyond what can be borne. Imagination is not always insanity, 
however; its use does not always imply regression. Imagination and fantasy allow each of us 
to deal with the unknown. . . 
—Jordan Peterson, Maps of Meaning: The Architecture of Belief (cf. Shelley above) 
 
23. 
“And what is true for the reader is a fortiori true of the poet, who learns very quickly that 
there is no singing school for his soul except the study of the monuments of its own 
magnificence.” 
—Northrop Frye, Anatomy of Criticism: Four Essays (cf. Shelley and Bloom above) 
 
24. 
“[T]here is no true expertise in the humanities without knowing all of the humanities. Art is 
a vast, ancient interconnected web-work, a fabricated tradition. Overconcentration on any 
one point is a distortion.” 
—Camille Paglia, Sex, Art, and American Culture: Essays 
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25. 
The old Delphic injunction “know thyself” now guides a great deal of scientific activity, as 
well as work in the traditional humanities. This is surely admirable, for there are no trade 
union barriers in the pursuit of knowledge. 
—Simon Blackburn, “The Seat of Knowledge: Smart and Comfortable” (cf. Paglia above) 
 
26. 
What can be said is that some terrible pain lurks behind his verse. He is, of course, the 
definitive poet of joy. But there are signs of personal trauma even in his most exuberant 
poems. 
—David S. Reynolds, Walt Whitman’s America: A Cultural Biography 
 
27. 
The pleasures of heaven are with me and the pains of hell are with me, 
The first I graft and increase upon myself, the latter I translate into a new tongue. 
—Walt Whitman, “Song of Myself” (cf. Reynolds above) 
 
28. 
Either there [are] aesthetic values, or there are only the overdetermination of race, class, and 
gender. You must choose, for if you believe that all value ascribed to poems or plays or 
novels and stories is only a mystification in the service of the ruling class, then why should 
you read at all rather than go forth to serve the desperate needs of the exploited classes? The 
idea that you benefit the insulted and injured by reading someone of their own origins rather 
than reading Shakespeare is one of the oddest illusions ever promoted . . . 
—Harold Bloom, On The Western Canon: The Books and School of the Ages 
 
29. 
Sweet are the uses of adversity; 
Which, like the toad, ugly and venomous, 
Wears yet a precious jewel in his head: 
And this our life, exempt from public haunt 
Finds tongues in trees, books in the running brooks, 
Sermons in stones, and good in every thing. 
—William Shakespeare 
 
30. 
Works of literature are places where some of our deepest sorrows find themselves reflected, 
codified, chrystallised, in a way which gives up hope and dignity and makes us feel less 
alone. 
—Alain de Botton, public talk 2016 (cf. Fitzgerald above) 
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31. 
If human life is as I have just described it then the human is tragic. This is the point of view 
I offer in this book. 
—Christopher Hamilton, A Philosophy of Tragedy 
 
32. 
Empirically, therefore, the self appears as a play of light and shadow, although conceived as 
a totality and unity in which the opposites are united. 
—Carl Jung, Psychological Types 
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Preface 
I received a personal introduction to the writings of Walt Whitman by a professor of American 
Literature, whose fondness for the poet was conveyed to me in terms I found both poignant and 
unusual, profound and strange. My teacher said that, after many years of reading and rereading the 
poet, he considered Whitman “a great companion to have”, one that he returned to “for comfort and 
companionship”. As I myself started getting an impression of the poet, I started to feel that my 
teacher’s words, in addition to being interesting and sincere, correctly identified a quality in 
Whitman that I instinctively assumed both unusual and admirable in literature. 
 Once the unique character of Whitman’s free verse began to yield to my curiosity and 
revealed the poet’s fresh thoughts and brave affirmation of the profound and difficult things in life, I 
had – to my great surprise and pleasure – a similar experience to that of my teacher. 
 John Cowper Powys called attention to the power in Whitman “of restoring us to 
courage and joy even under circumstances of aggravated gloom” and calls him “the poet of 
passionate friendship and the poet of all those exquisite evasive emotions which arise when our 
loves and our regrets are blended with the presence of Nature.”1 It is not irrelevant to this 
dissertation that my own opinion of Whitman is largely in agreement with Powys’s. Like the poet 
himself would have wanted it, I was hearing Whitman’s “chant of dilation or pride.”2 Compatible 
with Powys, the Geneva School critic Georges Poulet might have said of me that I was “a self who 
[had been] granted the experience of thinking thoughts foreign to him”, and that I was undergoing 
reading’s “remarkable transformation” which can “cause the physical objects around [a reader] to 
disappear” and enable a “rapport” with “thoughts which are . . . the cogitations of another.” 
Summing up this exciting idea, it was Poulet’s contention that when “I read as I ought . . . I am 
thinking the thoughts of another”, which “would be no cause for astonishment if I were thinking it 
as the thought of another. But I think it as my very own.”3 
 Whitman insisted that his verse be viewed not “as a literary performance, or attempt at 
                                                 
1 From John Cowper Powys, One Hundred Best Books, with Commentary and an Essay on Books and Reading, 27. 
2 From “Song of Myself”. 
3 Emphasis mine. Georges Poulet is cited in Jane P. Tompkins, ed., Reader Response Criticism: From Formalism to 
Post-Structuralism, 44. 
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such performance, or as aiming mainly toward art or ӕstheticism”.4 He also insisted that there was a 
practical distinction between generically, commonly defined poetry and “true” poetry: 
The words of the true poems give you more than poems, 
They give you to form for yourself, poems, religions, politics, war, peace, behavior, 
histories, essays, romances, and everything else, 
They balance ranks, colors, races, creeds, and the sexes, 
They do not seek beauty – they are sought.5 
And a little further on in the poem: “Whom they take, they take into space, to behold the birth of 
stars, to learn one of the meanings, / To launch off with absolute faith.” Addressing the reader 
directly (as “you”), Whitman wished that he could “spring from the pages into your arms” and 
entertained the idea of the reader’s “seeking [him]”.6 He also envisioned, wished for everyone to 
achieve, and labored at bringing about in himself a state of personal being – and a style of living 
conducive to and harmonious with it – that was “self-balanced for contingencies”, as unshakable 
under the influence of  “ridicule, accidents, rebuffs” as a tree and charged with “the feeling to-day 
or any day I am sufficient as I am.”7 He told his friend and biographer R. M. Bucke, “I have 
imagined a life which should be that of the average man in average circumstances, and still grand, 
heroic,” and insisted that the “true question to ask respecting a book” is, “Has it helped any human 
soul?”8 
 For better or worse, most Whitman critics have preferred not to address and direct 
their scholarship along these themes and values, although when reading certain scholars it is 
possible to infer a measure of personal excitement engendered by Whitman’s art. If most have erred 
on the impassive side, there are worthy exceptions; Roger Asselineau’s pioneering study The 
Evolution of Walt Whitman is one. Still, most Whitman studies do not highlight the connection 
between their personal enthusiasm and scholarly motivation for studying the poet. Although I 
personally find such prefacing both instructive and important, it is obvious that personal statements 
like that do not appear learned and sophisticated in the common technical sense. I nevertheless think 
there can be no harm in admitting to being guided by one’s involuntary responses, and I shall 
                                                 
4 From the 1889 essay “A Backward Glance O’er Travel’d Roads”. 
5 From “Song of the Answerer”. 
6 The quoted phrases in this sentence are from, respectively, “So Long!” and “Full of Life now”.   
7 From “Me Imperturbe” (twice) and “One Hour to Madness and Joy” (once). 
8 See Richard Maurice Bucke, Cosmic Consciousness: A Study in the Evolution of the Human Mind, 181. The last two 
quotes in the line are from “Democratic Vistas”, which is contained in Walt Whitman, Specimen Days and Collect, 
252. 
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suggest that Harold Bloom may be on to something profound when he calls “the individual self . . . 
the only method and the whole standard for apprehending aesthetic value.”9 He goes on to say that 
“the only pragmatic test for the canonical” is whether you think a work “worthy of rereading.” 
While I happen to consider Whitman not just “worthy of” but very nearly commanding or 
necessitating rereading, I shall keep the focus on Whitman – not me – and not mingle my arguments 
with personal introspection.10 Having said this, I must add that it is central to my underlying 
premises that there should be no stigma associated with literary scholars taking an interest in the 
relationship between literature and the health of readers’ souls, so to speak, in addition of course to 
several other issues that are properly found to warrant attention. And certainly I believe that as long 
as we strive to lead sane and moral lives, we should endorse and respect the kind of art and 
criticism that appears to be on the side of health and morality (hard though it may be to separate the 
wheat from the chaff). If there is a choice, we should care unapologetically for art which, in John 
Gardner’s words, 
seeks to hold off . . . the twilight of the gods and us, . . . that beats back the monsters . . . 
[and] builds walls against life’s leveling force [and] the ruin of . . . consciousness, . . . [that] 
asserts and reasserts those values which hold off dissolution, [that would] keep the mind 
intact . . . [including] what is necessary to humanness.”11 
I am sympathetic, then, to art which proposes to “transcend the human without forsaking 
humanism”, to borrow Bloom’s thumbnail definition of “the American Sublime”.12 And as a scholar 
I pledge my allegiance to Gardner’s brand of values in calm conviction that all human flourishing is 
finally predicated upon it. Similarly. I do not think it takes many verbal flourishes to argue 
persuasively that the healthy artist – who wills his or her own survival – had better make a decisive 
endeavor to be on the side that is “against chaos and death, against entropy.”13 
 When Ralph Waldo Emerson first read Whitman in 1855, he famously “rubbed [his] 
eyes a little” – as a man would pinch himself – before concluding, evidently a bit dazed, that “the 
solid sense of the book” was indeed “a sober reality”.14 This is the first of several personal accounts 
                                                 
9 Harold Bloom, On the Western Canon: The Books and School of the Ages, 22 
10 It is apropos that Bloom, in his most reason work, defends his “firm conviction that true criticism recognizes itself as 
a mode of memoir.” See Harold Bloom, The Daemon Knows, 49. 
11 From John Gardner, On Moral Fiction, 5–6. 
12 From Harold Bloom, The Daemon Knows: Literary Greatness and the American Sublime, 3. 
13 John Gardner, On Moral Fiction, 6. 
14 All quotations from Emerson in the current preface are from his famous 1855 letter to Whitman which is reproduced 
in full in Walt Whitman, Leaves of Grass and Other Writings, ed. by Michael Moon, 637. 
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that Leaves of Grass is capable of wielding over its readers a strange power best characterized as 
visceral – in the sense that there is potentially something super- or extra-literary about the text – 
which, as I have noted, seems to be what Whitman was consciously trying to achieve. The reaction 
of Robert Louis Stevenson is strikingly similar.15 Jan Christian Smuts, author of Walt Whiman: A 
Study in the Evolution of Personality (1895), also found that “Whitman did a great service to me in 
making me appreciate the Natural Man and freeing me from much theological or conventional 
preconceptions [sic] due to my very early pious upbringing. It was a sort of liberation . . . Sin 
ceased to dominate my view of life, and this was a great relief as I was inclined to be severely 
puritanical in all things.”16 And although public reception of his work was not unanimously 
enthusiastic, occasionally Whitman learned by mail of readers who (like a woman in Australian 
writing in 1888) found his books to be “moral tonics in their joyous healthiness and [providing] just 
the antidote that is needed to all the morbid self-analysis and sickly sentimentality of the present 
age. I never read them without feeling more strongly than ever what a beautiful sane thing human 
life is.”17 John Addington Symonds, who also corresponded with Whitman and went on to write a 
significant study on the poet, could think of only one book who had affected him more deeply than 
Leaves of Grass: the Bible.18 Mark van Doren remarks Whitman’s “Messianic nature” and adds that 
there is “still something legendary about Walt Whitman—about the man himself, and about . . . 
Leaves of Grass . . . It remains amazing, and so we look for wonders in the man. Nor is there any 
lack of them at hand.”19 
This dissertation is first and foremost my attempt to discover and discuss the full significance of 
these powerful and life-altering responses. Emerson’s response exhibits the two genres of 
evaluation I have indicated above: detached and critical versus involuntary personal. The New 
England sage saw with intellectual clarity that the contents of the book as well as the artistry of its 
execution defied casual description: “I find [in it]”, he wrote, “incomparable things said 
incomparably well, as they must be.”20 This is a crucial observation, but equally so – to me – is his 
                                                 
15 See Glenda Norquay, ed., R. L. Stevenson on Fiction: An Anthology of Literary and Critical Essays, 112. 
16 Smuts’s work on Whitman remained unpublished until 1973. The quoted words appear in W. K. Hancock, Smuts: The 
Sanguine Years, 1870–1919, 48. 
17 This particular fan letter (from one Jessie Taylor) is quoted in Walt Whitman, Intimate with Walt: Selections from 
Whitman’s Conversations with Horace Traubel 1888–1892, 178. 
18 See John Addington Symonds, Walt Whitman: A Study, 11. 
19 From the Introduction to The Portable Walt Whitman, ed. by Mark van Doren, ix. 
20 Lawrence Buell has pointed out that Emerson, by praising the work as “the most extraordinary piece of wit and 
wisdom that America has yet contributed”, seems deliberately to avoid calling it poetry. From Lawrence Buell, The 
American Transcendentalists: Essential Writings, 416. 
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personal and emotional response. It is valid and important in general to the complicated issue of our 
relationship with literature, with reading and writing. In thus lingering on the fact that Emerson 
found it incumbent on him to inform the author of Leaves of Grass that he was “very happy in 
reading it, as great power makes us happy,” I am foreshadowing that these – and related aesthetic 
merits and psychological benefits – will be among the leitmotifs of this dissertation.21 
 
 
PART 1 • THEORETICAL FOUNDATIONS 
Theoretical Perspectives on Crisis, Writing, Self and Transcendence 
Chapter 1. “The true questions to ask respecting a book is, 
has it helped any human soul?”: On the Reasonableness of 
Expecting Literature to Be Therapeutic 
Chapter summary: This dissertation seeks to uncover and discuss the potentials for 
literature – extending to and not excluding a normal person’s private experiments with the 
written word – to serve as an aid to discovering and understanding our subjective 
experiences. But more than that, the dissertation reflects my interest in literature’s 
usefulness as a tool with which to address and bring healing to psychic pain and reduce 
existential suffering. It thus deals, essentially and throughout, with the themes of human 
“survival” as well as “flourishing”, which I consider (in the tradition of the twentieth-century 
existentialists) to be two not categorically distinct states of being; it is my view then that 
survival differs from flourishing in degree, not in kind.22 I should add that my use of the 
                                                 
21 The phrase is Emerson’s. From Walt Whitman, Leaves of Grass and Other Writings, ed. by Michael Moon, 637. 
22 In other words, a flourishing person is technically speaking a person particularly apt at surviving. 
 Despite my affinity for certain twentieth-century existentialists, I have found Blaise Pascal’s account of 
human perception from the seventeenth century very useful as well. Compatible with what I have argued above, 
Pascal sums it up thus: “Qualities carried to excess are bad for us”, then offers this elaboration: “Our senses can 
perceive [and tolerate, let me add] nothing extreme; too much noise deafens us, too much light dazzles; when we are 
too far or too close we cannot see properly . . . too much pleasure causes discomfort; too much harmony in music is 
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word “survival” just now acknowledges the word’s broadest sense; therefore, were I to 
elaborate on how I am going to conceptualize it in discourse, I should emphasize psychic 
coping, the soothing of anxiety and the procurement and maintenance of sustainable non-
traumatic states. (Informally, survival is thus imagined to be the result of a robust aptitude 
for what one might call “psychic homeostasis”; I shall not be engaged with other – more 
physical and visually evident – modes of eluding fatality and enabling thriving.). Literature, 
then, is approached as a potential countervailing force – or activity, or method, if you like – 
to the individual whose situation is unbearable because of pain, anxiety or trauma, and for 
whom no external mitigation is forthcoming or foreseeable. In much of life – perhaps 
necessarily so – our psychological pangs are ignored or go unnoticed (often, Freud 
thought, due to repression of consciousness about the real roots of the discomfort); 
frequently, too, our attention is simply diverted away from it as a consequence of common 
distractions and life’s inherent flux and transience. We may later look back on such 
occurrences and utter the platitude “Time heals all wounds”. But that strikes me as the 
attitude of a person who has not yet learned quite as much about his or her psychic nature 
and emotional life as it is in general afforded human beings to learn. It is true that we often 
survive without having to consciously learn anything profound about ourselves. In relatively 
innocuous cases of suffering (when some threat, illness or enemy alters its, or his, 
destructive course before we are spoken for), it will often be sufficiently consoling to our 
aching psyche to be graciously sheltered in the sympathy of a loved one, parent or friend. 
Human consolation and solace might truly be the swiftest mood stabilizer commonly 
available. Sadly, however, human sympathy, let alone love, cannot be counted on to be 
extended automatically or in desired form every time we collide bruisingly with reality. 
Insofar as literature really has a positive (potential) role to play in making our psychological 
                                                 
displeasing; too much kindness annoys us. . .” Conversely, as will be seen, I am here saying: Human flourishing may 
occur insofar as there is an ability to withstand, negotiate, countervail or neutralize – in short, survive – threats, 
adversity and all “qualities carried to excess”. 
 Very appropriately, Pascal’s precis of human perception is offered in the context of his summary of the 
human condition with its inherent sources of good and ill. It is featured among my epigraphic perspectives (no. 5), 
and I shall silently take it for granted as a fundamental starting point in the following chapters. 
 Another reason why the theme of “flourishing”, for which survival is (obviously) a crucial 
precondition, will be secondary in rank to survival is that this thesis is concerned with crises, danger and “life gone 
wrong”, and although flourishing represents a fine ideal towards which the desperate individual – any individual – 
may well decide to strive, his first concern is naturally mere survival. (It might be remarked en passant that 
eudaimonia as a theoretical concept, which signifies “flourishing” in Greek, entered the Western canon – with Plato 
and Aristotle – very nearly at the same time that literary criticism as an intellectual discipline did – with Aristotle’s 
Poetics.) This note features words from Blaise Pascal, Pensées, 63. 
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vicissitudes easier to endure and less frustratingly mystifying, a dissertation devoted to 
systematically conceptualizing the process in principle and exploring it in practice is, in 
Simon Blackburn’s words, “unlikely to do us any harm”.23 
* * * 
One’s life is not always the thing it is supposed to be—has its periods and periods—dark, light, 
dark again—spots, errors, damned foolishnesses. 
—Walt Whitman, With Walt Whitman in Camden, vol. 6 
 
i. The Existential Hum and the Dream of Analgesics 
Beneath the surface of Horatio Dresser’s observation that “Life is a problem which has for each an 
individual solution” lies the recognition that it is no straightforward matter to master and excel at 
life or recommend a certain methodology or existential attitude to a human being who has resolved 
to learn to live well.24 The Delphic injunction “Know thyself” (identifying a prerequisite bit of 
psychoemotional, existential “homework” which, if shirked, a person would have little hope of 
excelling at life) also implicitly suggests that no one Weltanschauung can profitably be taught to 
everyone with equally great results. With such axiomatic caveats – with the recognition, for 
instance, of the dizzying multiplicity of unknowns and variables determining any individual’s life – 
begins the history of Western philosophy – in a manner of speaking. Aristotle usefully put it thus: 
For to some people happiness [the technical term is eudaimonia: “living well and doing 
well”] seems to be virtue; to others prudence; to others some sort of wisdom; to others again 
it seems to be these, or one of these, involving pleasure or requiring it to be added; others 
add in external prosperity as well. . . . It is reasonable for each group not to be completely 
wrong, but to be correct on one point at least, or even on most points.25 
More than two millennia later, the West is still hotly debating from whom the “answers” to the 
problems that life so stubbornly represents are to come (the natural sciences are frequently pitted 
against the humanities in that kind of debate – or against the theologians and mystics).26 Evidently, 
the burden of existence (the “existential hum”, in Kurt Vonnegut’s phrase) still drives human beings 
                                                 
23 Blackburn’s words are from Simon Blackburn, Mirror, Mirror: The Uses and Abuses of Self-Love, 190. 
24 Horatio W. Dresser, The Power of Silence: An Interpretation of Life in its Relation to Health and Happiness, 10. 
25 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 10. 
26 This is Blackburn’s point in Simon Blackburn, “The Seat of Knowledge: Smart and Comfortable”. 
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to belief or nihilism, substance abuse or self-help, quietism or company, contemplation or action or 
distraction.27 
 Although it has in the twentieth century become quaintly unfashionable for scholars in 
the humanities to busy themselves with defining and examining “philosophies of life” or 
speculating about such possibly ill-defined and nonintellectual concerns as “the meaning of life”, it 
has in fact not even been 150 years since Matthew Arnold declared that great poetry (which is still 
being studied) was inseparable from the issue of “How to live”.28 It has been even less time since D. 
H. Lawrence argued that art, “always ahead of the “times”,” can “reveal the relation between man 
and his circumambient universe, at the living moment.” But of course, Arnold and Lawrence were 
not exactly academics. Leonard Cohen has remarked that the world is generally “hostile to the 
writer, the world is hostile to the poet, the world is hostile to any man who will hold up a mirror to 
the particular kind of mindless chaos in which we endure” – and surely an accurate and honest 
engagement with the chaotic aspect of reality is unavoidable and essential to the issue of how to 
live.29 So why the disconnect? 
 Although I just a moment ago declared this a trend or situation obtaining 
predominantly in the twentieth and twenty-first century, let me note that the diagnosis predates the 
current era considerably. Montaigne was to my knowledge the first to put academics’ biases on 
behalf of technicality and sterile detail under critical scrutiny – and call them out for neglecting 
“virtue” in an effort to appear “learned”. Whateer the situation in 16th-century France, his useful 
diagnosis is worth quoting as this dissertation is predicated on my personal sense that it is quite 
pertinent and timely still: 
I gladly come back to the theme of the absurdity of our education: its end has not been to 
make us good and wise but learned. And it has succeeded. It has not taught us to seek virtue 
and to embrace wisdom: it has impressed upon us their derivation and their etymology. We 
know how to decline the Latin word for virtue: we do not know how to love virtue. Though 
we do not know what wisdom is in practice or from experience we do know the jargon off 
my heart. . . . A good education changes a boy’s judgement and morals . . .30 
                                                 
27 Vonnegut uses the phrase “existential hum” in Palm Sunday, in Kurt Vonnegut, Welcome To The Monkey House and 
Palm Sunday: An Autobiographical Collage, 497. Also, see the epigraphic words by Aldous Huxley (no. 7). 
28 To be fair, some academic scholars take on the issue – but very occasionally. Examples include Peter Singer 
(Practical Ethics, chapter 12), Shelly Kagan (Death, chapter 14) and Simon Blackburn (Being Good, chapter 17). 
29 The Cohen quote is from Leonard Cohen, “Leonard Cohen in 1964 – On being a Jewish writer, a Canadian and a 
seeker of G-d” [4:55]. 
30 Michel de Montaigne, “On Presumption”, The Complete Essays, ed. by M. A. Screech, 749–750. 
 H. D. Thoreau shared the concern that the aim, emphases and tendencies of academic scholarship were 
not infallible, adding (rather mysteriously) that “It is only when we forget all our learning that we begin to know”. In 
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Whitman, about whom this dissertation is after all about, wrote a poem intriguingly entitled “Long I 
thought that knowledge alone would suffice me”; and I feel sure he would agree with Montaigne 
and Thoreau (in footnote 30). He copied the following sentiment from Thomas Henry Huxley into 
the “common-place book” whose quotations he “absorb’d over and over again” – and later 
reproduced in Specimen Days and Collect: 
I myself agree with the sentiment of Thomas Hobbes . . . that “the scope of all speculation is 
the performance of some action or thing to be done.” I have not any great respect for, or 
interest in, mere “knowing,” as such.31 
On the same issue – that is, on the issue of which questions are more essential and critical and which 
theories for talking about them more appropriate – the psychologist Jordan Peterson appears loyal to 
a (in this context perhaps similarly unusual) intellectual position, namely that which takes seriously 
and follows to its logical conclusion the fact that because conscious “being” on this planet is a 
phenomenon that spans millions of years, it greatly antedates our modern allegiance to post-
Enlightenment “rationality” and conceptions of “truth”. In his elucidation of the mode of survival 
characterizing these vast stretches of time (evolutionary history), Peterson offers – usefully for me – 
what doubles as a thumbnail precis of the nature and usefulness of the arguments central to this 
thesis. His claim is that embodied biological being is generally sustainable over time when it is 
rooted in conscious, centralized being and responds dynamically to the constant need to “understand 
itself in the world [and] to figure out how to act in the world.” He continues: 
And I would say: That’s our fundamental problem. Our fundamental problem is not: What 
are things made of? (although I’m not saying that’s not a problem: it’s a problem 
[“discussable”, in Rick’s terminology, see footnote 30], but it’s not the fundamental 
problem.) The fundamental problem is: What to do about what things are made of? Where to 
                                                 
the best romantic form, he lamented too that “There are nowadays professors of philosophy, but not philosophers. . . 
. To be a philosopher is . . . to solve some of the problems of life, not only theoretically, but practically.” The 
parallelism with Montaigne’s distinction between knowing how, for instance, to decline the Latin word for virtue 
without knowing how to love virtue should be obvious. The first quote is from The Quotable Thoreau, ed. by Jeffery 
S. Cramer, 77; for the second, see H. D. Thoreau, Walden, 19. 
 Similarly, Christopher Ricks has overtly implied that the things critics tend to write about are not the 
most important ones: “[T]he critic must resist . . . the temptation to write as if the discussable things were the most 
important ones.” See Christopher Ricks, Poems and Critics: An Anthology of Poetry and Criticism from 
Shakespeare to Hardy, 12. 
31 Walt Whitman, Specimen Days and Collect, 185. Being personally acquainted and united in Emersonian orientations, 
I am also confident that he shared with Thoreau a desire “to explore the fundamental facts of existence in order to be 
able to recognize the real, the eternal truth and substance underlying all existence, as distinct from the actual, the 
distracting and sometimes misdirecting commontion that prevents our paying attention. The task he set himself was 
to find the reality that transcended his day-to-day experiences.” From Jeffrey S. Cramer’s annotations to Henry 
David Thoreau, I to Myself: An Annotated Selection from the Journal of Henry D. Thoreau, xviii. 
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go? [These are existential questions and of the same nature as] What’s the meaning of your 
life? What’s the purpose of your life? We shouldn’t be using materialist theories to address 
such questions – but we do, and it has cost us a lot.32 
To what degree the indicated ebb or decay in academic enthusiasm for these timeless and largely 
unanswerable (we might say sublime) problems of being – as well as the apparently attendant ebb in 
public support for thought to the detriment of support for scientific research – is due to obvious 
economic reasons I cannot settle; but it obviously stands to reason that it is easier to monetize and 
commercialize something that either makes or fixes a visible dent in the world’s physical surfaces 
than something that redresses the world’s more subtle problems – its moral, intellectual or psychic 
crises (in part because the latter are by far more difficult to measure). 
 In the wake of general indifference among academicians for assisting the public in 
their attempts to look after the well-being of their soul, it seems that a broad swathe of more or less 
doubtful coaches, gurus, media personalities and self-help authors have found ways to cater to the 
kind of appetite I have described – for evidently the interest among the public has not really waned, 
whether it is in vogue to avow it or not. Of course, so-called “self-help literature” predates the 
printing press and the Enlightenment, which is a kind of testimony to the observation of the alleged 
timelessness of the indicated issues: Marcus Aurelius’s Meditations is a classic example and has 
never been out of print. A much more recent example – though it predates D. H. Lawrence – is 
William Edward Hartpole Lecky’s interesting The Map of Life: Conduct and Character in which 
three “great guiding landmarks of a wise life” are straightforwardly identified: “to do our duty—to 
avoid useless sorrow—to acquiesce in the inevitable.”33 Whether such rather dogmatic injunctions 
                                                 
32 From Jordan Peterson, “2015 Maps of Meaning Lecture 02: Object and Meaning (Part 1)” [45:00]. 
 Jordan Peterson has said that one of the problems with approaching something purely academically is 
that (a) “thinking is a tool and “being” is something that supersedes any tool”, adding elsewhere that (b) “Wisdom 
[is] what the humanities is supposed to teach us, [and] wisdom is what enables you to deal honorably with the 
tragedy of life.” From (a) Jordan Peterson, “The Necessity of Virtue – Jordan B. Peterson” and (b) Jordan Peterson, 
“Biblical Series II: Genesis 1: Chaos & Order” [1:21:05]. 
 This might be an appropriate point to remark that although each person is necessarily very intimately 
familiar with seeing the world from the viewpoint of a body and viewing themselves as a “self”, I am going to 
consider the phenomenal fact of the self sublime. By that I essentially mean that (like sublime events in general) it 
eludes absolute rigorous description and poses its own distinct challenges to human flourishing. (The fact that there 
has been no decline in the torrent of arguments – from philosophers, theologians and mystics – supposedly 
establishing exactly when a self comes into being, when it goes out of being and what it is in the meantime should at 
the very least bear out my claim that the self is no trivially comprehended entity (or concept, event, phenomenon). 
Merely indicating the breadth of the literature on being, eschatology, philosophy of mind, and other centrally 
relevant associated disciplines of thought would be beyond what the scope of this dissertation permits.) 
33  W. E. H. Lecky, The Map of Life: Conduct and Character, 353. 
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can heal the ineluctable anguish associated with the human condition – or whether subtler, 
profounder works are indicated – I shall be considering in these chapters. 
ii. Grim Reality and Higher Consciousness 
Let me revisit my determination to address the age-old embarrassment and secrecy surrounding 
existential suffering in scholarly form and fashion. Taking a leaf out of Harold Bloom’s On The 
Western Canon, then (see epigraphic perspective 28), this dissertation declines to add to recent 
attempts to harness culture for politicized and sociological concerns (however apparently 
admirable), and is compelled to side instead with the psychoanalysts as well as certain 
contemporary thinkers (e.g. the philosophers Christopher Hamilton, Simon May and Shelley Kagan 
and the psychologist Jordan Peterson). It submits that the earth’s current population is to all intents 
and purposes, on average, every bit as desperate, agonized and traumatized as previous generations. 
Peterson says: “People suffer more than they have to because [they] profoundly misunderstand what 
is real. We’re blinded to what is truly fundamental by the things that present themselves most easily 
to our perception.”34 As a consequence of ineluctable suffering across the human race, then, it 
seems plausible that one is actually doing people a favor by constructing and defending the 
argument that there is more than one way of conceptualizing reality. In other words, it might be that 
most people have adopted and internalized an unnecessarily punishing view of how things are 
interrelated, and of what they amount to as individual persons. It might be, for starters, that we 
would all take heart from and find reassurance in the news that it is possible to think of art and 
culture as domains and artefacts of psychological and personal utility (i.e. characterized by the 
potential for personal transformation), quite beyond and separate from our culture’s wonted 
appropriation of the aesthetic for political, decorous and mildly hedonistic functions. I would 
commend such a position for the simple reason that I consider it the healthiest one. 
 And conversely, it is my view that to assume art particularly well-adapted to 
addressing and redressing issues of political and social injustice – rather than a realm or conduit via 
which one may grapple honestly with psychological, existential, philosophical, even essentially 
religious mysteries – is to manifest a prosaic and diminished attitude to the frequent profundity and 
inevitability of great works of art. Steeping our hearts and intellects in great works of art (as 
opposed to privileging more mechanical, gross, appetitive and unthinking forms of human activity) 
                                                 
34 From Jordan Peterson, “TEDxToronto – Dr. Jordan B. Peterson—Redefining Reality” [2:15]. 
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is to me as obviously valuable as it is intuitively preferable and high-minded to “gaze at the stars” 
when one is plunged in some miserable gutter (to reference Oscar Wilde’s famous quote). We have 
had a century of nihilism, genocide, catastrophe and disillusion; yet here we are in the West, 
comfortable, warm, educated, safe and free. The fact that we do not suffer inordinately is an 
unspeakable miracle from a historical perspective, and we ignore the significance thereof at our 
peril. In William James’s words, “Our civilization is founded on the shambles, and every individual 
existence goes out in a lonely spasm of helpless agony”; therefore, recognizing that we have the 
opportunity to nourish sides of ourselves that transcend the worldly domain, we really have no 
choice but to seize that opportunity with gratitude. 
 As a pacifistic human enterprise, art is in a different existential category from 
conventional modes of intervention on behalf of those who suffer. R. L. Stevenson wished to thank 
Whitman – and other poets have inspired equal and similarly articulated gratitude in their readers – 
for shattering the “cobwebs of genteel and ethical illusion”, shaking the “tabernacle of lies” and in 
practical terms defining a “strong foundation of all the original and manly virtues”. That is clearly 
no small service. The arts should be valued and listened to for what they invite us to do with them 
and thereby with ourselves; to decline to take them seriously for extending that opportunity is, in 
my opinion, to manifest an inappropriate level of ingratitude and a lack of engagement with the 
mystery of being, and it is therefore no way to recognize and repay the strange and complex causes 
that have placed us here to speak and think freely. It seems to me that only by confronting the 
mystery of being squarely and with all the intuition, courage and principle of our intellects (and by 
extension our speech), can we hope to transcend a cattlelike mode of being to one that finds us 
worthy of our ineluctable suffering.35 These words of mine are, I suppose, one way of restating and 
acknowledging my agreement with the, I think, eternally valid Delphic injunction (see epigraphic 
perspective 25). Whether they knew it or not, certain artists have been guided by its directive, as 
have certain mystics although to my thinking there is not anything intangible or mysterious about 
what I am describing. 
 If the attitude to being that I have traced above may be emblematized as the discovery 
of the Wells-ean “green door in the wall” (cf. epigraphic perspective 7), then Whitman has struck 
many readers as a poet who drew and offered maps to that door, so to speak.36 Let me entertain that 
                                                 
35 Fyodor Dostoevsky said, “There is only one thing that I dread: not to be worthy of my sufferings.” From Viktor 
Frankl, Man’s Search for Meaning, 66. 
36 To stay with the metaphor, Whitman wrote: “I often think the Leaves themselves are much the same sort of thing [as 
his American Primer]: a passage way to something rather than a thing in itself concluded: not the best that might be 
done but the best it is necessary to do for the present, to break the ground” (emphasis mine). Horace Traubel cites 
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metaphor throughout this paragraph. The analogy with a bona fide religious awakening has of 
course frequently been made.37 However, although William James has identified “expression[s] of . 
. . mystical experience” in Whitman’s poetry we do not need to proceed by ineffable terms and 
mysterious premises in order to present a provisional answer to this question: What can we 
comprehensively pronounce about the nature of the attitudes and values that lie beyond the “door” 
(the discovery of and access to which were arguably essential to Whitman’s survival and happiness 
– and could be to ours)?38 Unfashionable though it may make me appear (but heartened by Harold 
Bloom’s view that “there is no critical method except yourself”), I maintain that careful 
consideration of the insights on ordinary life and higher consciousness below – and careful 
reflection on how badly they have been comprehended in our frantic, official Western world – 
should convince most people that the surest way of limiting existential unhappiness might be 
psychological in nature. Properly understood – which is to say, understood beyond an average 
willingness to pay mechanical lip-service to the idea – it is unfortunately a culturally unorthodox 
view that we are the playthings (the reapers of the consequences) of our own mental health and 
mental powers to a greater degree than of external, measurable and manipulatable factors. Henry 
Miller was not surprised that the view I describe is so skeptically received: In his view people are 
by nature, inexorably, “busybodies [who] do not know how to swim on the river of life [but] prefer 
a sort of senseless insect activity” to the deeper meaning that is the often the hard-won reward of 
contemplation and art.39 If works of art – in this case Whitman’s poems – have so much as the 
faintest potential for putting us on the road to what is being outlined below (for “sensitizing” us to 
its insights; see footnote 101), then we need a good argument for choosing not to think about art’s 
potential in that way. Here – almost in full though not quite – are the insights that need to be 
carefully considered: 
Ordinary life rewards practical, unintrospective, self-justifying outlooks that are the 
hallmarks of what we could call ‘lower’ consciousness. Neuroscientists speak of a ‘lower’ 
part of the brain they term the reptilian mind and tell us that under its sway, we strike back 
when we’re hit, blame others, quell any stray questions that lack immediate relevance, fail to 
free-associate and stick closely to a flattering image of who we are and where we are 
heading. 
                                                 
Whitman thus in his foreword to Walt Whitman, An American Primer by Walt Whitman: With Facsimiles of the 
Original Manuscript, ed. by Horace Traubel, vii. 
37 Edwin Haviland Miller records that a fanatic “slogan” about Whitman was in circulation in the 1860s: “There are 
three great men in history, Jesus, Buddha, and Walt Whitman, and the greatest of these is—Walt Whitman.” From 
Walt Whitman, Selected Letters of Walt Whitman, ed. by Edwin Haviland Miller, 119. 
38 For James’s thoughts on Whitman and mysticism, see William James, The Varieties of Religious Experience, 342. 
39 From Henry Miller, My Life and Times, 37. 
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However, at rare moments, when there are no threats or demands upon us, perhaps 
late at night or early in the morning, when our bodies and passions are comfortable and 
quiescent, we have the privilege of being able to access the higher mind – what 
neuroscientists call our neocortex, the seat of imagination, empathy and impartial 
judgement. We loosen our hold on our own egos and ascend to a less biased and more 
universal perspective, casting off a little of the customary anxious self-justification and 
brittle pride. 
 In such states, the mind moves beyond its particular self-interests and cravings. We 
start to think of other people in a more imaginative way. Rather than criticise and attack, we 
are free to imagine that their behaviour is driven by pressures derived from their own more 
primitive minds, which they are generally in no position to tell us about. Their temper or 
viciousness are, we now see, symptoms of hurt rather than of ‘evil’. 
It’s an astonishing gradual evolution to develop the ability to explain others’ actions 
by their distress, rather than simply in terms of how it affects us. We perceive that the 
appropriate response to humanity is not fear, cynicism or aggression, but always – when we 
can manage it – love. 
At such moments, the world reveals itself as quite different: a place of suffering and 
misguided effort, full of people striving to be heard and lashing out against others, but also a 
place of tenderness and longing, beauty and touching vulnerability. The fitting response is 
universal sympathy and kindness. 
One’s own life feels less precious; one can contemplate being no longer present with 
tranquility. One’s interests are put aside and one may imaginatively fuse with transient or 
natural things: trees, the wind, a moth, clouds or waves breaking on the shore. From this 
point of view, status is nothing, possessions don’t matter, grievances lose their urgency. If 
certain people could encounter us at this point, they might be amazed at our transformation 
and at our newfound generosity and empathy.40 
iii. Of What Exactly May Whitman Remind Us? 
[41] In Whitman’s best poems the poet seems to bask in an existential attitude much like the one laid 
out above. He seems to have achieved it more or less by his own will and determination, and since 
news of an achievement of that nature first reached me I have been impressed and heartened by the 
promise – on behalf of the entire human race – and existential profundity indicated by its 
possibility. I have brought in a quote by Susan Rowland (see epigraphic perspective 8), but shall 
throughout use the word “spiritual” hesitantly, not casually, for it is notoriously hard to be scholarly 
about whatever it denotes. Fortunately, what I am trying to parse out has been considered by other 
Whitman scholars, including his biographer Justin Kaplan who, when asked if Leaves of Grass 
                                                 
40 This essay (from which I have omitted a few paragraphs) is entitled “On Higher Consciousness”. From Alain de 
Botton, “On Higher Consciousness”, in The Book of Life (online essay collection). 
41 Whitman wrote this to Emerson in 1856: “In poems or in speeches I say the word or two that has got to be said, 
adhere to the body, step with the countless common footsteps, and remind every man and woman of something” 
(emphasis added). From Walt Whitman, Leaves of Grass, ed. by Michael Moon, 638. 
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“primarily contain[s] a spiritual message”, replied: “Yes. Very definitely. Not in any doctrinal way. 
But a spirit. And you can’t pin spirit down.”42 I return to these themes under the rubric of saintliness 
in chapter 3. 
 As evidenced by my Preface, I have been very intrigued by other readers’ responses to 
Whitman. Some of them anticipate what de Botton more carefully develops in his piece on “higher 
consciousness”. The positive implications for survival (due to enhanced psychic endurance and 
personal immovability) as a direct consequence of attaining such a state – and despite the facts of 
life’s crises and traumas – seem to me obvious. As a minimum, then, a dissertation dedicated to 
art’s role as handmaiden of psychic renovation, renewal, healing and construction of self must at 
least register (if not explicate) the potential for occasionally bringing about such psychic states, 
such modes of existence. Curiously, de Botton’s psycho-attitudinal description of “higher 
consciousness” corresponds closely with a portrait of Whitman penned by his friend and biographer 
Richard Maurice Bucke. The portrait appeared in Bucke’s Cosmic Consciousness (1901): 
His favorite occupation . . . seemed to be strolling or sauntering about outdoors by himself, 
looking at the grass, the trees, the flowers, the vistas or light, the varying aspects of the sky, 
and listening to the birds, the crickets, the tree frogs, and all the hundreds of natural sounds. 
It was evident that these things gave him a pleasure far beyond what they give to ordinary 
people. Until I knew the man . . . it had not occurred to me that any one could derive so 
much absolute happiness from these things as he did. He was very fond of flowers, either 
wild or cultivated; liked all sorts. I think he admired lilacs and sunflowers just as much as 
roses. Perhaps, indeed, no man who ever lived liked to many things and disliked so few as 
Walt Whitman. All natural objects seemed to have a charm for him. All sights and sounds 
seemed to please him. He appeared to like (and I believe he did like) all the men, women, 
and children he saw (though I never knew him to say that he liked any one), but each who 
knew him felt that he liked him or her, and that he liked others also. I never knew him to 
argue or dispute, and he never spoke about money. He always justified, sometimes playfully, 
sometimes quite seriously, those who spoke harshly of himself or his writings, and I often 
thought he even took pleasure in the opposition of enemies. When I first knew [him], I used 
to think that he watched himself, and would not allow his tongue to give expression to 
fretfulness, antipathy, complaint, and remonstrance. It did not occur to me as possible that 
these mental states could be absent in him. After long observation, however, I satisfied 
myself that such absence or unconsciousness was entirely real. He never spoke 
deprecatingly of any nationality or class of men, or time in the world’s history, or against 
any trades or occupations—not even against any animals, insects, or inanimate things, nor 
any of the laws of nature, nor any of the results of those laws, such as illness, deformity, and 
death. He never complained or grumbled either at the weather, pain, illness, or anything else. 
                                                 
42 From Justin Kaplan and Rob Couteau, “ ‘The Mystery of the Man’: Justin Kaplan Talks About America’s Greatest 
Poet”. See footnote 558 where Horace Traubel mentions a “movement of the spirit.” 
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He never swore. He could not very well, since he never spoke in anger and apparently never 
was angry. He never exhibited fear, and I do not believe he ever felt it.43 
If even a fraction of this portrait is to be trusted (and who can say that it is? – but it might be) that at 
least raises the possibility (whether we are Whitman readers or not) that what we take for granted in 
general about the possibilities of the human psyche falls pitifully short of the actual psychic 
potentiality. 
iv. Self-balanced for Contingencies 
Although I shall return later to this point, it seems appropriate here to add that what Whitman (in 
Democratic Vistas) deemed his country sorely needed was works enabling each person to “confront 
Nature, and confront time and space, both with science, and con amore, and take his right place, 
prepared for life, master of fortune and misfortune.” 
 This mode of confrontation, I argue, is what he so nicely sums up in the phrase “self-
balanced for contingencies” (from the poem “Me Imperturbe”). If we are inclined to take at face 
value the poet’s own statement about his work (again from Democratic Vistas), then Leaves of 
Grass contains “a basic model or portrait of personality for general use” and aims to be the literary 
distillation of “a new breath of life” that will serve to accomplish “what neither the schools nor the 
churches and their clergy have hitherto accomplish’d, and without which this nation will no more 
stand, permanently, soundly, than a house will stand without a substratum”, namely the nurture and 
raising of “a religious and moral character beneath the political and productive and intellectual 
bases of the States” (footnote 44). 
 At the end of his life, Whitman told Horace Traubel that he had tried in his words “to 
leave men healthy, to fill them with a new atmosphere.” Although I am going to try to avoid the 
word “religious”, which can introduce unnecessary confusion, Whitman himself, we notice, does 
not shun it, although I doubt he wishes to imply numinous overtones in a formally metaphysical 
sense). In a context related to the secular appropriation of terms with a prominent religious history, I 
find it fascinating that the words “health”, “heal”, “hale”, “whole” and “holy” are all related 
etymologically.44 
                                                 
43  I cite from James’s Varieties of Religious Experience, which includes Bucke’s portrait. William James, The Varieties 
of Religious Experience, 83. 
44 The “leave men healthy” quote is from With Walt Whitman in Camden and is spoken on October 9, 1890. See Walt 
Whitman, Intimate with Walt: Selections from Whitman’s Conversations with Horace Traubel 1888–1892, 82. All 
the other quotes above (in section iv) derive from Democratic Vistas. I have verified the etymology at 
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 It is interesting too to find that Whitman was aware of the above-mentioned 
etymological relations. In William Swinton’s Rambles Among Words from 1859, to which several 
biographers believe Whitman contributed at least two chapters, we find this passage: 
The word ‘HEALTH’ wraps up within it—for, indeed, it is hardly a metaphor—a 
whole world of suggestion. It is that which healeth or causeth to be whole—what the 
Scotch call hale: that is, perfect ‘health’ is that state of the man when there is no 
discord or division in the system, but when all the functions conspire to make a perfect 
one or whole.”45 
v. The Cure of Poetry in an Age of Prose 
I have offered these views in defense of poetry and on behalf of art and aesthetic engagement 
because it is my sense that it has been tacitly established that art and aesthetic creations could not 
possibly offer nourishing correctives for our souls, could not possibly delight, comfort, ground or 
stimulate us in ways or to degrees worth taking seriously. The very word “soul” – or, more 
precisely, the act of defending its metaphoric utility rather than speaking of “psychological health” 
or refer learnedly to areas of the brain (see Adam Phillips in footnote 199) – seems these days 
enough to set levelheaded thinkers’ teeth on edge. The idea that there is something immature and 
childish – something hopelessly “romantic” – about that kind of language seems to pervade 
discourse and culture in the West, perhaps beyond the West as well. When it comes to psychic 
health, the majority of people seem to find it conducive and appropriate to affirm what appears to be 
the culture’s tacit consensus about the best way to health and happiness. Unfortunately that seems to 
involve an occasionally desensitizing sybaritic combination of fun, bliss, notoriety, recognition, 
socioeconomic status, correctives for aging, hedonistic distractions and palliative comforts, in short, 
a diet of luxury and convenience bordering on the decadent and summed up rather well by the old 
phrase “bread and circuses”.46 Seldom does one hear advertised the value of wisdom, reflection, 
self-mastery, perseverance, discipline or accurate Delphic self-knowledge. So, in a way, I feel 
moved to argue (with Angus Fletcher) that if we wish to elude the “the slavery of pleasure” (and it 
goes without question that we should), then we must cultivate an unillusioned (not naïve and 
                                                 
www.etymonline.com.  
45 From Zachary Turpin’s Introduction to Walt Whitman’s “Manly Health and Training”,” Walt Whitman Quarterly 
Review 33 (2016), 166. 
46 “Bread” conveniently doubles as a slang synonym for money. The following titles are recent texts that diagnose and 
explore the implications of the tendencies I have sketched: Affluenza (John de Graaf), Stuffocation (James Wallman), 
Status Anxiety (Alain de Botton), The Antidote (Oliver Burkeman) and Against Happiness (Eric G. Wilson). 
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“precious”) interest in the sublime.47 
 While “bread and circuses” are ineffective defenses against the real threats 
collectively faced by the human race, works of culture seem excellently suited for presenting the 
truth we dread most – including the fact of our mortality and vulnerability – without leaving us 
terrified. In a paper addressing the works of Merleau-Ponty, Husserl and Stendhal, Rudolf Bernet 
has argued that by virtue of “chang[ing] the common use of language”, “writing and reading . . . 
operate a transformation of human existence.” They may do this by “teach[ing] us more about the 
meaning of our real life than can be gotten from familiarity with its factual events”. Bernet adds that 
potentially “literature not only sublimates our lives, but also transforms our understanding of truth–
insofar as it is related to human existence. The true meaning of our lives involves possibilities as 
much as facts, imagination as much as actual experiences.” Taking Stendhal as his example, he 
suggests that the author (any author, but in this instance Stendhal) “transforms and sublimates his 
own life by means of his writing”, which in Merleau-Pontyean terms means that “writing allows for 
a more authentic mode of existence, characterized by self-transcendence and openness to new 
possibilities.”48 
 Perhaps an insistence on the need to face up – in some fashion – to the dark 
undeniable facts determining human life is likely to strike an emotional chord primarily with 
pessimistically-inclined realists. One can imagine that the naïve and presently comfortable might 
find such views alarming and reject them out of hand as morbid or “defeatist”. Yet I maintain that 
all friends of wisdom should be sympathetic to confronting the basic existential facts with 
seriousness (not untampered melancholy). In the case of poetry, I return to this noble function via 
Mary Kinzie’s The Cure of Poetry in an Age of Prose: Moral Essays on the Poet’s Calling (see 
footnote 128). This is important because when I look at the roster of blisses and comforts above – 
recommended for the nourishment of the modern soul – the feeling that we are playing a gigantic 
trick on ourselves, in fact collectively immersing ourselves in an existential delusion, is inescapable 
                                                 
47 The quote from Angus Fletcher’s Allegory: The Theory of a Symbolic Mode is given in Ralph Cohen, Studies in 
Eighteenth-century British Art and Aesthetics, 198. 
 The cultural portrait I offer in this paragraph would have worried Nietzsche too; he worried about and 
raged against “the religions of comfortableness”, which he thought had a claim on people who “experience suffering 
and displeasure as evil, hateful, worthy of annihilation, and as a defect of existence.” Cf. Whitman in footnote 502: 
“I am a great contender for the world as it is—the ill along with the good.” Nietzsche maintained that “happiness 
and unhappiness are sisters and even twins that . . . grow up together.” From Friedrich Nietzsche, The Gay Science: 
With a Prelude in German Rhymes and an Appendix of Songs, 192. 
48 Rudolf Bernet’s words are in reference to Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s Recherches sur l’usage littéraire du langage: 
Cours au Collège de France (1953). His paper – entitled “Philosophy and Literature – Literature and Philosophy” 
and given at the University of Copenhagen on 17 August 2017 – is slated for publication shortly in Chiasmi 
International, vol. 19. It is used here with the author’s permission. 
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to me. But so too is the intuition that we are in general unduly terrified of things. Take social 
rejection and exclusion: arguably one of the most common contemporary anxieties in the developed 
world (Orhan Pamuk seems to agree; see footnote 128). In his work Pensées, Pascal offered an 
archetypal image that elegantly captures the tragicomic scenario: It is as if every human being is all 
the time passing through a strange “town” feeling deeply worried about how he or she will be 
received by its citizenry (this, as I say, is an archetypal image distilling into narrative the problem of 
locating one’s place in a culture, or scene, or situation, and having to survive there for a time). 
However, Pascal reminds us that we do not in general 
. . . care about our reputation in towns where we are only passing through. But when we 
have to stay some time we do care. How much time does it take? A time proportionate to our 
vain and paltry existence.49 
The “punchline”, as far as I am concerned, is that this is always true – and true about life in general. 
We are only passing through, but we tend to forget it (or as Freud thought, repress it) because the 
fact of our mortality has been erased from the list of socially accepted subjects. Inescapably, we are 
mortal, and by that token all of this is temporary. This argument, of course, puts it bluntly; it is just 
an example. If what I say is not true about death – if “trigger warnings” about that concept are not 
yet required in public places – it is true about something that somebody is right now at their wits’ 
end about. Modern man really is and always will be – for it is an archetypal situation, in my 
estimation – in search of a soul, as Jung put it, i.e. in search of a mode of being, an existential 
attitude, a set of resources that preserve him in an emergency and when his character is found 
lacking in some way. At each moment of existence, John Cowper Powys claimed, each person more 
or less habitually manifests a more or less coherent “philosophy”, a kind of invariable pattern of 
“thought by which the self gathers itself together, cleanses itself, governs itself, steers itself; and 
copes as well as it may with all the pleasant or unpleasant impacts of the vast impinging Not-self.”50 
I merely venture to propose here that there is much to be gained by nourishing a real and true 
                                                 
49 Blaise Pascal, Pensées, 7. 
50 John Cowper Powys, A Philosophy of Solitude, 67. 
 It is Traubel’s opinion (stated in 1919) that Whitman personal “philosophy” manifested a healthy 
confidence vis-à-vis the archetypal trials confronting every individual who must take his or her place in the culture: 
“Schools, customs, rejected him. Scholarship, fashion, professionalism and professorialism, church and state, in the 
dubious measures of their silences and laughters, treated him as a negligible claimant. But he stayed round till they 
melted. He wasn’t scared off by bad weather. He wore out the patience of thousands of hells. They gave in. He 
didn’t. Of course he had only the usual steering chart to go by. Every man, derelict or divine, has this and no more. 
He took his medicine as they take theirs. With mingled emotions of gladness and sorrow.” From Walt Whitman, 
Intimate with Walt: Selections from Whitman’s Conversations with Horace Traubel 1888–1892, 294–295. 
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interest in the constitution, features, workings (that is, proclivities and capabilities) of the personal 
“philosophy” (in the Powysean sense) of one’s self. It seems plausible that integration of and 
familiarity with our personal nature is a significant step in the process to psychic health and 
discovery or recovery of the “soul” in Jung’s terminology; in chapter 4 I return to this under the 
rubric of Junging integration of the shadow aspects of the soul. 
vi. Archetypal Suffering, Archetypal Surviving 
My overall view is that there is life yet – and truth – in the romantic notion that there are invaluable 
riches to be gained by undertaking this integrative process, cultivation or exploration. Goethe 
thought so too; he said in conversation (specifically about Friedrich Schiller, whom – like Whitman 
– he admired, but the point can be made in general) that “Nothing constrains him, nothing narrows 
him, nothing draws downward the flight of his thoughts” who – “a true man, such as one ought to 
be” – is “in perfect possession of his sublime nature” and can freely express “the great views which 
lie within him”. Goethe goes on to correctly describe the situation of most of us: we “always feel 
ourselves subject to conditions. The persons, the objects that surround us have their influence upon 
us . . . [so that], paralyzed by a thousand considerations, we do not succeed in expressing freely 
whatever may be great in our nature. We are the slaves of objects round us, and appear little or 
important according as these contract or give us room to expand.”51 What I mean by citing Goethe 
to this effect is that, although so many objects surround us, these things, including “what lies behind 
us and what lies ahead of us[,] are tiny matters compared to what lies within us.”52 In this 
dissertation, as we shall see, the burdens beleaguering modern man are endured and redeemed 
through integrative and cooperative contact with “what lies within us” which is tapped into via 
existentially and psychologically charged aesthetic (i.e. poetic) expression.53 Jordan Peterson 
regards the process of evolving into what Goethe called “a true man [or woman], such as one ought 
to be” in purely existential terms and notes that finding a “pathway forward” tends to begin with an 
identification of the “reasons why [human beings] suffer”: 
Look at you and the way you’re built – it’s inevitable: there’s not very much of you and 
                                                 
51 From Johann Wolfgang von Goethe, Words of Goethe: Being the Conversations of Johann Wolfgang von Goethe, ed. 
by Johann Peter Eckermann, 265. See footnote 559. 
52 These words – often misattributed to Henry David Thoreau and sometimes to Ralph Waldo Emerson – are in fact 
from Henry Stanley Haskins’s Meditations in Wall Street. See The Quotable Thoreau, ed. by Jeffery S. Cramer, 469. 
53 “Only what is really oneself has the power to heal”, said Jung. From Carl Jung, The Relations between the Ego and the 
Unconscious, paragraph 258. 
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there’s a lot of everything else [this was Goethe’s view too]. And so, you just don’t last that 
long, and you’re fragile across multiple domains. And you’re harshly treated by society; 
there’s no doubt about that. And then there’s responsibility that can be laid at your own feet. 
 
In light of all this, Peterson points to a position developed by such thinkers as Viktor Frankl, 
Alexandr Solzhenitsyn, Søren Kierkegaard, Dostoevsky and Nietzsche, which stipulates that despite 
systemic, random and frequently unwarranted suffering on the personal level 
 
there’s a pathway forward [in the voluntary adoption of] a mode of being that has some 
nobility so that you can tolerate yourself and perhaps even have some respect for yourself as 
someone who is capable of standing up in the face of that terrible vulnerability and 
suffering.[54] [The] pathway forward as far as the existentialists are concerned is – certainly – 
by the avoidance of deceit, particularly in language, but also by the adoption of 
responsibility for the conditions of existence and some attempt on your part to actually 
rectify them.55 
 
I shall later investigate this attitude by making reference to the Cain and Abel story. But for now, 
having tried to sketch a relationship between coping with the most basic threats to the well-being of 
humans and the process of working towards psychic integration, let me add that this dissertation 
makes the case that to the degree I or you – or anybody – become, like Whitman, “a man [or 
woman] who is pre-occupied of his [or her] own soul” (not in the solipsistic or narcissistic senses 
but with a clear-headed, moral, steady dedication and allegiance), we will be less terrified by and 
less vulnerable to our collisions with the external world’s inherently (though not incessantly) 
unkind environment.56 Our anticipatory preemptive defense should be a robust inner constitution 
(more on that in chapter 2), and achieving that is, I claim, an option available to everybody.57 Being 
                                                 
54 Nietzsche said: “He who has a why to live for can bear almost any how.” 
55 From Jordan Peterson, “Jordan Peterson: Why We Suffer” [0:15]. David Aberbach records that Jean-Paul Sartre 
considered Nietzsche a “forerunner of Existentialism”. From David Aberbach, Surviving Trauma, 120. 
56 As for achieving the right degree of “pre-occupation” with one’s soul, Whitman later explained the point to his friend 
Traubel: “I do not lack in egotism, as you know—the sort of egotism that is willing to know itself as honestly as it is 
willing to know third or fourth parties.” See also footnote 300. From Walt Whitman, Intimate with Walt: Selections from 
Whitman’s Conversations with Horace Traubel 1888–1892, 59. 
57 Although I do not particularly wish to endorse the Stoic philosophers in this dissertation, I am forced to admit that the 
attitudes I have just recommended are strikingly close to those laid out in the Enchiridion of Epictetus: “[The] basic 
Stoic truth of subjective consciousness[ is:] to distinguish what is in our power from what is not in our power. Not in 
our power are all the elements which constitute our environment, such as wealth, health, reputation, social prestige, 
power, the lives of those we love, and death. In our power are our thinking, our intentions, our desires, our decisions. 
These make it possible for us to control ourselves and to make of ourselves elements and parts of the universe of 
nature. This knowledge of ourselves makes us free in a world of dependencies. This superiority of our powers 
enables us to live in conformity with nature.” Having noted the similarity, I shall say no more of the Enchiridion. 
From Epictetus, The Enchiridion, 6. 
 The “robust inner constitution” I have alluded to, including the hazards of neglecting its development, 
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necessarily “strangers in a strange land”, as the Bible has it, and forced to sustain skepticism 
towards our persons in every town we are obliged to “pass[] through”, we are, I claim, helped and 
fortified to the degree we can assess that situation from the self’s sane, wise and unillusioned point 
of view. 
 Speaking of illusions, I deem that one of the malaises of our era and present culture in 
the West is that it is not sufficiently honest about the unavoidable traumas – large as well as small – 
that any individual is bound to face throughout his life, obviously despite the great variability across 
different people’s individual fates. Although intuitively ill-advised and short-sighted, the 
suppression of accurate information about the essential facts of human life, including death and 
loss, is perhaps not that surprising; as Cormac McCarthy suggests in one of his novels, a case can 
be made that it is indeed “good that God [or culture] [keeps] the truths of life from the young as 
they [are] starting out or else they’d have no heart to start at all.”58 However, Freud sagely insists 
that “Men cannot remain children for ever. They must in the end go out into ‘hostile life’. We may 
call this ‘education to reality’. Need I confess to you that the sole purpose of my book is to point out 
the necessity for this forward step?”59 A wide-reaching problem inherent to modernity, as I see it, is 
that we are squeamish about and act immaturely around the most fundamental truth: That we are 
going to die and suffer. Cf. Peterson, cited above: “We’re blinded to what is truly fundamental by 
the things that present themselves most easily to our perception” (see footnote 34). If we could but 
really realize it and not flee from this allegedly dismal – but in fact bracing, necessary and 
significant – truth we might be able to embrace life more heartily and emphatically. And, 
recognizing accurately that “we are only passing through”, we might learn to lessen our worries 
                                                 
was on Tolstoy’s mind as well. His words are refreshing and compatible with my point above: “For God’s sake or if 
not for God, for your own sakes, come to your senses. Understand the senselessness of your lives. Tear yourself 
away even for a moment from all the trivia that occupies your daily life and that you think so important! All your 
chasing after money, . . . your parliaments, your sciences, your churches. Tear yourself away from all that for a 
moment and examine your life; look at yourself, at your soul which lives such an unpredictably short time in your 
body. Come to your senses. Look at life around you and understand all its craziness and be horrified by it. . . . [S]eek 
salvation from it. But you do not even have to seek it. Each one of you has it in your soul. Just come to your senses 
and understand who you are and ask yourself what you really need. The answer, which is the same for everyone, 
will come to you. . . . Come to your senses even for a minute and you will clearly see that the only important thing 
in life is not what is external but what is internal. Just realize that you need only one thing and nothing else. You 
need only to save your soul and only by doing that can we save the world. . . . [P]eople waste their souls’ energy on 
“arranging” their lives . . . rather than on improving themselves.” From Lev Tolstoy, Death and the Meaning of Life, 
91. 
58 Cormac McCarthy, All the Pretty Horses, vol. 1, 284. It seems that McCarthy is drawing on Joseph Conrad: “For 
every age is fed on illusions, lest men should renounce life early and the human race come to an end.” Conrad is 
featured as an epigraph  to Christopher Hamilton, A Philosophy of Tragedy. 
59 Sigmund Freud, On Freud’s “The Future of an Illusions”, 49. (The present version of the book features redundant 
pagination; page 49 is simultaneously page 55.)  
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about our reputation in various cultural contexts. In other words, we lack the kind of wisdom and 
understanding, which, according to Jung, is an analgesic for psychic suffering: 
 
Tears, sorrow, and disappointment are bitter, but wisdom is the comforter in all psychic 
suffering. Indeed, bitterness and wisdom form a pair of alternatives: Where there is 
bitterness, wisdom is lacking, and where wisdom is there can be no bitterness.60 
 
The mature engagement with good art can inform and deepen our education away from politically 
motivated half-truths towards an unillusioned integration of ourselves with reality – without which 
there can be no wisdom. We should grow existentially supple and dynamically wise rather than 
demand with childish stubbornness that the cosmos overturn the irredeemable fact of our mortality. 
 
vii. Intuition and the Wisdom of Poets 
 
I offer my thesis partly in the manner of one defending a moral position, knowing full well that 
though the argument is sincere it is not in any technical sense inevitable. Like Whitman, I say, “I’m 
not here to prove things but to say things.”61 And yet, my position remains that I see very little to be 
gained and much to be lost by negligently permitting “our thoughts [to be] unworthy of the great 
theme,” in W. MacNeile Dixon’s words.62 
 On that basis, I shall suggest in the following that if we were to consider taking an 
answer from any group or person to the sublime and outrageous question How to best get through 
life?, the nearest good poet might – in the role of an “Answerer” (which in Whitman’s coinage 
codes for a “maker of poems”) – turn out to be superior to more conventional specialists and 
experts.63 That significant, valuable, unique insights were forthcoming from artists, including poets, 
                                                 
60 Carl Jung, Mysterium Coniunctionis: An Inquiry into the Separation and Synthesis of Psychic Opposites in Alchemy, 
section 330.   
61 Isaiah Berlin is cited in Donna Bassin, Female Sexuality: Contemporary Engagements, 442. 
Whitman is cited in Horace Traubel, ed., With Walt Whitman in Camden, vol. 1, 229. 
The William James quote is from that writer’s The Varieties of Religious Experience, 149. 
62 From W. MacNeile Dixon, The Human Situation, chapter 1 (no pagination in online version). 
63 Although it is intellectually wayward and precarious to posit the existence of “perfect” minds (for how could we ever 
define “perfect”, and who would adjudicate?), I venture that it is not unreasonable to assume that the (by me 
alleged) relative utility of a poet in the present context would be due to such a person’s unillusioned attitude to 
human beings, psychological openness in general (accompanied by a lack of dogma and ideology), aloofness to 
restrictive teleological notions of the arts, healthy indifference to fame or castigation, nuanced linguistic skill and 
lack of lexical biases regardless of the degree to which such a lack might seem unfashionable or outlandish by 
current standards. Among these qualities (which I base on nothing but my own careful consideration), I should stress 
and privilege especially the first-mentioned quality: a Terence-esque tolerance and sympathy in the face of the 
bizarre, the crazy and the exceptional. (The Roman playwright Terence, or Publius Terentius Afer, wrote “Homo 
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was the view (as I have indicated) of Matthew Arnold who found that “the greatness of a poet lies in 
his powerful and beautiful application of ideas to life, – to the question: How to live.” And 
similarly, Virgil Nemoianu has said (of romantic poetry specifically) that it possesses “the kind of 
variety and indeterminacy, richness, and flexibility that could make it privileged ground for 
experimenting with human potentialities and responses, redeeming the past, assimilating the 
present, and projecting the future” – which, on the face of it, appears to usefully cover or 
complement certain skills that must be integral to surviving and fundamental to achieving that 
balance and command over life without which living is intolerable.64 Whitman himself was inclined 
to believe that when it came to understanding humanity, 
 
poets . . . present the most mark’d indications. Comprehending artists in a mass, musicians, 
painters, actors, and so on, and considering each and all of them as radiations or flanges of 
that furious whirling wheel, poetry, the centre and axis of the whole, where else indeed may 
we so well investigate the causes, growths, tally-marks of the time—the age's matter and 
malady?65 
 
If we accept Dresser’s assertion that “Life is a problem which has for each an individual solution”, 
we nevertheless arrive at the following problem. What if narrowing the issue down until we operate 
at the level of the individual does not bring us within reach of the desired existential “solution”. 
Each person will have to endure slightly different sorrows (some of which will be “useless”, in 
Lecky’s terminology, while others, tragically enough, will be worth our every mourning sob); 
similarly, the problems that fall under “the inevitable” rubric will present themselves differently to 
different persons, each of whom will have to discover and attend to the particulars and try to prove 
themselves “equal” to them. To continue my philosophical investigation of what “an answer” might 
ultimately be like and whether or not the desired kind of answer (fixed, unequivocal, applicable, 
expedient) is in fact a logical possibility, I suppose that we run into the practical concern that an 
answer might not be comprehensible to the human mind at all, not amenable to intellectual 
appreciation. This idea – i.e., that the answer or answers we correctly hanker for elude intellectual 
                                                 
sum, humani nihil a me alienum puto”, which is commonly rendered in English as “I am a man, I consider nothing 
that is human alien to me”.) I think that is what Freud took aim at when he wrote that “psycho-analytic observation 
must concede priority to imaginative writers. It can only repeat what they said long ago.” From Sigmund Freud, The 
Psychopathology of Everyday Life, 213. 
64 Nemoiany is quoted in Nicholas Mazza, Poetry Therapy: Theory and Practice, chapter 1 (no pagination in online 
version). Matthew Arnold’s words from The Study of Poetry are cited in Carmen Casaliggi and Paul March-Russell, 
eds., Legacies of Romanticism: Literature, Culture, Aesthetics, 118. 
65 From Walt Whitman, Specimen Days, 156. 
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presentation – is taken seriously within Zen Buddhism.66 And if intellectually knowable and 
reasonable, the looked-for truth or cluster of truths might still not exhibit a fixed nature across time, 
across the changing scenes and vicissitudes that flit across any given life. We might find, rather, that 
what life asks of us is nearly endless humility, methodological flexibility and general openness to 
shifting conditions. An analogy from Platonic metaphysics comes to mind: As with all Platonic 
forms, the “form” that we can only imagine Life to be (life at its highest and best, across time, for 
any given person) seems not to exist in any positivistic, handy and convenient sense in the concrete, 
chaotic world where we must life. Ideal Life may, it seems, float free from mental capture to remain 
something to be envisioned, a kind of mirage which only the existentially reflective will be inclined 
to pursue. 
 
viii. Existential Flexibility 
 
I think a kind of intellectual modesty is called for: Let us acknowledge that the factors and 
contingencies in life are too many, too varied, too complex, too hidden and frequently interacting in 
a fashion too chaotic for any human being to contrive an unfailing set of precepts synthesizing the 
wished-for ideal: unblemished, painless existence across reasonable stretches of time. For not only 
is the world around us constituted by a tightly woven fabric of countless chaotic and complex 
systems interacting with and within each other, the human being itself is also in psychological terms 
an unknowable and largely ungovernable cluster of systems. To think and argue seriously and 
methodically about living well under conditions as unstable and capricious as these invites 
immediate intellectual modesty, the kind of modesty one finds articulated so reasonably by John 
                                                 
66 Zen Buddhist stories operate on the principle that whatever must be imparted is not intellectual and therefore aloof to 
direct verbal articulation. A separate issue is the fact that sometimes the amount of information vying for our 
attention is greater than our capacity to process it – an answer or a piece of information can apparently dwarf the 
human mind attempting to grasp or hold it mentally (cf. Richard Feynman’s related claim, “I think I can safely say 
that nobody understands quantum mechanics.”). Speaking about the problem of artificially engineering machines 
capable of rivaling human perception and information processing, Jordan Peterson has said that at any moment in 
life our senses are inundated with vastly more information that could potentially be apprehended than humans are 
actually able to register; indiscriminately taking everything in would overwhelm (and perhaps even damage) our 
brains: “[Humans] ignore almost everything . . . You know already how complicated a chess game is, how 
incomputable that is. Yet [humans] are interacting with an environment whose complexity leaves a chess game in 
the dust. [That] environment is composed of an infinite number of hierarchically stacked chess games, and yet [we] 
wander through it without a second’s thought – unless something goes wrong.” From Jordan Peterson, “Music and 
the Patterns of Mind and World” [14:45]. The point is that humans do not approach being with what we tend to call 
“rational” parts of the brain; after all, by far main part of human existence has arguably been endured in so-called 
prerational times. 
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Gray: “There are many things the good life is not. But no one thing it is bound to be.”67 However 
much we might desire a gospel of timeless precepts, Dixon correctly recognizes that “reason, for all 
the flourishing of her trumpets,” does not itself offer a method for “illuminating the grand 
problems” of human life, and that though hard and fast answers are sometimes what we need and 
should look for we need – in the majority of instances, let me inject – to bear in mind “the utter 
folly of all dogmatism”. This agrees with George Santayana’s observation that a “complete mastery 
of existence achieved at one moment unfortunately gives no warrant that it will be sustained or 
achieved at the next.”68 It also agrees with Jaron Lanier’s formulation that “Being a person is not a 
pat formula, but a quest, a mystery, a leap of faith” and with Carl Rogers’s insistence that “The 
good life is a process, not a state of being. It is a direction, not a destination.” All these attitudes 
agree well with Henry Miller’s inclination to see the “joy of life” as a “not static but dynamic” 
state.69 
 Epistemologically speaking, the “dynamic” aspect that I am developing here is 
obviously more compatible with humanism, psychology and existentialist philosophy than with 
scientifically-rooted dogmatism and ideology. It is therefore fitting that it was a poet – a poet and 
thinker, who happened also to be a significant inspiration on Whitman – who said: “A foolish 
consistency is the hobgoblin of little minds, adored by little statesmen and philosophers and divines. 
With consistency a great soul has simply nothing to do.”70 
 
ix. Living Well 
 
In a style owing something to Montaigne’s unpretentious and colloquial essays, this chapter 
approaches the universal challenge or invitation to live well, the injunction to try as human beings to 
carve out as meaningful a life as possible and exist in a fashion that is as far from endless near-
death emergency uninterrupted survival as possible and not attended by too much physical or 
psychic discomfort. “We must learn to endure”, said Montaigne, “what we cannot avoid”, 
suggesting that we have a personal obligation to meet discomfort with at least a measure of dignity, 
                                                 
67 John Gray, Two Faces of Liberalism, 95. 
68 George Santayana, The Life of Reason: Reason in Art, quoted in Adam Phillips, Side Effects, 300. In Robert Frost’s 
phrase, we have to “go into battle on limited knowledge, insufficient knowledge.” From James Nelson, ed., Wisdom: 
Conversations with the Elder Wise Men of Our Day, 13. 
69 From Jaron Lanier, You Are not a Gadget, 5; Carl Rogers, On Becoming a Person: A Therapist's View of 
Psychotherapy, 186; and Henry Miller, The Colossus of Maroussi, 69. 
70 Ralph Waldo Emerson, “Self-Reliance”. 
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courage and resilience – in short, meet discomfort from a position of tenacious acceptance towards 
the fact that, necessarily, “[o]ur life is composed, like the harmony of the world, of contrary things, 
also of different tones, sweet and harsh, sharp and flat, soft and loud. If a musician liked only one 
kind, what would he have to say?”71 When the psychologist Steven Pinker offered his view that 
human beings were happiest when they were “healthy, well-fed, comfortable, safe, prosperous, 
knowledgeable, respected, non-celibate, and loved,” we might smile – as a result, perhaps, of the 
reassuring notion that happiness is nothing other than a multi-variable balancing act suggested by 
this catalogue of splendid states; however, we might weep the next second at recognizing the 
inherent contingency of each variable, each catalogued item.72 Even if by something like a miracle 
one managed to achieve some or all of these things, one would never escape from the realization 
that they are at best a kind of (temporary) loan. Also, one could argue that a life spent busily trying 
to accrue love and prosperity, food, shelter and so on, might not necessarily be worth the struggle if 
one were too – that is, obsessively – invested in it. If our obsessive scramble for “the usual 
rewards”, as Whitman calls them, is not attended by a strong sense of meaning we might be 
unhappy for all that we are, strictly speaking, successful. If the motivation that spurs us on turns 
maniacal or the grief that attends our intermittent failures crushes us then Pinker’s bouquet of 
blisses will not satisfy us in the desirable manner. 
 For as is often the case, when a proposed answer or solution to a problem is both 
simple and attractive, there is generally upon closer inspection a fly in the ointment. There is, as 
Adam Phillips remarks, “no peace” for those who see the human predicament through Freudian 
lenses.73 We are, as Robert Ardrey said, risen apes, not fallen angels, and reality reminds us of this 
in the sense that nothing in our life-sustaining environment is immune to decay, death or change. 
(Presumably an angelic world, of which one can only dream, would be invulnerable to these and all 
the other imperfections that characterize the world in which we are doomed to live.) The 
philosopher Christopher Hamilton has presented a wistful, indeed tragic, but ontologically 
undeniable summary of the manifold conditions that characterize and circumscribe human 
existence: 
Human being are born to suffer. All human lives are marked by pain and guilt, by loss and 
failure, by disappointment and compromise. All of us go through life confused, and need in 
the end to acknowledge that life itself damages us, often profoundly and always irreparably. 
Human endeavour is fragile and human beings have only limited control of their own lives. 
                                                 
71 Michel de Montaigne, “Of Experience”, in Michel de Montaigne, The Complete Essays, 1237. 
72 Steven Pinker, How the Mind Works, 387.  
73 Adam Phillips, Side Effects, 7. 
48 
 
Here and there, there may be progress in one or more senses - moral, political, technological 
and so on – for some periods, but there is no inevitability about the continuation of such 
progress. Human nature is not perfectible and happiness is not to be dreamed of - or, rather, 
is only to be dream of – even if there are moments in which we feel happy or content. Our 
desires are often in conflict with each other, and our reason is a fragile instrument that is 
largely driven by blind urges and needs. There is no moral world order; the wicked often 
flourish while the good are crushed and perish. Most of the time we do not really understand 
what we are doing, and there is no goal or purpose to history and no redemption for our pain 
and suffering. Human beings think they long for contentment, but when they get it they 
often destroy it because they are creatures who are deeply divided against themselves. And 
however excellent or morally good a life one has led, it ends in death, which is final, and 
from which there is no release or redemption. 
 If human life is as I have just described it then the human is tragic. This is the point of 
view I offer . . .74 
This bracing view may sound unremittingly harsh and gratuitous in its horribleness, but it is not 
exactly uncommon in the literature beyond “Positive Thinking” and similar intellectually doubtful 
psycho-philosophical maps to the territory. The moral philosopher Shelly Kagan presents a similar 
picture that rings both beautiful and melancholy.75 Upon calmly accepting the full implications of 
our basic existential and ontological predicament, Kagan is led, as many have been before him 
(Viktor Frankl, Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn and more recently Jordan Peterson, for instance), to a 
distinctly moral conclusion. It seems to Kagan that the only constructive response of the individual 
to the surrounding chaos must take the form of a personal resolution which will manifest itself as an 
attempt patiently and persistently to try to “to replace ignorance with knowledge, intolerance with 
tolerance, subjugation with justice”. 
 It is, I think, worth considering for a moment that the line of reasoning here, roughly 
speaking, goes from descriptive to moral – from encompassing everything to centering on the 
individual and the individual’s response. (Solzhenitsyn offered a metaphor that sustains that model: 
However paradoxically, the individual (each individual) is the “center of the Universe” which 
consequently has “as many different centers as there are living beings in it” – we are all of us Atlas, 
then, in a way.) Let us not neglect to remark that for the individual to begin to carry out these 
                                                 
74 Christopher Hamilton, A Philosophy of Tragedy, 9–10. 
75 At a 2014 debate hosted by The Veritas Forum at Yale University, Kagan said: “[Leaving aside the “breath-taking 
beauty and awe-inspiring complexity” of the world] it also seems to me, sadly enough, that the universe is utterly, 
utterly indifferent to us, to not just humans but to other sentient creatures as well. It just doesn’t care about how it 
crushes us, it doesn’t care about the suffering, misery, that it causes us, it doesn’t care about the fact that it cuts us 
down and tramples on our dreams. More horrifyingly still, it is not just nature that often has this attitude, we have 
this attitude to one another. Other humans are indifferent to the suffering of their fellow humans or, even worse, 
contribute in a malicious, vindictive, sadistic fashion to compounding their misery.” From Shelly Kagan and N. T. 
Wright, “Living Well in the Light of Death – NT Wright and Shelly Kagan at Yale” [2:30]. 
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worthy “replacements” (along with others that they depend on and will facilitate), the individual 
must be in a position to carry out the work, which is another way of saying that the individual must 
have somehow achieved a certain existential balance him- or herself – a critical level of physical 
health and psychic and emotional well-being (not to mention a knack for self-management and a 
few skills). Montaigne knew this too: “Not being able to govern events, I govern myself”, he wrote 
– whereby he suggests that success at “governing” oneself may partly compensate for the difficulty 
of governing events in the external world.76 It is indeed true that governing events is very often 
nearly impossible, but sometimes it is not totally impossible. Kagan (in the Veritas debate I have 
mentioned) acknowledges that although immense “the blackness is not immutable”; or, as Henry 
Miller puts it 
The one great power we have is our ability to transmute things. When a thing goes wrong 
you have to turn the wrong into the right. This is . . . the greatest thing about the universe—
that it can be altered. . . . Man has a bit of this power in him: to take what is lost and failed 
and convert it into a new and wonderful things.77 
“Man has a bit of this power in him”, writes Miller. The redemptive transformation of something 
associated with the disagreeable, the terrifying, the lamentable, the chaotically disorganized and 
elusive, into something one can accept, even bless and wish to protect, is one of the fundamental 
themes of this dissertation at the level of the embodied self. I shall appropriate the theme takes in 
psychological terms, but in its basic narrative conceptualization the process lies at the heart of one 
of the oldest stories our culture has preserved, the Bible. 
There is something about the very nature of human being that makes us feel as if something 
needs to be said right. When that’s been discussed historically, it’s been associated with the 
term redemption – people are in need of redemption. . . . Human beings in the West have 
been meditating on the nature of human being for thousands of years, perhaps ever since we 
became self-conscious, which[, among other things, is a property that] drives our search for 
meaning. One of the consequences of this meditation has been the production of a series of 
books that people know as the Bible [the first book of which, Genesis,] starts out with the 
word of God [Logos] creating being from chaos. . . .78 
                                                 
76 In his surest moments (he knew doubts too), Whitman also was capable of “governing” his self: “When shows break 
up what but One’s-Self is sure?” he asked in “Quicksand Years.” 
77 From Henry Miller, My Life and Times, 122. On page 190 of that work, he returns to the subject from a purely 
metaphysical angle: “It is possible to transmute the bad into the good, the wrong into the right. There is always this 
possibility. It would be an utterly uninteresting world if everything remained what it seems to be.” 
78 Jordan Peterson, “Psychology of Redemption in Christianity” [0:45]. 
The Hebrew phrase “tohu wa-bohu” describes the chaotic state out of which, according to the Book of Genesis 
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Logos, Peterson explains, is “something like consciousness and something like speech” and  
has the power to pull order out of an underlying chaos. Now, we [human beings] do this all 
the time . . . That’s, I suppose, in some sense why we are hypothetically made in the image 
of God.[79] We use our consciousness to constantly construct being out of chaos. And 
according to the initial opening of Genesis, there’s something about this that is akin to the 
construction of the world. . . . Consciousness itself plays a world-constructing role. It’s got a 
central place. And human beings in some [minor] sense participate in that.80 
Peterson’s point is that in carrying out this work humans are akin to the deity as represented by the 
biblical texts. The idea of using our “consciousness to . . . construct being out of chaos” has a 
striking echo in Gregory Orr’s work where “poetry of survival [is delineated as] a restabilizing of 
self through poetic ordering”.81 Henry Miller made the same connection and was completely open 
about it (notice how closely the fifth sentence is synonymous with the words from Edison): 
No man is as full of chaos as I am. People think I am an orderly man. My house is orderly 
and my work table is orderly. But inside I’m a raging chaos. I don’t think I could be creative 
                                                 
(1:2), the world was made; the phase has been translated, variously, as “waste and void,” “formless and empty,” or 
“chaos and desolation.” The latter variant sustains the implied analogy to psychological chaos (suffering, 
dislocation, confusion) particularly well. Indicating the antiquity of the relationship between “the word” and 
ameliorating influence and potential, one finds the theme a leitmotif of the texts of the Bible. In Psalms, for instance, 
Logos, as spoken by God, is presented as both the creative principle and an agent of healing: “By the word of the 
Lord were the heavens made; and all the host of them by the breath of his mouth” (Psalms 33:6); “He sent out his 
word and healed them; he rescued them from the grave” (Psalms 107:20). 
 A secular formulation of the idea and process of Genesis 1:2 is at the heart of Edison’s aphorism, “To 
invent, you need a good imagination and a pile of junk”. The analogy to alchemy, which throughout this thesis I 
shall occasionally indicate, should be obvious. From Mark A. Runco and Steven R. Pritzker, Encyclopedia of 
Creativity, Two-Volume Set, 270. 
79 Peterson does not mean this literally. He is in this passage engaged in construing the myths in Genesis archetypically. 
80 From Jordan Peterson, “Psychology of Redemption in Christianity” [5:50]. 
By way of introducing one of the central thinkers of my thesis, I should perhaps mention that Jordan Peterson 
accurately sums up his own scholarly premises with the following words, some of which I have referred to 
previously: “People suffer more than they have to because we profoundly misunderstand what is real. We’re blinded 
to what is truly fundamental by the things that present themselves most easily to our perception. Thus we fail to 
realize what is most genuine and important. We believe that the world is made out of objects. I would like to propose 
instead that the world is made out of chaos and order and that the quality of our being is dependent on how we 
manage the balance between the two. Chaos – that’s what manifests itself when we don’t know what we’re looking 
at[: it comprises “the unknown, the unexpected, the anomalous” but also the “fruitfulness of nature” and “an ocean 
of possibility surrounding the territory of human culture”, “the water of life” as well as “the flood unleashed by an 
angry god”, archetypally speaking.] . . . Order, by contrast, is where you are when everything is running properly[: it 
is a mode of being characterized by sufficient time, security, happiness, stability – making it a reliable “dwelling 
place” for men and women] . . . When men and women cry out to heaven in the face of their suffering, what is it that 
they can call forth? Meaning.” From Jordan Peterson, “TEDxToronto – Dr. Jordan B. Peterson—Redefining 
Reality” [2:15]. The word “meaning” anticipates Viktor Frankl’s “logotherapy” to which I shall turn later in this 
chapter. 
81 Gregory Orr, Poetry as Survival, 180. Judith Harris finds that literature “involves the underwriting of the whole 
person in all his or her emotional complexity”, which seems an equivalent perspective. Both Orr and Harris speak of 
poetry in terms of a useful ally and countervailing force when the self is threatened from without. 
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if I weren’t so chaotic. Just lately some scholars dug up an ancient manuscript relating to 
pre-Biblical times. It had to do with the first words in Genesis about the creation of the 
world. In this manuscript God was said to have brought order out of chaos. This is quite 
different from creation. What God did was to bring about order. In other words He did not 
create. 
 That’s the definition in my mind of an artist, that he is only a man who rearranges 
things. Arthur Rimbaud said, “No man ever created anything.” Man is not a creator. All man 
does is turn things about, rearrange things, that’s all. That’s creation as far as man goes.82 
Whitman appears to have been intimately familiar with personal transformation, and it informs 
much of Leaves of Grass.83 Given the fundamental ontological – rather forbidding – facts upon 
which human existence is predicated – and given the evident impossibility of synthesizing and 
disseminating “good” and eliminating the causes of suffering in order to usher in the utopia reliably 
and once and for all – it seems that the best one can do is aim to live in a manner that is “not 
unworthy of the great theme”. It is, of course, very hard to say what that means qualitatively, 
technically. Again, as John Gray says, “Though we can be in error about how we want to live, there 
need be no one truth about the best life. There are many things the good life is not, but no one thing 
it is bound to be.”84 
 One problem with Dixon’s lofty and lyrical phrase is its implied quasy-religious 
connotation. It does not evacuate us from a deeply speculative realm, so everything I say in the 
following is said with this caveat: “You may accept or reject it to the extent that it agrees with your 
                                                 
82 Henry Miller, My Life and Times, 137. My emphasis. 
83 Incidentally, as Thomas Becknell establishes, Whitman’s work betrays his deep familiarity with the language of the 
Bible. But the central story in the Bible also resonates with Leaves of Grass because both texts deal with the difficult 
struggle for (human) perfection. (Interesting in that regard is Jordan Peterson’s indication of the commonality 
between the Bible and traditional hero mythologies.) See Becknell’s entry “The Bible” in J. R. LeMaster and Donald 
D. Kummings, eds., The Routledge Encyclopedia of Walt Whitman, 55. 
 The central story I have in mind can be paraphrased thus: The Old Testament dramatizes the problems 
associated with creating a perfect state. A cyclical pattern arises insofar that, as soon as a state is established, people 
(subjects as well as rulers) begin to get corrupt. As a consequence of their tendency to grow corrupt, the state 
collapses into a state of chaos, which is accompanied by a prophetic revelation in the form of a warning against the 
chaos. Then comes a terrible period of chaotic disruption, which is followed by renewal and regeneration of the 
state. Then the process repeats itself. The New Testament can be regarded as a text trying to solve that problem. 
Jordan Peterson has said that it emphasizes the necessity of “endless micro-deaths and renewal” on the personal 
level (one finds this theme in Whitman, as I have said) and of “aiming at the highest value, sacrificing what is no 
longer useful and valid in yourself and telling the truth.” From Jordan Peterson, “Psychology of Redemption in 
Christianity” [46:00]. 
84 John Gray, Two Faces of Liberalism, 63. A similar dissymmetry was noticed by C. S. Lewis (“How monotonously 
alike all the great tyrants and conquerors have been: how gloriously different are the saints”) and by Jordan 
Peterson. On formulating a “transnational and transethnic morality”, the latter said: “We don’t know what it is, but 
we know what it isn’t. It isn’t pointless torture and genocide. At minimum to be virtuous is to live your life in such a 
way that the probability that you would engage in such actions, given the opportunity, is minimized.” From Jordan 
Peterson, “The Necessity of Virtue”. For Lewis’s quote, see C. S. Lewis, Mere Christianity, 226.  
52 
 
own observation and introspection.”85 Even supposing for a moment that there were no semantic 
ambiguity about its meaning semantically, there still might be different (and mutually contradictory) 
existential stances across a group of different individuals. That there are no quick and 
straightforward solutions seems one of only two things we can conclude with any semblance of 
certainty at this moment. The other is that human beings will inescapably, time and again, find 
themselves in desperate need of ways to confront and survive intermittent hopelessness, ruin, 
disappointment and dejection. I shall be arguing that one such ways leads through literature and 
through what literature can help us achieve. 
x. Suffering and Being Human 
I said before that there was a sting in the tail of the constituents of Steven Pinker’s happy state, 
namely the fact of the inconstant, contingent, brittle nature of our happy conditions and untroubled 
moods. The insufferable thing about existential suffering, so to speak, is that it rarely emerges 
predictably, the product of neatly definable external conditions and factors for which prevention or 
a cure can be synthesized with precision and ingenuity. Plausibly, at first blush anyhow, preventing 
psychic worry, static, regret and so on would depend on perfect knowledge of the human psyche 
and nature; but unsurprisingly perhaps we seem to be denied access such knowledge. Our conscious 
minds (so Alain de Botton distills the fundamental Freudian principle) are condemned to all the 
time “ride like tiny boats on the swells of unconscious psychoanalytic and biological seas”; 
interestingly, that we suffer is (at least partly) a consequence of our being conscious. So when we 
suffer we know that we suffer, which is a fate, say, a blade of seaweed or an amoeba is spared for all 
that it is alive and that its life or being can go more or less well. The reality without us and within 
us is not engineered, so to speak, for our secure and easy tranquility: 
We often experience the world as confusing and chaotic, especially during crises. This 
confusion can be outside us, in the objective conditions of our social and political lives, or it 
can be inside us, in the shifting world of emotions, thoughts, and memories. [Aware of] the 
power of disorder in our experience, we are likely to become aware of a strong need [for] 
some order in the world that helps us feel safe and secure.86 
                                                 
85 Peter Singer, Practical Ethics, 292. 
86 Gregory Orr, Poetry as Survival, 3. 
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I shall return, in the latter part of this chapter, to these words from Gregory Orr’s Poetry as 
Survival, a trenchant and useful contribution to the argument that literature might indicate and assist 
us in beating a path to a sense of order, safety and security (among other things – such as wisdom) – 
or to what Aldous Huxley calls “Doors in the Wall” (with a reference to H. G. Wells’s fine short 
story about searching for a lost, half-forgotten paradise).87 Huxley considers humankind’s need for 
“vacations from intolerable selfhood” and “urge to self-transcendence” (which I will at present take 
in the broadest sense) to be “undoubtedly [ineradicable]”, “universal and ever-present”. 
 Regardless of the nature of the steps taken, regardless of the process, it is surely a 
significant feat and a profound spiritual achievement to manifest, and sustain over time, a state of 
peaceful being in a world “whose very nature is momentariness and fluidity”, in which change is 
the only constant.88 We all emerge from evolution unclothed and vulnerable (and are each of us “a 
stranger and afraid / in a world [we] never made”, in Housman’s words), a strange network or 
“contexture” (as Marcus Aurelius puts it) of “blood and bones and . . . nerves, veins, and arteries” 
with no choice but to meet the unpredictable odds of our survival and make do with our own 
individual combination of arbitrary and fixed limitations and our own frequency of psychic static.89 
“Man is the animal for whom to be or not to be is the question: its resolution therefore must have 
the form of an answer”, writes Stanely Cavell in Must We Mean What We Say (before asserting that 
pain and meaninglessness have the upper hand over pleasure and sense).90 To that precarious mental 
ambivalence and existentially trying predicament Jordan Peterson adds the insight that we are all 
forced to bear certain unnegotiable “arbitrary facts of being” that are blindly imposed on everyone 
through no fault of their own: 
. . . [Y]ou’re a certain amount of attractive, a certain amount of intelligent, you’re a certain 
amount of athletic, you’re a certain amount of mentally ill, [and] you’re a certain amount of 
pre-disposition to cancer.91 
                                                 
87 “The true paradises are the paradises we have lost”, writes Proust in Remembrance of Things Past, vol. 3, 903. 
88 Alan Watts, The Wisdom of Insecurity, 77. 
89 “A stranger and alone” is A. E. Housman’s famous phrase from “XII” in Last Poems. The Aurelius quote is from 
chapter 2 of the Meditations. 
90 Stanley Cavell, Must We Mean What We Say, 132. 
91 From Jordan Peterson, “The Necessity of Virtue – Jordan B. Peterson”. Or, as he puts it in Maps of Meaning: “The 
fact of mortal vulnerability—that defining characteristic of the individual . . .—may be rendered even more “unjust” 
and “intolerable” by the specific manifestations of such vulnerability. Some are poorer than others, some weaker, 
some unsightlier—all less able, in some regard . . . Recognition of the seemingly arbitrary distribution of skill and 
advantage adds additional rationally “justifiable” grounds for [resentment and disillusionment].” Jordan Peterson, 
Maps of Meaning, 322. (The Phillips quote below is from Adam Phillips, Side Effects, 19.) 
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Though an inconvenient truth perhaps, the fact is that a life wholly untouched by crises – bodily and 
mental – is patently unlikely. Sometimes a normal and unsuspecting human being is suddenly 
ambushed by what Adam Phillips calls an “attack of [his or her] own nature” – a potentially 
psychologically crippling and traumatic event – which from that moment radically rewrites the 
conditions governing the person’s existence: “ ‘trauma’ [can become] another word for living a 
life.” Despite the acuteness of the suffering involved there is frequently nothing especially grand or 
spectacular about the particular unfortunate eventuality – we may sit stunned from some 
catastrophic bolt from the blue and wonder why no deep moral was written on the calamity. (The 
best we may be able to say about it is that if we survive we might subsequently hold uneventful, 
painless living in higher regard.) But we might learn or should perhaps always bear in mind that we 
are vulnerable creatures – especially in psychological terms; thus Phillips in Side Effects credits 
Freud with summarizing our universal human predicament to the effect that we are all of us always 
“in shock, but wishing our way through. It is as though there is a design flaw in the human animal; 
our childhood is more than our development can cope with. We are all in recovery of having been 
children.” Further compounding this situation, Phillips has in other work (Unforbidden Pleasures, 
particularly pp. 84–121) argued that parts of our psychological make-up, the part which Freud 
called the superego, behaves in a way that is quite revealing about our entire history as persons, 
from our infantile beginnings till now. Let me end this section, then, with what according to Phillips 
is revealed about us by our superego: “Were we to meet [the embodied superego] socially, as it 
were, this accusatory character, this internal critic, we would think there was something wrong with 
him. He would just be boring and cruel. We might think that something terrible had happened to 
him. That he was living in the aftermath, in the fallout of some catastrophe.” Phillips adds: “And we 
would be right.” 
xi. The Human Condition and Literature 
There is nothing new or controversial about the bracingly dark view of human existence presented 
above. Indeed, for most of recorded history it has been dominant, central to many cultures, as the 
earliest written texts suggest. One example is The Buddha, proclaiming that “life is suffering”. Or 
one might think of The Book of Job which contains the lines, “Man that is born of a woman is of 
few days, and full of trouble. Man comes forth like a flower as is cut down.” And in a recent work, 
Gabriele Schwab insists that “There is no history without trauma. Some lives will forever be 
overshadowed by violent histories . . . Collective trauma is passed down to individuals in 
55 
 
multifarious and refracted ways. . . [When] trauma becomes a chronic condition [it] violently halts 
the flow of time, fractures the self, and punctures memory and language.” Although these 
irremediable facts are likely to sit uneasily with most people they need stating honestly and 
candidly, I think, because it is to the detriment of precisely those who suffer that our cheery secular 
modernity remains so averse to acknowledging and embracing the inherent friction and always-
impending disintegration of our being.92 In an age when technology, entertainment and social media 
are well on the way to effectively eliminate pain, boredom and social isolation from the human 
experience, and it is widely believed that rational thought, dialogue and knowledge are the only 
keys to resolving human problems, it has – I think – come to be seen as demoralizing and almost 
controversial to suggest 
that the world is not only benevolent, it is also malevolent, [and that] because we’re 
equipped with certain emotional possibilities and certain motivational possibilities, the 
probability that we will encounter despair and frustration and disappointment and anxiety is 
just as real as the possibility that we will encounter elation and hope and satisfaction. [For 
human beings then] the world is bivalent; it takes with one hand and gives with the other. 
And that is true for the natural world which produces us and destroys us, as it is for the 
social world which fosters our development and crushes our individuality . . . 93 
The best poets have responded fruitfully and been very alive to all the timeless, universal, 
ineradicable aspects of (what used to be called) “evil” that can mar a human life. Contriving in this 
context a useful phrase and applying it to the lives of John Keats and Walt Whitman, the critic 
Harold Bloom speaks of the inevitable “pain and suffering of being a natural man or woman living 
and dying in a natural world”.94 Thus phrased, it does not sound quite so terrible; Bloom subtly 
                                                 
92 Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn argues that a precarious mental brittleness accompanies an unreasonably sunny view of the 
world: “[It would be more] correct to say that no [labour] camp can corrupt those . . . who do not accept the pitiful 
ideology which holds that “human beings are created for happiness,” an ideology which is done in by the first blow 
of the work assigner’s cudgel.” From Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn, The Gulag Archipelago, vol. 2, An Experiment in 
Literary Investigation, 626. Also cited above: Gabriele Schwab, Haunting Legacies: Violent Histories and 
Transgenerational Trauma, 42. 
 Similarly, Carl Jung found the idea of existence without an element of inner torment simply unnatural: 
“The apparently unendurable conflict is proof of the rightness of your life. A life without inner contradiction is either 
only half a life or else a life in the Beyond, which is destined only for angels. But God loves human beings more 
than the angels.” (William Blake conveys the same idea in The Marriage of Heaven and Hell: “Without contraries is 
no progression”). Jung also took it as uncontroversial that “even the most hard-boiled rationalist is not immune from 
shattering nightmares and haunting fears.” The first Jung quote is from C. G. Jung, Letters, 375. The latter one is 
from C. G. Jung, Jung on Christianity, ed. by Murray Stein, 207. 
93 Jordan Peterson, “Maps of Meaning: 4 Games People Must Play (TVO)” [15:50]. 
 The presuppositions unique to the current zeitgeist (touching on modern-era technology, entertainment 
and social media) are a paraphrase of the presentation in Jonathan Lear, Freud, 2. 
94 From Harold Bloom, The Daemon Knows, 362. 
56 
 
leads us to recognize the normality, the naturalness, of the ordeal. After all, who can deny that the 
best of lives involve living, aging and dying, and that having a body necessarily means vulnerability 
and risk? If Whitman was subject to the “pain and suffering of being a natural man”, then he can (to 
adapt a phrase from Ward Churchill), to the degree he was afflicted by that predicament, be said to 
have been “wounded” by life (a wound being a contingent crisis afflicting us liminally), not “sick” 
(sickness being a systemically pervasive crisis); Churchill writes “[being wounded] requires 
healing, [being sick requires] a cure.”95 
 I am here embarked on arguing that writing can be potentially healing (i.e. 
therapeutic), not curative. It would be terribly naïve to make the claim that every truly life-
threatening crisis can be tackled aesthetically. Yet, it would also be an unfortunate oversight to 
suggest that the accumulative implications of sustained liminal wounding could not present a 
situation every bit as grave as Churchill’s “sickness”. Hence, it is appropriate that Whitman deemed 
it noble to write in order to “leave men healthy” (see the etymological observation in footnote 47).96 
 If I can be excused for speculating semi-idly about something which perhaps lies 
beyond the realm of the knowable, one of the unique things about literature is the  very reason why 
it has proven so timelessly popular with reading audiences (or in illiterate eras, listening audiences): 
from myths and fairy-tales, handed down orally through prehistoric eons, to the handy volumes that 
have made the bestseller lists over the centuries and peppered our language with names and 
archetypes like Hamlet, Emma Bovary, Uriah Heep, Raskolnikov and Mildred Ratched.97 It seems 
plausible that literature works because it can, in happy instances, “catch [our] conscience” (or, less 
fancifully, almost mysteriously compel us to take an interest), and it is a poignant fact that our 
conscience can, as Hamlet well knew, be caught against our will. “The play’s the thing / Wherein 
I’ll catch the conscience of the king”, the Danish prince says. Sheherazade exploited a similar 
human susceptibility in order, night after night, to keep death at bay for another twenty-four hours – 
to put stories between her would-be executioner and her own execution. It seems that something in 
our psychological construction is sensitive, hospitable and willing – sometimes eager – to 
temporarily give ourselves over to what Freud calls “castles in the air”, to something as non-
immediate and intangible as the airy constructions of an imagined tale.98 The Canadian writer 
                                                 
95 Ward Churschill, Wielding Words Like Weapons: Selected Essays in Indigenism, 1995–2005, chapter 13. 
96 The “leave men healthy” quote is from With Walt Whitman in Camden, vol. 9, and is spoken on October 9, 1890. See 
Walt Whitman, Intimate with Walt: Selections from Whitman’s Conversations with Horace Traubel 1888–1892, 82. 
97 The creations of William Shakespeare, Gustave Flaubert, Charles Dickens, Fyodor Dostoyevsky and Ken Kesey, 
respectively. 
98 Sigmund Freud, “The Poet and Day-Dreaming”, in Sigmund Freud, On Creativity and the Unconscious: The 
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Sheila Heti has suggested that “[l]iterature would not work if we were all more different that we are 
alike”, so possibly it is the universal existential condition and the reassuring discovery that one is 
not alone in the world which sparks our interest in reports from the lives of other people – which 
accounts for much of the best literature (Alain de Botton has said that English literature is 
essentially about human relationships; see also epigraphic perspective 11).99 
 Adam Smith too noticed that we possess a fairly ready and somewhat mysterious 
ability to interest ourselves in narrative and narrated events, even when we know the involved 
names do not designate people who can need our help or become our friends. Thinking 
philosophically about the nature of human empathy – or “fellow-feeling” – Smith finds that 
something similar must charge our enjoyment of stories; we somehow live vicariously through 
others’ episodes, whether real or imagined: 
Whatever is the passion which arises . . . in the person principally concerned, an analogous 
emotion springs up, at the thought of his situation, in the breast of every attentive spectator. 
Our joy for the deliverance of those heroes of tragedy or romance who interest us, is as 
sincere as our grief for their distress, and our fellow-feeling with their misery is not more 
real than that with their happiness. We enter into their gratitude towards those faithful 
friends who did not desert them in their difficulties; and we heartily go along with their 
resentment against those perfidious traitors who injured, abandoned, or deceived them.100 
Smith is of the opinion that romances and tragedies animate the same vicarious emotions as scenes 
and episodes in real life. (In modern terminology, one might say that while we do not believe that 
someone’s courage is rewarded or punished we do, as reading bystanders, alieve it.) “In every 
passion of which the mind of man is susceptible, the emotions of the bystander always corresponds 
to what, by bringing the case home to himself, he imagines should be the sentiments of the 
sufferer”, adds Smith. 
 Another way in which the psychological distance between the literary domain and the 
                                                 
Psychology of Art, Literature, Love, and Religion, 46. 
99 Sheila Heti, introduction to Alain de Botton, Essays in Love, ix. Heti’s interesting statement is not new in literary 
history: Horace indicated it with his famous line “Why do you laugh? Change only the name, and the case is your 
own.” From Horace, Satires, in The Works of Horace: Translated into English Prose, book 1, 8, ll. 69–70. Henry 
Miller tapped into the same idea as the one expressed by Poulet (epigraphic perspective 4) when he wrote: “The 
good reader, like the good author, knows that everything stems from the same source. He knows that he could not 
participate in the author’s private experience were he not composed of the same substance through and through.” 
From Henry Miller, The Books in My Life, 29. 
 The observations from Alain de Botton (“English literature is not a subject, the real subject is 
relationships”) are given in this 2015 interview: Alain de Botton, “Talent will not be wasted for much longer”. 
100 Adam Smith, The Theory of Moral Sentiments, 4. In the following I shall explain how archetypal theory sheds light 
on Smith’s observation. 
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attentive reading “spectator” is reduced or bridged is present in the idea that we as enthusiastic 
readers identify not so much with a tragic or romantic character but with the glimpses of the author 
we may catch from bringing ourselves into intimate contact with the author’s work. This idea is 
persuasively presented by Alain de Botton: 
The way to look at literature is as an instrument that sensitizes us to different things. We all 
know that if five different people are asked to describe one scene, they will all describe it 
differently. Some will describe the light, others will focus on what people’s feet were doing, 
others will look at the material shape of the room, or whatever. A great writer picks up on 
those things that matter. It’s almost as if their radar is attuned to the most significant 
moments. . . . [F]or me, that radar is not something we should simply passively accept while 
we read the book. It’s something we should learn from; we should shut the book and then 
say, “Okay, I’ve read Jane Austen or Proust or Shakespeare, and now I’m going to see my 
mother, or I’m going to have a chat with my aunt or I’m going to go and talk to some friends 
in a coffeeshop, and, rather than just doing it the normal way, I’m going to look at them and 
I’m going to ask myself that basic question, How would Jane Austen see them? How would 
Proust see them? How would Shakespeare see them?” In other words, I’m not just going to 
look at the world of Shakespeare or Jane Austen through my eyes. I’m going to look at my 
world through their eyes. That is the benefit – that is the intelligence-giving power of great 
literature. We are sensitized by the books we read, and the more books we read and the 
deeper their lessons sink into us, the more pairs of glasses we have, and those glasses will 
enable us to see things that we would otherwise have missed.101 
xii. Sad Soliloquies in the Happy Valley 
Let me return to the suffering and desperation that even an relatively comfortable and by all 
standards enviable life can throw at us, no matter how many “existential trouble-shooters” we might 
be able to enlist to prevent and dispel any crisis imaginable. Dr Johnson’s Rasselas contains an 
archetypal and culturally familiar picture of a human being plunged into existential crisis, a human 
being about whom a companion might say (as was said of Captain Ahab): He is “sort of sick, and 
yet he don’t look so. In fact, he ain’t sick; but no, he isn’t well either”.102 I have already mentioned 
Ward Churchill’s fruitful distinction between sick and wounded, which might apply here and lead 
us to define this state as of the latter category. See Churchill’s distinction between being sick and 
                                                 
101 Alain de Botton, “How Proust Can Change Your Life” (video interview), accessed November 3, 2016. 
102 These words are spoken by Captain Peleg in Herman Melville, Moby Dick (chapter 16). Moby Dick is sometimes 
compared to Leaves of Grass; Van Wick Brooks calls them “planetary” books in The Times of Melville and 
Whitman, adding: “One gave the dark side of the planet, the other the bright.” Indicating the archetypal nature of the 
predicament in question, many other classic stories explore and dramatize comparable existential or spiritual 
malaise, e.g. The Pilgrim’s Progress whose eponymous hero, like Rasselas, finds himself anxious and directionless 
before formulating his original answer: to pursue “an inheritance incorruptible, undefiled, and that fadeth not away.” 
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wounded above.103 Usefully enough, the kind of wound that interests me (and Churchill) has been 
dealt the soul. Rasselas is a character and person for whom practically all Steven Pinker’s 
parametres have been satisfied (his home is the so-called Happy Valley where the prince’s every 
wish is attended to by servants and entertainers), yet who nonetheless miserably comes to realize 
that for the existentially dislocated (and “soul-wounded”) even a life of privilege and pleasure 
becomes a problem demanding that its central character contrive an individual solution, locate a 
source of healing. A bewildering Weltschmerz, a splenetic ennui, an agonizing restlessness, has at 
the beginning of the book begun to vex the young prince who has ample opportunity to reflect on 
his woeful situation. Involuntarily he takes to running philosophical and rhetorically charged 
inventories of the suffering to which human flesh is heir: 
“What,” said he, “makes the difference between man and all the rest of the animal creation? 
Every beast that strays beside me has the same corporal necessities with myself: he is 
hungry, and crops the grass; he is thirsty, and drinks the stream; his thirst and hunger are 
appeased; he is satisfied, and sleeps; he rises again, and is hungry; he is again fed, and is at 
rest. I am hungry and thirsty, like him, but when thirst and hunger cease, I am not at rest. I 
am, like him, pained with want, but am not, like him, satisfied with fulness. . . . I can 
discover in me no power of perception which is not glutted with its proper pleasure, yet I do 
not feel myself delighted. Man surely has some latent sense for which this place affords no 
gratification; or he has some desire distinct from sense, which must be satisfied before he 
can be happy. . . . I have many distresses from which you [the animals of the fields] are free; 
I fear pain when I do not feel it; I sometimes shrink at evils recollected, and sometimes start 
at evils anticipated: surely the equity of Providence has balanced peculiar sufferings with 
peculiar enjoyments.”104 
                                                 
103 Churchill adds: “To describe and assert the distinction [between being sick and being wounded can be] an act of 
empowerment . . .” A person’s rejection of a diagnosis of his or her predicament summed up in “the patient is sick” 
is a theme also addressed by Thomaz Szasz (overtly, in the following) and Adam Phillips. Szasz writes that in order 
to “ameliorate” the problems of those who suffer and seek help, the “psychiatrist . . . offers not treatment or cure but 
psychological counseling.” Phillips would rather reappropriate and seek to reintegrate whatever it is inherent to a 
person that is resistant and aloof to the phenomenon of a cure: “We are [always] already confounded by our fate. 
Psychoanalysis – and this is another paradox at the heart of Freud’s work – is always after the event. It doesn’t cure 
people so much as show them what it is about themselves that is incurable. Or, rather, it shows them the areas of 
their lives in which ‘cure’ would be the wrong word; in which we have to come up with something else to do other 
than get better. And one thing we can do, Freud . . . suggests, is track the unconsciousness of our lives.” This is what 
W. H. Auden called Freud’s attempt to “have us remember most of all / to be enthusiastic over the night.” 
  See Thomas S. Szasz, Ideology and Insanity, 80; Adam Phillips, Side Effects, 13–14. 
 And why are our problems normal and natural? Because “all the information that you’ve ever gathered 
in your entire life to build yourself out of, and to make your life stable, has come as a consequence of your ability to 
explore what you don’t understand”, which if we are unable to confront it will remain bewildering and paralyzing. 
From Jordan Peterson, “Maps of Meaning: 13 The Force Within (TVO)” [14:18]. 
104 Samuel Johnson, The History of Rasselas, Prince of Abissinia, in Samuel Johnson, Selected Writings, 263. 
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Herein lies, in part, the prince’s important observation that, in the words of the contemporary 
psychologist Jordan Peterson, “the fundamental constituent elements of reality” are not material to 
the individual (that is, the person forced to exist in the material landscape and whose well-being is 
what interests us); rather, the fundamental constituent elements of each individual’s “own reality” 
are 
emotional, they’re motivational, they’re dreams, they’re visions, they’re relationships with 
other people. They’re conscious: they’re dependent on consciousness [and] self-
consciousness.105 
In fact, it is a somewhat humbling facts about modern neurological science that specialists have, to 
quote Peterson speaking, “absolutely no materialist explanation whatsoever either for consciousness 
or self-consciousness”. But I would add that literary qualia – literary experiences, literary 
engagement and literary pleasure – retain some of their fascination precisely because the 
neurological facts about how they affect, challenge and delight the human psyche stubbornly elude 
the most subtle among those who make it their business to know. Now, back to Rasselas who thus 
locates his problem, first and foremost, in his soul or psyche: Besides learning that his happiness is 
not the neat and inevitable result of exposure to all the happy influences known to man, it appears 
that the prince discovers shortly afterwards the relief that attends verbal articulation of inner 
suffering.106 Rasselas discovers, in the words of Thomas Mann, that “knowledge of the soul would 
unfailingly make us melancholy if the pleasures of expression did not keep us alert and of good 
cheer.”107 
 The notion of reaping cathartic or therapeutic rewards from literary self-representation 
is not new and has to me a particularly important precursor in the Holocaust survivor Viktor 
Frankl’s account of his experiences in Theresienstadt and Auschwitz, written shortly after his 
release at the end of the war. Embodying a therapeutic system based partly on what he saw and 
realized while a prisoner in the camps, his work Man’s Search for Meaning (originally and 
                                                 
105 From Jordan Peterson, “The Necessity of Virtue”. 
106 Regarding the words “soul” and “psyche”: Sam Parnia (interviewed here by Robert Lawrence Kuhn for the PBS 
series Closer to Truth), has said that conflating the terms “mind”, “consciousness”, “psyche”, “soul” and “self” is 
permissible in certain contexts. From this interview: Sam Parnia and Robert Lawrence Kuhn, Closer to Truth [2:50], 
accessed October 2016.   
107 Thomas Mann, Tonio Kröger, in Death in Venice: and Seven Other Stories, 92. Compare Leonard Cohen’s line from 
The Favourite Game (footnote 185). 
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accurately entitled From Death-Camp to Existentialism) includes the following account which sees 
the author, in his state of unimaginable unmitigated misery and debasement, forcing his 
thoughts to turn to another subject. . . . I [imagined that I] was giving a lecture on the 
psychology of the concentration camp! All that oppressed me at that moment became 
objective, seen and described from the remote viewpoint of science. By this method I 
succeeded somehow in rising above the situation, above the sufferings of the moment, and I 
observed them as if they were already of the past. Both I and my troubles became the object 
of an interesting psychoscientific study undertaken by myself. What does Spinoza say in his 
Ethics? – “Affectus, qui passio est, desinit esse passio simulatque eius claram et distinctam 
formamus ideam.” Emotion, which is suffering, ceases to be suffering as soon as we form a 
clear and precise picture of it.  
I shall later return to Frankl and have more to say on what exactly he discovered about suffering 
while imprisoned during World War II, particularly about human survival. 
 On the related note of transitioning from suffering to articulation based in suffering, a 
famous essay by Freud contains the interesting view that “unsatisfied wishes are the driving power 
behind phantasies”, which leads Freud to conclude that “happy people never make phantisies”. 
Freud goes on to consider “[men] of literary talent” and explains that “many emotions which are 
essentially painful may become a source of enjoyment to the spectators and hearers of a poet’s 
work.” An author will – or at any rate, can – elicit “great pleasure”, including sometimes a “feeling 
of repulsion [being] overcome”, or instigate a “release of tensions in [the] minds” of his or her 
audience by skillfully “relat[ing] what we take to be his personal day-dreams”. For this, a sustained 
theme in the present thesis, incidentally, Freud does not offer a complete and unimprovable reason 
or explanation, but after acknowledging that the “technique” with which the writer accomplishes 
this is “his innermost secret” (suggesting that the enjoyment-enhancing qualities may differ among 
authors), he does recognise that it has to do with the individual’s essential loneliness (which, in 
turn, is an issue related with the enjoyment of “repulsion . . . overcome”). It is his view that “the 
essential ars poetica” of a writer is sympathetic, respectful and generous to our existential solitude, 
to the fact of “those barriers [which, once we grow up and leave our babyhood behind, we find] 
erected between every individual being and all others.” It seems plausible, I think (and shall argue), 
that the writer can him- or herself partake of and share some of the “aesthetic . . . pleasure” that is 
made available to an audience (see Hermann Hesse’s words in footnote 191: “[the poem] speaks 
first of all to the poet himself, it is his cry, his scream, his dream, his smile, his whirling fists”). This 
is apparently the case with Rasselas. While I cannot settle whether having him form beautiful 
soliloquys on the hollowness of existence afforded his author, Dr Johnson, personal pleasure, I can 
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coherently infer that Johnson certainly felt it correct as an author to arrange for his character to 
discover some respite from suffering by engaging in a kind of creative process of sublimation in 
which frustrated day-dreams were enabled to reemerge in the shape of dignified, melancholy and 
aesthetically robust soliloquies; for he writes (emphasis added): 
With observations like these the Prince amused himself as he returned, uttering them with a 
plaintive voice, yet with a look that discovered him to feel some complacence in his own 
perspicacity, and to receive some solace of the miseries of life from consciousness of the 
delicacy with which he felt and the eloquence with which he bewailed them. . . . [H]is heart 
was lightened.  
Matthew Arnold considered poetry a “criticism of life”, and the gist of that observation seems 
indicated in this context.108 Interestingly, Freud seems to share Heti’s point that “[l]iterature would 
not work if we were all more different that we are alike” as well as agree with Smith’s point that we 
quite spontaneously enter into highly intimate psychological communion with the characters 
appearing before us via a literary medium. Writes Freud: 
Perhaps much that brings about this [aesthetically pleasant result in the audience] consists in 
the writer’s putting us into a position in which we can enjoy our own day-dreams without 
reproach or shame.109 
For, significantly, day-dreams need not be a source of pain in and of themselves (unlike the perhaps 
more straightforward agonies of sorrows and anxiety), but can become so by virtue of being 
impossible to mention to anybody in our present circle of acquaintances (homosexual desire in the 
Victorian era may represent a case in point).110 After all, not every private wish is equally well-
suited for the kinds of conversation we are brave and articulate enough to have with our friends and 
family. And even if, by laying the cards of our psychic frailty or discomfort on the table, we manage 
to elicit the sympathy of friends or family, we might in truth have benefited more from the sense 
that our experience was not ours alone, from feeling deeply the dismantling of “those barriers” 
                                                 
108 In Arnold’s poem “Wordsworth” (1879), he states that “poetry is at bottom a criticism of life.” Dietmar Schloss, 
Culture and Criticism in Henry James, 20. 
109 Sigmund Freud, “The Poet and Day-Dreaming”, in On Creativity and the Unconscious, 54. 
110 I have found Gregory Orr’s essay on Whitman (in Poetry as Survival, 159–179) both cogent and useful, but am 
simultaneously sympathetic to Harold Bloom’s injunction to “clear[] your mind of the nonsense that our nation’s 
greatest writer can be understood merely in terms of his homoerotic orientation.” Unconsciously echoing Freud’s 
phrase “reproach or shame”, Orr writes: “What I want to claim about Whitman is simply this: that to be gay in an 
intolerant, heterosexual world is to be an outsider, to be someone . . . who personally feels the destructive forces of 
guilt and shame.” For Bloom’s words, see his introduction to Frank D. Casale, Bloom’s How to Write about Walt 
Whitman, vi. 
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separating our predicament from that of a fellow sufferer somewhere in the world. (“Misery loves 
company”, an old proverb states; on the dissolution of barriers, see Cohen in footnote 467.) 
Extended sympathy might reinforce our sense of being uniquely cursed, whereas the imagined 
company of a fellow sufferer will make our predicament seem a much less personal affront. Peter 
Abelard captures some of the philosophy behind this kind of dynamic precisely: 
Often the hearts of men and women are stirred, as likewise they are soothed in their sorrows, 
more by example than by words. And therefore, because I too have known some consolation 
from speech had with one who was a witness thereof, am I now minded to write of the 
sufferings which have sprung out of my misfortunes, for the eyes of one who, though absent, 
is of himself ever a consoler. This I do so that, in comparing your sorrows with mine, you 
may discover that yours are in truth nought, or at the most but of small account, and so you 
shall come to bear them more easily.111 
Freud’s words that much that brings about a pleasant release of tension in our minds as consumers 
of the relevant literature “consists in the writer’s putting us into a position in which we can enjoy 
our own day-dreams without reproach or shame” are finally also in agreement with Alain de 
Botton’s claim that certain good books can offer “descriptions of who we genuinely are . . . with an 
honesty quite different from what ordinary conversation allows for”. This is quite obviously a great 
relief when we feel ourselves misunderstood, strange and are unable to “say what is really on our 
minds”; he goes on: 
In the best books it’s as if the writer knows us better than we know ourselves [and finds] the 
words to describe the fragile, weird, special experiences of our inner lives. . . . Writers open 
our hearts and minds – and give us maps to our own selves so that we can travel in them 
more reliably and with less of a feeling of paranoia and persecution. As the writer Emerson 
remarked: ‘In the works of great writers, we find our own neglected thoughts.’112 
An undercurrent in Alain de Botton’s works is captured in his next – concluding – words, which can 
be allowed to double as an ethos central and meaningful to this dissertation also: 
[I]f literature can really do all these things, we might need to treat it a bit differently to the 
way we do now. We tend to treat it as a distraction, an entertainment (something for the 
beach). But it’s far more than that. It’s really therapy, in the broad sense. . . . Literature 
deserves its prestige for one reason above all others: because it’s a tool to help us live and 
die with a little more wisdom, goodness and sanity. 
                                                 
111 Peter Abelard, foreword to Historia Calamitatum. Cited as prologue to Henry Miller, Tropic of Capricorn. 
112 Alain de Botton, “What Is Literature for?” (video essay). 
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xiii. Love and Sorrow 
There is of course no guarantee that we can apply literature “tool”-like and instrumentally to our 
lives in a useful, rewarding manner. But when things look grim and no other analgesic is 
forthcoming, a merely contingent source of redemption is, I venture, preferable to none at all. De 
Botton, who with the philosopher John Armstrong has cowritten a book entitled Art as Therapy, 
writes (although not in that book) that “art [whether literary, visual or otherwise] is there to help us 
make us feel less lonely, to make us understand our pains and to help us precisely when love has 
failed us.”113 I am ready to defend the view, for which I think there are good arguments, that our 
psychological health is to a high degree a correlate of the amount of love in our life. It is one of 
those things that every child knows – although august adults may find it a bit awkward to estimate 
and express the degree to which the presence of a caring, loving sympathizer alleviates suffering. 
The awkwardness is lessened somewhat if we substitute “empathy” for “love”, and (reassuringly) it 
turns out that the fact of the human capacity for empathy is nothing less than a prerequisite for 
moral philosophy. A poet, as I stated earlier, should be someone who can confront the quirks, needs 
and vulnerabilities of humanity with a calm and clear eye, and this is exactly what W. H. Auden did 
when he stated, in “September 1, 1939”, that “we must love one another or die.” Philosophers and 
psychoanalysts, too, can hardly afford to ignore the basic relationship between love or empathy (on 
which social integration and acceptance rest) and human well-being. The emphases in the following 
are mine: 
We are not iron men. We are buffeted by misfortunes, frequently dependent on other people, 
far from immune to fears, hopes, griefs, and desires. . . . [Y]ou are the creation of luck, not 
immune to time and chance, and any day infirmity or accident can find you, depending 
entirely on the good offices of others.114 
Faced with the stresses and strains of everyday life, it’s easy now for people to feel that 
they’re failing. And what they are failing at, one way or another, is managing the ordinary 
excesses that we are all beset by. Too much frustration, too much bad feeling, too little love, 
too little success, and so on.115 
                                                 
113 From Alain de Botton’s afterword to Alain de Botton, Essays in Love, 215.  
114 From Simon Blackburn, Mirror, Mirror: The Uses and Abuses of Self-Love, 7 and 190.  
115 Adam Phillips, “Adam Phillips – ‘On Being Too Much for Ourselves’ – BBC Radio4 – The Essay – Part 4” [0:37]. 
The essay is featured in Phillips’s book On Balance. 
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These perspectives are interesting and useful for subtly reminding us of something profound as well 
as important to my argument. Art is old; so is love – both are human constants, practically speaking, 
which have presumably accompanied humans in some shape or form for a long, long time – they 
reach deep into prehistory to be coincidental with the rapid development of the prefrontol cortex 
and our most human traits. All that time, love has surely been failing us periodically, powerfully 
defeated us, trampled on our dreams, subjected us to agonising psychic travails that were no doubt 
variously surprising, terrifying or humbling. But notice, before I proceed, that I am not talking 
chiefly of the pain that is caused by a sense of unrequited romantic love (incidentally, a historically 
recent mass phenomenon). I mean, rather, that love (familial, confraternal, communal, what you 
like) fails us when – for whatever reason – it is absent during crises of the heart, during moment of 
psychic pain for which it is, I shall assume, the most expedient kind of cure. 
 It is to me a deeply poignant fact that our options, defenses, remedies and tactics when 
faced with this category of crisis are currently as few and useless as they always have been. 
Redeeming that poignancy somewhat, Alain de Botton argues, as I have already said, that “art is 
there to help us . . . when love has failed us,” to which Gregory Orr adds: “Human culture 
“invented” or evolved the personal lyric as a means of helping individuals survive the existential 
crises represented by the extremes of subjectivity and also by such outer circumstances as poverty, 
suffering, pain, illness, violence, of loss of a loved one.”116 
 When love “fails us – when we are made, for example, to suffer our “reproach or 
shame [etc.]” in psychoexistential exile from sympathizers or fellow-sufferers – we are in trouble 
precisely because we are suffering in an area of life where quick, convenient and recognizably 
instrumental solutions are not and cannot enter. We are in the grips of a type of suffering that 
bypasses all we have physically built and invented to fortify our lives over eons of human history. 
In an age when philosophy is less and less at the front of average Western citizens’ mind, such 
problems – problems without technological, science-based solutions – are something of an 
unwelcome anomaly, at least from the position of thinking systematically and theoretically about 
resolving them. The dominant ethos of our times is optimistic in the sense that most things are 
automatically taken to be in principle physically perfectible; even pathology of the human mind is 
studied in principle no differently than a physicist studies the combustion engine. Verifiability and 
replication of results are the criterion under which potential ideas must be evaluated. But the 
different problems that (absent) “love”, in the broadest sense, can wreak across our lives (including 
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crises of self-worth, anxiety, loneliness, guilt, jealousy, disappointment in self or other, nervous 
break-downs, shame and sexual woes) are of an essentially timeless quality, which renders them 
decidedly cure-proof (in the instrumental definition of cure). A broken heart, shattered hopes, 
blasted self-esteem, existential fear and so on, do not represent problems amenable to practical 
solutions for the obvious reason that by virtue of being psychological problems they cannot be 
brought in proper contact with a cure. 
 In the poem “Harlem”, Langston Hughes asked “What happens to a dream deferred?” 
and found himself unable to move past his amusing and hopeless string of questions: 
Does it dry up 
like a raisin in the sun? 
Or fester like a sore— 
And then run? 
Does it stink like rotten meat? 
Or crust and sugar over— 
like a syrupy sweet?  
Maybe it just sags 
like a heavy load.  
Or does it explode? 
A dream deferred is, as everyone knows, a common phenomenon (with a real presence) in the 
world. But it is admittedly real and present in the world – and matters darkly to whomever it 
matters – in ways categorically different from that of rotting meat, sagging loads or raisins drying 
up in the sun. It is real in a way very similar to the way H. W. Auden found love to be real and 
present in the world. In the poem “Tell Me the Truth about Love”, W. H. Auden too looked for 
answers, answers about the quality of love. He did so in a manner very similar to that of Hughes 
and was similarly unable to provide an anatomy of the mystery under observation: 
Does [love] look like a pair of pyjamas, 
Or the ham in a temperance hotel? 
Does its odour remind one of llamas, 
Or has it a comforting smell? 
Is it prickly to touch as a hedge is, 
Or soft as eiderdown fluff? 
Is it sharp or quite smooth at the edges? 
O tell me the truth about love. 
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Evidently, the matter is too deep for logical, lexical, or intellectual explanations. (The singer and 
writer Leonard Cohen once made the useful comment that certain things that resist being “explained 
. . . must be embraced.”117) And yet, despite the absurdist litany of questions, something 
meaningful, important and concrete (but empirically elusive) is known by Auden’s speaker about 
love. The speaker knows that the respectable, official and learned generally find love awkward to 
acknowledge openly and seriously (“Our history books refer to it / In cryptic little notes”); that it is 
powerful enough to motivate many to migrate to another continent (“It’s quite a common topic on / 
The Transatlantic boats;”); that its accidents can in some cases sap the sufferer of his or her will to 
live (“I’ve found the subject mentioned in / Accounts of suicides,”); and that its inspiring episodes 
can overwhelm lovers and turn them temporarily into poets while waiting for a train (“And even 
seen it scribbled on / The backs of railway guides”). When a pain gathers momentum in the human 
psyche, the world seems to change before the eyes of the sufferer – so much so that Goethe’s 
Werther is far from being the only person on the long list of suicides, literary and otherwise. It is a 
kind of premise of this thesis that all contenders for a swift and instrumental physical cure, even 
those affecting the psyche more than anything else (such as alcohol or psychoactive drugs), fall 
short of meriting the word “cure”. That term should be reserved for more elegant and less 
aggressive means. After all, because the initial causes of psychic pain are almost always literally 
irreversible (so, for instance, traumatic childhood episodes, accidents and many other crises which 
are the result of either mechanical or genetic misfortune or “evil”), a physical cure is powerless to 
rectify the problem per se. As far as I am concerned, the difference between an instrumental cure 
and therapeutic engagement (which may offer healing) is that the former is valuable to the extent it 
can eliminate the problem swiftly and completely whereas the latter is valuable to the extent it can 
accommodate, befriend and often painlessly produce a helpful redescription of the problem – not 
annihilate it (see Phillips in footnote 277). If the problem is, say, a raging fire that threatens to 
obliterate one’s crop, the cure will soak the field, put out the fire and drown the plants, whereas a 
therapeutic confrontation with the problem is committed to finding a use for the fire, perhaps 
contain and prevent its spread, and accept that crops must from now on be grown elsewhere. 
Therapy’s power is to enable the acquisition of a new attitude to one’s pain, one that makes 
coexisting with the pain a livable scenario; the similar argument for a cure is that it transforms the 
sufferer into a kind of master over mental pains, vested with the power, in theory, to decide which 
can linger and which should go. The reason why I find being pacifistically accommodating toward 
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psychic pain whenever possible an appealing position ultimately comes down to a matter of “faith” 
(although not the religious kind). If one can seriously consider the possibility that one’s psychic 
pain is importantly symptomatic of one’s failed attempts to interact smoothly with the surrounding 
landscape, one is compelled to welcome and scrutinize the symptoms provided one wishes to 
comprehend one’s bruising collisions with the landscape. But if psychic pain is not assumed to have 
symptomatic newsworthiness, then perhaps a swift execution of the offending part of the mind is 
preferable. 
 What, then, is an appropriate way to behave when help is needed in this most basic 
and human way – when our psyches are in that primordial state of pain that shoots to the core of our 
being (presumably because it has dogged us consistently through our Pleistocene evolution)? While 
in this thesis I shall not be concerned with any kind of solution to psychic suffering invented and 
manufactured in a laboratory, it is important to appreciate some of the reasons why so-called “art-
as-therapy” is these days so widely disregarded in favor of alternatives that probably strike most 
modern world-views as more radical, more comfortingly “one-size-fits-all” (than an art therapeutic 
program, presumably), something that does not commit the patient to spending too much time and 
effort, something conveying a powerful aura of the “cutting-edge” and technological sophistication 
(enough so to warrant patent protection), something quite observably effective (even if the 
effectiveness is chiefly felt as more or less expected side-effects). The at least equally sophisticated 
osmotic transfusion, so to speak, of the most moving or interesting details of a given artwork into 
the scientifically baffling neural complexity that underlies a person’s mind is, it would seem, largely 
deemed a different kind of “sophisticated” or “radical” from that of psychopharmaca or a change in 
diet or exercise (which, like practically everything, also affects our minds in a number of ways). 
There was a time when it could be seriously opined that whereas science was appropriately the 
domain of those “desir[ing] to see things as they are”, culture was worthy of respect because it had 
essentially risen out of humanity itself, including 
all the love of our neighbour, the impulses towards action, help, and beneficence, the desire 
for stopping human error, clearing human confusion, and diminishing the sum of human 
misery, the noble aspiration to leave the world better and happier than we found it—motives 
eminently such as are called social . . . [Culture] moves by the force, not merely or primarily 
of the scientific passion for pure knowledge, but also of the moral and social passion for 
doing good.118 
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But in a human emergency – when confusion is most paralysing, say, and we are increasingly guilty 
of leaving the world worse off and unhappier than we found it – it is no longer very fashionable to 
look inward, to dwell on timeless questions, to take an interest in the ineluctable error and 
culpability of humans or recall the wisdom of geniuses. Because would-be scientific panaceas (none 
truly worthy of the name exists, of course, despite the many very impressive break-throughs 
achieved by great scientists) have always appeared in a flash of insight or as a sudden epiphany, 
their merits are gazetted across the culture in louder, prouder tones than are the merits and charms 
of art, culture, philosophy and wisdom, which have come about painstakingly and organically – not 
spontaneously – and, in Oscar Wilde’s satirical words, are “quite useless”. So in this hypothetical 
scenario, the troubled modern individual would find Matthew Arnold’s words quaintly charming 
and laughably naive. 
 Although from a cosmic perspective, the same laws must necessarily apply to all 
domains of human activity, a few undeniable intellectual differences persist between the natural 
science, on the one hand, and the arts, philosophy, existentialism and (scientifically untestable) 
theories, on the other. But interestingly, both, I venture, can arguably be expected to perform what 
are taken to be desirable services – I use the word loosely – that are useful for those able to receive 
them. The respective methodologies are obviously radically different, but there is some 
commonality in their fundamental raisons d’être. In a shrewdly introspective statement, Alfred 
Einstein once succinctly implied what is, in my opinion, the principal difference between the natural 
sciences and the arts: “I sold myself body and soul to science”, he said, “—a flight from the I and 
we to the it.”119 These words bear out the premise (central to this thesis) that the world can, at least 
in principle, be approached from the subjective, anthropocentric perspective of the affected 
individual and, alternatively, from the objective, scientifically unassailable “perspective” of a 
psyche-less omnipresent “ideal observer” – from what the philosopher Henry Sidgwick called “the 
perspective of the universe”. The latter is totally undistracted by personal values or what Kurt 
Vonnegut calls the “existential hum”, so there is something Platonic and perfect about this 
description of the world – it can by definition never be experienced.120 Both views have their 
usefulness, but it is important to know from which one one is regarding reality. As for the 
widespread, involuntary privileging of the latter in the West these days, the privileging is hardly 
surprising. That science and technology have impressively transformed the world and continue to 
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do so is wholly beyond dispute. The first man-made structure visible from space (The Wall of 
China) was the result of then-sophisticated technological ingenuity (as well as brute force), and the 
same applies for the rockets and satellites that were crucial in finally establishing its visibility from 
space. The modern world is one in which the accelerating rise of new physical possibilities is only 
rivaled by the impressive grinding into the dust of age-old problems, problems that most of our 
ancestors found so unconquerable and impenetrable that they were explained by appeal to the 
supernatural realm; thus, diseases were once explained by appeal to demons, and weather by appeal 
to gods. Given that most thoroughgoing transformation of our world in recent history – enabled by 
the fortuitous discoveries and scrupulous labours of Copernicus, Galilei, Kepler, Newton, Lenoir, 
Watt, Morse, Bell, Edison, Darwin, Pasteur, Mendel, Röntgen, Tesla, Curie, the Wright Brothers, 
Einstein, Turing and their colleageus – it is not surprising that we tend by default to look in the 
direction of experts in “it” rather than experts in “I” and “we” when our lives throw up discomfort 
and ambiguity. 
xiv. Technological Panaceas 
But there is a problem with this automatic disposition or bias, and Henry David Thoreau summed it 
up nicely: “[T]he improvement of ages have had but little influence on the essential laws of man’s 
existence.”121 Around a hundred years later, the essayist, thinker and exponent of Buddhist thought 
to Western audiences Alan Watts took what he called a long and wide view of things only to register 
that “the entire project of ‘conquering nature’ ”, which in his view was the métier of all the 
aforementioned scientists, “appears more and more of a mirage – an increase in the pace of living 
without fundamental change of position”.122 Alain de Botton willingly grants that the “trajectories 
of mankind have been pointed in a firmly upward direction for several centuries” and that 
[m]aterial improvements since the mid-eighteenth century have . . . have so exponentially 
increased our comfort, safety, wealth and power . . . as to deal and almost fatal blow to our 
capacity to remain pessimistic. . . . [W]e have witnessed the cracking of the genetic code, the 
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invention of the mobile phone, the opening of Western-style supermarkets in remote corners 
of China and the launch of Hubble telescope.123 
One is almost, he writes, forgiven for sometimes expecting that “the combined powers of the IMF, 
the medical research establishment, Silicon Valley and democratic politics could together cure the 
ills of mankind”. Unfortunately, he too cannot resist the feeling that “the essential laws of man’s 
existence” float obliviously free of all triumphant victories among the scientific community. Indeed, 
it must be admitted that although mankind as a whole has benefited in countless instances 
we do not comprise mankind: none of us individuals can dwell exclusively amidst the 
ground-breaking developments in genetics or telecommunications that lend out age its 
distinctive and buoyant prejudices. We may derive some benefit from the availability of hot 
baths and computer chips, but our lives are no less subject to accidents, frustrated ambition, 
jealousy, anxiety or death than were those of our medieval forebears. . . . [Happiness is 
unable to] ever make a permanent home for itself on this earth.124 
It is an “ontological truth” – and a “fundamental statement about the nature of being” in Jordan 
Peterson’s words – that “suffering is an integral part of being”, an inevitable corollary of the fact 
that human beings are sentient creatures with no choice but to live within the certain parameters, 
certain quite specific limitation.125 This truth obtains so universally as to be an almost forgotten or 
invisible condition and will to many be so familiar as to seem a cliché. Given the fairly upbeat and 
optimistic cultural spirits in the West, such an apparently off-putting and grim insight may not be 
widely and frequently mentioned, yet (informally speaking) there would be no undertakers, 
insurance agencies, doctors or therapists if it were not true. And yet, as I have said, panic and 
despair are premature and unwarranted reactions. A passage from Alice Munro’s story “The 
Children Stay” comes to mind: While this universal human condition may be, so to speak, chronic, 
“chronic means that it will be permanent but perhaps not constant. . . . And you’ll learn some tricks 
to dull it or banish it, trying not to end up destroying what you incurred this pain to get.” There is, 
in other words, a price to pay for embodied and psychological life. The mature response will accept 
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our fundamental vulnerability to suffering which frees up mental power to focus on living with and 
in spite of it rather than trying to dismantle and remove it as an “ontological truth.” 
xv. Approaching Poetry as Therapy or Healing for Woundedness 
I have been suggesting that because the ablest and most likely trouble-shooters servicing our culture 
– from their posts at the frontier of what is technologically possible – can, in Judith Harris’s phrase, 
offer no “protective cuirass” for our fundamental existential and psychic vulnerability, the 
individual is compelled to seek solutions or coping mechanisms elsewhere.126 Religious faith and 
community are the answer for some and I have no doubt the therapeutic payoff from that approach 
can in some cases be real and valuable. In fact, by analogy many of the arguments concerning 
“literature as therapy” developed in this thesis could probably be adapted – with no appeal 
whatsoever to the numinous and esoteric – to fit the type of healing and therapy that is the preserve 
of churches and faiths all over the world. But this is a thesis on the therapeutic engagement with 
literature, and as such it has much in common with Mary Kinzie’s constructive ambitions in that 
context and on behalf specifically of poetry. In her book The Cure of Poetry in an Age of Prose: 
Moral Essays on the Poet’s Calling, she explains that poetry must exhibit both “technical 
concentration and moral truth” (on “truth”, see Bernet in footnote 48), the latter half of which 
statement arguably reveals her to be a critic celebrating and emphasizing the ability of poems (and 
indeed any writing) to be sensitive and generous – not blind or indifferent – to human suffering.127 
Her 
definition reflects the demand that a novel, poem, play, or artful meditation reply to the need 
for coherence in a human life while reflecting the facts of experiential complexity, and that 
literary work must speak memorably about our great anxieties—affliction, injustice, 
death.128 
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Citing Rilke – “You must change your life” – Kinzie discusses this existential possibility with the 
practicality and energy of a non-fatalist, non-defeatist person. In other words, it is Kinzie’s point 
that Rilke’s words succinctly express the real (because true) possibility that we might discover and 
recover, if we tried, a modicum of self-agency against external forces vying with us to govern our 
lives. Few thinkers articulate this point better than Viktor Frankl, as I shall show at the end of this 
chapter. Poetry can offer a “stay against confusion,” Robert Frost wrote, and when it does it is a 
shining human triumph, one which those plunged in suffering would be foolish not to harness art in 
order to try to mimic and follow. “If you are doing it right, rather than you watching it, art sees and 
changes you . . . . [W]hat if one imagined the work itself to be announcing its demeanor, and 
soliciting and modifying our scrutiny by its own?” Kinzie writes. Characteristic of Kinzie’s 
hopefully confident claims on behalf of the potential effectiveness of art and poetry as vehicles for 
self-renovation is a certain wise and reasonable modesty. I identify the same modest hopefulness in 
Adam Phillips’s attitude to psychoanalytic therapy: Psychoanalysis, he says, and I share his view, 
“is an experiment. It’s not as though it promises a better life, but it might do.”129 (Cathy Caruth, as I 
shall show shortly hereafter, offers an explanation for the kinship between literature and 
psychoanalysis.) I have already argued that in an emergency – when the need for relief is urgent – it 
is irrational to be excessively exacting, pedantic and dismissive of any source of relief on account 
purely of its contingent or only partial effectiveness. In the introduction to her book (page x), Kinzie 
seems to see things the same way, as is evidenced by the caution with which she chooses her verbs: 
I have frequently experienced the sensation that to study a work, a painting or poem, was to 
be studied in return, until studying, listening, or reading became also a process of being 
                                                 
are their next of kin.” Simic is cited in Neil Astley, ed., Staying Alive: Real Poems for Unreal Times, 29. Also, Orhan 
Pamuk, “My Father’s Suitcase” (Nobel lecture). 
 Cf. Judith Harris’s words (in footnote 472) that “A poet must bring sadness or lament into the reader’s 
heart.” Whitman, as will become clear, is strongly an exemplar of the moral “demands” expressed by Kinzie – as 
were Federico Garcia Lorca and others. Leonard Cohen found them in Lorca whom he took to stress that “if one is 
to express the great inevitable defeat that awaits us all, it must be done within the strict confines of dignity and 
beauty” (which ensures, arguably, that the expression turns out “memorable”). From Sylvie Simmons, I’m Your 
Man: The Life of Leonard Cohen, 491. 
 Jordan Peterson, finally, contributes the distinction that, “Any good work of art . . . speaks to you of 
things that you almost know but don’t yet know. That’s what makes it profound.” When art achieves that, I would 
claim, it meets our need for (i.e. instils) “coherence” (Kinzie’s term) in our lives. From a public talk: Jordan 
Peterson, “2017/03/12: Strengthen the Individual: A Counterpoint to Post Modern Political Correctness” [18:45]. 
129 From Adam Phillips, “Adam Phillips: ‘Against Self-Criticism’ (with Q&A)” [47:25]. Thomas S. Szasz writes: “What 
psychoanalysis (and some other therapies) can offer [the suffering individual] is a better knowledge of himself, 
which may enable him to make new and better choices in the conduct of his life.” From Thomas S. Szasz, Ideology 
and Insanity, 80. 
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studied, of being read. . . . It may be that if we could restrain our chronic urge to reduce art 
to something else, we might perceive truths we could not have predicted. 
The hope is, of course, that such “truths” afford us the opportunity to arrive at less paralyzing 
conclusions about whatever we are currently feeling victimized by. 
 Among the quotes serving as a prologue to this thesis, I have cited from a 
conversation between the authors Alain de Botton and Chris Hedges. Speaking in that order here, 
the writers discover that they are in agreement about the idea that 
– All works of culture should be How X Can Change Your Life . . . 
– More importantly that’s why they wrote it.130 
While I am skeptical of adopting the quoted viewpoint as anything amounting to a supreme 
criterion against which to judge literature, I do welcome and am excited by the idea of literature as 
powerful enough to improve our thinking and enhance our experience – with all the attendant 
payoffs from the perspective of our psychic health. I have a strong interest in works that are even 
intermittently capable, as Arnold puts it in Culture and Anarchy, of clearing human confusion, 
diminishing the sum of human misery and leaving the world better and happier than we found it (a 
tall order though this may seem). In a manner similar to that of Montaigne who, as already 
mentioned, criticized “education” for aiming “to make us not good or wise, but learned”, and for 
“not [teaching] us to follow and embrace virtue but [rather] imprint[ing] in us their derivation and 
etymology”, Kinzie declares herself 
curious to see how the intellectual environment might grow less obscuring, where art is 
concerned, if a number of readers were to entertain a posture of readiness and even need for 
guidance from the words of artists. In this way we might reacquaint ourselves with the 
human and curative powers of creation. To experience art would mean to be scrutinized by 
the creative intelligence that worked through it in its growth. [As a consequence one might 
hope to] achieve possession over one’s own past, one’s own pulse, and one’s own untoward 
and surprising predilections. Rather than cancelling the individual person and obviating self-
knowledge, the disciplines required by art return to us perfected command over what is most 
fruitfully idiosyncratic.131 
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Let me bracket our often bruising collisions with the unpredictable external landscape for now and 
instead observe the following: The fact that there are parts of ourselves – such as our “past” 
experiences and “untoward” present selves – that partake simultaneously of the fruitful and the 
idiosyncratic is a familiar, if paradoxical, thought that segues usefully into an insight from Viktor 
Frankl that I shall adopt as a premise for the rest of my thesis; I shall close this chapter on that 
insight.132 
 Freudian psychoanalysis is predicated on the notion that although we – in a deep sense 
– ourselves constitute the problem, we also contain in us the potential for moving past or rectifying 
the problem, that is for transcending our problematic selves or reconfiguring our problematic selves. 
Judith Harris prefers the word “self-renovation” (see page Signifying Pain, xi) for the kind of 
therapy that literature can provide, and I have already cited Phillips who reminds us that “It is as 
though there is a design flaw in the human animal; our childhood is more than our development can 
cope with. We are all in recovery of having been children.” But we also contain, as I say, in some 
unrealized but potential and not unrealizable shape the means of transcending our crisis. I shall 
return, by another route, to the profound implications located by Jordan Peterson in “the idea 
[dominant in Judeo-Christian scripture] that continual death and rebirth is a necessary precondition 
to proper human adaptation” (see footnotes 171 and 313). “Survival” is a better word than 
“adaptation”, but the idea is the same: Peterson’s point is that surmounting crisis is predicated on 
the individual’s ability “to identify with the part of [the ]self that transcends . . . current personality 
[and] can constantly die and be reborn.” I locate a similar argument in Lev Tolstoy’s My 
                                                 
132 Incidentally, the fact that in matters of the psyche the beneficial and the difficult are often inseparably conjoined was 
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Confessions (chapter 6) where he considers the steps by which he himself avoided destruction 
(suicide) at the height of a religious crisis: 
[T]he passage to annihilation is opposed by our own nature, by our will to live, which causes 
our own existence and that of the universe. That we so fear annihilation, or, what is the 
same, that we so wish to live, only shows that we ourselves are nothing but that wish, and 
know nothing beyond it. Consequently, what remains to us after the annihilation of will, 
except will again, is assuredly nothing; on the other hand, for those in whom will has 
destroyed itself, the whole of this material universe of ours, with all its suns and its milky-
ways is nothing. 
Let me make the link I insist on a little clearer. When Tolstoy writes “we ourselves are nothing but 
that wish [to live]”, then that corresponds to Peterson’s argument which sees adaptation as a result 
of “identify[ing] with the part of [the ]self that transcends . . . current personality [and] can 
constantly die and be reborn” (note that only a part perishes). (In these thoughts I also detect 
reverberations of Harold Bloom’s thumbnail definition of the American Sublime (footnote 12): 
“transcend[ing] the human without forsaking humanity”.) My argument then – informed by the old 
alchemical notion of “In sterquiliniis invenitur”133 – is essentially this: Within a person’s voluntary 
recognition that suffering is essentially inevitable and therefore “natural”, a countervailing, 
alleviating “influence” or resource may be located and accessed. Something promising – or, as I 
have described it, potentially nourishing or “fruitful” – is latent in the very darkest predicament. In 
its bracing way the “dark” holds something that “nourishes” and can be discovered firsthand 
provided we resist the perfectly natural human temptation to curse the darkness out of fear. Perhaps 
the idea was given an even more effective articulation by Edward Carpenter, a friend and 
correspondent of Whitman, although his discussion from The Drama of Love and Death is couched 
in broader considerations concerning numinous verities and cosmic reality. The words on 
“hindrance” halfway into the citation are especially apposite: 
What then, it will be asked, is the object or purpose or use of our incarnation in this grosser 
body? Limitation and hindrance are part and parcel of the great scheme of the soul’s 
deliverance. . . . These subserve the evolution of self-consciousness and of the sense of 
identity. It is obvious that diffused faculties and perceptions, however swift and powerful, 
could never have brought these gifts with them. It was only by pinning sensitivity down to a 
point in space and time by means of a body, and limiting its perceptions by means of bodily 
end-organs, that these new values could be added to creation – the local self and the sense of 
Identity. All the variety of human and animal nature, all the endless differences of points of 
                                                 
133 The phrase means “it is found in cesspools”. See Carl Jung, Mysterium Coniunctionis: An Inquiry into the 
Separation and Synthesis of Psychic Opposites in Alchemy, 35. 
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view, all diversity and charm of form and character and temperament must be credited to this 
principle. . . . And not only limitation but also hindrance. These things give an intensity and 
passion to life, and a power and decisiveness to individuality, the absence of which would 
indeed be sad. As a water-conduit by limiting the spread of the stream and confining it in a 
close channel gives it velocity and force to drive the mill, so limitation and hindrance in 
human life stimulate the individualised energy from which for good or evil, all our world-
activities spring. . . . The vast and pervasive soul-stuff of the universe (in its hidden way 
omniscient and omnipresent), suffers an obscuration and a limitation, and is condensed into 
a bodily prison in a point of space and time – but with a consequent explosive energy 
incalculable.134 
It is the nourishing quality of Carpenter’s incalculable “explosive energy” which should be 
celebrated despite the necessarily attendant discomfort. We are necessarily conflicted and 
ambivalent about suffering discomfort, but because it is “necessary” (in Phillips’s word) a mature 
mind will tolerate and find it “good”. To reference the Hostile Brothers again (see footnote 134), an 
Abel will do that while a Cain will not. William James also identifies the essentially religious aspect 
of the attitudinal divide; speaking here of what I see as Abel’s attitude, James writes, “There is a 
state of mind, known to religious men, but to no others, in which the will to assert ourselves and 
hold our own has been displaced by a willingness to close our mouths and be as nothing in the 
floods and waterspouts of God.”135 Because it is futile and counterproductive to protest the 
fundamental, unalterable, ineluctable and often grim facts of existence in the hope of avoiding 
them, only the foolish and immature are given to doing it – from the misguided perspective that 
there is something to be gained from indulging in idle fantasies, which generally amounts to 
nothing more than some form of denial (see Peterson in epigraphic perspective 22).136 As for 
Whitman, part of his program was his resolve “to show that whatever happens to anybody it may be 
turn’d to beautiful results” and to “search carefully for [what he “was for” in] defeat and dismay.”137 
                                                 
134 Edward Carpenter, The Drama of Love and Death, 243–245. Subtly suggesting the metaphor of alchemy, Harry 
Emerson Fosdick sums up Carpenter’s word when we writes: “No steam of gas ever drives anything until it is 
confined. No Niagara is ever turned into light and power until it is tunneled. No life ever grows until it is focused, 
dedicated, disciplined.” The link between discipline and the flourishing of human life is of course the theme of one 
of the oldest stories in our culture: the story of Cain and Abel. The relationship between accepting suffering humbly, 
cooperatively and without resentment (which Cain cannot), on the one hand, and respectable living, on the other, 
arguably has archetypal status. It is therefore unsurprising that it resonates productively with the present discussion. 
The words from Fosdick are from Harry Emerson Fosdick, Answers to Real Problems: Harry Emerson Fosdick 
Speaks to Our Time: Selected Sermons of Harry Emerson Fosdick, 160.  
135 William James, The Varieties of Religious Experience, 52. 
136 Consider too Marcus Aurelius’s words (from Meditations): “[If] anyone is afraid of an operation of nature, he is a 
child”; and consider, finally, C. D. C. Reeve’s words (from Love’s Confusions) on regrettable but common human 
personality traits: They “would be a flaw, I suppose, if there were a better alternative” (emphasis mine). From C. D. 
C. Reeve, Love’s Confusions, 139. 
137 The first quote is from “Starting from Paumanok”. In full, the second quotation reads: “I do not know what you are 
for, (I do not what I am for myself, nor what any thing is for,) / But I will search carefully for it in being foiled, / In 
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 To argue affirmatively, as I am currently doing, for the potential recognition of 
something positive or nourishing inherent to situations of keen distress and perplexity might on the 
face of it seem a radical, unpitying and unkind position, but I maintain that an enlightened 
reconceptualization of the terms of suffering, with which we are ineluctably saddled anyway, will 
turn out to be in fact an uncontroversial way to proceed. One can perhaps see this by noticing that 
locating a positive possibility in one’s predicament need not involve anything other than coming to 
realize that moving beyond the suffering (“getting better”) may have to depend on a process of 
personal evolution, or growth and change. And this one would certainly be ill-advised to dismiss as 
an obvious evil out of hand: There is no getting around the problem that denouncing personal 
evolution looks suspiciously like voluntarily embracing stagnation and personal fossilization.138 
Once again, because one is oneself part and parcel of the problem of one’s suffering, one is also – 
insofar as one is capable of changing at all, which I shall assume – part of the solution; that is, one 
is an integral part of the modest but crucial amelioration of one’s own crisis. And this is 
uncontroversial because although it might not be the most obvious fact due to its systemic 
metaphysical ubiquity (it is hiding in plain sight all the time), all we ever do in life is change.139 
Whether we are inclined to agree, there is no question that we are continually, imperceptibly 
readjusting ourselves as a consequence of our surroundings; we never cease to renovate ourselves in 
order to go on living. Predominantly, as I have suggested, we do so unconsciously and so subtly that 
we do not notice it. (My suspicion is that an unconscious and automatic, culturally instilled 
tendency to pay lip-service to the good of positive personal change while cursing all manifestations 
of suffering is widespread in our culture; the problem with that is that we fail to notice the inherent 
contradiction of such a position: We cannot have it both ways. Growth is for extremely good 
reasons inextricably linked with suffering; for if nothing is “broken”, why would we ever “fix” it –
or improve, amend and change?)140 The fact that self-improving evolution is even an “psycho-
ontological” possibility is that kind of “fruitful” element of which we might have remained 
                                                 
defeat, poverty, imprisonment—for they too are great. / / Did we think victory great? / So it is—But now it seems to 
me, when it cannot be helped, that defeat is great, / And that death and dismay are great.” These verses are from “To 
a Foil’d European Revolutionaire” (emphases mine). 
138 Of course, in fairness, there are cases of such crushing despair and suffering that even this thought might be too 
conceptually ambitious and demanding; at the very least, the process of getting better might be a life-long process. 
139 See my note on “endless micro-deaths and renewal” in footnote 83. Change, I posit, is essentially “micro-death and 
renewal”. 
140 In discussing a passage in Proust In Search of Lost Time, Alain de Botton writes, “It is perhaps only normal if we 
remain ignorant when things are blissful. While a car is working well, what incentive is there to learn of its complex 
internal functioning? . . . Only when plunged into grief do we have the Proustian incentive to confront difficult 
truths.” See Alain de Botton, How Proust Can Change Your Life, 75. 
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oblivious were it not for our suffering, which may serve as a kind of awakening.141 Henry Miller 
nicely articulated the attitude by noting, “Like every man I am my own worst enemy, but unlike 
most men I know too that I am my own saviour.”142 That in a nutshell is the principle and attitude 
upon which I suspect effective therapy is predicated (whether the suffering person is conscious of it 
or not). 
 To repeat, all will to life must, I think, involve the recognition and realization that of 
course we cannot expect to persist in an unchanged state, and that change will be demanded of us 
by external events. Sometimes we must grow or change in unpredicted manners and directions in 
order to stand – meaning tolerate – our lives at their more difficult junctures. And it is typically at 
the more difficult junctures that we undergo the most radical transformation; they should not be 
shunned or childishly cursed merely because they seem perilous; life is necessarily perilous – or we 
would grow blasé and apathetic in the face of it, and disinclined to take it seriously. Although we 
necessarily change and evolve continuously over the course of our lives, it is during critical psychic 
suffering and distress that our personal evolution tends to be (because it must be) more specific in 
mode and more noticeable in degree – if personal evolution is an impossibility the individual is in 
grave danger. In Eric G. Wilson’s words: “alienation [and] anxiety are calls for us to take 
responsibility for our own unique beings, for us to become, for once, authentic. We conclude that 
crisis is the crucible that burns away the inessential and reveals to us our vital core.”143 
xvi. Everyone Suffers Alone – Selfhood and Suffering 
Of course, as with most worthwhile things, there is a significant probability that we will fail. But 
this dissertation is not a statistical evaluation but a sincere discussion of the psychological 
experience of suffering, one that emphasizes the real arguments for taking heart amidst defeat, 
distress and crisis. While still embarked on my preamble leading up to Viktor Frankl’s insight, let 
                                                 
141 Indeed, a profound connection between existential threats and the heightened form of consciousness that 
characterizes human beings has been established as central to human evolution. For more on this, see Maps of 
Meaning, 300–302. Cf. Viktor Frankl: “[M]an’s search for meaning may arouse inner tension rather than inner 
equilibrium. However, precisely such tension is an indispensable prerequisite of mental health.” (Cf. Jung’s words 
on “unendurable conflict” in footnote 92.) Thomas S. Szasz writes: “The dialectical interplay of the opposing 
tendencies or themes of freedom and slavery, liberation and oppression, competence and incompetence, 
responsibility and license, order and chaos[ is] essential to the growth, life and death of the individual.” From 
Thomas S. Szasz, Ideology and Insanity, 2.  
142 That sentiment was shared by Whitman who wished to signal and usher in a new order – and new era – in which 
“every man shall be his own priest.” Cf. his 1855 Preface. Miller’s words are from Henry Miller, Henry Miller on 
Writing, 119. Recall also Miller’s description of the “joy of life” as “not static but dynamic” (cited earlier). 
143 From Eric G. Wilson, Against Happiness: In Praise of Melancholy, 42. 
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me make an auxiliary argument about the relationship between the phenomenological sense of self 
and heightened crises of suffering.144 (The centrality of “meaning” to the phenomenological 
approach of reality is useful and significant to me – in short because I agree with Nietzsche, 
Dostoevsky, Frankl, Primo Levi and others that the most reliable antidote to suffering is meaning.) 
It has been argued that “phenomenology” represents a “stronger source of appeal for discovering 
the nature of mind and individuating elements than either ordinary language or ordinary language 
and science”, which is a realization I consider analogous to Eric G. Wilson’s claim that there is a 
strong, intimate and potentially enlightening relationship between a person’s suffering and his or 
her sense of self.145 In their own ways, others have corroborated the gist of such observations; 
Jordan Peterson, for instance, remarks simply that the experience of suffering (or “pain”) seems to 
partake of a higher or more primary order of reality than other sensual experiences: “For most 
people there is nothing more real than their own pain”, a fact which also interested William James, 
R. W. Emerson, Nietzsche and several other thinkers.146 (Purely speculatively, I could say that this 
should not surprise us at all; in other words, suffering (which in its more widespread manifestations 
historically speaking must be imagined to translate trivially to the threat of incapacitation and 
annihilation) should “wake us up” about the true state of our situation more than pleasure, because 
not responding to threats with a heightened level of self-awareness would in evolutionary terms not 
have been conducive to survival.) The fact remains that suffering is deeply personal and frequently 
accompanied by a sense of isolation, of having been socially singled out. The poet and Trappist 
monk Thomas Merton, writing a few decades before Peterson, asks, “What, after all, is more 
personal than suffering? The awful futility of our attempts to convey the reality of our suffering to 
other people, and the tragic inadequacy of human sympathy, both prove how incommunicable a 
thing suffering really is. When a man suffers, he is most alone. Therefore, it is in suffering that we 
are most tested as persons.”147 Echoing Merton’s claim is Joyce Carol Oates’s description of 
“despair” as “a state of intense inwardness”. (Later I shall present an argument that resonates 
                                                 
144 In referring to phenomenology going forward, I shall seldom stray from this brief definition: “Literally, 
phenomenology is the study of “phenomena”: appearances of things, or things as they appear in our experience, or 
the ways we experience things, thus the meanings things have in our experience. Phenomenology studies conscious 
experience as experienced from the subjective or first person point of view. This field of philosophy is then to be 
distinguished from, and related to, the other main fields of philosophy: ontology (the study of being or what is), 
epistemology (the study of knowledge), logic (the study of valid reasoning), ethics (the study of right and wrong 
action), etc.” From “Phenomenology” in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. 
145 From Timb Hoswell, Phenomenology and The Ghost in The Machine: An Investigation into Wilfrid Sellars, Jean--
Paul Sartre, Gilbert Ryle and The Concept of Mind, 296. 
146 From Jordan Peterson’s “The Necessity of Virtue – Jordan B. Peterson”. This is part and parcel’s of Peterson’s 
phenomenological conception of being. 
147 See Thomas Merton, No Man Is an Island, 84. 
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strongly with Oates’s observation that “this state of keenly heightened inwardness has always 
fascinated the writer, whose subject is after all the imaginative reconstruction of language. The 
ostensible subject out there is but the vehicle, or the pretext, for the ravishing discoveries to be 
made in here in the activity of creating.”)148 The relation between self and suffering is established 
even further by Eric G. Wilson who offers an explanation of why moments of limitation and 
suffering may occasionally entail or potentially prepare for something like an existential epiphany 
within the self, an event that then typically facilitates our survival (notice how we are again told that 
the apparently forbidding and unsafe dark might harbor nourishing experiences): 
To sit long with our various alienations and our sumptuous paralyses and our nervous fears 
is to come indeed to a startling realization[: that m]elancholy connects us to our fundamental 
being.[149] . . . If I am anxiously sad, I don’t enjoy a comfortable relationship to the objects of 
people around me. . . . Unmoored from these familiar things, I am forced to look within 
myself, into my most mysterious interiors. . . . [S]tripped of the familiar, I get in touch with 
what is most intimate: I am this person and no one else [and in order to remain this person] I 
must find my unique potentialities.150 
In the moment when we lose the customary implicit, innocent, quasi-childlike trust we once had in 
the world, we may gain or access ourselves in a new and richer sense. 
 This, I grant, may sound awfully like hopeful, pseudointellectual cant; however, we 
rarely exclaim so upon meeting people who have survived a real trauma or illness and have avoided 
being completely warped by the experience. In such situations we generally vicariously enjoy their 
sense of grateful relief and wonder at the unknowable (because to all intents and purposes invisible) 
operations of the world’s chaotic forces and serendipitous events. I further claim, effectively backed 
up by Adam Smith (footnote 100), that we tend to listen to such people with rapt attention – an 
observation borne out by the fact that suffering, survival and premature death form deeply 
embedded archetypal narrative motifs which have a natural claim on human interest for all that they 
                                                 
148 These Oates quotes are from Joyce Carol Oates, “ “Zero at the Bone”: Despair as Sin and Enlightenment”, in Where 
I've Been, and where I'm Going: Essays, Reviews, and Prose, 63. 
149 Cf. Jordan Peterson whose statement (cited previously) corroborates Wilson’s above: “Human being is predicated on 
a kind of fundamental limitation in that we are what we are and we’re not other things.” This harkens back to the 
classical Jewish commentary on the nature of God which includes the question: What does something characterized 
by omnipresence, omnipotence and omniscience (omnibenevolence is sometimes included also) lack? The answer: 
limitation. It is of course essentially part and parcel of the so-called Frame Problem (which I introduce on page 103) 
– and also integral to the principles of semantics and speech– that without limitation (in the form of arbitrarily 
defined category boundaries) there is no being (there is just undifferentiated “omnibeing”). For more on the classical 
commentary on the nature of God, see Jordan Peterson’s “The Necessity of Virtue – Jordan B. Peterson”. 
150 Eric G. Wilson, Against Happiness, 43. As I shall show at the end of this chapter, Jung too subscribes to the ultimate 
instructiveness of assuming that we are completely alone in our crises. If we did not assume so, “[we] would remain 
merely a child.” From Carl Jung, Visions: Notes of the Seminar Given in 1930–1934, vol. 1, 385. 
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do not constitute very “discussable” things. Whitman offers the view that these things especially 
appeal to the sensibilities of poets: 
And yet there is another shape of personality dearer far to the artist-sense [than the theme of 
perfect, unalloyed happiness], (which likes the play of strongest lights and shades,) where 
the perfect character, the good, the heroic, although never attain’d, is never lost sight of, but 
through failures, sorrows, temporary downfalls, is return’d to again and again, and while 
often violated, is passionately adhered to as long as mind, muscles, voice, obey the power 
we call volition.151 
In discussing the corresponding archetype in Jungian terms (under the rubric of “rebirth”, which 
connotes psychic transformation), Maud Bodkin discerns three elements: frustration, which is 
followed by creative evolution, which leads to transcendence.152 The middle element can be 
alternatively conceptualized as a kind of growth during which “the constituent factors are 
transformed”.153 As for gaining or accessing ourselves in a new and richer sense while plunged in a 
socially isolating crisis, a contributor to True Tales of American Lives (edited by Paul Auster), 
perfectly encapsulates such a story: 
I have been unable to write for weeks now, my mind riddled instead by imminent departures, 
imminent change.  
 Then it strikes me: this moment is the friendly hand of solitude. . . 
Sometimes it is good fortune to be abandoned. While we are looking after our losses, our 
selves may slip back inside.154 
xvii. Literature, Trauma and Psychoanalysis 
                                                 
151 From Walt Whitman, Specimen Days and Collect, 156–157. Emphasis mine. Whitman later told Traubel: “I think 
things are as good as they can be—all right as they are . . . including the agitation, including the agitation! especially 
the agitation! Indeed, I might think agitation the most important factor of all—the most deeply important: to stir, to 
question, to suspect, to examine, to denounce!” From Walt Whitman, Intimate with Walt: Selections from Whitman’s 
Conversations with Horace Traubel 1888–1892, 59. 
152 Charles Hamilton Morgan argues that the Jungian archetype in question informs many of the poems dealing with 
crisis in Leaves of Grass – I shall return to this idea. See Charles Hamilton Morgan, “A New Look at Whitman's 
“Crisis”,” 41. 
153 Cf. Ricks’s words in footnote 30. 
 The very fact that an observed phenomenon does not yield hard empirical data and is therefore not 
verifiable or falsifiable in a Popperean sense should of course not make us pretend the phenomenon is not important 
– that would be materialism at its most stingy and dogmatic. Important – indeed, perhaps the most important – 
things do not always manifest themselves in empirical form. On this, Adam Phillips has said that “If you live in a 
culture that regards scientific criteria as the privileged ones, then psychoanalysis is going to fail. [But] nobody wants 
to measure friendship, say, or love.” From Adam Phillips, “RSA Replay: One Way and Another”. 
154 The writer of this account (“An Average Sadness”) is Ameni Rozsa. From Paul Auster, ed., True Tales of American 
Life, 473. 
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It is, as I have said, a premise derived from psychoanalysis that although we must all sometimes 
endure suffering that is somehow inseparable from “ourselves” – a product of parts of our psyche – 
we nevertheless simultaneously possess the potential for untangling our confusion, for transcending 
ourselves in helpful ways and for arriving at newfound ways to live in the face of psychic struggle 
or pain. This dissertation is about our discovery, awareness, attitudes toward and eventual 
celebration of that potentiality as approached via, and activated and harnessed by means of, 
literature. 
 As regards psychoanalysis (and Freud’s writings on trauma in particular), Cathy 
Caruth identifies a link or kinship between literature and psychoanalysis that goes some way 
towards validating the parallelism I indicated earlier. Caruth writes 
If Freud turns to literature to describe traumatic experience, it is because literature, like 
psychoanalysis, is interested in the complex relation between knowing and not knowing. 
And it is at the specific point at which knowing and not knowing intersect that the language 
of literature and the psychoanalytic theory of traumatic experience precisely meet.”155 
(My own suspicion, which I cannot go into too much at the moment, is that “the complex relation 
between knowing and not knowing” is an issue essential to phenomenology too.)156 Volney P. Gay 
writes that psychoanalysis 
has much to say about the production and enjoyment of art. This seems true of the narrative 
arts, like the novel, which are often similar to dreams and other psychological acts that 
                                                 
155 Cathy Caruth, Unclaimed Experience: Trauma, Narrative, and History, 3. The psychologist James W. Pennebaker 
who has done research on expressive emotions therapy (EET), i.e. the beneficial health potentials of writing 
creatively, also indicates the affinities between the “talking cure” (psychoanalysis) and creative writing: “Writing 
about emotional upheavals in our lives can improve physical and mental health. Although the scientific research 
surrounding the value of expressive writing is still in the early phases, there are some approaches to writing that 
have been found to be helpful. . . . You can write longhand or you can type on a computer. If you are unable to write, 
you can also talk into a tape recorder.” From James Pennebaker, “Writing & Health” (emphasis mine). 
 It might be remarked that Christopher Isherwood also affirmed the kinship between literature and the 
realm of psychology and therapy. He once remarked that his writing was a kind of self-discovery, “not unlike, really, 
the self-discovery of free association in psychiatry”. 
156 My thinking here (that is, my inclination to think of literature, psychoanalysis and phenomenology as mutually 
compatible domains of thinking) is encouraged rather specifically (meaning precisely) by Jordan Peterson’s 
observation that “The automatic attribution of meaning to things—or the failure to distinguish between them 
initially [cf. knowing v. not knowing]—is a characteristic of narrative, of myth, not of scientific thought. Narrative 
accurately captures the nature of raw experience [note that dreams – spontaneous products of the psyche – tend to 
have narrative structure]. Things are scary, people are irritating, events are promising, food is satisfying—at least in 
terms of our basic experience [much of our experiential life is only communicable in phenomenological terms].” 
From Jordan Peterson, Maps of Meaning, 2. 
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Freud investigated. I believe psychoanalysis is a valid science and relevant to the narrative 
and nonnarrative arts.157 
It deserves to be mentioned that in his essay “The Poet and Day-Dreaming”, Freud argues that the 
human desire to alter the existing and often unsatisfactory or unpleasant world of reality can results 
in such diverse mental activities as childhood play, fantasies, dreams and – for my purposes most 
interestingly – works of art. The mental activity, then, Freud says, is undertaken for the sake of 
inventing a situation in which wishes, hitherto unsatisfied, are fulfilled. The parallel to 
psychoanalysis is clear. 
 On the face of it it might seem an undesirable quality of suffering that it serves, as I 
have argued, to amplify and intensify the sufferer’s sense of self (or selfhood). The upside of this, 
however, is what is thereby offered us obliquely (the “toad” of suffering may be ugly and venomous 
but there is a “precious jewel in his head”; see epigraphic perspective 29). The intensified sense of 
self enables the suffering person to potentially become something other than a purely passive 
victimized object upon whom suffering is inflicted. Although there are no guarantees of triumph 
here, there is enough evidence in the literature I have consulted for me to posit that one can attempt 
to suffer with a degree of involvement, agency and deliberation. That is to say, one can attempt to 
suffer attentively, fully aware and awake (some might say “Stoically” but I shall not carry that word 
forward), rather than stumblingly, haphazardly, chaotically, numbly or desperately. Take Nietzsche’s 
famous dictum, “He who has a why to live for can bear with almost any how”: these oft-quoted 
words remind us that although a person may be greatly burdened by external hardship, the person 
participates in the suffering like no merely material object could participate in its destruction by 
actively recalling and rehearsing a personal why. From a certain personal standpoint, the how – a 
reality inflicted by external forces – is secondary precisely because it is external, whereas the why is 
primary and closer to the individual by virtue of being internal and personal. In Nietzsche’s words 
reappear – with a shifted emphasis – what I have tried to make clear about suffering’s amplification 
of the sufferer’s sense of self.158 
                                                 
157 From Volney P. Gay, Freud on Sublimation: Reconsiderations, 11. Also, Adam Phillips finds undergoing 
psychoanalytic treatment (entering into what Lacan called “the psychoanalytic opportunity”) very similar to 
“reading a powerful work of literature, [which can amount to a] leap into the relative dark.” From Adam Phillips, 
Side Effects, xii. 
158 Viktor Frankl said of Nietzsche’s aphorism, “There is much wisdom in [it]. I can see in these words a motto which 
holds true for any psychotherapy. In the Nazy concentration camps, one could have witnessed that those who knew 
that there was a task waiting for them to fulfill were most apt to survive. The same conclusion has since been 
reached by other authors of books on concentration camps . . . As for myself, when I was taken to the concentration 
camp of Auschwitz, a manuscript of mine ready for publication was confiscated. Certainly, my deep desire to write 
this manuscript anew helped me to survive the rigors of the camps I was in. For instance, when in a camp in Bavaria 
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 Only by rescuing, encircling and defending a measure of mandated selfhood that 
might otherwise “go under” and be lost, will our personal attitude to the trying situation be able to 
emerge. Upon merely emerging, our attitude gains a theoretical chance of affecting in a (perhaps 
modest but) decisive and positive (i.e. redemptive) way the experiential quality of the crisis. (Henry 
Miller knew that in general it was hopeless to dream of altering the world: “I certainly do not hope 
to alter the world. Perhaps I can put it best by saying that I hope to alter my own vision of the 
world. I want to be more and more myself . . .” (a statement which rehearses the elements of the 
Tolstoy aphorism cited just before footnote 211).159 The idea of responding to external reality with 
deliberation and “indirectly” (and via the only available option given the dauntingly immoveable 
quality of external reality, i.e. by calibrating and attending to the psychological aspect of the 
interaction) is an idea which also interested a man whom Henry Miller admired and learned from: 
E. Graham Howe. In Howe’s book War Dance: A Study of the Psychology of War, the author 
presents the following meditation relevant to this dissertation’s present as well as upcoming theme: 
Certainly it is true that our attitude towards this ‘real’ external world is determined by our 
attitude towards these forces which exist within ourselves. It is as if in that outer world we 
are seeing ourselves as within a mirror. It is not so objective as it seems: it is as if we change 
the map of life itself by changing our attitudes to it.160 
Cf. Powys in epigraphic perspective 17.161 These words indicate the most central theme of my 
dissertation – and possibly the most profound theme of human life: the degree to and manner in 
which are lives are affected by the state of (and what we do with) our psyches, our souls. And now 
                                                 
I fell ill with typhus fever, I jotted down on little scraps of paper many notes intended to enable me to rewrite the 
manuscript, should I live to the day of liberation. I am sure that this reconstruction of my lost manuscript in the dark 
barracks of a Bavarian concentration camp assisted me in overcoming the danger of cardiovascular collapse. 
 “Thus it can be seen that mental health is based on a certain degree of tension, the tension between what 
one has already achieved and what one still ought to accomplish, or the gap between what one is and what one 
should become. Such a tension is inherent in the human being and therefore is indispensable to mental well-being.” 
From Viktor Frankl, Man’s Search for Meaning, 104–105. 
159 From Henry Miller, Henry Miller on Writing, 141. 
160 E. Graham Howe, War Dance: A Study of the Psychology of War, 190–191. 
161 Joyce Carol Oates suggests that we may have to be “adolescent: restless, vulnerable, passionate, hungry to learn, 
skeptical and naive by turns” if we are to “believ[e] in the power of the imagination to change, if not the life itself, 
one’s comprehension of life.” Such a person, she adds, suggests the traits of an “ideal reader.” From Joyce Carol 
Oates, “ “Zero at the Bone”: Despair as Sin and Enlightenment”, in Where I’ve Been, and where I’m Going: Essays, 
Reviews, and Prose, 65. 
 I am also reminded of John Cowper Powys’s words that “Not the wretchedest man or woman but has a 
deep secretive mythology with which to wrestle his material world and to overcome it and pass beyond it. Not the 
wretchedest human being but has his share in the creative energy that builds the world. We are all creators. We all 
create a mythological world of our own out of certain shapeless materials.” From John Cowper Powys, The Meaning 
of Culture, 189. 
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finally I have arrived at the point where I can introduce the premise and insight which essentially 
defines and informs my whole thesis. Viktor Frankl’s powerful idea – one bound up profoundly 
with the theme of survival – will serve as a kind of underlying premise for all I have said thus far 
and all I shall argue in the chapters to come. It is related to the thought that we can come to discover 
that suffering successfully enables us to evolve meaningfully and change in a coordinated and 
valuable fashion. 
 Consider a person at the very height of physical and psychological distress; imagine, 
for instance, a person submitted to torture from which no escape is possible and no rescue in sight. 
As a concentration camp inmate during the Holocaust, Frankl saw and endured several crises that fit 
this description. However, his observation – a mental stroke of genius – articulated in Man’s Search 
for Meaning (originally released as From Death-Camp to Existentialism) has found a nearly 
universal welcome, certainly far beyond the walls restraining the insulted and humiliated. Plunged 
in unspeakable depths of suffering, Frankl nevertheless found that “the last of the human freedoms” 
remained available to him in the form of his ability “to choose [his own] attitude in any given set of 
circumstances, to choose [his] own way”. The epiphany, which to an extent partakes of what I have 
said earlier about suffering with “involvement, agency and deliberation”, deserves quoting more or 
less in full: 
[In the camp] there were always choices to make. Every day, every hour, offered the 
opportunity to make a decision, a decision which determined whether you would or would 
not submit to those powers which threatened to rob you of your very self, your inner 
freedom; which determined whether or not you would become the plaything of 
circumstance, renouncing freedom and dignity to become molded into the form or the 
typical inmate. 
 Seen from this point of view, the mental reactions of the inmates of a concentration 
camp must seem more to us than the mere expression of certain physical and sociological 
conditions. Even though conditions such as lack of sleep, insufficient food and various 
mental stresses may suggest that the inmates were bound to react in certain ways, in the final 
analysis it becomes clear that the sort of person the prisoner became was the result of an 
inner decision, and not the result of camp influences alone. Fundamentally, therefore, any 
man can, even under such circumstances, decide what shall become of him—mentally and 
spiritually. He may retain his human dignity even in a concentration camp [and prove 
himself “worthy of his suffering” and a living proof] that the last inner freedom cannot be 
lost. . . It is this spiritual freedom—which cannot be taken away—that makes life 
meaningful and purposeful.162 
                                                 
162 Fom Viktor Frankl, Man’s Search for Meaning, 65–67. 
 I am struck by the equivalence of the insight put forward in Tolstoy’s My Confession, chapter 6. The 
passage is cited above. Like Frankl, he conceived, at the height of his religious crisis in 1879–1880, of the 
87 
 
It is thought-provoking that in the case of Frankl it took a sustained and nearly lethal series of 
assaults on his person and personal dignity and integrity to bring about the realization that “any man 
can, even under such circumstances [which for all intents and purposes means any circumstances 
whatsoever], decide what shall become of him—mentally and spiritually.” Frankl witnessed inmates 
“walk[ing] through the huts comforting others, giving away their last piece of bread” and distilled 
the extraordinary principle that the freedom “to choose one’s attitude in any given set of 
circumstances” will always be potentially free from destructive incursion.163 That such a kernel of 
wisdom was enfolded in such a barrage of evil and misery recalls, if you will, Jung’s “In 
sterquiliniis invenitur”; I have featured Milton’s familiar words among the epigraphs for a similar 
reason (epigraph no. 16). It might be interesting to note for a second that a similar violent dynamic 
was described by another suffering inmate a few decades later: Solzhenitsyn also discerned insights 
of existential philosophy reflected in acts of torturous humiliation: 
So wouldn’t it be more correct to say that no camp can corrupt those who have a stable 
nucleus, who do not accept that pitiful ideology which holds that “human beings are created 
for happiness,” an ideology which is done in by the first blow of the work assigner’s 
cudgel?164 
But Frankl only provides the outline of what is so crucial to my dissertation. He tells us that no man 
is ever fatally robbed of the mental and spiritual freedom to choose his attitude to whatever scenario 
surrounds him. (Cf. Powys in the latter half of epigraphic perspective 17.) I am going to do two 
things: First, because I find it suggestive, I am going to take that part for granted – to treat it as a 
given or a fixed assumption – without subjecting it to dismantling criticism. (Doing the latter would 
not benefit the overall argument.)165 Second, I am going to argue that the attitudes taken by those 
                                                 
individual’s survival as part and parcel of (if not identical with) his or her steady determination to retain a residual 
will in a situation when agency was under attack or threat of being stripped away. Note too the close parallelism 
between Tolstoy’s line “we ourselves are nothing but that wish [to live]” and Frankl’s observation that the choice of 
personal attitude to life is decidedly “the last of the human freedoms” in a life-threatening crisis. 
163 Viktor Frankl, Man’s Search for Meaning, 65. 
164 From Aleksandr I. Solzhenitsyn, The Gulag Archipelago, vol. 2, 626. Dostoevsky is another figure who at the height 
of despair and terror (I allude to his mock-execution in 1849) fell abruptly into radically different beliefs and 
attitudes about human life and human potential. See Konstantin Mochulsky, Dostoevsky: His Life and Work, 141. 
165 What I can do is remark that other thinkers validate Frankl in their different ways. Thus, for instance, William James: 
“Even a sick man, unable to be militant outwardly, can carry on the moral warfare. He can willfully turn his 
attention away from his own future, whether in this future or the next. He can train himself to indifference to his 
present drawbacks and immerse himself in whatever objective interests still remain accessible. He can follow public 
news and sympathize with other people’s affairs. He can cultivate cheerful manners, and be silent about his miseries. 
He can contemplate whatever ideal aspects of existence his philosophy is able to present to him, and practice 
whatever duties, such as patience, resignation, trust, his ethical system requires. Such a man lives on his loftiest, 
largest plane. He is a high-hearted freeman and no pining slave.” From William James, The Varieties of Religious 
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fortunate enough to survive have at least one profound thing in common. Such “surviving 
attitudes”, I argue, must arguably be imbued by an Abel-like humility, patience and cooperation 
with the terrible ordeal (at least such aspects as cannot be countered and deflected). I think one can 
suggest an analogy to psychic suffering more generally: I would construe the Abel-like attitude I 
have outlined as similar to the “will to health” (as opposed to “will to illness”) that Otto Rank and 
(later) Carl Rogers – and, independently, Thomas S. Szasz – have written of.166 In being cooperative 
and patient I do not mean, of course, that the person fundamentally agrees with or even blesses the 
ordeal – far from it; however, and this will sound strange in the context of all-out murderous torture, 
the ordeal must be suffered to occur (permitted to happen), much though it is detested, for if there 
really is no alternative to it, if it really be overpowering and unavoidable, it will not do to deny 
reality in either deed or name. 
[W]isdom begins only when one takes things as they are; otherwise we get nowhere, we 
simply become inflated balloons with no feet on the earth. So it is a healing attitude when 
one can agree with the facts as they are; only then can we live in our body on this earth, only 
then can we thrive.167 
                                                 
Experience, 51. 
 Also, cf. Epictetus’s words in epigraphic perspective 14, and Emmanuel Kant’s suggestion that we are 
endowed with a measure of agency in precisely how we experience reality: The “pragmatic” human being can, Kant 
writes, choose to engage in a willed “investigation of what he as a free-acting being makes of himself, or can and 
should make of himself.” Kant’s words (from Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View) are cited in Simon 
Blackburn, Mirror, Mirror: The Uses and Abuses of Self-Love, 1. Blackburn explains that Kant is echoing an older 
theological tradition that “human beings are free to make of themselves what they will.” 
166 Szasz declares that successful therapy depends on “a consenting, co-operative client. There is no way to “help” an 
individual who does not want to be a psychiatric patient.” From Thomas S. Szasz, Ideology and Insanity, 81. 
 Otto Rank thought that “people were inevitably caught in a battle between their “will to health” and 
their “will to illness,” [and that thought] would greatly influence Rogers. From “The Gale Group” [no individual 
author is identified], A Study Guide for Psychologists and Their Theories for Students: Carl Ransom Rogers, no 
pagination in online version. Compare “will to health” with Frankl’s concept “will to meaning”. 
 Equally relevant is Rogers’s “state of congruence”; see Carl Rogers, “The necessary and sufficient 
conditions of therapeutic personality change”, 95. 
167 These words are from Carl Jung, Visions: Notes of the Seminar Given in 1930–1934, vol. 1, 545. 
 Earlier I quoted W. E. H. Lecky’s words of advice “Acquiesce in the inevitable”, which speak to the 
same theme. Shakespeare gleaned the same principle and put it thus: “Let me embrace thee, sour adversity, for wise 
men say it is the wisest course.” From Henry VI, Part III. Cf. epigrammatic statement no. 28. Gregory Orr speaks of 
a necessary “passive receptivity”, which he finds articulated in D. H. Lawrence’s aptly-entitled poem “Song of a 
Man Who Has Come Through”. From Gregory Orr, Poetry as Survival, 5. 
 Also consider Whitman’s words “I do not lack in . . . the sort of egotism that is willing to know itself as 
honestly as it is willing to know third or fourth parties” (cited in footnote 56). 
Another sentiment from Carl Rogers seems pertinent (if not in its particulars then at least in overall spirit): “I 
find I am more effective when I can listen acceptably to myself, and can be myself. . . . I feel I have become more 
adequate in letting myself be what I am. It becomes easier to accept myself as a decidedly imperfect person [one, in 
our case, who is powerless against the agony of a terrible trial]. . . This must seem to some like a very strange 
direction in which to move. It seems to me to have value because the curious paradox is that when I accept myself as 
I am, then I change. . . . [We] cannot move away from what we are, until we thoroughly accept what we are. Then 
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A Cain’s “wroth” insistence (incidentally representing a very human and understandable position, 
of course) that the world is at genuine fault for being such an aggravating, impossible and unfair 
series of trials is simply too optimistically brittle an attitude to withstand the first blow of reality’s 
“cudgel” (to allude to Solzhenitsyn). I base these remarks in references to Cain and Abel because 
the biblical Hostile Brothers represent archetypal psychological attitudes to reality, particularly its 
trying and painful aspects, and though we may not like to admit it these aspects are a constant in 
human lives – whether of the sort that scar us to the point where we barely survive or the much 
more commonly occurring ones which merely make it difficult to flourish like we could wish to 
flourish (to reference my discussion of eudaimonia in chapter 1). Jung too considered what I am 
tempted to call “Frankl’s scenario” and gave a useful description of what may happen if one 
assumes Abel’s attitude and suffers the unavoidable bad to occur: 
[When] you get into a disagreeable situation where you see no opening, no direct path, you 
assume that you are quite alone with yourself. In a way it is a very good thing that you think 
so; otherwise you would never make up your mind, you would remain merely a child. You 
must believe that you are practically alone. But you may find yourself in a really tight place 
where you can’t get out, where you are helpless. Then you recognize that you are not alone, 
because such an absolute impasse is an archetypal situation, and an archetypal figure 
becomes constellated, a fact in your psychology, a potential, and so you are up to the 
situation. This has repeated itself innumerable times in history, man has again and again 
passed through such situations and has a psychological method of adapting, the thing to do 
in such a case.[168] For by his consciousness alone, particularly the dim consciousness of 
early ages, man was quite unable to invent such a thing; to primitive man everything was 
revealed, he invented absolutely nothing, he could not think, it thought. So it is the totality 
of the psyche that functions in that way; the psyche produces a double, it brings up another 
figure; that is a psychological fact. The psychopompos is this second figure; you can call it 
the daimon [divine manifestation], or the shadow, or a god or an ancestor spirit;[169] it does 
not matter what name you give it, it is simply a figure; it might even be an animal. For in 
such a predicament we are dépossèdés [dispossessed], we lose the power of our ego, we lose 
our self-confidence. Until that moment, we were willful or arbitrary, we had made our own 
choice, we had found out a way, we had proceeded as far as this particular place. Then 
suddenly we are in an impasse, we lose faith in ourselves, and it is just as if all of our energy 
                                                 
change seems to come about almost unnoticed.” From Carl Rogers, The Carl Rogers Reader, 19. 
168 John Cowper Powys records a similar insight in A Philosophy of Solitude: “The mind that can shake itself free from 
its human preoccupations is not a mind that has betrayed its human engendering; it is a mind that has gathered up 
the historic continuity of the generations; it is a mind that is aware of what Job endured, of what Homer enjoyed, of 
what Sophocles experienced, of what Goethe felt.” From John Cowper Powys, A Philosophy of Solitude, 83–84. 
169 In terms of whether the phenomenon of the sublime is indicated here, note that Jung’s use of the world “god” agrees 
with Bloom’s words, especially the latter half, here: “Whitman, our national poet, calls out for an answering 
greatness. . . . What is the American Sublime and how does it differ from British and Continental instances? 
Simplistically, the sublime in literature has been associated with peak experiences that render a secular version of 
theophany: a sense of something interfused that transforms a natural moment, landscape, action, or countenance” 
(emphasis added). From Harold Bloom, The Daemon Knows, 3. 
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became regressive. And then our psyche reacts by constellating that double, which has the 
effect of leading us out of the situation.170 
Previously in the context of Jung I have mentioned alchemy and, elsewhere, the notion of the 
biblical Logos as a process by which order is produced out of chaos. In light of those previous 
remarks and the Jung quote immediately above, consider Eric G. Wilson remarks “that [in Jung’s 
mind] melancholia and insight are intimately connected, that profound gloom generates rapid light, 
that dissolution is the key to transformation. . . . [and] that the life of Jesus [is] ultimately a parable 
for the alchemical process by which one moves from necessary melancholy to a grasp of the 
essential self.” Thus the main motifs and strands of my argument are collectively addressed and 
mutually related. Another observation central to this dissertation is due to Peterson who sees death 
and rebirth as “a necessary precondition to proper human adaptation”, as I have said, and adds that 
in order to survive “you have to identify with the part of yourself that transcends your current 
personality [and] can constantly die and be reborn.”171 It would seem then that “dissolution” (in 
Jung and Wilson) and “[self-]transcendence” (in Peterson) are means to the same end: 
“transformation” or “proper human adaptation”, both of which are forms of survival and therefore 
crucial. An important clue – supporting the existential instructiveness of what I have painted as the 
Abel-like approach to trying and painful aspects of existence – emerges from this: It turns out to be 
true (as I hinted earlier) that there are extremely good reasons why positive growth is linked with 
suffering: We have to nearly break (break down) in order to enable our own fixing (by which 
process we learn something about ourselves and about survival) or in order to improve – or change 
and grow – as persons: “[The writer] has to establish, or re-establish, a unity which has been broken 
and which is felt just as keenly by the reader, who is a potential artist, as by the writer, who believes 
himself to be an artist,” writes Henry Miller.172 From a different angle, Peterson comes at the same 
issue: 
                                                 
170 From Carl Jung, Visions: Notes of the Seminar Given in 1930–1934, vol. 1, 385. One can of course doubt Jung’s 
confident assertions (to pretend otherwise would turn my argument into a combination of dogma and wishful 
thinking). The kind of dynamic that Jung takes aim at seems to resonate with religious descriptions of the world; this 
does not trouble me, however, in part because the entire theory of the literary sublime itself has religious overtones 
(Harold Bloom sees R. W. Emerson and Whitman as exemplars of “the American Religion”, for instance), and in 
part because I use Jung’s and Frankl’s assertions as a premise or conditional on which the ensuing argument hinges. 
The religiously charged nature of Jung’s words is even more evident in this approximately synonymous observation 
from Tolstoy: “There is something in the human spirit that will survive and prevail, there is a tiny and brilliant light 
burning in the heart of man that will not go out no matter how dark the world becomes.” Tolstoy’s words are 
featured as the epigraph to Frank Chadwick, How Dark the World Becomes. 
171 From Jordan Peterson, “Biblical Series III: God and the Hierarchy of Authority” [2:15:45]. 
172 Henry Miller, The Henry Miller Reader, 361. 
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Creative exploration of the unknown, and consequent generation of knowledge [in my 
phraseology, confronting the predicament with an Abel-ish attitude and acknowledging that 
something about us may need to change], is construction or update of patterns of behavior 
and representation [“the curious paradox is that when I accept myself as I am, then I 
change”, Rogers said], such that the unknown is transformed from something terrifying and 
compelling into something beneficial (or, at least, something irrelevant) [in my words, what 
appeared to be an absolutely hellish experience – Frankl’s suffering in various concentration 
camps are a strong example – is not so hellish that it must “rob you of your very self, your 
inner freedom”, as Frankl found]. The presence of capacity for such creative exploration and 
knowledge generation may be regarded as the third, and final, permanent constituent 
element of human experience (in addition to the domain of the “known” [order] and 
“unknown” [chaos]) [again, it is my contention that this redemptive, transformative attitude 
is the central feature that survivor mindsets share in the hour of their keenest suffering]. 
 Mythological representations of the world – which are representations of reality as a 
forum for action – portray the dynamic interrelationship between all three constituent 
elements of human experience. The eternal unknown – nature, metaphorically speaking, 
creative and destructive, source and destination of all determinant things – is generally 
ascribed an affectively ambivalent feminine character (as the “mother” and eventual 
“devourer” of everyone and everything). The eternal knower, finally – the process that 
mediates between the known and the unknown – is the knight who slays the dragon of 
chaos, the hero who replaces disorder and confusion with clarity and certainty [I am herein 
arguing that that process can be undertaken aesthetically, linguistically, through the written 
word], the sun-god who eternally slays the forces of darkness, and the “word” that 
engenders creation of the cosmos.173 
The appropriate moment for returning to Gregory Orr has finally come. Like Peterson, Orr also 
considers our experiences in the world defined by the balance of order and disorder (Peterson says 
“chaos”).174 Orr writes: 
Our day to day consciousness can be characterized as an endlessly shifting, back-and-forth 
awareness of the power and presence of disorder in our lives and our desire or need for a 
sense of order [cf. Harrower in epigraphic perspective 6]. Most of us live most of our lives 
more or less comfortably with the daily interplay of these two awarenesses, but in certain 
existential crises, disorder threatens to overwhelm us entirely. In those cases, the very 
integrity of the self is threatened, and its desire or ability to persist is challenged. . . . [Our] 
instability is present to us almost daily in our unpredictable moods and the way memories 
haunt us and fantasies play themselves out at will on our inner mental screen. We are 
creatures whose volatile inner lives are both mysterious to us and beyond our control. How 
to respond to the strangeness and unpredictability of our own emotional being? One 
important answer to this question is the personal lyric, the “I” poem dramatizing inner and 
outer experience.175 
                                                 
173 Jordan Peterson, Maps of Meaning, 20. 
174 Note the highly appropriate two-fold meaning of the word “disorder”: lack of order versus ill health. 
175 Gregory Orr, Poetry as Survival, 4. See also Harrower’s words in epigraphic perspective 6. 
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It is interesting to read Whitman’s work as the repeated recognition that the personal lyric has this 
property: that it can help us respond to the mental pangs that scar our lives. I have quoted Phillips as 
saying that psychoanalysis can show people “the areas of their lives in which ‘cure’ would be the 
wrong word; in which we have to come up with something else to do other than get better”, and I 
have suggested that therapeutic writing can accomplish the same. The psychologist Jay Martin 
shares that view (as does, of course, Orr): “One of the processes we see in creativity is that the 
creative person solves a problem. That is, he’s depressed, he’s anxious, he’s uncertain, he’s 
mourning, he’s grieving. He writes, and in the process of writing, he doesn’t necessarily cure 
himself, but he gets some perspective by writing. By putting one sentence down after another, you 
get a perspective on your own disorder.”176 The limited but crucial and redemptive influence we 
may have and exert on our suffering can be concentrated – like a meditative breath – in the resolve 
to “put[] one sentence down after another”, or as Orr puts it: “Maybe I should look inside myself for 
something stable”, for “each of us needs a sense of order, a sense that some patterns or enduring 
principles are at work in our lives. . . . Each of us needs to believe that patterns and structures exist 
and can be made to exist.” The hopeful possibility inherent in the word “can” sums up the central 
parts of these concluding remarks. But Orr goes on in what seems unconscious corroboration of 
Frankl’s and Jung’s important ideas – with a coincidental approving glance at Shelley as well 
(epigraphic perspective 20): 
The awareness of disorder generates in the human mind a spontaneous ordering response. 
This ordering response is innate, a natural power—all human minds possess it. Why not call 
it “imagination” and recognize it as a fundamentally human cognitive capacity?177 
I believe that when Harold Bloom speaks of “the mind’s influence upon itself” (see epigraphical 
perspective 21), it is in an intimately related sense. Speaking of Bloom, it is to him (via Jung, as it 
happens) that I owe the concept of the literary “daemon” (although Jung spells it “daimon”, as we 
have seen, and does not speak specifically of writers); Bloom calls it the “poet-in-a-poet”, whereas 
Jung considers it a psychically generated “double” (and calls it “psychopompos” as well as a few 
other things). Here is Bloom: 
Most of the American writers studied in this book [The Deamon Knows: Literary Greatness 
and the American Sublime] start with a recognition of the god or daemon within themselves 
and compose through moving outward: Emerson, Hawthorne, Whitman, Dickinson, 
                                                 
176 Jay Martin is cited by the authors of this work: David Shields and Shane Salerno, Salinger, 263. 
177 Gregory Orr, Poetry as Survival, 16–17. See epigraphic perspectives 6 and 20–22. 
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Melville, Henry James, Stevens, Frost, Hart Crane. . . . The territory all of them light out for 
is ultimately themselves. 
Again, something in the psyche – activated by suffering and discomfort or disorder, awakened by 
the terrible threats towards aspects of the self – has the capacity to discover, establish and manifest 
self, a process that may take the form of – or inform, guide and accompany – literary creation: “All 
artistic production and enjoyment,” writes Wilhelm Worringer, “is accompanied by that state of 
inner psychic exaltation [“excitation”, “turbulence” or “crisis” are permissible stand-ins for 
“exaltation”, I think; Worringer is no trauma scholar] in which for us to-day artistic experience is 
localized”.178 The finished writing may then be regarded as a record of the self (or soul) and its 
struggle toward wholeness (etymologically related to “healing” and “wholesomeness”, as I have 
said).179 It is equally a record of the transformation of the person under the yoke of crisis.180 Cathy 
Caruth, in her work Unclaimed Experience, seems to agree with the main character of that 
description and provides a poignant and useful image by conceptualizing traumatic experience in 
terms of “a human voice that cries out from the wound [symbolizing the beginning of suffering], a 
voice that witnesses a truth that [the traumatized person] cannot fully know.”181 
 
 
                                                 
178 Wilhelm Worringer, Abstraction and Empathy, 132. The Harold Bloom quote preceding Worringer is from Harold 
Bloom, The Daemon Knows, 406. 
179 Consider this passage, very relevant to my overall theme: “For the awakened individual, however, life begins now, at 
any and every moment; it begins at the moment when he realizes that he is part of a great whole, and in the 
realization becomes himself whole. In the knowledge of limits and relationships he discovers the eternal self, 
thenceforth to move with obedience and discipline in full freedom. Balance, discipline, illumination—these are the 
key words in [E. Graham] Howe’s doctrine of wholeness, or holiness, for the words mean the same thing. It is not 
essentially new, but it needs to be rediscovered by each and every one individually. As I said before, one meets it in 
such poets and thinkers as Emerson, Thoreau, Whitman, to take a few recent examples.” From Henry Miller, The 
Wisdom of the Heart, in The Henry Miller Reader, ed. by Lawrence Durrell, 259. 
180 Arthur Koestler wrote, “Writing is a form of therapy; sometimes I wonder how all those who do not write, compose 
or paint can manage to escape the madness, the melancholia, the panic fear which is inherent in the human 
condition.” Cited in Jeffrey Berman, Death in the Classroom: Writing about Love and Loss, 252. Whitman’s art has 
been called therapeutic several times; see, for instance, Donald. D. Kummings’s entry “Asselineau, Roger (1915– )” 
in J. R. LeMaster and Donald D. Kummings, eds., The Routledge Encyclopedia of Walt Whitman, 36. See also Carl 
Martin Lindner’s words on “personal wholeness” in footnote 291. 
181 Cathy Caruth, Unclaimed Experience: Trauma, Narrative, and History, 3. Despite the brevity of my citation, the 
whole chapter rewards close study. Caruth’s Freud-derived metaphor resonates with this image from Whitman’s 
“Song of Myself”: “Dazzling and tremendous how quick the sun-rise would kill me, / If I could not now and always 
send sun-rise out of me.” 
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xviii. Clearing the Wilderness 
To recap and conclude the chapter, I have tried to argue a number of things: (1) That suffering in 
one form or another is an integral, ineluctable and therefore effectively archetypal and central 
condition or fact of life (this goes for suffering that is the direct consequence of brutal collisions 
with external reality as well as more predominantly psychic varieties of suffering which seem to 
have no discernible cause in the world beyond our selves);182 and (2) that we are naturally disposed 
to respond to suffering by sometimes doing nothing (being unwilling or not daring or experienced 
enough to acknowledge that we are suffering), sometimes losing ourselves in escapist distractions 
that efficiently but only temporarily alleviate our distress (an unwise response, amounting to a kind 
of denial, which might only exacerbate our crisis); but I have also said that in the absence of a swift 
and reliable elimination of the source of our anguish we do have another option, which is a result of 
the freedom and agency of self that Frankl asserts is always ours;183 and (3) that exercising this 
option takes us in the direction of potential transcendence of our current suffering even though the 
cost very likely is that we undergo some changes that we would not have welcomed prior to the 
crisis.184 I have argued too that language can be the instrument or method through which we try to 
get a handle of the elusive and overwhelming nature of our suffering. Plunged in meditation on – or 
feeling victimized by – “the great inevitable defeat that awaits us all” as well as of all other more 
manageable manifestations of defeat, we should aim to write – to the degree it is an option – with 
what Nietzsche calls “greatness” and Cohen calls “beauty and dignity”. (And should the suffering 
person feel that the therapy of art be beyond their reach on account of a lack of skill or excellence, 
we might well take a word of encouragement from Whitman: “There is that indescribable freshness 
and unconsciousness about an illiterate person that humbles and mocks the power of the noblest 
expressive genius.”) What matters is the resolve to take charge over a sinister situation (the “will to 
health”, in Otto Rank’s words), rather than allowing it to ride roughshod over the individual. If the 
                                                 
182 “Tragic encounter with the forces of the unknown is inevitable, in the course of normal development, given 
continued expansion of conscious awareness.” From Jordan Peterson, Maps of Meaning, 324. Paul Auster penned an 
elegant articulation of this universally dreaded contingency: “You didn’t deserve it, but neither did you not deserve 
it.” Jordan Peterson’s equally pithy articulation of the same is “If something terrible is happening to you, you’re 
going to wonder why you? That’s for sure. Why not you? might be a better question because it’s inevitable.” From 
Jordan Peterson, “The Necessity of Virtue”. For the Auster quote, see Paul Auster, Winter Journal, 198. 
183 Cf. “The intrinsic nature of human experience ensures that potent motivation for deceitful adaptations is always 
present. It is the encounter with what is truly horrible and terrifying, after all, that inspires fear and engenders 
avoidance. The human tendency to flee into false heavens of security can therefore be viewed with sympathy and 
understanding.” From Jordan Peterson, Maps of Meaning, 324. 
184 “Maturation is a frightening process.” From Jordan Peterson, Maps of Meaning, 324. 
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result of such an effort be a literary text, no matter how insignificant or aesthetically unremarkable 
it appears to even the kindliest assessor (who in lieu of other readers might be the suffering person 
him- or herself), then we have nevertheless taken part in a creative act, which means we have 
already by definition transcended brute suffering and transformed a “weary, stale, flat, and 
unprofitable” state of being (to quote Shakespeare’s Hamlet) into a fertile one. (Once again, it is 
“fertile” technically, by definition, in that it is capable of partaking of the genesis of something – i.e. 
our writing, our report, our testimony, our poem – which exhibits a higher degree of inherent order 
and meaning than the chaos and anguish afflicting the person.) “The news is sad but it’s in a song so 
it’s not so bad” would be an appropriate summary of why the genesis I am identifying is one to be 
celebrated; or as Whitman put it in a poem about death: “These carols sung to cheer my passage 
through the world I see.”185 The thought is familiar to many writers; Emily Dickinson informs a 
correspondent: “I had a terror—since September—I could tell to none; and so I sing . . . because I 
am afraid.”186 Thoreau appears to consider the “imagination” characterized by similar capabilities 
as those expressed by Shelley in epigraphic perspective 20. Whereas Shelley spoke of imaginative 
mind acting upon certain other thoughts and in so doing was able to “colour them with its own light, 
and composing from them as from elements, other thoughts, each containing within itself the 
principle of its own integrity”, Thoreau emphasized the lasting pleasure of imaginative creation: 
If you have ever done any work with these finest tools, the imagination and fancy and 
reason, it is a new creation, independent of the world, and a possession forever. You 
have laid up something against a rainy day. You have to that extent cleared the 
wilderness.187 
Other writers have presented views compatible with this idea: Gardner, as I have said, sees “moral” 
art, which he endorses exclusively, as art that pushes back against “chaos and death, [and] against 
entropy”; André Malraux suggests that “all art and the love of art allow us to negate our 
nothingness”, and Frankl (who, like Gardner, is cited previously) urges us to transcend “apathy 
                                                 
185 The first quote is from Leonard Cohen, The Favourite Game, 94. Whitman’s words are from the 1871 poem “These 
Carols”. 
 Kenneth Burke, who had a “real love/hate relationship with Whitman” in William H. Rueckert’s 
estimation, has made the deflationary statement that Whitman in his poems is merely “whistling in the dark”; but 
William H. Rueckert writes, “To reduce Whitman’s poems to whistling in the dark is to reduce them to a kind of 
absurdity, to a purely verbal symbolic action with no basis in reality. [Whitman] was not, as Burke suggests, just 
peddling nature as American real estate.” From Kenneth Burke, On Human Nature: A Gathering While Everything 
Flows, 1967–1984, ed. by William H. Rueckert and Angelo Bonadonna, 66. 
186 The last quote is reprinted in George Mamunes, “So has a Daisy vanished”: Emily Dickinson and Tuberculosis, 128. 
187 Cited in Christopher Edgar and Gary Lenhart, ed., The Teachers & Writers Guide to Classic American Literature, 58. 
See also Peterson’s words in epigraphic perspective 22. 
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[and] irritability” by a mental effort to discover life “meaningful and purposeful”).188 Adam Phillips 
writes that “suffering can sometimes be transformed by applying words to wounds, by being seen as 
meaningful,” which faithfully echoes my words and constitutes a straightforward way in which one 
might be able to resolve the Nietzschean problem overtly indicated by Nietzsche’s words, “To live 
is to suffer, to survive is to find some meaning in the suffering.”189 By writing from the midst of our 
catastrophe or crisis (and thereby being “worthy of our suffering” in Frankl’s words – or proving 
ourselves “equal to” it), it is as if we are salvaging something valuable from a wreck, the wreck 
being the simultaneous death and transformation of our habitual life “philosophy” in Powys’s 
sense.190 Our writing is necessarily distinguished by being a cry that is uttered in an emergency, 
which is to say through a wound, figuratively speaking, and literally through woundedness (if you 
will forgive the contradictions between Caruth’s and Phillips’s incompatible wound metaphors), 
and its message is similar in spirit and import to that carried by Job’s messenger carrying news of 
calamity: “I only am escaped alone to tell thee.”191 In short, our survival or recovery is predicated 
on our honest cooperation with the difficult facts of our predicament and our implicit recognition of 
the possibility that we may need to change in order to survive (not because it is not tragic that 
                                                 
188 Malraux is cited by Brombert in Victor Brombert, Musings on Mortality: From Tolstoy to Primo Levi, 4. 
189 Adam Phillips, Side Effects, 19. The phrases from Frankl are referenced earlier in this dissertation. 
 Michael Moon, editor of the Norton Critical Edition of Leaves of Grass, associates with Whitman a 
“compassionate involvement in the episodes of human fortitude and faith.” From Walt Whitman, Leaves of Grass, 
ed. by Michael Moon, 546n6. 
 On the subject of Nietzsche’s oft-cited aphorism, which is at the heart of Viktor Frankl’s logotherapy 
(defined in terms of “Will to Meaning”), the philosopher Simon May has said this about Heidegger and Camus: 
“[Heidegger, like Camus,] had this vision of the human being as “thrown” (he used the word “geworfen”) . . . into a 
world, which in a sense is not ready for him, and he is not ready (or she is not ready) for it. And the idea is not that 
this is actually tragic. . . . It’s not actually tragic. It’s part of accepting and understanding life that you accept the fact 
that we are thrown into this world that can be profoundly hostile to our intentions, that has no concern for us 
whatsoever. And that the challenge of living a well-lived life . . . for Heidegger is to find an authentic relationship to 
this world in which you in a sense make it your own and in which you in some way dispense with the whole 
question of cost-benefit calculations. . . [One way to make the world one’s own would be,] firstly, by a profound act 
of acceptance, which also involves getting rid of . . . a sort of “means-end” instrumental approach to the world [and] 
of seeing the world as a sort of object for the subject to manipulate, in fact [of] the whole subject-object distinction.” 
Many of the themes I have developed were, in Simon May’s portrait of Heidegger, central to that man’s life and 
existential perspectives as well. For more on “Will to Meaning”, see Viktor Frankl, Man’s Search for Meaning, 97–
101. 
190 Differing gently with Archibald MacLeish who wrote that “A poem should be equal to: / not true” (see footnote 228), 
Seamus Heaney said in his Nobel Lecture that “poetry can be equal to and true at the same time”. He added: “there 
are times when a deeper need enters, when we want the poem to be not only pleasurably right but compellingly 
wise, not only a surprising variation played upon the world, but a re-tuning of the world itself. We want the surprise 
to be transitive like the impatient thump which unexpectedly restores the picture to the television set, or the electric 
shock which sets the fibrillating heart back to its proper rhythm.” 
191 Hermann Hesse bears this out by saying, memorably, that “In its origin a poem is something completely 
unequivocal. It is a discharge, a call, a cry, a sigh, a gesture, a reaction by which the living soul seeks to defend itself 
from or to become aware of an emotion, an experience. In this first spontaneous most important function no poem 
can be judged. It speaks first of all to the poet himself, it is his cry, his scream, his dream, his smile, his whirling 
fists.” Cited in John Fox, Poetic Medicine: The Healing Art of Poem-Making, 2. 
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external forces are causing us suffering, but because among the two – person and predicament – 
only the former can, so it appears, be moderated here and now). In Carl Rogers’s words, we “cannot 
move away from what we are, until we thoroughly accept what we are. Then change seems to come 
about almost unnoticed.” Frankl’s insistence that we may partake mentally, dynamically and with 
real agency in the painful process of enduring existential distress will be a premise in what I shall 
have to say in the following. By “premise” I mean to say that I consider it the fundamental 
psychological principle on which our sublime intention to suffer successfully or deliberately hinges, 
and which in turn presents us with the opportunity to discover meaning in suffering and on that rise 
and evolve in a meaningful valuable direction. 
 I shall in chapter 3 particularly return to and consider some relevant instances from 
Whitman’s work that reflect what I have said above. For now, let me present one passage by way of 
closing the chapter in which Whitman investigates a phenomenon that seems strikingly closely 
related to the psychic dynamics outlined by Frankl and Jung: 
What do you think is the grandeur of storms and dismemberments and the deadliest battles 
and wrecks and the wildest fury of the elements and the power of the sea and the motion of 
nature and of the throes of human desires and dignity and hate and love? It is that something 
in the soul which says, Rage on, Whirl on, I tread master here and everywhere, Master of the 
spasms of the sky and of the shatter of the sea, Master of nature and passion and death, And 
of all terror and all pain.192 
                                                 
192 From Whitman’s 1855 Preface to Leaves of Grass. Roger Asselineau notes that the “superb arrogance” with which 
this Preface is charged “perhaps arose from an obscure feeling of inferiority.” From that perspective, the text 
becomes a manifestation in deed of what it conveys and urges in name (very “meta”, as we have learned to say); 
consider in this context my words on Coleridge’s line “From the soul must issue forth . . . A sweet and potent voice, 
of its own birth” (cited in footnote 374). From Roger Asselineau, The Evolution of Walt Whitman, vol. 1, 181. 
 It should also be noted, given the textual resonance with the cited passage, that Whitman would later 
consider Leaves of Grass not “an intellectual or scholastic effort of Poem mainly, but more as a radical utterance out 
of the abyms of the Soul, the Emotions and the Physique.” From the Preface to the 1876 edition of Leaves of Grass; 
cited in Roger Asselineau, The Evolution of Walt Whitman, 12. 
 It is interesting to consider the quoted passage in the light of these lines: “Apart from the pulling and 
hauling stands what I am, / Stands amused, complacent, compassionating, idle, unitary, / Looks down, is erect, or 
bends an arm on an impalpable certain rest, / Looking with side-curved head curious what will come next, / Both in 
and out of the game and watching and wondering at it.” From “Song of Myself”. The word “grandeur” also makes it 
pertinent to what Whitman said in a Specimen Day passage I have cited earlier (“there is another shape of 
personality dearer far to the artist-sense”); see footnote 151. 
  As a note of interest, Rudyard Kipling posits the existence of the very same kind of voice when in the 
poem “If—“ he writes “[If you can] hold on when there is nothing in you / Except the Will which says to [your heart 
and nerve and sinew]: ‘Hold on!’ / . . . [then] you’ll be a Man, my son!”  
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Chapter 2. “[I]t is not my material eyes which finally see, / 
Nor my material body which finally loves”: Leaves of Grass 
as Redemptive Inauguration of Symbolic Self 
Chapter summary: The failure on the part of scholars, primarily philosophers, to 
satisfactorily and consensually define the nature of the personal self is part and parcel of a 
kind of positive consequence, namely that it generates the potential for individuals to 
symbolically (and phenomenologically) represent, explore and reconfigure aspects and 
features of their individual self via art or language. These aspects and features represent 
dimensions which float free and to some degree remain aloof to the empirical realities 
surrounding personal identity which are harder, sometimes impossible, to influence and 
alter. E.g. one cannot with the word take a very interesting look at the fact that one has two 
arms and two legs; but one can write interestingly about the qualities felt to be attributable 
to one’s self, which manifests itself in ways both empirically undeniable and empirically 
elusive. The linguistic handling of qualities inherent to the self is, as I have already 
suggested, fundamentally a phenomenological issue. The fact that it is possible via 
language to gain access to and potentially influence the composition and internal situation 
of a self is the fundamental axiom and premise on which psychoanalysis is predicated: We 
are thus amenable to psychic change and have as speaking, writing selves a role 
ourselves in facilitating it. Part of the definitional ambiguity afflicting the practice of defining 
self has to do with the fuzziness and instability of the categories involved in the intuitively 
tempting binary model self versus other. As one looks into these issues it becomes clear 
that the familiar poetic self-portrait from Housman – “I, a stranger and afraid / In a world I 
never made” – is overwhelmingly a subjective and phenomenological summary of the 
existential situation. That it is intuitive can hardly be denied, and from an evolutionary 
perspective taking it for granted has no doubt been incomparably effective. A more 
defensible account, however, would argue that we are not neatly and hermetically divorced 
and in separation from the so-called “external” world with its empirically available 
experiences, but rather integral to and in our small way co-constitutive of it. While some 
threats to human well-being are clearly best tackled by construing human life for the 
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individual as an atomized and lonely I-against-the-world battle (predatory animals and 
natural disasters, for instance), others are not. Some threats and problems arise on or 
inside the liminal border (a categorical boundary) which we have learned not to question 
as a result of early-childhood socialization and are culturally obliged to reiterate daily in the 
act of clothing ourselves. Psychic problems are among these threats and problems – 
running the gamut from the commonest personality frailties to regrets, anguish, traumas 
and clinical malaise. The specific psychological attitudes that one harbors to specific crisis 
and threats turn out to significantly impact and influence the specific nature of the 
experience of feeling persecuted or threatened, which means that it is useful to direct 
focus away from the somewhat fruitless attempt to discover and chart with scientific 
veracity the nature of our existential situation and instead recognize the psychologically 
consoling or healing rewards that might be gained from the activity of creative self-
examination and self-expression. The goal for the person is “individual liberation” (in 
Thomas S. Szasz’s phrase): i.e. to facilitate that “self-control and self-direction supplant 
internal anarchy and external constraint”.193 (Goethe, on this issue, spoke of “Antique 
natures”; cf. footnote 335.) This thesis is in part a reminder of the fact that each person 
always has the choice – related to or dependent on the freedom Frankl identified (end of 
chapter 1) – to mentally question, adjust, care about, restructure and redeem the initial 
mental reactions of the pandemoniacal self (a phrase which seems to cover the earlier oft-
cited conceptualizations “rhapsody of perceptions” and “blooming buzzing confusion”) 
when confronted with the forces that assail it.194 The self is not a static given entity 
doomed to life-long engulfment in a sea of hostile surroundings, it turns out, but an 
organically evolving multiplicity or conglomerate that via the oxygen of self-examination, 
self-expression and symbolic self-repair and self-maintenance can be taught to “roll with 
the punches” and thus be assisted in its mandatory pursuit of enough peace, stability and 
confidence to stay sane. This choice – available to each person – may even be said to 
                                                 
193 Szasz stresses the significance of self-discipline, which he sees as a prerequisite of individual liberty. From Thomas 
S. Szasz, Ideology and Insanity, 2. I am sympathetic to that position although I would prefer “self-agency” to “self-
discipline” whereby (to adopt Viktor Frankl’s vision) I mean the person’s genius for making a certain “inner 
decision” and thus “decide what shall become of him—mentally and spiritually.” In dire crisis, Frankl thought, a 
person’s human dignity depends on that crucial “inner decision”. 
194 The quoted phrases in parenthesis are, respectively, Emmanuel Kant’s and William James’s. They are quoted in the 
chapter on “The Self” in Simon Blackburn, Think, 138. The metaphor of pandemonium in relationship to the self is 
due to the contemporary philosopher Daniel Dennett, as will become clear. 
 Reminiscent of Orr’s phrase, Viktor Frankl, as I shall show at the end of chapter 1, spoke of guarding 
against “powers which threatened to rob you of your very self”. 
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offer what Aldous Huxley called psychological “self-transcendence” (see epigraphic 
perspective 7). 
* * * 
 
We sail a dangerous sea of seething currents, cross and under-currents, 
vortices—all so dark, untried—and whither shall we turn? 
—Walt Whitman, Democratic Vistas 
 
i. That Art Thou: Reflections on Being and “Me and Not-Me” 
[195] At the end of this second chapter, I propose that Leaves of Grass can usefully be thought of as 
the poet’s discovery and iterative honing over many years of a poetic voice capable of articulating 
the unique characteristics – more precisely, the existential attitudes – of a mode of being which he 
hoped would (and then found could) redeem or reduce his suffering thus assisting his survival in 
bad times and enriching his experience of living in better times. This is the kind of function of 
poetry that Seamus Heaney was identifying when he pointed out that poetry deserves credit “for 
making possible a fluid and restorative relationship between the mind’s center and its 
circumference” and for instilling an order that is simultaneously “true to the impact of external 
reality” and “sensitive to the inner laws of a poet’s being”.196 It also provides an apt example of 
what Arthur Koestler was getting at when he claimed that “self-repair and self-realization” could be 
achieved through “creative activity”, through the artistical attempt to “express the inexpressible” 
and “escape from the distortions and constraints imposed by the conventional styles and 
techniques”. (See also Goethe’s perspectives on “Antique natures”; footnote 335.) It is of some 
                                                 
195 This phrase (“Me and Not-Me” along with “I and Not-I”) are used by Ralph Waldo Emerson who used them in an 
argument on the philosopher Fichte’s “Ich and Nicht-Ich”. See Patrick J. Keane, Emerson, Romanticism, and 
Intuitive Reason: The Transatlantic “Light of All Our Day”, 277. 
196 In his 1995 Nobel Lecture, Heaney employs an instructive metaphor. Speaking of his childhood days, he remarks 
that his inexperienced mind was as “susceptible and impressionable as the drinking water that stood in a bucket in our 
scullery: every time a passing train made the earth shake, the surface of that water used to ripple delicately, 
concentrically, and in utter silence.” When considering – as an adult poet – the mental service and order that poetry is to 
be credited for rendering, he writes: “I credit it ultimately because poetry can make an order as true to the impact of 
external reality and as sensitive to the inner laws of the poet’s being as the ripples that rippled in and rippled out across 
the water in that scullery bucket fifty years ago. An order where we can at last grow up to that which we stored up as we 
grew. An order which satisfies all that is appetitive in the intelligence and prehensile in the affections.” Another writer 
managed to nourish a “restorative relationship between the mind’s centre and its circumference”: Thus Henry Miller’s 
greatness, in Norman Mailer’s estimation, was that he managed to “maintain some relation between his mind and that 
theatre which presumes to call itself reality.” Henry Miller, Genius and Lust: a Journey through the Major Writings of 
Henry Miller, ed. by Norman Mailer, 84. 
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interest also that Koestler covertly makes the point that self-repair and self-realization are part and 
parcel of the same process and are apparently happening simultaneously; that there is a generative 
quality to fixing oneself when “in bad shape” is at the heart of the idea I shall lay out. In Koestler, 
again, repair and realization are the two aspects integral to the “do-it-yourself therapy” (his phrase) 
that artists are (rather enviably perhaps) capable of potentially manifesting through their creative 
and aesthetic “attempt[s] to come to terms with traumatizing challenges.”197 
 I shall consider how one might appropriately conceptualize a person’s self in terms of 
the pressures and challenges of “external reality”, whatever that phrase precisely means – i.e. 
wherever precisely that domain begins and ends – which turns out to be part of the problem. 
Interestingly, however, it is also part of a solution – in other relevant terms. And I shall show how 
Leaves of Grass embodies and represents Whitman’s response to these and related problems and 
challenges. 
 Six years before his death, Leonard Cohen reflected on what Federico Garcia Lorca’s 
poetry had taught him as a young man about the manner in which a poet must speak of death: “[If] 
one is to express the great inevitable defeat that awaits us all, it must be done within the strict 
confines of dignity and beauty,” he said (see footnote 128). Unwittingly, this insight might have a 
distant precursor in Nietzsche’s words, “Of what is great one must either be silent or speak with 
greatness.” This chapter quietly accepts the premise (derived trivially from these sentiments and 
from the necessary interconnectedness of life and death) that life (including being, bodies, selfhood, 
personal identity, consciousness, the self) are properly to be spoken of within certain strict confines 
of a kind of “greatness”, by which I mean confines indicated by a respect for the mystery of the 
various themes and issues (specifically, in this thesis, those that are difficult for us). It seems 
reasonable to assume that the philosophical and theological literature on death, human being, 
personal identity and related issues is already so vast – and still growing – precisely because these 
are virtually inexhaustible domains. This confers a kind of impossibility and humbling hardness to 
                                                 
197 From Arthur Koestler, The Ghost in the Machine, 177. That view echoes Graham Greene’s view (cited earlier). 
Green is cited in Jeffrey Berman, Death in the Classroom: Writing about Love and Loss, 252. 
As a note of interest, let me mention that Koestler seems to agreement with Alan Watts, whom I shall mention in the 
following, that “the task and delight of poetry is to say what cannot be said” and “to eff the ineffable, and to unscrew 
the inscrutable”. From Alan Watts, In My Own Way: An Autobiography 1915–1965, xiii. 
Not surprisingly, the phrase “representing the unrepresentable” is often used by scholars in connection with coming to 
terms with and working through trauma; Cf. Walter Kalaidjian, The Edge of Modernism: American Poetry and the 
Traumatic Past, 41. 
Also, note how Koestler’s duality “self-repair and self-realization” finds a synonymous counterpart in the latter half 
of the title of Judith Harris’s book Signifying Pain: Constructing and Healing the Self through Writing (underlining 
added). 
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them – a “greatness” in Nietzsche’s terminology. 
 A different way of expressing the same observation is the following: I suppose the 
scholars and thinkers in these domains of exploration are trying (in Alan Watts’s phraseology) to 
make the ear hear itself, the teeth bite themselves or the hand catch hold of itself.198 They are 
engaged, in other words, in something akin to a tautological impossibility which ushers in the kind 
of respectful (and humble and open-minded) stance I insist we need to embrace and argue from. We 
are grappling with something that both dwarfs and subsumes ourselves at every level of analysis 
which is why extreme epistemological humility and caution is advised. In the first chapter of 
Walden, Thoreau put it nicely: “The finest qualities of our nature, like the bloom on fruits, can be 
preserved only by the most delicate handling.” When in this chapter I use the word “sublime” and 
cite Alan Watts, Aldous Huxley and Jordan Peterson (scholars of psychology as well as religion), a 
robust card-carrying materialist of the New Atheist variety might suppose that I have lost my 
scholarly bearings and seduced myself with pretty superstition. Let me therefore at this point openly 
state that I respectfully doubt that a strictly materialist delineation of selfhood will lead to a very 
useful picture; I fear it will not amount to more than a mechanical and hopelessly sterile portrait of 
human being – which we would be forced to dismiss insofar as we were against “explaining away” 
what is “great” rather than “explaining it”.199 I would add that I am perfectly willing to say that it 
might be useful to say that there is something sublime or transcendent about being (Peterson’s 
work, especially Maps of Meaning, presents a carefully calibrated and persuasive argument for this 
claim), and that it seems no coincidence or slip of the pen that Harold Bloom boldly establishes 
synonymousness between “American literary selfhood” and the “American Religion” (my 
                                                 
198 Alan Watts, What Is Tao?, 31. 
199 Allan Hobson mentions the oft-cited criticism of Daniel Dennett’s book Consciousness Explained, which some 
critics felt should have been entitled “Consciousness Explained Away”, in Allan Hobson, Psychodynamic 
Neurology: Dreams, Consciousness, and Virtual Reality, 32. My wariness of an overly materialist handling of this 
issue owes something to both Thomas S. Szasz, Roger Scruton, Jordan Peterson and Adam Phillips. Szasz writes, “I 
do not deny or minimize the empirical or scientific basis of various systems of classification. However, my concern 
here is different: it is to clarify the strategic intent and import of systems of classification regardless of their 
content.” From Thomas S. Szasz, Ideology and Insanity, 197. (More on Szasz later.) Relevant to the same, Scruton, 
much more recently, has written: “I am fairly confident that the picture painted by the evolutionary psychologists is 
true. But I am also confident that it is not the whole truth, and that it leaves out of account precisely the most 
important thing, which is the human subject.” From Roger Scruton, “If We Are Not Just Animals, What Are We?”, 
in The Stone, March 6, 2017. 
 Adam Phillips agrees with Scruton: “I am unmoved by [evolutionary and neuroscientific explanations 
of psychological traits]. It’s not that I think it’s wrong or false. Lots of it sounds true to me. . . . But I am just 
unmoved by the sentences. So I am not fascinated by the brain – this is not to my credit, you understand – but 
people have different interests. And when neuroscientists write about the brain I find it incredibly boring. . . . But I 
find the brain the least alluring body part. I prefer faces much more. . . . Neuroscience is for the people who love it.” 
From Adam Phillips, “RSA Replay: One Way or Another” [24:00].  
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emphasis) both of which partake, in his thinking, of the “American Sublime.”200 I have found that 
these words by Huxley adequately sum up the situation and dispose of it very well: 
No account of the scientific picture of the world and its history would be complete unless it 
contained a reminder of the fact, frequently forgotten by scientists themselves, that this 
picture does not even claim to be comprehensive. From the world we actually live in, the 
world that is given by our senses, our intuitions of beauty and goodness, our emotions and 
impulses, our moods and sentiments, the man of science abstracts a simplified private 
universe of things possessing only those qualities which used to be called “primary.” 
Arbitrarily, because it happens to be convenient, because his methods do not allow him to 
deal with the immense complexity of reality, he selects from the whole of experience only 
those elements which can be weighed, measured, numbered, or which lend themselves in 
any other way to mathematical treatment.[201] By using this technique of simplification and 
abstraction, the scientist has succeeded to an astonishing degree in understanding and 
dominating the physical environment. The success was intoxicating and, with an illogicality 
which, in the circumstances, was doubtless pardonable, many scientists and philosophers 
came to imagine that this useful abstraction from reality was reality itself. Reality as actually 
experienced contains intuitions of value and significance, contains love, beauty, mystical 
ecstasy, intimations of godhead. Science did not and still does not possess intellectual 
instruments with which to deal with these aspects of reality. Consequently it ignored them 
and concentrated its attention upon such aspects of the world as it could deal with by means 
of arithmetic, geometry and the various branches of higher mathematics. Our conviction that 
the world is meaningless is due in part to the fact (discussed in a later paragraph) that the 
philosophy of meaninglessness lends itself very effectively to furthering the ends of erotic or 
political passion; in part to a genuine intellectual error—the error of identifying the world of 
science, a world from which all meaning and value has been deliberately excluded, with 
ultimate reality. . . . In [the present moment] we are able to see that the contents of literature, 
art, music—even in some measure of divinity and school metaphysics—are not sophistry 
and illusion, but simply those elements of experience which scientists chose to leave out of 
account, for the good reason that they had no intellectual methods for dealing with them. In 
the arts, in philosophy, in religion men are trying—doubtless, without complete success—to 
describe and explain the non-measurable, purely qualitative aspects of reality.202 
Before embarking on this chapter properly, let me inject that I have already indicated above that the 
arguments I am developing in this dissertation are charged or facilitated by positing an imagined 
liminal contact surface or “membrane” between, in Orr’s words, “the self and the forces that assail 
it” – or, in Emerson’s, “the me and the not-me”. While this dualism is a methodological 
                                                 
200 Harold Bloom, The Daemon Knows, 23. 
201 On the current intellectual and epistemological climate, Alan Watts has usefully remarked that “[M]odern 
Protestantism . . ., in its liberal and progressive forms, is the religion most strongly influenced by the mythology of 
the world of objects, and of man as the separate ego.”) From Robert L. Johnson, Counter Culture and the Vision of 
God, 87. 
202 Aldous Huxley, “Beliefs”. Printed as an appendix in Aldous Huxley, The Perennial Phillosophy, separate pagination. 
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convenience sanctioned on essentially phenomenological grounds, as I shall show, it has the added 
merit of being natural and intuitive – it is compatible with how we tend to think about our lives: 
[Thingking] in terms of an ‘I’ now looks like a formal or structural requirement on 
interpreting experience in the way we do—as experience of a three-dimensional world of 
continuing objects, amongst which we move. The ‘I’ is the point of view from which 
interpretation starts. It is not something else given in experience, because nothing given in 
experience could solve the formal problem for which an ‘I’ is needed. But a point of view is 
always needed: to represent a scene to yourself is to represent yourself as experiencing it one 
way or another.203 
I used the word “membrane” earlier; Judith Harris, to whose work (Signifying Pain) I am 
sympathetic and to some degree indebted, uses the very apt word “cuirass” (see footnote 126). 
Whether, however, it presents a true picture in some philosophically sound, empirical and hallowed-
by-science sense is a debate I shall not try to settle in these pages (my suspicion is that humankind 
will never settle it and that it shall remain a philosophical problem and outlast the subtlest thinkers 
to come); suffice it to say that a vast slew of common considerations about human being in the 
world are certainly predicated on it. In chapter 1, I excerpted a few words from Jordan Peterson’s 
lecture “The Necessity of Virtue”. The relevant passage makes the persuasive argument that we 
very often have no choice but to be phenomenological about things; that is, we are often forced to 
privilege what things feel like in the absence of that presumably empirical data which – if it could 
be produced and rationally evaluated, which is arguably itself something of a problem – might 
corroborate and legitimize the feeling and thus cement its validity beyond the power of subjectivity. 
In “The Necessity of Virtue” Peterson says: 
Modern people are fundamentally materialistic. And there’s some utility in that: We’re 
masters of material transformation, and the fact that we are materialist in our scientific 
philosophy has made us extremely powerful . . . from a technological perspective, but it’s 
blinded us to certain things. And I think one of the things it’s really blinded us to is the 
nature of our own being, because we make the assumption that the fundamental constituent 
elements of reality are material. We fail to notice that the fundamental constituent elements 
of our own reality are not material – they’re emotional, they’re motivational, they’re dreams, 
they’re visions, they’re relationships with other people. They’re conscious: they’re 
dependent on consciousness [and] self-consciousness. . . . We don’t deal well from a 
materialistic perspective with the qualities of being. 
                                                 
203 Simon Blackburn, Think, 140. 
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I consider that to be accurate. But I shall also suggest that that is simply an unalterable aspect of the 
curious nature of being in this universe – and that we must act accordingly. I think Jung bears out 
that stance when he very usefully observes 
The psyche deserves to be taken as a phenomenon in its own right; there are no grounds at 
all for regarding it as a mere epiphenomenon, dependent though it may be on the functioning 
of the brain. One would be as little justified in regarding life as an epiphenomenon of the 
chemistry of carbon compounds.204 
Central to Tolstoy’s quote “Everyone thinks of changing the world, but no one thinks of 
changing himself” is the implied observation that the self – any given person’s self – is an element 
of the world.205 This state of self subsumption means that change necessarily occurs in both when 
occurring (originating, or occurring first) in one. That insight agrees too with Jung’s assertion that 
“any internal state of contradiction, unrecognized, will be played out in the world as fate.”206 And 
Henry Miller wrote of Whitman that “He knows that if there’s anything wrong with [the world], no 
tinkering on his part will mend it. He knows that the only way to put it to rights, if we must use the 
expression, is for every living individual to first put himself to rights.”207 Despite the mutual 
integration or overlap between self and world, we tend also to be keenly aware and somewhat 
troubled to concede that selves can be eliminated (as in death) without necessarily causing 
substantial change in the world, which as an observation lends credence to the conceptual 
distinction between self and world that I have just mentioned. There is obviously a paradox here, 
and much philosophy and religious thought have unfolded from these first foundational steps 
towards an accurate picture of the world and a believable existentialist philosophy. We are in 
philosophical territory that  (in Shelly Kagan’s terminology) remains riddled with “mysteries”.208 
 Having proved intellectually indissoluble – which is to say timeless, practically 
speaking, and for that reason integral to the human condition or, alternatively, archetypal – the 
mysteries and paradoxes that persist in and around existentialism, personal identity and the notion 
of the self furthermore happen to be of a multiplicity and variety that make attempts at summarizing 
                                                 
204 Carl Jung, The Structure and Dynamics of the Psyche, 7–8. 
205 Tolstoy is quoted by Alfred Armand Montapert, ed., Words of Wisdom to Live by: An Encyclopedia of Wisdom in 
Condensed Form, 40. An observation containing the same idea in different guise arguable motivated Montaigne’s “Not 
being able to govern events, I govern myself” (quoted in the previous chapter). 
206 Cited in Jordan B. Peterson, Maps of Meaning, 342. Jung said elsewhere “It is often tragic to see how blatantly a 
man bungles his own life and the lives of others yet remains totally incapable of seeing how much the whole tragedy 
originates in himself, and how he continually feeds it and keeps it going.” From Carl Jung, Aion, paragraph 18. 
207 Henry Miller, The Books in My Life, 222. 
208 See, for instance, Shelly Kagan, The Limits of Morality, 121 and 177. 
106 
 
them not only time-consuming but ultimately not very useful and meaningful. The rich, high-
resolution picture is distorted by attempts to shrink it. Ongoing intellectual divisiveness is an aspect 
of the complexity. For instance, as for the problem of specifying “the nature of an individual” a 
standard reference guide agrees with me that while these 
questions [are] of great interest and importance [they] defy summary treatment: it must 
suffice to say that they are the subject of lively contemporary debate, most of the 
contributors to which, recognizing that Locke’s commitments cannot both be held together, 
argue for abandoning one or the other.”209 
I shall therefore refer the interested reader to the relevant philosophical treaties and only present a 
few salient aspects necessary for coming to grips with the issue as it appears in the context of my 
arguments on therapeutically handling and responding to the forces that assail the self (dysphoria, 
trauma, mental anguish, etc.). 
 The briefest and, among historians of philosophy, most legendary verbal articulation 
of what centrally defines selfhood is doubtless Descartes’s “cogito ergo sum”: I think, therefore I 
am. In the context of Descartes’s significant contributions to philosophy, the insight is justly 
famous, and Freud is by no means the first – nor the last – to argue for the reasonableness of 
assuming that what it offers, albeit quietly and indirectly, in the way of a definition of a self 
(“someone who thinks”) is axiomatic and valuable: 
Normally, there is nothing of which we are more certain than the feeling of ourselves, of our 
own ego. This ego appears to us as something autonomous and unitary, marked off distinctly 
from everything else[,] . . . seems to maintain clear sharp lines of demarcation.210 
Thus Freud on the familiar appearance of a perfect one-to-one identity between a person’s ego and 
his or her quality of existing as an individual entity (meaning, literally, that which cannot be 
divided). My remarks, in the previous chapter, to the effect that “When a man suffers, he is most 
alone”, as Merton puts it, also sustain the idea that I or you indeed are bounded-off entities existing 
in a world of objects and events – what Alan Watts calls “separate ego[s] enclosed in a bag of skin.” 
                                                 
209 See A. C. Grayling, ed., Philosophy: A Guide through the Subject, 506. Of course, various worthwhile précis exist in 
book form, for instance, John Perry’s A Dialogue on Personal Identity and Immortality. Derek Parfit’s Reason and 
Persons offers a seminal contemporary discussion of the topic. 
210 Sigmund Freud, Civilisation and Its Discontents, 12–13. Freud proceeds by saying that “such an appearance is 
deceptive” due to the claim defended by psychoanalytic research that “the ego is continued inwards without any 
sharp delimitation, into an unconscious mental entity which we designate as the id and for which it serves as a kind 
of façade”. 
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But it is worth thinking hard, as Pierre Gassendi (a contemporary of Descartes) did, before 
accepting “cogito ergo sum” as a sound starting point for developing a good understanding of 
selfhood. Gassendi pointed out that Descartes was guilty of a central unwitting assumption, and that 
the fact that thinking is going on does not lead smoothly to the conclusion that thinking is being 
done by a thinker, by one particular and unitary agent.”211 
 What I want to get at is competently stated in Oliver Burkeman The Antidote: 
What if we are mistaken, not only about how to change ourselves but also about the 
nature of the selves we’re trying to change? Calling into question our assumptions 
about what it means to talk about the self might prompt an entirely different approach 
to the psychology of happiness. 
   The notion that our commonplace assumptions about 
selfhood might need re-examining . . . is an ancient thought, central to Buddhism and 
to numerous other philosophical traditions – a theme recurring so frequently in the 
history of religion and spirituality, in fact, that it is a part of what Aldous Huxley and 
others labelled ‘the perennial philosophy.’ 
The fact that it is possible to coherently argue that “our commonplace assumptions about selfhood 
might need re-examing” is suggestive and revelatory to me. Beyond the certainly thought-
provoking fact that apparently all manner of spiritual, religious and no doubt culture-generating 
practices and traditions have sprung from the fertile grounds of an intellectually elusive 
phenomenon, it reveals something profound about human being. It is this: In the final analysis, the 
phenomenon and very fact of (human) being appears finally open to (human) interpretation. The 
natural scientists have not offered the last word or closed the book on what it finally means to be a 
self in the world. In the universal absence of that kind of truth – i.e. of the relevant indubitable and 
authoritative account – the account that you contrive for yourself is potentially as valuable as any.212 
                                                 
211 The German scientist Georg Lichtenberg later declared that Descartes was entitled only to claim that “thinking is 
occurring”, not “I think, therefore I am”. Also, see Oliver Burkeman, The Antidote, 107 (quoted on this page). 
 To return to alchemy, Terence McKenna has said that for the alchemists, “the firm ontological division 
between mind and matter that is built into western thinking now, did not exist. That comes with René Descartes with 
what is called the “res extensa” (the extended world) and the “res [cogitans]” (the interior world), which has no 
spatial extension.” From Terence McKenna, “Terence McKenna – Carl Jung & Psychic Archetypes (Lecture)” 
[8:10]. 
212 Thus it is that without believing in or wanting to defend the Cartesian notion of souls, the psychologist Paul Bloom 
can write a book-length treatise, Descartes’ Baby: How the Science of Child Development Explains What Makes Us 
Human, the whole “premise of [which] is that we are [Cartesian] dualists” by instinct. Whether or not that could be 
proved or we can argue ourselves out of it, it is crucial and interesting to Paul Bloom (and me) that we “do not feel 
as if we are bodies; we feel as if we occupy them.” (His emphasis is on what being “feels” like, which is where it 
should be.) I shall shortly hereafter credit Rousseau with the apt observation that “One does not begin by reasoning 
but by feeling,” which also is an insight that this dissertation appreciates. In general, it is my belief that no 
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ii. The Frame Problem 
Jordan Peterson has taken an interest in the wider epistemological implications of the so-called 
Frame Problem: “the problem of how to bind your perceptions – to limit them.” Here, he flags and 
questions the apparent object-like spatial discreteness of a human being that is generally inferable 
from visually encountering the human form: 
When you look in the mirror you see yourself as an object. You see your eyes, you see 
your nose, you see your face, you see your body. And that’s pretty much what you see 
when you look at other people. But that isn’t all there is to you. In fact, that’s hardly 
any of what there is to you. . . . [F]or example, you exist at the level of the quantum 
particle. You can’t perceive that, in fact people didn’t know that until seventy-five 
years ago. Above that level you exist at an atomic level, and then a molecular level, 
and then you exist at the level of complex organs and the interactions between those 
organs. And then you, and then your family, and then the groups that your family 
belongs to. And then the ecosystems that the groups belong to, and so on and so forth 
until what it is that you are can expand to encompass virtually anything. 
 Now, when you look at yourself you don’t see that. You see yourself at a 
certain level of resolution . . . but all those other levels are equally real and equally 
relevant. And we in fact have very little idea how it is that you’re only able to see 
what you see. Almost nothing has obvious boundaries and this has real world 
consequences, it’s not something that’s merely abstract.213 
I mentioned in passing the spiritual dimension of the intellectual elusiveness of the matter. One 
person who considered seriously the argument that “all those other levels are equally real and 
equally relevant” was Alan Watts. Watts emphasized the spiritually liberating rewards of 
recognizing, wholly in conformity with the just-cited argument (though he predates Peterson), that 
                                                 
dissertation could speak seriously about lyrical poetry – in which the “I” speaks “strongly and directly [from] 
personal experience” in Robert Frost’s words – without attending at least as loyally to subjective experiences as to 
what is given the distinction of being “empirical” by contemporary science.  
213 Jordan Peterson, from the lecture “Jordan Peterson: Reality and the Sacred” [5:20]. D. H. Lawrence was conscious of 
the same problem: “Now I absolutely flatly deny that I am a soul, or a body, or a mind, or an intelligence, or a brain, 
or a nervous system, or a bunch of glands, or any of the rest of these bits of me. The whole is greater than the part. 
And therefore, I, who am man alive, am greater than my soul, or spirit, or body, or mind, or consciousness, or 
anything else that is merely a part of me.” D. H. Lawrence, “Why the Novel Matters”, in Carl E. Bain, Jerome Beaty 
and J. Paul Hunter, The Norton Introduction to Literature, 402–403. 
 Paul Bloom offers this useful precis of the Frame Problem: “[O]ne might argue that bodies and souls do 
not exist because the only proper description of the world is given in the language of physics. Because of this, there 
are not chairs, clocks, forks, fish, or people. All that really exists is elementary forces, quarks, leptons, and whever 
else that physicists discover. But this is far too minimalist a perspective. The natural sciences . . . explain lawful 
generalizations at levels above that of physics, some of them involving real-world objects. The philosopher Hilary 
Putnam makes the point that nothing at the level of physics can explain why a square peg cannot fit in a roung hole. 
If you want to explain this you need to be able to talk about pegs and holes.” From Paul Bloom, Descartes’ Baby: 
How the Science of Child Development Explains What Makes Us Human, 223. 
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You would immediately feel at one with all nature, and with the universe itself, if you 
could understand that there is no “you” as the hard-core thinker of thoughts, feeler of 
feelings, and senser of sensations, and that because your body is something in the 
physical world, that world is not “external” to you.214 
I do not think that this part of Watts’s program, in and of itself, merits the word “religious” (along 
with William James, I would reserve that designation to other sentiments and mindsets), but 
obviously it resonates with, updates and repeats thoughts and attitudes whose religious credentials, 
so to speak, are unquestionable.215 (Incidentally, the view delineated by Watts owes much to 
Vedanta, Taoist thought and Buddhism.) I quote Watts because he is relevant to the dissertation 
theme by virtue of exemplifying, in his own “spiritual” way, the potential for the individual to 
playfully inaugurate and nourish an existential attitude that lends consolation in a frequently 
bewildering world: 
We do not need a new religion or a new bible. We need a new experience—a new 
feeling of what it is to be “I.” The lowdown (which is, of course, the secret and 
profound view) on life is that our normal sensation of self is a hoax, or, at best, a 
temporary role that we are playing, or have been conned into playing—with our own 
tacit consent, just as every hypnotized person is basically willing to be hypnotized. 
The most strongly enforced of all known taboos is the taboo against knowing who or 
what you really are behind the mask of your apparently separate, independent, and 
isolated ego. . . . 
 . . . The sensation of “I” as a lonely and isolated center of being is so 
powerful and commonsensical, and so fundamental to our modes of speech and 
thought, that we cannot experience selfhood except as something superficial in the 
scheme of the universe.216 
Watts’s book is conveniently characterized as the attempt to dismantle or at least challenge the 
widespread and dominant – although in post-Frame Problem philosophical terms arguably 
problematic – view that “ “I myself” is a separate center of feeling and action, living inside and 
                                                 
214 More speficially, where the Frame Problem angle that Peterson adopts is concerned, Watts wrote: “The first result of 
th[e illusion that human beings only exist on one level of being] is that our attitude to the world “outside” us is 
largely hostile. . . . The hostile attitude of conquering nature ignores the basic interdependence of all things and 
events—that the world beyond the skin is actually an extension of our own bodies—and will end in destroying the 
very environment from which we emerge and upon which our whole life depends.” The ominous tone and note of 
warning here echoes Peterson’s “Almost nothing has obvious boundaries and this has real world consequences”. E. 
Graham Howe, whom I shall quote later, wrote, “What then is the true nature of this external world in which we 
live? To find the truth, we are again engaged in metaphysical abstractions. Has it a reality of its own, objective, 
independent—or is it to be regarded only as the image of ourselves? Are we to say ‘I am that’, or ‘I am Not that’, or 
perhaps both?” From E. Graham Howe, War Dance: A Study of the Psychology of War, 190. 
215 William James elects to construe “religion” as the “[generally “helpless and sacrificial”] personal attitude which the 
individual finds himself impelled to take up towards what he apprehends to be the divine.” From William James, 
The Varieties of Religious Experience, 149. 
216 Alan Watts, The Book: On the Taboo against Knowing Who You Are, 12. 
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bounded by the physical body”. His thesis has the secondary value, useful to me, of associating this 
understanding of selfhood with the sense of being vulnerable and ultimately defenseless (that is, if 
one is really there in concentrated, discrete, palpable form, then one can be hurt). Once adopted, 
this perspective puts the world squarely in front of us and sees it as something that must be 
confronted, understood, negotiated and appeased – if for no other reason than that there is so much 
more of “it” than there is of “me”.217 From such common sentences and phrases as “I came into this 
world,” “you must face reality”, “the conquest of nature”, we unthinkingly side with the poet who 
found himself to be 
 . . . a stranger and afraid 
 In a world I never made,218 
rather than recognize that we 
do not “come into” this world; we come out of it, as leaves from a tree. As the ocean 
“waves,” the universe “peoples.” Every individual is an expression of the whole realm 
of nature, a unique action of the total universe. . . . [But, as we have seen] even those 
who know it to be true in theory do not sense or feel it . . .219 
For the purposes of illustration and because this has implications for the self too, here is Watts’s 
treatment (akin to a “deconstruction”) of discrete physical events. As with the self, under minimal 
philosophical examination these too betray themselves as hypostasized conventions: 
Let’s take something called an event. How do we demark it from other events? At what 
point, shall we say, were you born? Were you born at parturition, or when the doctor slapped 
you on the bottom, or cut the umbilical cord, or when you were conceived, or when your 
father and mother were first attracted to each other? When was it? When did you begin? 
There is no way of deciding except arbitrarily. . . . There isn’t a real beginning. . . . When 
are you dead? That’s another big argument. . . . So just as there are no point instance in the 
curve [a metaphor from mathematical calculus], there are no events in nature.220 
Or rather, there are only events in nature when a human spectator has arbitrarily defined the criteria 
for the kind of event concerned as well as satisfied him- or herself that the criteria obtain in the 
                                                 
217 “[B]ecause you’re finite and you’re surrounded by [the sum total of everything [including] all those multiple levels 
of being that are beyond your perceptual capacity], in a sense you’re in a battle that you can never win. [This is] 
because there is always more of what it is that you’re trying to contend with than there is of you. And worse than 
that . . . is that the thing that you’re contending with isn’t even static. It keeps changing, so that what worked for you 
yesterday won’t necessarily work for you tomorrow.” From Jordan Peterson’s lecture “Reality and the Sacred” 
(22:50) 
218 A. E. Housman: “The Laws of God, the Laws of Man”. 
219 Alan Watts, The Book: On the Taboo against Knowing Who You Are, 8-9. 
220 From Alan Watts, “Alan Watts[:] How To Enjoy Yourself Successfully” [5:00]. 
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given situation. This is no trivial matter; think, for example, of how difficult it can be (in a court of 
law) to determine whether the willful telling of a lie has taken place or not. 
 Having shown above how the innovative and thoughtful mind may turn the arguably 
contradictory ontological facts about the reality of human selfhood into a source of relief via 
discourse, let me put Watts aside and proceed. 
iii. Going into Battle on Limited Knowledge 
Between the two World Wars, E. M. Forster faced an analogous and similar intellectual dislocation 
– and also (like Watts and the hypothetical writers I am imagining) proposed to “formulate a creed 
of [his] own”. Observing the persistent failure of the intelligentsia to provide an irrefutable and 
unchallengeable descriptive definition of the self and of personal identity, I think we can learn from 
Forster’s constructive pragmatism and resolution to be undeterred in his similar circumstances of 
limited knowledge. In his 1938 essay “What I Believe”, he admits discomfort and displeasure with 
the fact that 
Psychology has split and shattered the idea of a “Person” [notice that he could thus far 
as easily have leveled the critique at philosophy], and has shown that there is 
something incalculable in each of us, which may at any moment rise to the surface and 
destroy our normal balance. We don’t know what we are like. 
But his response to this picture of unpredictability and unknowability – and therefore danger 
(which, in a very real political sense is the theme of the essay) – is instructive and heartening: 
We can’t know what other people are like. How, then, can we put any trust in personal 
relationships, or cling to them in the gathering political storm? In theory we cannot. 
But in practice we can and do. . . . For the purpose of living one has to assume that the 
personality is solid, and the “self” is an entity, and to ignore all contrary evidence. . . . 
Starting from [personal relationships], I get a little order into the contemporary 
chaos.221  
It does not so much matter that – obviously – Forster’s picture of selfhood, which hypostatizes the 
self as an entity, diverges in terms of content from Watts’s program, which is informed by his 
skepticism and dismissive stance with regards to ontological category boundaries.222 Forster’s 
                                                 
221 From E. M. Forster, “What I Believe” (emphasis mine).  
222 Unlike Forster, Watts held that to think of “ego” as “real, as an effective entity,” would inevitably induce “confusion 
and psychic self-contradiction.” From Alan Watts, “The “ego” as an Abstraction,” in Alan Watts – In the Academy: 
Essays and Lectures, 306. 
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attitude is relevant because it too shows us a mind deciding to proceed, without violating what it 
perceives to be true, nourished by and allied to its subjective understanding of itself as a positive 
presence in the world. Or, in other terms, given the ontological “leeway” that in some areas is an 
attribute of the world as we perceive it, we effectively become – along with unbending reality – the 
co-authors of the statutes conditioning our being in the world. It is true, of course, that Forster’s 
main point concerns personal relationships and the obligations people have toward each other – not 
the metaphysical or ontological truth concerning selfhood and embodied being; but his subsidiary 
point, on which the main one is predicated, coincides with my present theme: For better or worse 
(and I shall argue the former), the self and being elude indubitable description, yet accepting this 
benignly and then acting accordingly certainly seems – no matter how one parses it – advisable. 
What is not advisable is intellectually tying oneself into knots in vehement but ultimately futile 
attempts to know. 
 Fully appreciating the difficulty of specifying the nature of an individual, John Locke 
suggested we distinguish between “real” and “nominal” essence. The former is “the real internal, 
but generally in Substances, unknown Constitution of Things, whereon their discoverable Qualities 
depend” (which, let us say, represents what we wish to know). Nominal essences are apparent 
properties and inform our opinions and decisions. We can, it transpires from Locke’s argument, be 
misled about the real essence of something yet have to form opinions about it based on its nominal 
essence. Tellingly, Locke avoids what a minute ago I called “tying himself into knots”; he 
recognizes with tranquility that it seems to be humans’ lot to live the greater part of their lives in 
familiarity only with things’ nominal essences. “If [nominal differences] be not real enough to make 
[some] thing of one kind and not of another, I do not see how animal rationale can be enough really 
to distinguish a man from a horse [or a “stag from . . . a buck”]. . . I suppose everyone thinks 
[nominal differences] real enough to make a real difference between that and other kinds.” In other 
words, Locke refuses to be defeated into depressed inaction by having to infer and intuit knowledge 
as opposed to knowing something absolutely.223 Wittgenstein would agree; his stance with regards 
to skepticism is not dissimilar to that of Hume and Kant, and can be summarized thus: There are 
some things we have to accept in order to get on with our ordinary ways of thinking and 
speaking.224 
                                                 
223 The Locke quotes are from John Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, book III, chapter iii, 300–301. 
The debate concerning the essential identity of things continues to this day; my precis explores only a small minority 
of the possible aspects one could address. 
224 Cf. A. C. Grayling, ed., Philosophy: a Guide through the Subject, 57. 
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 I hope it is made apparent by these examples that something constructive, creative and 
imaginative can be introduced to fill a void where something unshakably factual would otherwise 
be. We cannot know ourselves in some absolute sense (this is true psychologically as well as 
philosophically), and yet we have to act as entities (which is not precisely what we are) from a 
position of agency (which we do not precisely command). One seems to be a less warped and 
troubled agent if one has made one’s peace with the haunting implications of this domain, 
particularly the things in it which cannot be known in an absolute sense. Indeed, this is one of the 
themes of this dissertation: Out of a forbidding, lamentable, chaotic, indecipherable, unnamable 
tangle or mess, the mind can weave – or distill, literally produce, bring about – something of value, 
comparative order and meaning – and therefore consolation. 
 That process, especially as laid out by Forster, seems to have something to do with an 
idea I first encountered in Nietzsche, then rediscovered in a few other thinkers. In The Gay Science, 
Nietzsche offers a phrase that seems in favor of privileging description (subjective in nature) over 
truth (objective in nature): 
This has caused me the greatest trouble and still does always cause me the greatest trouble: 
to realize that what things are called is unspeakably more important than what they are.225 
Nietzsche admits, one notices, that the sentiment he presents can be difficult to accept, which I 
second (if taken at face value).226 When it comes to negotiating the world, I would generally put my 
trust in a maxim privileging “what [things] are” over “what [they] are called” – assuming the 
distinction is evident and represents an actual and unambiguous choice. I would suggest that what 
“things are called” is more important than “what they are” only when the latter is sufficiently 
unknowable and mysterious – and perhaps (as an added proviso) is of consequence primarily to 
oneself. Indeed, so as to not seem to be promoting linguistic anarchy and self-indulgence, which is 
also, of course, the last thing Nietzsche would do, I am inclined to accept his proposition only in 
two kinds of situations: The first falls epistemologically under the rubric of phenomenology (here 
we are more or less forced to sort and negotiate reality linguistically as we best can and see fit – 
                                                 
225 Italics in original. Friedrich Nietzsche, The Gay Science: With a Prelude of German Rhymes and an Appendix of 
Songs, section 58, 69. 
226 I am wary of the sentiment for precisely the same reason that I am skeptical of the Nietzschean statement that “facts 
are precisely what there is not, [there are] only interpretations”: I would caution us not to wade too far into the soggy 
sands of epistemological relativism. Note that Simon Blackburn has remarked of Nietzsche that “some of his 
sayings may have the status of aphorisms – tossed off to stimulate thought rather than as representations of how 
things are”. Blackburn does acknowledge, however, that “clearly in many cases Nietzsche advances these assertions 
as true”. 
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although the subject matter in question defeats and mocks our best attempts at true comprehension); 
in the second situation we are working towards aesthetic ends.227 Consider Oscar Wilde’s famous 
aphorism: “Lying, the telling of beautiful untrue things, is the proper aim of Art.”228 John 
Sutherland suggests that “[i]t is through the forms of art . . . that we shape and understand the 
formlessness of the world around us.”229 
 In the same spirit, consider what Shelley Fisher Fishkin writes about Whitman and his 
transition from journalist into poet: “the roots of this transition will undoubtedly remain as opaque 
as they are complex; the origins of poetic inspiration simply are that way. But while we may never 
know what went on in Whitman, we do know what went on in his work. The brilliance of 
Whitman’s greatest poems stems from the ways in which the poet transformed fact into art.”230 I 
also suggested that there frequently arise situations in life when we are, as I put it, “forced” to err on 
the phenomenological side where verbal expression is concerned, and I mentioned Emerson’s 
argument about language from Nature (see footnote 256). Apparently, all prehistoric civilizations 
invented complex, rich and meaningful – but scientifically provisional, “primitive” and updateable 
– explanations for such things as weather, fate, death, fortune, health, the night sky – including 
many other aspects of the observable or phenomenal world. Essentially, they did this by 
representing these things and their supposed causes and meanings as they could be perceived – 
otherwise how could conversation about them viably proceed (or be initiated)? These provisional 
representations were arguably not “true” in a modern-scientific, empirical, post-Enlightenment 
sense (although, as I have hinted, modern scientific results are also not absolutely true either; they 
                                                 
227 As I say, it goes without saying that Nietzsche never advocated deliberate verbal deception. He seems to merely 
deem it a lost cause for humans ever truly to know the suchness of reality, the “thing-in-itself” (in Kant’s 
terminology) or what Locke called the “real” essence of things, as opposed to “nominal”. Because of this 
ontological handicap, talking as if one knew and could legitimately recruit and benefit from the authority of 
language is really the only option. And that seems to have its own distinct advantage, as Montaigne very likely 
thought (and argued in “On Books”): “I freely say what I think about all things – even about those which doubtless 
exceed my competence and which I in no wise claim to be within my jurisdiction. When I express my opinions it is 
so as to reveal the measure of my sight not the measure of the thing”. 
 It was Nietzsche’s understanding that the natural state of “men” is one of deep immersion in “illusions 
and dream images; their eye[, he writes,] glides only over the surface of things and sees ‘forms’; their feeling 
nowhere lead into truth, but contents itself with the reception of stimuli, playing, as it were, a game of blindman’s 
buff on the backs of things. Moreover, man permits himself to be lied to at night, his life long, when he dreams, and 
his moral sense never even tries to prevent this . . . What, indeed, does man know of himself! Can he even once 
perceive himself completely[?]” From Friedrich Nietzsche, “On Truth and Lie in an Extra-Moral Sense” (1873). 
 Elsewhere, Nietzsche has said that only “He who suffers from [actuality]” has “reason to lie himself out 
of [it]”, which seems pertinent to my thoughts on art and mental health (note my emphasis). From On the Genealogy 
of Morals. Cited by the author of this work: Jordan Peterson, Maps of Meaning, 324. 
228 From Oscar Wilde’s “The Decay of Lying”, in Oscar Wilde – The Major Works, 239 Famously, the American poet 
Archibald MacLeish wrote “A poem should be equal to: / not true.” 
229 From John Sutherland, A Little History of Literature, 136. 
230 Shelley Fisher Fishkin, From Fact to Fiction: Journalism & Imaginative Writing in America, 33 (italics mine). 
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too potentially can always be overturned should scientific research make further headway) – but the 
“primitive” explanations of our forebears were true enough. Consider this example from John 
Berger: 
Those who first invented and then named the constellations were storytellers. Tracing an 
imaginary line between a cluster of stars gave them an image and an identity. The stars 
threaded on that line were like events threaded on a narrative. Imagining the constellations 
did not of course change the stars, nor did it change the black emptiness that surrounds 
them. What it changed was the way people read the night sky. 
It seems to me abundantly and self-evidently useful for humans to agree on and exercise certain 
arbitrary ways of seeing and talking about phenomena that would otherwise elude identification due 
to their essentially random (e.g. the night sky), chaotic, ephemeral or elusive nature. As Alan Watts 
has pointed out, the self (Watts says “ego”, but that does not spoil the point) arguably represents one 
such elusive phenomenon: “It exists in the same way as the Equator, or a line of longitude, or an 
inch. It is a social institution, or a convention, but it is not an effective agent.”231 Like with the stars, 
however, we “trac[e] imaginary lines between” points in our pandemoniac internal experiences (to 
use the word Daniel Dennett borrowed from John Milton) and emerge equipped with a way of 
elucidating what would otherwise be insurmountably mysterious – e.g. consciousness, selfhood, 
being. When it comes to ancient civilizations’ anthropomorphized or “magical” explanations, 
needless to say, modern-day observers have tended to coolly dismissive of them – in compliance 
with the dicta of their discipline, it would seem. (However, it is worth asking this: When we use 
language to convey and explicate scientific findings today, are we really doing something 
essentially different from so-called primitive civilizations? I am not so sure.)232 At the end of the 
day, language remains our best tool or method with which to arrive at approximately correct 
                                                 
231 From Alan Watts, “Unity in Contemplation,” in Alan Watts – In the Academy: Essays and Lectures, 254. The 
quotation from Berger above is cited in Ralf Hertel and David Malcolm, On John Berger: Telling Stories, 139. 
232 Carl Jung said that “The primitive mentality does not invent myths, it experiences them.” The kind of expressive (or 
“inspired”, or mythological) language use that characterizes such myths and that we are sometimes thrown back on 
by virtue of being inadequately informed factually, does not offer up and convey untruths. It serves us truth which at 
a later point is doomed to seem expressed, linguistically speaking, in low resolution. The very lowest-resolution 
truth claims may, it may turn out, finally not escape the epithet “factually wrong” as our comparatively sophisticated 
(but never infinitely sophisticated) understanding distances itself from the earlier one; but to call them useless, naive 
or misleading betrays a certain arrogance with respect to the ontological excellence of the present moment – and, by 
that token, betrays confusion too about the ongoing scientific evolution in the direction of more sophisticated 
descriptions of the world. 
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conclusions about the nature and details of reality (whether only we hold it or they become the more 
or less consensual view). 
iv. Co-authoring Experience 
Quite usefully in the context of these questions, Rousseau has remarked that “One does not begin 
by reasoning but by feeling.”233 Sometimes one stays closer to feeling (subjective experience) than 
one moves towards fact (objective representation) – even though, as Thoreau equally usefully said, 
we tend to forget “that it is, after all, always the first person that is speaking”, that is, objective 
representation might never or only extremely rarely be completely purged of a subjective 
element.234 Pertinent to this, Thomas Samuel Kuhn has written: 
Scientists can agree that a Newton, Lavoisier, Maxwell or Einstein has produced an 
apparently permanent solution to a group of outstanding problems and still disagree, 
sometimes without being aware of it, about the particular abstract characteristics that make 
those solutions permanent.235 
What I wish to argue is that it is reasonable to say that there may be moments in life where the 
content of a person’s feelings concerning the experiential side of life may more usefully be 
emphasized – may, with Nietzsche’s words above, be more “important” to the person – than some 
true and well-reasoned argument which could be impersonally affirmed by uninvolved parties 
across the board. For an example, take any person’s life at some moment – take mine specifically: 
Arguably there is some objectively true sense (and much might depend on “some”) in which I am as 
engaged in living as I am in aging and as engaged in aging as I am in dying (this recalls what I said 
                                                 
233 Quoted in Gregory Orr, Poetry as Survival, 40. Harking back to the Miltonic distinction between intuitive and 
discursive reason, T. S. Eliot indicated practically the same thing with his observation that “Genuine poetry can 
communicate before it is understood.” Similarly, Alan Watts notes that the “root of the matter is the way in which we 
feel and conceive ourselves as human beings, our sensation of being alive, of individual existence and identity.” (My 
emphasis) Alan Watts, The Book: On the Taboo of Knowing who You Are, 8. 
234 Albert Einstein was aware too that, although they may be very hard to separate, objective representation and 
subjective experience tend to get in each other’s way; see his words (in footnote 119) on devoting his energy to the 
world of objective reality at the cost of all subjective perspective. 
 The Henry David Thoreau quote, prefacing a highly personal book-length essay, is from the Walden 
(chapter 1): “In most books, the I, or first person, is omitted; in this it will be retained; that, in respect to egotism, is 
the main difference.” 
235 From Thomas Samuel Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1970), 44. 
Kuhn adds, in a footnote: “Michael Polyani [in Permanent Knowledge: Towards a Post-Critical Philosophy from 
1958] has brilliantly developed a very similar theme, arguing that much of the scientist’s success depends upon 
“tacit knowledge,” i.e., upon knowledge that is acquired through practice and that cannot be articulated explicitly.” 
See also Jordan Peterson, Maps of Meaning, 236–238. 
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about arbitrarily defining what constitutes events above). Equally there may be some objectively 
true sense in which I am guilty as I am innocent, as isolated as a member of one or more social 
groups, as faced with an unfamiliar scenario as faced with a familiar one, and so on. Again, if there 
are no events in the universe, if everything is one gigantic event, then the Big Bang is still crashing 
on today – with us all right in the middle of it; and if it takes an arbitrary human effort to 
conceptually, linguistically carve subordinate events out of the Grand Event everything partakes of, 
then that amounts to a rather frank admission that a subjective conceptualization must be brought to 
bear on the undifferentiated cosmos, chaos, totality before we can make sense of anything.236 Kafka 
once reminded himself in his diary: “It is never possible to take note of and evaluate all the 
circumstances that influence the mood of the moment, are even at work within it, and finally are at 
work in the evaluation, hence it is false to say that I felt resolute yesterday, that I am in despair 
today.”237 What I wish to argue is that a certain permutation or distribution of emphases across the 
in principle countless parameters and dimensions that are relevant to my current situation might 
correctly be said to represent – and be – my subjective experience at any given moment. (If this 
seems a stretch, then recall that the freedom Frankl identified and posited as a universally present 
feature of the human psyche is upheld in this discussion as an overarching premise.) The central and 
interesting point is that no standard for accuracy could be introduced to validate or invalidate a 
given representation of a given person’s situation at a given moment in time (hence the difficulty of 
demonstrating such things as deceit as well as many other deeds that are psychological in nature). 
 The attempt to produce and provide a true “report from the interior” in any given 
moment (one accurately true to whatever I feel myself to be going through) amounts to a desire to 
simultaneously discover and record an honest, earnest and therefore probably useful inventory of a 
subjective situation, i.e. a kind of abstract of my whole psychological situation. Analogous to the 
attempt to state the objective truth, the self-representational activity I am describing is an activity 
with obvious similarities to giving testimony. (Observe that giving testimony is commonly a 
survivor’s job or duty; so a writing person is also usefully thought of as someone who, like 
Phillips’s superego, is “living in the aftermath, in the fallout of some catastrophe”, cf. chapter 1, 
section x of this dissertation.) Once again, by carefully and truthfully tracing the details of my 
experience and negotiating and investigating the degree of badness visited upon me, it seems 
possible that I might be able to represent myself in a way that in general terms is existentially 
                                                 
236 See Alan Watts, Tao: The Water-Course Way, 54. 
237 Franz Kafka, Diaries, 245. 
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fortifying as well as a first step towards getting to know myself more accurately and intimately, thus 
locating a measure of self-respect and bringing my self-estimation and current external conditions 
into mutual alignment: 
On this view, there might be something that for a given individual is his or her truth, his or 
her way of truthfully living a life, but there is no such thing as the truth, no such thing as the 
uniquely right or correct way of looking at life. You can look at life as tragic or comic; as an 
adventure or as a trial; as an arena in which we are carried by, but also tested by, God’s love; 
as a struggle between fundamentally egotistical individuals; as a scene of amusement and 
joy; as a kind of pantomime or as more of a farce; and so on. . . . [P. F.] Strawson says that 
there are truths, but no truth. I would make the same point by saying that each of these ways 
could be a way for some individuals to live a life truthfully, and people can have good 
reasons for what they think and feel, for living in that way.238 
v. Logos and the Influencing of One’s Self 
[239] In the diary excerpt from which I have just quoted, Kafka agreed that “tak[ing] note of and 
evaluat[ing] all the circumstances that influence the mood of the moment” could constitute an 
exercise in altering and influencing one’s personal outlook – but because he considered it on a par 
with deluding oneself he was deeply ambivalent about the final value of the enterprise. Still, it is 
worth citing his angry outburst in full as it does provide a thought-provoking thumbnail picture of 
the enterprise: 
Such differentiations [e.g. “I felt resolute yesterday” and “I am in despair today”] only prove 
that one desires to influence oneself, and, as far removed from oneself as possible, hidden 
                                                 
238 From Christopher Hamilton, A Philosophy of Tragedy, 27–28. 
239 I have said that there is some objectively true sense in which it is a true that I am dying as that I am living (or as true 
that I am “drowning” as that I am “waving”, to reference the famous poem “Now Waving but Drowning” by Stevie 
Smith); recall and consider my axiomatic premise above to the effect that there is a difference in degree, not 
category, between “surviving” and “flourishing” (the difference is analogous to the difference between, literally, any 
two colors in the visible spectrum). Interestingly both observations – the upbeat and morose – can be used to 
generate a therapeutically beneficial line (depending on the person, presumably). A pessimist might latch on to the 
former and permit it to be a channel for the subjectively welcome news that calamities would, in light of the present 
situation, henceforth need to assume seriously dismal (and therefore unlikely) dimensions in order to vitiate the 
quality of life significantly (hypothetically this would constitute an uplifting perspective to a pessimist); an optimist, 
on the other hand, might by merely “chanting” I am (still) living, thereby permit his or her self to be a channel for 
the reassuring news that that utterance is generally found to incorporate (by being a kind of “count-your-blessings” 
summing-up at the center of a perhaps precarious life). 
 In a related context, Adam Phillips has said: “People should try the therapies they’re intrigued by . . . 
[And besides, if] anything worked, we’d all be doing it. There’s no mystery to this. In this culture there’s an array of 
possible things you might do. [Whereas, if] you have a broken leg, there is probably more or less universal 
consensus about what you should do, if you have a broken heart, there isn’t. So we are left with what’s available in 
the culture. . . . [Any form of therapy is] as good as it is for those people for whom it’s good.” (My emphasis.) Adam 
Phillips, “RSA Replay: One Way and Another” [1:00:45]. 
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behind prejudices and fantasies, temporarily to create an artificial life, as sometimes 
someone in the corner of a tavern, sufficiently concealed behind a small glass of whiskey, 
entirely alone with himself, entertains himself with nothing but false, unprovable imaginings 
and dreams.240 
I, however, would humbly counter Kafka’s diatribe by asking: What is so objectionable about 
cultivating in the mind an atmosphere of self-honesty and truthful representation of external and 
internal reality? Surely, where the attempt of “influenc[ing] oneself” is concerned, it can be done for 
good as well as for ill.241 
  Crucially, what we feel is less fixed and more fluid than what we believe; we may run 
through more consecutive feelings over the course of one day than we run through consecutive 
beliefs – about fundamental issues, certainly – over the course of a year or more. I think Rousseau is 
right that in most cases feeling a certain way about something precedes the reasoning we might 
subsequently engage in vis-à-vis what caused the feeling. When it comes to using poetry 
therapeutically – and expressively (in hopes to bring about a “clarification of life [and summon] a 
momentary stay against confusion”, as Frost put it) – I should think it a bad approach to sacrifice 
honest and careful attention to feeling for the sake of objectively sound reasoning. Of equal 
importance is the fact, already presented, that in matters concerning the individual’s sense of self 
the account you may contrive for yourself, based in your subjective experience of being alive, is 
potentially every bit as valuable as (1) the account I may contrive for myself (so we need not try to 
influence or convert each other in this domain), and (2) the objective account I may form about you 
through empirical study. 
 Heraclitus once argues that human beings must necessarily adhere to the “common” 
(xynos) and “follow what is common”; in other words they must conform somewhat and come 
together around a shared, collectively established understanding of things. Because “the Logos is 
common” we establish and discover “all things” via Logos, via this (in the words of C. J. Vamvacas) 
“supreme principle that combines and sustains everything – the directive power, which pervades, 
governs, and arranges ‘the single and common world’ ”.242 These days – i.e. in the post-
Enlightenment era – I consider the aforementioned domain of objective reality versus subjective 
                                                 
240 Franz Kafka, Diaries, 245. 
241 A critic of my line of reasoning might say here that this argument makes me an ally of the Positive Psychology 
group. I say merely, that I see no argument that would conclusively prevent the premise (and promise) of the Talking 
Cure from applying (and manifesting), at least to some degree, in instances where dialogue is replaced by written 
self-representation.  
242 Constantine J. Vamvacas, The Founders of Western Thought – The Presocratics: A diachronic parallelism between 
Presocratic Thought and Philosophy and the Natural Sciences, 112–113. 
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experience (or “Not-Me” versus “Me” to reference Emerson’s appropriation of Fichte) akin to 
Heraclitus’s Logos versus what he elucidates thus: “[While from a place of rationality and logic, 
Logos] speaks with intelligence and trust what is common to all . . . men prove as unable to 
understand it once they have heard it as before they heard it. For, though all things come to pass in 
accordance with Logos, men seem as if ignorant. [The reason is that] although the Logos is 
common, most men live as if they had a private understanding of their own”, i.e. their own arbitrary 
private Logos (private reason, language). Vamvaca’s argues that the vast majority of mankind set 
their own ‘private understanding’ against the ‘common’ Logos. To that I would add and argue that 
they do so out of a need to bolster and retain selfhood, a need to preserve identity and mental 
integrity against the constant onslaught of external reality. They do so – or can at least attempt to do 
so – in order (as Whitman puts it) to “no longer take things at second or third hand”. The poet 
wanted the common man to “not look through my eyes either, nor take things from me, / You shall 
listen to all sides and filter them from yourself.”243 
vi. The Elusive Self 
I want now to look from a new angle at the difficulty of discursively establishing a fundamental 
account of the self, an angle that allows us to discover what this difficulty offers in terms of 
working out for ourselves what is true – and could be true – about ourselves. 
 First, let me present one case where Whitman seems to anticipate Freud fairly 
strikingly. Here below is Whitman (immediately followed by Freud): 
Whitman: “What a history is folded, folded inward and inward again, in the single 
word I.” 
Freud: “[While the] ego appears to us as something autonomous and unitary, marked 
off distinctly from everything else[,] that such an appearance is deceptive, and that on 
the contrary the ego is continued inwards without any sharp delimitation, into an 
unconscious mental entity which we designate as the id and for which it serves as a 
kind of façade – this is a discovery first made by psychoanalytic research, which 
should still have much more to tell us about the relation of the ego to the id.”244 
                                                 
243 From “Song of Myself”. 
244 Sigmund Freud, Civilisation and Its Discontents, 12–13 (emphases added). Whitman’s words will be seen more 
clearly to antedate Freud’s conceptualization of the psyche when it is borne in mind, in the present context, that 
Freud was fond of employing the metaphor of archeology when speaking of the psyche. 
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Whitman’s most famous line from “Song of Myself”– “I am large, I contain multitudes” – also 
finds a counterpart in Freud’s assertion that the appearance of the ego as “unitary” is “deceptive”; 
nor, he writes, is the ego “autonomous”.245 Michael Frayn, whose brilliant allegory I have quoted in 
the preceding footnote, asserted: “I discover that I am not an absolute ruler after all. I am a mere 
constitutional fiction.”246 The idea of something fictional at the heart of what we are has also 
exercised the contemporary philosopher Christopher Hamilton who lays out his argument that we 
are up against a “fundamental mystery of the self [which means that it] can’t be very well 
articulated in the discursive terms of philosophy”.247 His view is, by his own admission, “not a view 
very widely accepted” but parts of it are familiar to the psychoanalytically inclined, for instance that 
“we are [as human beings] fundamentally . . . mysterious to ourselves”: 
[Humans] are unable to get clear on the meaning of their actions. What is really going on [in 
any situation]? What . . .  do I really want from [any endeavor]? . . . Is it not, after all, rather 
pointless? These are exactly the kinds of questions that we can and do ask ourselves as we 
seek to understand what it is that we are doing with our lives. It is as if we live on two 
levels: One, at the surface, where we know what we are doing and can explain it, and 
another, deeper level where we cannot make sense of ourselves. It is no doubt true that we 
live most of the time on the surface, but there are moments, particularly those of crisis, 
where we are struck by how little we understand things. Moreover, it also seems to be that a 
growing sense of our living on the deeper level comes with ageing, as we start to be able to 
look back across periods of our lives and wonder what they meant – and, therefore, what the 
present means.248 
In basic agreement with the case I have been trying to make with regards to the ontological 
“leeway” that is a result of the difficulty of defining human selfhood, and the interesting 
philosophical possibilities that go along with it, Hamilton also posits that letters and language have 
a role to play as a consequence of the “fundamental opacity [which] attends who one is”. As he puts 
                                                 
245 This speaks to Forster’s lament above (see footnote 221) that psychologists have “split and shattered the idea of a 
“Person”, and has shown that there is something incalculable in each of us, which may at any moment rise to the 
surface and destroy our normal balance.” In his book The Human Touch: Our Part in the Creation of a Universe, 
Michael Frayn gives a both amusing and memorable allegorical account of the doubtful case for establishing 
autonomy on the part of the human psyche. See Michael Frayn, The Human Touch: Our Part in the Creation of the 
Universe, 394. 
 Edward Carpenter, a friend of Whitman’s, would agree with Frayn’s picture: “We can none of us boast, 
at any point, of a rounded, definite and stationary self.” From Edward Carpenter, The Drama of Love and Death, 
274. 
246 From Michael Frayn, The Human Touch: Our Part in the Creation of the Universe, 394. 
 In a book review on Nietzsche and the Nietzschean conception of the human self, Roger Caldwell 
remarks that “even a ‘fictional’ self is still a choosing self, and not a merely passive receptor of experience.” From 
Roger Caldwell, “Nietzsche and Morality”. 
247 Christopher Hamilton lays out his view in detail in his book A Philosophy of Tragedy. 
248 Christopher Hamilton in Grant Bartley, et al., Philosophy Now, “The Tragedy of Life”. 
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it in Philosophy Now, “the fundamental mystery of the self . . . comes through much more in 
literature”. 
 His point is subtle and difficult to summarize, but I think that one implication of it is 
that we are able to know Madame Bovary, Uriah Heep or Tonio Kröger more deeply and with a 
greater clarity than we will be able to know an actual living person; I suppose that another way of 
saying this is that it is a different kind of knowledge by virtue of the known being more 
authoritatively established, certain, final and immutable. Consider the mysterious property accorded 
to language, or more precisely words, by W. H. Auden in the sonnet “Words”: 
A sentence uttered makes a world appear 
Where all things happen as it says to do; 
We doubt the speaker, not the tongue we hear: 
Words have no words for words that are not true.249 
Actual human selves, manifest as flesh and bounded by time and space, are ontologically or 
descriptively elusive and ephemeral in other ways which make them impossible to pin down 
accurately – in short: aloof to true description. By highlighting, ordering, defining and limiting 
authoritatively, literature can permit the self of a character to be revealed in ways our fellow human 
beings (including ourselves) are never revealed.250 Let me investigate that thought a bit further. 
 First, I shall suggest that Isak Dinesen’s (i.e. Karen Blixen’s) claim that “Any sorrow 
can be borne if it can be made into a story, or if a story can be told about it” is a potentially 
profound insight.251 I take it Blixen is thinking that by transplanting one’s elusive, unknowable 
personal self into a harrowing, exciting or competently narrated story where (as a symbolic self) it 
survives despite odds, say, then one has demonstrated that the symbolic self – despite its inevitable 
vulnerabilities and limited knowability – can be represented as something real, as an coordinated 
entity heroically resistant to the hostile forces (including sorrow) opposing it. The common and 
straightforward idea – borne out by and central to James W. Pennebaker’s research, I think (see 
footnote 155) – is essentially this: 
If you tell a simple story like a parable . . ., what do you extract out from the story? A 
moral. And what’s the moral? It’s the implication of the story for behavior. So you tell 
a little story about someone who acts out a given moral code, and that person does 
                                                 
249 Of the sonnet’s fourteen lines, these – the first four – are most frequently cited. From W. H. Auden, Collected 
Shorter Poems 1927–1957, 320 
250 “After finishing [John Williams’s novel Stoner]”, Stephen Elliot wrote in a review, “I felt I knew Stoner better than I 
know some of my friends.” From Stephen Elliott, “Stephen Elliott on John Williams’ Stoner”. 
251 Blixen is cited in Gregory Orr, Poetry as Survival, 21. 
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better or worse, and the moral of the story is: If you act in this manner, you will do 
better or worse.252 
It is, I think, in this sense and along these theoretical principles that “Writing . . . can provide a 
protective cuirass for the wounded”, as Judith Harris writes.253 
 The following thoughts on a much-debated argument from Daniel Dennett seem 
crucial to unpacking what Blixen and Christopher Hamilton suggest and imply; I cite the passage 
because it invaluably establishes that language is (1) a functional ability and (2) without equal when 
it comes to (phenomenologically) negotiating the conditions of being under which the individual 
must persist: 
Language is not used just for communication with others: it leads to reflection—to 
communication with ourselves, as it were. Reflection requires language. Language may 
initially be needed in order to tell others the reasons for our actions, but once it exists, it 
supplies the concepts that allow us to become aware of our own mental processes.254 A dog 
may bark in anger but cannot reflect on the fact that it is angry.255 
Let me at this point permit the interjection of Thomas S. Szasz’s point that 
Classification is not reserved for science of the scientists. It is a fundamental human act.256 
To name something is to classify it. But why do men name things? The answer often is: To 
gain control over the thing named, and, more generally, over one’s power to act in the world. 
. . . It is another way of saying that man’s superiority over the other animals lies in his 
ability to use language.257 
David L. Thompsen continues his precis of Dennett’s position: 
Once humans learned the term “anger” in the process of explaining their behavior to others, 
they may ask themselves the reason for an incipient behavior and use the concept to reflect 
                                                 
252 From Jordan Peterson, “Maps of Meaning: 1 Monsters of Our Own Making (TVO)” [21:00] 
 A related, profound and slightly different exegesis of Blixen’s claim may learn from Simon May who, 
in the context of Nietzsche’s Thus Spake Zarathustra, concludes that “A free self – a self that is not merely an effective 
hierarchy of drives but is also not structured by metaphysical notions . . . – must, therefore, be a self that affirms itself 
as a product of its history, a history that is a brute given and that can never be undone or be otherwise. As Zarathustra 
again puts it: Redemption is ‘to re-create all “it was” into a “thus I willed it”. . . . All “it was” is a fragment, a riddle, a 
dreadful accident—until the creative will says to is, “But thus I willed it . . . . thus shall I will it” ’ . . .” Source: Simon 
May, “Nihilism and the Free Self”, in Ken Gemes and Simon May, eds., Nietzsche on Freedom and Autonomy, online 
version is unpaginated. Also, see Cathy Caruth, Unclaimed Experience: Trauma, Narrative, and History, 3. 
253 From Judith Harris, Signifying Pain: Constructing and Healing the Self through Writing, 5. 
254 “Concepts” is correct. The distinction between “thing” and “concept” (both invoked by a word) was already fully 
developed in John Locke’s Essay on Human Understanding and has (according to Paul H. Frye) “been more or less 
commonly accepted since then”. From Paul H. Frye, Theory of Literature, 99. See my comments on the Lockean 
distinction between “nominal” and “real” in footnote 223.  
255 David L. Thompson, Daniel Dennett, 83. 
256 As to just how fundamental it is, it was R. W. Emerson who in chapter 4 of Nature (entitled “Language”) noted: 
“Words are signs of natural facts. . . . Every word which is used to express a moral or intellectual fact, if traced to its 
root, is found to be borrowed from some material appearance.” From Ralph Waldo Emerson, Essays & Lectures, 22. 
257 Thomas S. Szasz, Ideology and Insanity: Essays on the Psychiatric Dehumanization of Man, 196. 
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on their own internal state—even if such reflection actually results in inhibiting the behavior 
itself. Self-consciousness, the consciousness of oneself, appears as a secondary result of our 
linguistic interaction with others. 
 Language not only results in self-awareness. It also enables us to issue commands—
not just to others but to ourselves. We can set ourselves tasks—going to class, for instance—
that would be impossible without the linguistic concepts involved. Language enables us to 
become chameleonic transformers: when we use language to take on new projects and adopt 
new rules and policies, we transform our mind from one virtual machine into another. Such 
self-commands allow the linguistic level of mind to control other processes, and this is the 
basis for voluntary action. An action is free in so far as it is the result of something I have 
asked myself to do. . . . 
 For Dennett, language does even more than enable communication, self-awareness, 
and voluntary action. Language generates stories or narratives and these in turn create the 
self. Inverting common sense, Dennett holds that it is not the self that tells tales; initially at 
least, it is the narrative that generates the self. The distinctively human self is a narrative self 
and is a construct of language: “Our tales are spun, but for the most part we don’t spin them; 
they spin us. Our human consciousness, and our narrative selfhood, is their product, not their 
source”. . . 
 The idea that language precedes consciousness—“pandemonium”—[leads us now to] 
the implications for the nature of the self. A science-fiction scenario may help us. Imagine a 
computer that has been programmed to write novels. (Artificial intelligence have created 
poetry and music, so a novel is not too much of a stretch.) Suppose that one story our 
computer produces appears to be an autobiography: “Call me Gilbert . . .,” it starts. We have 
stipulated that the computer is just a machine: it is not conscious and cannot thing. And 
Gilbert is, of course, fictional. Nevertheless, we can interpret the text as a series of 
adventures that center on Gilbert, our fictional character. Let us elaborate this thought-
experiement by embedding this computer in a robot with videocams, a speaker system and 
perhaps wheels. Careful programming allows the ongoing autobiography to be modified by 
the real circumstances and events in the world around the robot. If you knock it with a 
baseball bat, for instance, the subsequent section of the story will involve an individual, 
whose description matches you, hitting Gilbert with a bat. It now appears as if the text, as 
we interpret it, is a heterophenomenological report, the report of someone’s experience. But 
whose? 
 In our earlier reference to the novels of Conan Doyle . . ., we distinguished Sherlock 
Holmes, as a character in the content of the novels, from the author and the process of 
writing. In our current scenario, there is no author: the novel-writing computer/robot is 
simply a machine. Here there is even less temptation to say that the writer is the subject of 
the experience. It is to “Gilbert” that we must attribute the experience recounted. Gilbert is 
neither the name of the machine nor the name of the program that generates the novel. 
Gilbert is the protagonist within the heterophenomenological report created by the computer. 
. . . It is not just conscious experience that is generated by the mechanisms of language 
generation in the brain: the very existence of the self has the same status. 
We are to understand from Dennett’s thinking that “every self is a construct created by an 
impersonal—that is, unselflike—process of language production in the brain” (emphasis added – 
“for reasons”, as Whitman would say). It should be obvious that because each of us is to some 
extent capable of observing ourselves in the world (i.e. imagining how we must appear to others) as 
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well as monitoring closely what we are withholding from the world (by not avowing it in speech), 
we are exclusively highly privileged to witness our own self-narratives and the emergent picture of 
our own “self”. If for the sake of the argument (though not altogether unreasonably) I may define 
“identity” as a socially negotiated self, then these words by Lawrence A. Joseph (on Catherine 
Pozzi) describe the scenario well: 
[Feeling “her very essence undermined”, w]riting represented her attempt to fill this 
existential void: language and the imagination enabled her to construct a self and give an 
identity to a fragmented consciousness. As patently autobiographical enterprises, the letter 
and the intimate journal were naturally her privileged mode of expression. But identity 
requires not only the construction, in words, of a self but also its recognition in the eyes of 
others. However voluminous these autobiographical writings, their value to her as self-
construction was restricted by the discontinuous nature of their form as well as by their 
limited circulation.258 
Somerset Maugham is a good example of a writer for whom it was specifically the act of publishing 
a text of self-narrative (his autobiographical novel Of Human Bondage) that was redemptive.259 The 
same is true of Alexandr Solzhenitsyn with respect to the publication of The Gulag Archipelago, 
part novel and part personal testimony: “When [he] heard the announcement about the novel’s 
publication on the BBC, he felt as though “an enormous burden had been lifted” from his 
shoulders.”260 
 Historically, Maugham precedes the argument proposed by Dennett that our selves are 
                                                 
258 From Lawrence A. Joseph, “Catherine Pozzi’s “Agnes”: Writing as Self-Construction”, Biography, vol. 11 (Winter 
1988): 49–50.  
259 In the memoir The Summing Up, Maugham recalls: “I was but just firmly established as a popular playwright when I 
began to be obsessed by the teeming memories of my past life. The loss of my mother and then the break-up of my 
home, the wretchedness of my first year at school for which my French childhood had so ill-prepared me and which 
my stammering made so difficult, the delight of those easy, monotonous and exciting days in Heidelberg, when I 
first entered upon the intellectual life, the irksomeness of my few years at the [St Thomas’s] hospital and the thrill of 
London; it all came back to me so pressingly, in my sleep, on my walks, when I was rehearsing plays, when I was at 
a party, it became such a burden to me that I made up my mind that I could only regain my peace by writing it all 
down in the form of a novel. . . . 
 “I had written a novel on the same themes when, after taking my medical degrees, I went to Seville. 
Luckily for me Fisher Unwin refused to give me the hundred pounds I wanted for it and no other publisher would 
have it at any price; or I should have lost a subject which I was then too young to make proper use of. . . . It seems to 
me that if the writing of the first novel did not finally repress into my subconscious the unhappy memories with 
which it was concerned it is because the writer is not finally disembarrassed of his subject till his work is published. 
When it is delivered to the public, however heedless the public be, it is his no longer and he is free from the burden 
that oppressed him. I called my book . . . Of Human Bondage. It is not an autobiography, but an autobiographical 
novel; fact and fiction are inextricably mingled; the emotions are my own, but not all the incidents are related as 
they happened and some of them are transferred to my hero not from my own life but from that of persons with 
whom I was intimate. The book did for me what I wanted, and when it was issued to the world . . . I found myself 
free forever from those pains and unhappy recollections. I put into it everything I then knew and having at last 
finished it prepared to make a fresh start.” From W. Somerset Maugham, The Summing Up, 119–120. 
260 From Alexandra Popoff, The Wives: The Women Behind Russia’s Literary Giants, no pagination in online version. 
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so naturally and conveniently inaugurated linguistically; he had this to say about writers (and artists 
in general): 
It may well be that we are all of us a bundle of mutually contradictive selves, but the writer, 
the artist, is deeply conscious of it. With other men, the life they lead makes one side of 
them predominant [cf. Hamilton’s “two levels” in footnote 248], so that, except perhaps in 
the depths of the subconscious [sic], it ends by being the whole man. But the painter, the 
writer, the saint is always looking inside himself for new facets; he is bored at repeating 
himself and seeks, though it may be without actually knowing it, to prevent himself from 
becoming one-sided.261 
This corresponds well to Roberto González Echevarría’s claim about “literature’s foremost appeal: 
to become another, to leave a typically embattled self for another closer to one’s desires and 
aspirations.”262 And in the case of John Cowper Powys, Charles Lock writes: 
Constantly in the Autobiography Powys . . . wonders how much of life can be put into a 
narrative. Life as we experience it consists of “so many completely meaningless, 
insignificant, irrelevant episodes. . .unconnected with any general ‘stream of tendency’ ” [I 
omit here a reference to a footnote in Lock’s dissertation]; and out of these episodes we 
“have to invent our own destiny.” . . . [The following are Powys’s words from page 46 of his 
Autobiography:] 
 What excites our more intelligent interest is a story, that is to say the struggle of a 
 soul. . .with the obstacles that hinder its living growth, that obstruct the lilt of its pulse
 and joggle to left or right its integral continuity . . .263 
I have said that stories about life enabled, hopes dashed, triumph prevented, traumas endured by the 
unknowable and treacherous forces of the world have a “natural claim” on the interest of humans. 
The interesting question is, approximately, this: How are our experiences altered by what we can do 
at the level of our self? Let me investigate that notion a little closer. 
vii. Fragmentary Repositories of Alternative Selves 
Freud observes at one point that each individual “has built up his ego-ideal on the most various 
models”, whereby he seems to hint at the possibility on the part of a person to – in some measure – 
influence, shape or select the constituent “content” (the word is not ideal, but may be adequate as a 
metaphor) of his or her own self.264 And it is my contention that it is not hard to imagine a close 
                                                 
261 W. Somerset Maugham, The Summing Up, chapter 61. 
262 Roberto González Echevarría, Cervantes’ “Don Quixote”, 2. 
263 Charles J. S. Lock, “Development of Style in the Writings of John Cowper Powys, 1915–29” (DPhil diss.; University 
of Oxford, 1981). 
264 Sigmund Freud, Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego, chapter 11. 
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constructive relationship between that process and a process of healing or coping in a situation of 
suffering. Touching on the same principle, Adam Phillips learns from Hamlet who (according to 
Brian Cummings) 
‘far from speaking his mind, confronts us with a fragmentary repository of alternative 
selves, and searches within for the limits of being.’ [Phillips continues:] Once we have 
the idea of alternative selves, we will have questions about the limits of being, about 
what or who we can take ourselves to be. If conscience can be caught – like a fish, like 
a criminal – it might become part of that fragmentary repository of alternative selves 
that resemble a troupe of actors. If the play is the thing, then we can say that it was 
useful to have a cultural form in which the conscience of a king – or indeed of anyone; 
conscience itself being like a king – could be caught, exposed, seen to be like a 
character.265 
William James had this to say on the same issue: “Mankind is susceptible and suggestible in 
opposite directions, and the rivalry of influences is unsleeping. The saintly and the worldly ideal 
pursue their feud in literature as must as in real life.”266 
 Kurt Vonnegut, too, felt that he knew something about the potential for transformation 
(and, less innocuously, malleability and distortion) of self, and he expressed it in the famous 
warning that accompanied his novel on lending cooperation with the Nazi movement: “We are what 
we pretend to be, so we must be careful about what we pretend to be.”267 The point is, I suppose, 
that the kinds of selves that exist surround us and that we ourselves typify are impossible to pin 
down with accuracy, are constantly evolving, are highly impressionable to external and internal 
stimuli and, given their fundamental impressionability, are at no point invulnerable to sadness or 
precluded from delight. 
 At the beginning of this chapter I called it an uncontroversial (if also in some ways 
problematic) convenience to conceptually distinguish between “self” and “world”. On the 
convenience side of the argument, clearly we cannot claim that “thoughts and feelings do not exists 
                                                 
265 On the issue of “alternative selves” and the fragmented ego, Freud wrote that “Normally, there is nothing of which 
we are more certain than the feeling of ourselves, of our own ego. This ego appears to us as something autonomous 
and unitary, marked off distinctly from everything else. That such an appearance is deceptive, and that on the 
contrary the ego is continued inwards without any sharp delimitation, into an unconscious mental entity which we 
designate as the id and for which it serves as a kind of façade – this is a discovery first made by psychoanalytic 
research . . . But towards the outside, at any rate, the ego seems to maintain clear sharp lines of demarcation.” From 
Sigmund Freud, Civilisation and Its Discontents, 12–13. 
266 William James, The Varieties of Religious Experience, 323. 
267 Vonnegut’s aphorism is the epigraph to his novel Mother Night about the ideological possession of Nazis during 
World War II. Thomas Weiskel echoes the sentiment by saying that we are generally as ignorant about what lies 
within the parameters of human possibility as what lies beyond. Harold Bloom cites Weiskel in Harold Bloom, The 
Daemon Knows, 3. 
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(as some radical behaviorists assert).”268 As for the problematic side of the case, I should also flag 
Alan Watts’s highly logical (semantic) argument that 
You cannot have an experience called “self” without an experience called “other.” 
This is why the two are really one, which is both self and other and yet neither . . . 
The gist of these words will probably sit awkwardly with some; after all, they seem to conclusively 
reveal that what is commonly taken to be a true dichotomy (“self” versus “other”) is actually one 
thing, and, further, that that one thing is cleaved into opposites merely by the element of human 
“experience”. But it is helpful – indeed, absolutely crucial – to recognize that selfhood is 
experiential, i.e. literally something inferred from the phenomenon of experience. There is 
empirically and phenomenally no thing there (for all that there is a useful word, which can be used 
in a fashion that is approximately phenomenological).269 Why is this helpful and crucial? Because it 
means that our accounts of what we perceive ourselves (our so-called “selves”) to go through, 
including who we take ourselves to be and what we hope to be in the future or to go through (or 
avoid going through again) are not wrong – they are unburdened by the obligation to be objectively 
right, empirically correct, because their whole validity rests entirely on their being subjectively 
meaningful, adequate and useful to the experiencing self. (“Right” or “wrong” in the empirical 
sense is not the appropriate standard with which to evaluate the validity of the word; “useful” would 
be better; I am reminded of the Yale psychologist Paul Bloom who in detailing “one of the main 
critiques of Freud” rephrases the well-known critique leveled by the physicist Wolfgang Pauli at a 
colleague in the 1920s: “That’s not right; it’s not even wrong.”)270 
 On that note, pay special attention to my added emphases within this quotation from 
Alan Watts: 
[W]hen the Emperor Wu asked Bodhi-dharma, “Who are you?” he answered, “I don't 
know.” Neither do I, for it is impossible to bring vision into clear and objective focus 
upon itself. Just try—and somewhere along the way you will discover that the only 
real “you” is the shifting and momentary totality of everything you see and feel, 
within and without.271 I do not, then, bother with the vicious circle of discovering my 
                                                 
268 From Paul Bloom, Descartes’ Baby: How the Science of Child Development Explains What Makes Us Human, 191. 
The Watts quote that follows is from Alan Watts, In My Own Way: An Autobiography, 188. 
269 To clarify the semantic distinction presented by that sentence: “The phenomenal level concerns the things we 
encounter in ordinary experience—books and trees—while the phenomenological level concerns facts about sensory 
experience considered strictly from the viewpoint of the experiencer’s apprehension of sensible qualities.” A. C. 
Grayling, ed., Philosophy: A Guide through the Subject, 515. 
270 From this lecture: Paul Bloom, “3. Foundations: Freud” [34:30]. The precise wording of this widely-cited quote 
varies somewhat. 
271 Cf. David Hume: “We are nothing but a bundle or collection of different perceptions, which succeed each other with 
an inconceivable rapidity, and are in perpetual flux and movement.” Hume also said: “For my part, when I enter 
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“real personality” or make any special attempt to act naturally. I just put on whatever 
personal style seems appropriate to the circumstances, or entertaining to myself or 
others. Others may see a consistent personality underlying all these “acts,” but this 
must be their projection on my Rorschach blot . . . All interesting descriptions of 
human character are poetic, imaginative, dramatic, and fantastic, whereas all 
attempts at valid description are myopic, interminable, and dull. This is why the 
writing of history and biography is an art, not a science.272 
With Vonnegut, whom I have just alluded to, we might now say that we really do seem to be and 
become “what we pretend to be”.273 And with Hamilton (and Watts) we might well agree that “the 
fundamental mystery of the self . . . comes through much more in literature” (cf. Caruth’s 
comparison of literature and psychoanalysis in chapter 1).274 
viii. Experimenting with Human Potentialities 
The self is conscious then, and to a certain degree free (phenomenologically, it takes itself to be so, 
and in that sense the observation is sufficiently true). When an embodied self applies that 
experiential freedom to the activity of artistic representation, the result is liberating to the degree 
that the person discovers that the created artwork (let us assume it is a literary work) allows and 
endows the writing person with a certain agency that is absent from the rest of life. Bluntly put, the 
page affords one the opportunity and perfect freedom to name, mold, temper, deepen, order, 
highlight and soften things, as well as the opportunity to adjudicate, crop and “omit” details (for 
instance, through focalization) as one sees fit. The idea is that a valuable opportunity is thus 
provided for working with and attending only to a manageable selected part of the countless 
constituent elements of experiential reality; a trail can be blazed and access gained to what 
Nemoianu terms a “privileged ground for experimenting with human potentialities and responses, 
redeeming the past, assimilating the present, and projecting the future.”275 Harold Bloom suggests 
                                                 
most intimately into what I call myself, I always stumble on some particular perception or other, of heat of cold, light 
or shade, love or hatred, pain or pleasure. I never can catch myself at any time without a perception, and never can 
observe any thing but the perception.” From David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, 1.4.6. (Book, Part, Section). 
272 Alan Watts, In My Own Way: An Autobiography 1915–1965, 209. My emphasis. 
273 Again, spiritual leaders have found the malleability of self intriguing and something to be celebrated as well as 
regarded warily. “You are as holy as you wish to be,” is John Ruysbroeck’s formulation emphasizing the promising 
and celebratory aspect of this. I have long thought that Emerson’s idea of the “the infinitude of the private man” 
represented a similar idea. 
274 See footnote 261. 
275 See footnote 131. 
Many very different examples from literature could be given, and much more said, on this. An excellent example 
related to what I have described is given by Steven Marcus under the rubric of “transference” and concerns Charles 
Dickens’s central character in The Old Curiosity Shop: “He suggests that through Nell’s death Dickens may have 
been mourning his own spiritual death in childhood, during the blacking factory humiliations that he described in his 
autobiography. [In this way,] Dickens was both remembering his own experience and identifying with another’s.” 
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that we ask of any poem or play: “What precisely does this leave out to make it the beautifully 
expensive torso it is?”276 When we write “strongly and directly [from] personal experience”, as 
Frost urged us to do, we can take what the world looks like when it (for instance) most frightens us, 
address the vast and chaotically conjoined mess and with our own limited but nevertheless literally 
creative truthful “Logos” effect a change that is analogous to the creation of the world out of chaos 
in Genesis: We can aim for the feeling of order rising triumphantly above underlying chaos (see my 
reference to Genesis in chapter 1). Thus a story can be told and, in Blixen’s words, with its telling 
the relevant “sorrow can [hypothetically, at least] be borne”; in Phillips’s words, “a redescription” 
can emerge of what we are or what has happened to us.277 
 I am here reminded of Molly Harrower’s words in epigraphic perspective 6 on the 
potential for poetry to help the individual to “create order and understanding out of a mental 
muddle.”278 On the drive to write poems distilling order out of some unbearable “inner chaos”, I am 
reminded too that one of Whitman’s significant biographies, The Evolution of Walt Whitman by 
Roger Asselineau, features the argument that “the composition of Leaves of Grass . . . rapidly 
permitted Whitman to put the confused world of his perceptions in order and clearly to distinguish 
between the Me and the Not-Me.” It also goes some way towards bearing out Seamus Heaney’s 
words that poetry provides “an order where we can at last grow up to that which we stored up as we 
grew.”279 And I fully concur with this analysis: 
Although any definition of literature will be inconclusive, it doesn’t mean that literature as a 
category doesn’t exist. At some point in our history, language in the form of poems and 
stories was harnessed to explain the world to the self and the self to the world. After that, 
literature could not in good conscience be seen as arbitrary but rather as something that 
                                                 
See Meredith Anne Skura, The Literary Use of the Psychoanalytic Process, 192–193. 
276 Harold Bloom, The Daemon Knows, 52. It also seems apposite here to mention that when Whitman turned to poetry 
seriously in 1855 he did so partly from his desire to “bestow[] on every object or quality its fit proportions neither 
more nor less. He [wished to prove himself] the arbiter of the diverse” and external realm and to hand over the 
relevant “key” (i.e. the mental skill with which to negotiate the imposing features of the world) to “common folks”.  
277 Adam Phillips has frequently emphasised that “psychoanalysis [and I am suggesting that writing may partake of the 
same therapeutic function] offers a person, at best, an essentially unpredictable redescription [of the self and its 
crisis].” Adam Phillips, Side Effects, 17. Jordan Peterson has said that an archetypal motif emerges “when human 
beings encounter the unknown [and] encapsulate it in an explanatory network [by applying names to unidentified 
elements]. It’s a way of binding up the anomaly or unknown and giving it a substantive form.” From Jordan 
Peterson, “Maps of Meaning: 2 Contending with Chaos (TVO)” [22:00]. 
278 Molly Harrower, The Therapy of Poetry, 53. 
 W. H. Auden subtly employs a number of paradisal metaphors when he describes the successful poetic 
labor like this: “With the farming of a verse / Make a vineyard of the curse, / Sing of human unsuccess / In a rapture 
of distress; // In the deserts of the heart / Let the healing fountain start, / In the prison of his days / Teach the free 
man how to praise.” From Auden’s poem “In Memory of W. B. Yeats”. 
279 From Roger Asselineau, The Evolution of Walt Whitman, vol. 2, 35, and Floyd Collins, Seamus Heaney: The Crisis 
of Identity, 217. See also footnote 196. 
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answers a basic human need: It’s part of the civilizing process, it helps us to thrive. 
Literature may not exactly be indispensable, but, in retrospect, it does seem inevitable.280 
In certain circumstances, then, we are able to aesthetically bring about something imbued with the 
potential to nourish our self. When this happens, we are, classically speaking, artists, to honor 
Gardner’s conceptualization (quoted more fully in chapter 1) of art as that which “asserts and 
reasserts those values which hold off dissolution [while offering] what is necessary to 
humanness.”281 Similarly, Harold Bloom associates Whitman’s “grand voice” with “hold[ing] off 
the permanent darkness” and finds that it typifies the property specific to the so-called American 
Sublime; it “transcend[s] the human without forsaking humanism.”282 When the world challenges 
us with its chaotically conjoined clusters – with “cows and wars and chewing gum and mountains”, 
as Gardner amusingly writes – we might with Franklean resolve (see footnote 162) attempt 
aesthetically to celebrate order and meaning – by creating miniature simulacra and instantiations of 
order and meaning; alternatively, when “the world is too much with us” (in Wordsworth’s words), 
we have the potential to bring about something that is imbued – perhaps – with harmony, cheer, 
wisdom, magnanimity and orderly subordination (the latter of which items alludes to Gardner again 
and codes for orderly and rational causality as in “guilt because of sin because of pain”).283 
 Molly Harrower (cf. epigraphic perspective 6) identifies one of the highly valuable 
functions of poetry thus: the potential of restoring “an inner balance which has temporarily been 
lost”. This function is what my former teacher’s words identify (see the Preface above) in 
characterizing Whitman as a writer who through his poems reliably offers “comfort and 
companionship”. I like the metaphor of “inner balance”, to which I shall return, and am inclined to 
value inner balance (plausibly the result of trying successfully to carry out the Delphic injunction) 
over many other things worth having. Poetry – or the poetic word – is such a useful thing (“for 
those people for whom it’s good [and useful]”, to quote Adam Phillips from footnote 239) because 
it can potentially assist a dislocated person in restoring a state of inner balance. 
 
                                                 
280 From Arthur Krystal, This Thing We Call Literature, 82. 
281 John Gardner, On Moral Fiction, 5–6. Henry Miller writes that Nietzsche once coined the phrase “the healing quality 
of art.” From Henry Miller, The Henry Miller Reader, 290. 
Also, cf. Kinzie’s insistence that literary art should “reply to the need for coherence in a human life while reflecting 
the facts of experiential complexity, and . . . speak memorably about our great anxieties—affliction, injustice, 
death.” Kinzie is cited in the previous chapter. 
282 Harold Bloom, The Daemon Knows, 49 and 32. 
283 John Gardner, On Moral Fiction, 6. 
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ix. “All interesting descriptions of human character are 
poetic, imaginative, dramatic, and fantastic” 
[284] It is important in this context to not lose sight of the “I”, or speaking self, and its functions for 
these are a central aspect of the poetry that interests me. As I segue into talking increasingly about 
this poetry in the case of Whitman, I am going to adopt Sedikides and Skowronski’s phrase 
“symbolic self”, which according to the authors represents the “symbolic construction of the 
self”.285 Because this dissertation fundamentally deals with survival and argues that the symbolic 
self-represention that animates lyrical poetry may be of therapeutic value to the self, I would be 
remiss if I omitted the following surprising and interesting fact: Sedikides and Skowronski offer the 
argument that the capacities for “self-awareness and self-representation” may be much more 
valuable than one might be inclined to assume; this is because arguably a “well-developed symbolic 
capability is highly likely to increase reproductive fitness.”286 Cf. Peterson’s words on what makes 
“embodied biological being . . . sustainable over time” just before footnote 32. (I am not in a 
position to elaborate on Sedikides and Skowronski’s claim but consider the bioevolutionary 
argument, at the very least, intriguing.) 
 Emily Dickinson may be of help if we are to try to understand how poetry may serve a 
personally generative function and align the act of “locat[ing] a voice” with “locat[ing] a self” (in 
Leonard Cohen’s words). At a 2007 plenary seminar entitled What Happens in a Poem at The 
Philoctetes Center for the Multidisciplinary Study of Imagination, the poet Timothy Donnelly draws 
                                                 
284 Cited above, the words in the section title are Alan Watts’s. 
285 Yoshihisa Kashima, Margaret Foddy and Michael Platow, eds., Self and Identity: Personal, Social, and Symbolic, 18. 
Cf. Alan Watts: “Thus we come back to the question of what we mean by “I.” First of all, obviously we mean our 
symbol of ourselves.” Characteristically, Watts adds, “Ourselves, in this case, is the whole psychophysical organism, 
conscious and unconscious, plus its environment. That is your real self.” From Alan Watts, Eastern Wisdom, Modern 
Life: Collected Talks: 1960–1969, 216. 
 When an “I” appears in a Whitman poem, Whitman scholars typically call it “the poetic ‘I’ ” by which 
they mean exclusively the poetic speaker when signified by and appearing under the one-letter pronoun. But I find 
the air-quotes and pronoun-cum-noun coinage awkward and shall instead use “symbolic self” to designate the self-
referring speaker speaking the word “I”. 
286 This argument from Darwinian survival is also presented by V. S. Ramachandran (The Tell-Tale Brain: Unlocking the 
Mystery of Human Nature) and by Jordan Peterson who suggests that we have evolved an ability to “view the world 
through a narrative lens because the fundamental problem we have to solve as living creatures is how we should act 
in the world”, not what the world is materially made of. Human flourishing, Peterson argues with reference to 
phenomenology and existentialism, is predicated on finding out what matters, less so what matter is. Cf. Peterson’s 
lecture “2017 Maps of Meaning 2: Marionettes & Individuals (Part 1)” [1:48]. 
 Also, consider again Arthur Krystal’s words from This Thing We Call Literature (in footnote 286 
above). The passage quoted there continues thus: “Like music, drawing, or sculpture, literature makes life more 
manageable; but unlike the other arts, it speaks to us in the way we speak to one another; it’s the self-conscious 
repository of consciousness.” (Emphases added) Arthur Krystal, This Thing We Call Literature, 82. See also my 
reference elsewhere to Thomas S. Szasz. 
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attention to this line from one of Dickinson’s letters: “When I state myself, as the representative of 
the verse, it does not mean me, but a supposed person.”287 Donnelly then presents the notion that 
the practice and medium of poetry afford the poet a chance to dramatize, investigate and examine “a 
potential self, a potential psychology”: 
[T]here are poets who want to be able to investigate possible psychologies . . . rather than 
dramatizing their own. I think that that’s something that some poets are after. And of course 
that raises the question: How we choose [via poetry] to . . . investigate a potential 
psychology may actually reflect a great deal on our own psychology, and probably does. But 
I do feel that as a poet I need the liberty of knowing that people aren’t necessary going to 
read my own poems as biographical or even necessarily as something like dreamwork.288 
In other words, to touch on the salient aspects of this statement, “potential” personalities or selves 
may rise and fall as a consequence of our poetic voice which we necessarily construct out of the raw 
material of “our own psychology”. Also (to address Donnelly’s last sentence), it might be true that 
the degree to which these aesthetically inaugurated – or contrived and dramatized – “possible 
psychologies” are externally noticeable is minimal (to a biographer, say, or a critic); after all, it is 
not easy after all to infer and record accurately and instantly what informs another person’s self-
consciousness at any given moment; this is what Watts is getting at in remarking “the only real 
“you” is the shifting and momentary totality of everything you see and feel, within and without.” 289 
 Hence, I consider Donnelly’s view practically compatible with my own thesis which 
posits that poetry might present a site or space where a person’s attitudes, experiences and 
emotions, specifically those implicating or pertaining to the person’s sense of self, can be 
negotiated, represented and considered, which as a strategy would appear particularly useful in a 
moment of crisis given, as I have argued above, that what hurts us does so by virtue of our strong 
sensation of being ourselves, i.e. of being involuntarily targeted by adverse forces.290 
 
 
 
                                                 
287 From a letter to Mr. T. W. Higginson. See Emily Dickinson, Letters of Emily Dickinson, ed. by Mabel Loomis Todd, 
257. My emphasis. 
288 Timothy Donnelly in “What Happens in a Poem” [1:55:43]. 
289 See footnote 272. From Alan Watts, In My Own Way: An Autobiography 1915–1965, 209. 
290 My description of poetry here is in accord with that put forward by Virgil Nemoianu, mentioned previously. See 
footnote 64. 
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x. Sublime Self-realization, Authentic Masks, the Voice of Faith 
As for seeing poetry as a mode of introspection, Harold Bloom has credited Ralph Waldo Emerson 
with pointing out that “voice, not text, is America’s mode of self-knowing” – and has himself said: 
The revelation making possible the breakthrough that is Leaves of Grass 1855 was 
neither mystical nor psychosexual. It was the invention of the mask “Walt Whitman, 
an American, one of the roughs, a kosmos,” who could not reconcile his soul and his 
true self and so took up the middle ground between them.291 
It seems relevant that Whitman himself has written that he was inclined to consider Leaves of Grass 
“an attempt to give the spirit, the body, the man, new words, new potentialities of speech—an 
American, a cosmopolitan . . . range of self-expression” (emphases added).292 Cf. these lines from 
“Song of Myself”: “My voice goes after what my eyes cannot reach, / With the twirl of my tongue I 
encompass worlds and volumes of worlds. // Speech is the twin of my vision, it is unequal to 
measure itself, / It provokes me forever.” Given Whitman’s acknowledgement in a letter to John 
Addington Symonds that “the writing and rounding of L[eaves] of G[rass] has been to me the 
reason-for-being, & life comfort” (and, in “Backward Glance O’er Travel’d Roads”, that it “has 
been the comfort of my life since it was originally commenced”), I am inclined to think that 
Whitman would willingly conflate his own “[providing] new potentialities of speech” with 
“[providing] new potentialities via speech”.293 
 Bloom’s seemingly deflationary assessment that Whitman merely “invent[ed] a mask” 
and behind it proceeded to compose an important work of literature becomes less deflationary in 
light of Bloom’s frequently stated enthusiasm for Oscar Wilde, with whom he playfully agrees that 
“Art is perfectly useless” – and possibly would agree too that “Lying, the telling of beautiful untrue 
things, is the proper aim of Art.”294 More interestingly, perhaps, is Whitman’s own concurring view 
                                                 
291 Harold Bloom, The Daemon Knows, 57. Bloom is insistent on the word “mask”; in On the Western Canon he writes 
“The Whitmanian soul is unknown nature, a kind of blank, while the rough self is a persona or mask, an endlessly 
shifting series of identifications.” R. W. French who contributes the entry on “Persona” in the Walt Whitman 
Encyclopedia observes that to “a certain extent, particularly in his later years, [Whitman] became what he imagined 
himself to be, and the evidence is in the poetry as well as in his public pronouncements. Whitman seems to have had 
a remarkable ability to will himself into being.” As for Whitman’s attempt to take up the middle ground between his 
soul and his true self (a dichotomy which I will not adopt exclusively), Carl Martin Lindner points out that Whitman 
in Leaves of Grass laboured towards psychological or personal wholeness and integrity. Cf. J. R. LeMaster and 
Donald D. Kummings, eds., The Routledge Encyclopedia of Walt Whitman, 513 and 239, respectively. 
292 From Walt Whitman, An American Primer, viii–ix. 
293 The letter to Addington is cited in Justin Kaplan, Walt Whitman: A Life, 47. 
294 Along with his phlegmatic acceptance that “reading the very best writers . . . is not going to make us better citizens” 
and that “literary criticism, as an art, always was and always will be an elitist phenomenon”, Bloom expresses his 
sympathy for Wilde in Harold Bloom, On the Western Canon: The Books and School of the Ages, 15–16. 
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(in 1867) that the symbolic self of 1855 (“Walt Whitman, an American, one of the roughs, a 
kosmos”) was indeed a mask.295 His wording is doubly interesting because in the attempt to 
distance himself from a characterization he had himself done much to deserve he simultaneously 
uses language to suggest a new and different persona: 
[P]ersonally the author of Leaves of Grass is in no sense or sort whatever the “rough,” the 
“eccentric,” “vagabond,” or queer person that the commentators (always bound for the 
intensest possible statement,) persist in making him. He has moved, & moves still, along the 
path of his life’s happenings & fortunes, as they befall or have befallen him, with entire 
serenity & decorum, never defiant even to the conventions, always bodily sweet & fresh, 
dressed plainly & cleanly, a gait & demeanor of antique simplicity, cheerful & smiling, 
performing carefully all his domestic, social, & municipal obligations, his demonstrative 
nature toned very low, but eloquent enough of eye, posture, & expression, though using only 
moderate words; and offering to the world, in himself, an American Personality, & real 
Democratic Presence, that not only the best old Hindu, Greek, and Roman worthies would at 
once have responded to, but which the most cultured European, from court or academy, 
would likewise, on meeting to-day, see & own without demur.296 
Potentiality of self-expression (as Whitman approximately puts it in his American Primer) is, from a 
slightly different angle, what Dickinson is getting at too with her “supposed person”. Elsewhere in 
Harold Bloom’s The Daemon Knows, the author argues to equivalent effect that Whitman “creates a 
fiction of the self that becomes a poem in our eyes” – that to Whitman “the self was a necessary 
fiction, an illusion so desired that leaves of grass would sprout from the barren rock of being.”297 
While thus amassing textual support for my argument, let me add that Kenneth Burke (cited by 
Bloom in The Daemon Knows) has suggested that “Whitmanian vistas are future possibilities” 
                                                 
295 Asselineau uses the word “pose”, not “mask”, and settles that to accuse Whitman of “imposture” is to “misconceive 
the complexity of the problem.” I return to this later; see footnote 291. 
296 From a letter to his friend William D. O’Connor (10 November 1867). See Walt Whitman, The Correspondence, vol. 
1, 347–349. 
297 Far from intending a pejorative remark, Harold Bloom also writes that Whitman “had no poetic method except his 
self.” Whatever the exact meaning of that line, a strong relation between poetic creation and the inauguration and 
consolidation of voice-dependent self is clearly suggested. To ask, at a given moment, whether self is generated via 
poetry or vice versa seems a little bit like asking: Which came first – the soup or the recipe? (cf. Donnelly in 
footnote 288: “How we choose [via poetry] to . . . investigate a potential psychology may actually reflect a great 
deal on our own psychology, and probably does.”) There is a circular element to this process, which these lines from 
T. S. Eliot memorably capture if we choose to “hear” them in the context of the discovery or creation of a self: 
“[T]he end of all our exploring / Will be to arrive where we started / And know the place for the first time.” The 
clinical psychologist Jordan Peterson considers Eliot’s words “the most remarkable elaboration of the nature of the 
relationship between the individual human consciousness and reality itself that has ever been penned – and the 
culmination of a system of thought that’s been developing over thousands and thousand of years.” The Bloom quote 
is from The Daemon Knows, 54. Jordan Peterson’s quote is from the TED talk “Potential: Jordan Peterson at 
TEDxUofT” [19:50]. 
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which (beyond echoing my dissertation title suggestively) corresponds well with Ed Folsom’s 
assertion that 
The key for Whitman was always to enlarge the self, to work toward a democratic 
conception of selfhood as absorptive, nondiscriminating, receptive, and loving. For 
Whitman, a democratic self was one that came to recognize vast multitude of 
possibility within its own identity [cf. Whitman in epigraphic perspective 9], one that 
could imagine how one’s own identity, given altered circumstances, might incorporate 
the identity of anyone in the culture, from the most marginalized and despised to the 
most exalted and powerful. 
The notion that poetry may serve its therapeutic role via generative, expansive, adjusting 
ministrations with regards to self or personality is central to my thesis, and as a claim it seems 
amply borne out by observations such as these.298 I especially like the metaphor in Bloom’s 
wording that a new self, which had to be fairly deeply desired in order to be manifested, was born 
through the obstetrical intervention of a “necessary fiction” (notice the clear parallel here between 
“fiction” and Vonnegut’s “pretend to be”). 
 We have, it would seem, before us a man who discovered himself able to use the 
creative and poetic word to sift and amplify, sculpt and generate that germ in him which was 
nourishing for the whole, knowable and worth enlarging from what was unknowable, destructive 
and negative.299 These lines, gathered from across the body of work, seem to reflect this principle 
pithily, and taken together they indicate a thoroughgoing concern with self and identity (all 
emphases are mine): 
• (a) I too have felt the resistless call of myself 
• (b) I celebrate myself, and sing myself, 
. . . 
And of these one and all I weave the song of myself. 
. . . 
                                                 
298 Recalling an early crucial moment that foreshadowed his poetic output, the poet and songwriter Leonard Cohen has 
said the following: “to find a voice – to locate a voice – that is, to locate a self – a self that is not fixed, a self that 
struggles for its own existence”. These words run parallel with the theory I am charting for the relationship between 
voice and self. 
 The Ed Folsom quote above (“The key for Whitman . . .”) is from his entry “Democracy” in J. R. 
LeMaster and Donald D. Kummings, eds., The Routledge Encyclopedia of Walt Whitman, 173. 
299 According to several acquaintances, Whitman was able to carry out – at least intermittently – what T. S. Eliot later 
captured in the alliterative resolution, “Let’s not be narrow, nasty and negative.” The achievement was marked 
enough to deeply impress or intrigue many who knew the poet: “Until I knew the man,” writes Dr R. M. Bucke, “it 
had not occurred to me that anyone could derive so much absolute happiness from [admiring flowers, animals and 
the sky while “sauntering about outdoors by himself”] as he did. . . . Perhaps, indeed, no man who ever lived liked 
so many things and disliked so few as Walt Whitman.” Bucke’s description of Whitman is cited – in the context of 
healthy-mindedness – in William James, Varieties of Religious Experience, 84. 
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In all people I see myself, none more and not one a barley-corn less, 
And the good or bad I say of myself I say of them, 
. . . 
And nothing, not God, is greater to one than one’s-self is, 
. . . 
You will hardly know who I am or what I mean, 
But I shall be good health to you nevertheless, 
. . . 
I stop somewhere waiting for you 
• (c) I will effuse egotism and show it underlying all, and I will be the bard of 
personality300 
• (d) “One’s self I sing, a simple separate person”  
• (e) “Only the theme I sing, the great and strong-possess’d soul, eludes not, 
One’s-self must never give way—that is the final substance—that out of all is sure, 
Out of politics, triumphs, battles, life, what at last finally remains? 
When shows break up what but One’s-Self is sure?” 
• (f) O the joy of my soul leaning pois’d on itself, receiving identity through materials 
and loving them, observing characters and absorbing them, 
My soul vibrated back to me from them, from sight, hearing, touch, reason, 
articulation, comparison, memory, and the like, 
The real life of my senses and flesh transcending my senses and flesh, 
My body done with materials, my sight done with my material eyes, 
Proved to me this day beyond cavil that it is not my material eyes which finally see, 
Nor my material body which finally loves, walks, laughs, shouts, embraces, 
procreates. 
• (g) Me, wherever my life is lived, O to be self-balanced for contingencies! 
• (h) Defiant of . . . conventions, I avowedly chant “the great pride of man in himself,” 
and permit it to be more or less a motif of nearly all my verse. 
• (i) Through angers, losses, ambition, ignorance, ennui, what you are picks its way. 
• (j) You broken resolutions, you racking angers, you smother’d ennuis; 
Ah, think not you finally triumph—My real self has yet to come forth.301 
                                                 
300 In a conversation with Traubel several years later, Whitman thought it necessary to define his precise meaning in 
using this word: “I do not lack in egotism, as you know—the sort of egotism that is willing to know itself as honestly as 
it is willing to know third or fourth parties.” On another day he had this to say: “A certain amount of egotism is 
necessary—but for having it, we never could have endured the strain—passed unharmed through the fire—especially in 
the years when Leaves of Grass stood alone, unfriended but by me.” Cf. Walt Whitman, Intimate with Walt: Selections 
from Whitman’s Conversations with Horace Traubel 1888–1892, 59 and 60. 
301 These lines are from, respectively, (a) “Song at Sunset”, (b) “Song of Myself”, (c) “Starting from Paumanok”, (d) 
“One’s Self I Sing”, (e) “Quicksand Years”, (f) “Song of Joys”, (g) “Me Imperturbe”, (h) “A Backward Glance O’er 
Travel’d Roads”, (i) “To You”, (j) “Ah Poverties, Winkings, and Sulky Retreats”. The emphases are mine. 
 The last line cited above has a certain affinity with a line Whitman wrote in one of the “self-reviews”, 
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Crucially Whitman seems to have discovered that he had a say about the direction in which he 
intended to grow psychologically – a say generally uttered in direct response to life’s trying events 
and “forces that [would] assail” him and often taking the form of poetic lines and stanzas awaiting 
publication in the next edition of Leaves of Grass. On the dispiriting critical responses he garnered, 
he remarked: “[The critics] sail into me in great style—but that is the great test: if I cannot stand 
their attack I might as well go out of the Leaves business”, which affirms seeing Leaves of Grass as 
a work of stalwart and undaunted persistence in the face of opposition and disappointment. His 
biographer David S. Reynolds has also settled the degree of volition as the handmaiden or catalyst 
for Whitman’s “optimism”, which according to Reynolds “was very much a willed optimism, one 
achieved in the face of harsh social conditions and great personal challenges.”302 
 
xi. Some Ground for Hope and Renewal 
 
Observe the significant word “volition” in the quote from Specimen Days (footnote 151). And, also, 
in the words of another scholar, “particularly in his later years, he became what he imagined himself 
to be” (footnote 291), the evidence of which “is in the poetry as in his public pronouncements”. As 
for the conflation of what has been called “personae” versus the actual poet, Edwin Haviland Miller 
notes that “Whitman himself does not always differentiate [between the poetic figment and the real 
Whitman]” – which in the light of these themes I hope the reader will recognize the significance 
of.303 As I say, Whitman seems to have recognized that he indeed had a say in the matter of what he 
represented and who he was; particularly, he recognized that it might pay off to hopefully intend by 
volition to steer toward what Gary Schmidgall calls “light-hearted[ness]” (consider the significant 
word “want”): “I don’t want to figure anywhere as misanthropic, sour, doubtful: as a discourager—
as a putter-out of lights.”304 Toward the end of his life, Whitman seems to have succeeded in 
nourishing such a “restorative relationship between [his] mind’s centre and its circumference” (to 
                                                 
i.e. in his own review of Leaves of Grass: “The style of the bard that is waited for is to be transcendent and new.” 
302 David S. Reynolds, “Walt Whitman’s World: America Still Needs His Poetry”. Cf. the words by R. W. French cited 
above (“To a certain extent . . . he became what he imagined himself to be, and the evidence is in his poetry as well 
as in his public pronouncements. Whitman seems to have had a remarkable ability to will himself into being”). 
303 For the quote preceding E. H. Miller’s, see “Personae” (by R. W. French) in J. R. LeMaster and Donald D. 
Kummings, eds., The Routledge Encyclopedia of Walt Whitman, 514. For Miller’s quote, see Edwin Haviland 
Miller, Walt Whitman’s Poetry: a Psychological Journey, 136. 
304 Walt Whitman, Intimate with Walt: Selections from Whitman’s Conversations with Horace Traubel 1888–1892, 60. 
The word “Light-hearted” is the editor’s designation of what Whitman establishes in the quoted line. 
 Approximately thirty years earlier, Whitman had written these lines: “I remember I said to myself at the 
winter-close, before / my leaves sprang at all, that I would become a / candid and unloosed summer-poet” – the 
intention and volition with regards to self and being is clear. From “So Long!” (1860 edition). 
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reference Heaney’s formulation of the dynamic) that he was able to claim, “Whether it is 
constitutional or what not with me, I stand for the sunny point of view—stand for the joyful 
conclusions. This is . . . because my faith seems to belong to the nature of things—is imposed, 
cannot be escaped: can better account for life and what goes with life than the opposite theory.”305 
 In the passage from E. H. Miller that I have just cited, the scholar adds that Whitman’s 
“idolators, understandably, do not make” a distinction “between the poetic figment and the real 
Whitman”, and the word “understandably” is worth thinking about. As a young man, Roger 
Asselineau was one “idolator” who out of his own suffering probably approached Whitman from 
the assumption that the potential psychological attitudes that made Leaves of Grass such an 
attractive work might “actually reflect a great deal on [Whitman’s] own psychology” (to cite 
Timothy Donnelly). During the German occupation of France during the Second World War, 
Asselineau, who later wrote a great Whitman biography, found that merely exposing himself to the 
fruit of Whitman’s poetic efforts exerted a spiritually instructive, consoling and on the whole 
ameliorative effect on Asselineau. It prevented “moral suffocation” and “offered some ground for 
hope and for a renewal of faith in mankind”306: 
 
Invaluable lessons of tenacious energy could be drawn from his Leaves of Grass, in which 
with patient strength he overcame his anxieties and doubts and repelled their repeated 
attacks over the years. The presence of evil within him and around him never broke his 
spirit. His faith and enthusiasm always brought him through. But this invincible optimism 
was the result of a continual struggle, and thus the serenity of his old age was a victory over 
anguish.307 
 
As concerns the menacing scenes and imposing things around him, I have already noted, first, that 
sometimes the only thing a person – a self – can do is try to regulate his or her own liminal attitude 
to the surroundings, and, second, that poetry might offer one way to do this; for in Heaney’s words 
we have seen that poetry might simultaneously be “true to the impact of external reality” and 
“sensitive to the inner laws of a poet’s being”.308 
                                                 
305 Ibid. 
306 Roger Asselineau, The Evolution of Walt Whitman, 1. Appropriately, Whitman described himself (in an 1855 self-
review of Leaves of Grass) as someone whose voice brought “hope and prophecy to the generous races of young 
and old”. The poet meant for his work to teach that “Happiness is no dream, and perfection is no dream. 
Amelioration is my lesson, he says with calm voice, and progress is my lesson and the lesson of all things.” 
www.whitmanarchive.org/. 
307 Roger Asselineau, The Evolution of Walt Whitman, 1. I shall return in chapter 4 to the theme of “the presence of evil 
within him”. 
308 In an essay (“Beauty, a Hint of Happiness”), Santayana once defined “the sense of beauty” as arising from “the 
harmony between our nature and our experience”: “When our senses and imagination find what they crave, when 
the world so shapes itself and so moulds the mind that the correspondence between them is perfect, then perception 
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 Why poetry enables (and, to some, extends) this potential is, I suspect, as difficult to 
clear up as the related question, How does psychoanalysis make some (but not all) people better? I 
have sketched and presented part of a possible explanation in the context of Karen Blixen’s insight 
that “Any sorrow can be borne if it can be made into a story, or if a story can be told about it”, but 
let me add to those words the following, which hints at what is going on when we express ourselves 
and exercise our capacity for “self-awareness and self-representation”, particularly in a story 
(poetry can have a narrative structure too). Suppose we told ourselves a few stories about who we 
are, where we would like to be, and how we are going to get there. It now happens that as a 
consequence of our narrativization exercise the 
 
stories regulate our emotions, by determining the significance of all the things we 
encounter and all the events we experience. We regard things that get us on our way 
as positive, things that impede our progress as negative, and things that do neither as 
irrelevant. . . . 
. . . 
Our initial attention [to those things that occur contrary to our predictions and in spite 
of our desires] constitutes the first step in the process by which we come to adjust our 
behavior and our interpretive schemas to the world of experience . . .309 
If only for the potential benefit of having “things we encounter” cast reliably into relief, Peterson 
here present a pretty strong argument for story-telling (which, as I am suggesting, is compatible 
with poetry’s domain) as a form of therapy, the operating principle of which would then presumably 
be that our stories may serve as lenses through which an instructive view of life may be glimpsed 
(cf. Bernet’s words in footnote 48). This corresponds to what Peterson has said elsewhere. Beyond 
offering a few useful phrases, the block quotation above is valuable and central to my overall thesis 
because: 
                                                 
is pleasure, and existence needs no apology. . . . Beauty is a pledge of the possible conformity between the soul and 
nature, and consequently a ground of faith in the prevalence of the good.” From George Santayana, “Beauty, a Hint 
of Happiness”, in Logan Pearsall Smith and George Santayana, Little Essay Drawn from the Writings of George 
Santayana, 286. Anticipating (or at least predating) the essential principle of such formulations, Whitman wrote in 
1855 that not only should the poet comprehend beauty and dignity, he should “indicate the path between reality and 
[folks’] souls.” There appears to be some affinity between Santayana and Whitman. In any event, the former’s view 
that “Beauty is a pledge of the possible conformity between the soul and nature, and consequently a ground of faith 
in the supremacy of the good” finds several corresponding utterances in Whitman. Here is one: “I match my spirit 
against yours, you orbs, growths, mountains, brutes, / Copious as you are, I absorb you all in myself, and become 
the master Myself.” The theme of “matching” outward reality and inner fortitude and “amplitude” – a kind of 
“rapprochement” – is pronounced in Whitman. See Whitman’s “A Song of the Rolling Earth”, section 3. 
309 Jordan Peterson, Maps of Meaning, 20. Italics original and not added. Cf. again, Cathy Caruth, Unclaimed 
Experience: Trauma, Narrative, and History, 3 (cited in chapter 1). 
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• it suggests that stories (or, broadly speaking, written representations of our 
lives) – through the regulation of our “emotions” – profoundly inform our 
well-being, 
• it hints at the kind of order our words might help create (principally our story, 
but poetry might serve the same function), 
• it asserts that the change may have to take place in us (which I have arguing 
and which I have already begun to claim pertained to Whitman), 
• and it asserts that the change will be gradual and proceed by “steps”.310 
Now back to Whitman, the notion of a mask and the inauguration of a certain way of being. 
Speaking in the first person in the essay “A Backward Glance O’er Travel’d Roads”, Whitman 
aimed to  
articulate and faithfully express in literary or poetic form, and uncompromisingly, my 
own physical, emotional, moral, intellectual, and æsthetic Personality . . . in a far more 
candid and comprehensive sense than any hitherto poem or book.311 
The quote does not make it sufficiently clear that the “Personality” in question was not fully 
formed, that it “had yet to arrive” (to overtly allude to a poem I shall indicate shortly). Harold 
Bloom, Michael Sowder and others remind us that rather than “faithfully express” what was already 
a fully-fledged “Personality”, Whitman’s verse and incessant editorial revisions reflected a kind of 
continual becoming and was more accurately seen as the inauguration and adjustment of a symbolic 
self. In Harold Bloom’s blunt words, Leaves of Grass was the “invention of [a] mask”, i.e. a recipe 
for new and (until actually inaugurated) merely potential modes of being, centrally featuring a 
poetically constellated symbolic self defined by its genius for expressing the exact attitudes and 
psychoemotional nature that would ensure survival and enable satisfaction under such grim 
conditions as confronted “the real Whitman”. Mark van Doren has said that between 1848 and 1855 
Whitman “changed into a person who understood how to talk as if he were Adam reborn.”312 
 Indeed, so mesmerizing and affective appears the genius for living of this symbolic 
                                                 
310 The first of these bullet points seems borne out by the considerable evidence that stories are linked to psychophysical 
responses. Here is Somerset Maugham to that effect: “It would be difficult to persuade an author that there was not a 
close interaction between the body and the mind. . . . Most writers have chills and fevers, aches and pains, nausea at 
times, when they are engaged in composition; and contrariwise they are aware to what morbid states of their body 
they owe many of their happiest inventions.” From Somerset Maugham, The Summing Up, 172–173. The long 
history of the word catharsis, which Aristotle uses it in his Poetics, is a reminder that a psychophysical regulation 
has long been associated with storytelling. 
311 From “A Backward Glance O’er Travel’d Roads”. 
312 See Michael Sowder, Whitman’s Ecstatic Union: Conversion and Ideology in Leaves of Grass, 57–59. See also 
Introduction to The Portable Walt Whitman, ed. by Mark van Doren, xiv. 
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self that Henry Miller, in his essay on Whitman, regarded its creation as “truly an awakening and 
not a mere development of creative talent” (note that Henry Miller heeds Whitman’s request not to 
be viewed in terms of a literary performance). I have already mentioned that Whitman’s symbolic 
self was frequently assumed by his “disciples” to be an accurate portrait of the poet, and I think 
Henry Miller is tempted to assume as much when he writes: “Between the early Whitman and the 
“awakened” Whitman there is no resemblance whatever. . . . Whitman remade himself from head to 
foot.”313 More to the point, Miller affirms my argument that the symbolic Whitmanean self enabled 
Whitman to, as Miller puts it, “march[] on, calm, steady, sure of himself, certain of ultimate 
victory”.314 This claim is amply corroborated by the work of several Whitman specialists (although 
it is of course not true that Whitman was permanently “sure of himself”; there is evidence of his 
personal doubts in several letters). 
 It is of course finally impossible exactly to measure the extent to which the historical 
“real” Whitman – the poet and citizen – was transformed by vocally creating a symbolic self, but as 
I have said we can only conclude that he benefited considerably from it.315 This was the view of 
Horace Traubel – his companion and amanuensis – as well as the majority of later biographers; his 
biographer Justin Kaplan, for instance, calls his works a “gospel of the self redeemed through art”, 
and the later biographer David S. Reynolds locates “a recipe for healing” in Whitman’s poetry. 
(Acting as his own critic, Whitman himself wrote in one of his highly interesting and anonymous 
“self-reviews” from 1855 that Leaves of Grass contained a “voice bringing hope”.)316 
                                                 
313 The Miller quotes are from his essay “Walt Whitman”. See Jim Perlman, Ed Folsom and Dan Campion, eds., Walt 
Whitman: The Measure of His Song, 206. 
 Asked to reflect on the psychological significance of the central miracle in the story of Christ’s 
resurrection, Jordan Peterson has reflected that there are profound implications in “the idea that continual death and 
rebirth is a necessary precondition to proper human adaptation. Every time you learn something new: that is 
important. Part of the “stupid old you” has to die, and sometimes it can be an awful lot of you. In fact, it can be so 
much of you sometimes that you just die; you just can’t handle it. So there is a real idea [in the proposition] that you 
have to identify with the part of yourself that transcends your current personality [and] can constantly die and be 
reborn.” Jordan Peterson, from the lecture “Biblical Series III: God and the Hierarchy of Authority” [2:15:45].  
314 From Henry Miller’s essay “Walt Whitman”. See Jim Perlman, Ed Folsom and Dan Campion, eds., Walt Whitman: 
The Measure of His Song, 206. 
315 The Whitman biographer David S. Reynolds has stated, as I have already mentioned, that “We may never know the 
complex relationship between the ‘I’ of his poetry . . . and the private Whitman.” Cf. David S. Reynolds, Walt 
Whitman’s America: A Cultural Biography, 199. Whitman always insisted that Leaves of Grass had been “the 
comfort of [his] life”. 
316 Reynolds speaks of Whitman’s poetry as “a recipe for healing” in his afterword to Walt Whitman, Leaves of Grass, 
ed. by David S. Reynolds, 86. Kaplan’s words are from this interview with Rob Couteau: Justin Kaplan and Rob 
Couteau, “ ‘The Mystery of the Man’: Justin Kaplan Talks About America’s Greatest Poet”. The 1855 “self-review” 
in question (famous for the opening last “An American bard at last!”) is available in Walt Whitman, Selected Poems 
1855–1892, 114. 
143 
 
xii. Giving Voice to What One Has on One’s Mind 
Alan Watts was cited earlier for stating that the self is in no true sense to be located like a 
conceptually coherent thing hiding “behind the mask of [a person’s] apparently separate, 
independent, and isolated ego”. I suspect the word “mask” carries negative connotations to many, 
but there is an important, etymologically rooted sense in which it is synonymous with “person” and 
in which “person” by the same token is approximately synonymous with “giving voice to what one 
has on one’s mind” – and these points neatly sum up what I have been arguing in this chapter. So let 
me close this chapter with a few remarks on these issues. Here is Watts unpacking the etymological 
point: 
When you say, “I am a person,” the word person is from the [artform of] drama. When 
you open a play script and see the list of the actors, this is the dramatis personae, the 
persons of the drama. The word person in Latin is persona, meaning “through sound,” 
or something through which sound comes; the persona in Greek or Roman drama was 
the mask worn by the actors. And because they acted on an open-air stage, the mask’s 
mouth was shaped like a small megaphone that would project the sound. So the person 
is the mask. Isn’t it funny how we have forgotten that? Harry Emerson Fosdick could 
write a book called On Being a Real Person, which translated literally is, “How to be 
a genuine fake,” because in the old sense the person is the role, the part played by the 
actor. But if you forget that you are the actor, and think you are the person, you have 
been taken in by your own role. 
A leitmotif of Leaves of Grass is a kind of rapprochement, which is the result of the poet’s 
juxtaposition of reality’s forbidding and terrifying aspects (death, sickness, injury, loneliness, scorn, 
denouncement, armed conflict) and the verbally constellated, “magnificent and haughty” attitude of 
the individual confronting these things. The attitudes are those of “an individual who creates a self 
in the context of the fullest possible understanding of the external world”, as Scholnick puts it.317 
Leaves of Grass, then, frequently juxtaposes variations of scenes where a (frequently triumphant) 
self is faced with (frequently terrible) reality: 
I match my spirit against yours, you orbs, growths, mountains, brutes, 
Copious as you are, I absorb you all in myself, and become the master myself.318 
                                                 
317 Emphasis mine. From the entry “Science” by Robert J. Scholnick in J. R. LeMaster and Donald D. Kummings, eds., 
The Routledge Encyclopedia of Walt Whitman, 239. “[M]agnificent and haughty” is from the same entry. The quote 
starting “When you say . . .” is from Alan Watts, Eastern Wisdom, Modern Life: Collected Talks: 1960–1969, 57. 
318 These lines are from “By Blue Ontario’s Shore” (emphasis mine). 
   As I side-note, let me ask: Does this kind of scenario tap into essential “beauty”? George Santayana 
seems to think so: see the quote from “Beauty, a Hint of Happiness” in footnote 308 and the commonality with 
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In light of Watts’ words of the paradoxical, inherently thespian element of “being a real person”, it 
ought to not upset even the most puritanical adherents of personal “authenticity” that Whitman in a 
manner of speaking has adopted a mask in order to give voice to his “magnificent and haughty” 
alter ego. Purists need to realize that “the authentic self” is too grand a phrase, that it falls apart 
under scrutiny, that capital A “Authenticity” is hence nowhere to be found, that in a manner of 
speaking Watts is right that “the person is the mask” and that by that token Whitman has in a certain 
sense become – and is – what he pretended to be (to borrow Vonnegut’s words). 
 This may sound strange, but is not really, as Octavio Paz shows us. He introduces his 
chapter on Whitman with these words: 
Walt Whitman is the only great modern poet who does not seem to experience 
inconformity vis-à-vis his world. Or even loneliness; his monologue is a vast chorus. 
Doubtless there are, at least, two persons in him: the public poet and the private 
person, who conceals his real erotic inclinations. But his mask—the poet of 
democracy—is something more than a mask: it is his true face. Despite certain recent 
interpretations, the poetic dream and the historic one coincide in him completely. 
There is no break between his beliefs and the social reality.319 
If we let Paz guide us to the assumption that Whitman’s mask (the symbolic self he carefully 
contrived and continually honed and adjusted over the latter half of his life as a defense against his 
“anxieties and doubts and [the] presence of evil within him and around him”) legitimately was his 
true face, his “willed optimis[tic]” face, (as opposed to something we really ought to dismiss as 
inauthentic), then it becomes easier to make sense of Whitman’s words from “So Long!” 
This is no book, 
Who touches this, touches a man . . . 
Leaves of Grass was the book in which via art he rendered his symbolic self “imperturbe”, i.e. 
exemplifying and partaking of an existential attitude that made it “balanced for contingencies” (note 
                                                 
Whitman’s 1855 Preface to Leaves of Grass. Note too that D. H. Lawrence corroborates Whitman’s words (about 
the poet being a master of the path between reality and the soul) by writing: “The business of art is to reveal the 
relation between man and his circumambient universe, at the living moment. As mankind is always struggling in the 
toils of old relationships, art is always ahead of the “times,” which themselves are always far in the rear of the living 
moment. . . . A new relation, a new relatedness hurts somewhat in the attaining; and will always hurt. So life will 
always hurt.” D. H. Lawrence, “Morality and the Novel”, 402–403. 
319 Octavio Paz, The Bow and the Lyre: The Poem, The Poetic Revelation, Poetry and History, 271. 
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that Harrower above also uses the metaphor of balance; see epigraphical perspective 6). Leaves of 
Grass was the work in which he directly confronted and addressed 
. . . poverties, wincings, and sulky retreats, 
. . . foes that in conflict have overcome me, 
. . . 
. . . degradations, . . . tussle[s] with passions and appetites, 
. . . smarts from dissatisfied friendships . . .,  
. . . toil of painful and choked articulations [etc.],320 
and told these “hells” (as Horace Traubel might say)321 
Ah think not you finally triumph, my real self has yet to come forth, 
It shall yet march forth o’ermastering, till all lies beneath me, 
It shall yet stand up the soldier of ultimate victory.322 
Here is an example of the poet revealing that he was consciously in the process of self-realization 
(awaiting his “real self”). He shows himself to be at once curing and constructing his self (to allude 
to the title of Judith Harris’s book). With Donnelly I believe that while investigating, exploring, 
yearning for a precisely “potential psychology” Whitman in the moment of writing in fact 
“reflect[s] a great deal on [his] own [current] psychology”, which obviously evolves – yet perhaps 
not quite as fast as his poetry would invite it to. When Anne Gilchrist, the author of “An 
Englishwoman’s estimate of Walt Whitman”, was powerfully taken in (indeed hopelessly seduced 
and romantically attracted) by Whitman’s mesmerizing and affective lines of self-realization-stroke-
self-repair, Whitman had to bust the myth and spell out the categorical difference between self-
portrait and self-projection: 
Dear friend, [he wrote to her,] let me warn you somewhat about myself—& yourself also. 
You must not construct such an unauthorized & imaginary ideal Figure, & call it W. W. and 
so devotedly invest your loving nature in it. The actual W. W. is a very plain personage, & 
entirely unworthy such devotion. 
Crucially, the Leaves of Grass “Figure” that Gilchrist told Whitman that she had fallen in love with, 
really was “ideal” – a godlike being – so on that point Gilchrist was far from imaging things (as 
Whitman would later admit). What she saw – and took the risk of directly telling her beloved that 
                                                 
320 From “Ah Poverties Wincings, and Sulky Retreats”. 
321 Cf. the words, spoken by Horace Traubel at the centenary of Whitman’s birth in 1919 (footnote 50 and 557). 
322 Emphasis mine. From “Ah Poverties, Wincings and Sulky Retreats”. 
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she saw – was plainly there to see, only it was not to be taken literally for it was no self-portrait. In 
his meditation on those events several years later, Whitman said, “She was not a blind dreamer—a 
chaser of fancies: she was concrete—spiritually concrete.” (My emphasis; these words were 
recorded by Traubel and featured in Intimate with Walt under the heading “Oxygenated Men and 
Women: Walt’s Pantheon”.) 
xiii. Towards Psychic Healing 
The self that emerges from Leaves of Grass is “ideal”, to be sure – or sublime. I have presented 
Harold Bloom’s conception of the “American Sublime” (of which Harold Bloom considers 
Whitman an exemplar) as that which “transcend[s] the human without forsaking humanism”. But I 
would argue – uncontroversially I hope – that nothing in the world (no problem or sorrow, or 
anxiety or loneliness) is transcended via a sublime text unless the individual “is basically willing” to 
cooperate; writes Alan Watts (immediately followed by Aldous Huxley): 
We do not need a new religion or a new bible. We need a new experience – a new 
feeling of what it is to be “I.” The lowdown (which is of course the secret and 
profound view) on life is that our normal sensation of self is a hoax, or, at best, a 
temporary role that we are playing, or have been conned into playing – with our own 
tacit consent, just as every hypnotized person is basically willing to be hypnotized.323 
The universal and ever-present urge to self-transcendence is not to be abolished by 
slamming the currently popular Doors in the Wall. The only reasonable policy it to 
open other, better doors . . . [some of which] will be social and technological in nature, 
others religious or psychological . . .324 
The reason I cite this is that I believe that for a work of self-transcending or sublime potential to 
help in a psychological fashion the suffering person must in some way mentally allow, permit or 
will that his or her world-view and attitudes undergo change or enhancement of some sort. 
Shoshana Felman has noted that “the capacity to witness and the act of bearing witness in 
themselves embody some remedial quality and belong . . ., in obscure ways, to the healing 
process.”325 (See also the Jung quote in footnote 60.) Interestingly, this amounts to a faith in the 
                                                 
323 Alan Watts, The Book: On the Taboo Against Knowing Who You Are, 12. The quotation above (“Dear friend”) is cited 
in Marion Walker Alcaro, Walt Whitman’s Mrs. G: A Biography of Anne Gilchrist, 145.  
324 Aldous Huxley, The Doors of Perception, 64. As for “religious”, cf. Whitman’s words on the “religious and moral 
character” (footnote 44). 
325 Felman is cited in Cathy Caruth, ed. Trauma: Explorations in Memory, 16. 
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work, more specifically a faith in what psychological conversion or healing the work could 
potentially facilitate. Michael Frayn, who has briefly been mentioned above, offers a useful 
description of the kind of faith I intend, the kind of faith on which self-transcendence must, I think, 
be predicated. I think it can be argued that Leaves of Grass amounts to a declaration of faith on the 
poet’s part, which is a claim compatible with Harold Bloom’s observation that “American literary 
selfhood” as represented by Whitman exemplifies “the American Religion”.326 I shall return to this 
– and the function of prayer – in chapter 3 where I argue that Whitman is continually at work 
constructing (or expressing his dependence on) a “sublime” poetic program capable of supporting 
him by suggesting with which attitudes he might be equal to his suffering and survive in a 
frequently hostile world. 
Citing Arthur Krystal, I have said above that literature at once “makes life more manageable” and is 
“the self-conscious repository of consciousness” (footnote 286). These remarks should be kept 
carefully in mind in the context of the following two observations: 
“Writers write for themselves and not for their readers, and that art has nothing to do with 
communication between person and person, only with communication between different 
parts of a person’s mind.”327 
—Rebecca West 
 
“Self is not an idea—it is simply the perception of intercommunications of internal 
experience, which accompanies that experience itself.”328 
—Wilhelm Wundt) 
(I have underlined the emergent “resonances” between West and Wundt.) Taking West and Wundt at 
their word for the moment, if “art [amounts to] communication between different parts of a person’s 
mind” and “self [amounts to] the perception of intercommunications of internal experience”, then 
the two insights seem to be, if not synonymous, certainly conceptually and thematically related. 
They seem teleologically geared toward the same end, namely that of preserving (or serving as 
repository, in Krystal’s word, for) something like self, or consciousness, or self-consciousness. 
                                                 
326 Indeed, as I have mentioned, Asselineau found that it was Whitman’s “faith and enthusiasm [which] always brought 
him through.” See footnote 307. 
327 Quoted in Lisa M. Schwerdt, Isherwood’s Fiction: The Self and Technique, 110. 
328 Quoted in Edward Carpenter, The Art of Creation: Essays on the Self and Its Powers, 70. 
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xiv. Writing and Healing the Self  
In order to be able to appropriately close this chapter, I would like to approach the above sentiment 
(derived from West, Wundt and Krystal) via a different route: The philosophical reasons are 
admittedly complicated, so I shall select and emphasize only the necessary ones in this summing-
up. 
 In part because we are animated beings whose existential meaning, import and precise 
manifestation in the world as well as in our own eyes is in the constant process of being determined 
and “recalculated” as the scenes and trials around us shift (and have us struggling to keep up and act 
accordingly), it is impossible to arrive at something like a final, fixed and definitive statement about 
who and what we truly are at the level of the self. There are several possible levels of analysis, each 
of which has validity, but ultimately our being is too strange a phenomenon – and too difficult to 
explain – for us to get an adequate intellectual handle on being once and for all. In the attempt to 
triangulate the phenomenon a combination of narrative and phenomenological description seems 
the most sensible way forward. Such approaches appear to get the balance more or less right 
between the need for intellectual humility (given the philosophical difficulty of the problem) and 
the need for an answer (given humans’ innate desire to comprehend their situation). (No doubt the 
Biblical stories, which I have touched on here and there, owe their longevity as cultural artefacts in 
part to the fact that stories engage the human psyche in ways disembodied facts cannot.) When 
Judith Harris shrewdly uses the word “renovation” (see Signifying Pain, xi) for the kind of 
maintenance work without which the human self would fossilize or decay, she thereby, sensibly and 
indirectly, inaugurates a kind of image of what a human self is like. (She also invites us to move 
from her term – “renovation” – to the inference (correct in my opinion) that our own hand is 
needed; for we can neither renovate nor partake of the in principle open-ended construction, 
reconstruction, healing and redemption of our selves if we do not take deliberate action and exercise 
the kind of free agency whose conceptualization I have found so well expressed by Viktor Frankl; 
see the end of chapter 1.) 
 Harris’s metaphors associated with care, repair, renovation etc. bring to mind a 
philosophical thought experiment – familiar to philosophers of identity – known as the Ship of 
Theseus or Neurath’s Boat. In order to present it here, I will have to stress that, as with our selves, 
we are both the ship and the crew (both “body and soul”). Our condition is very similar to Neurath’s 
sailors about whom Otto Neurath says: 
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[On] the open sea [they] must reconstruct their ship but are never able to start afresh 
from the bottom. Where a beam is taken away a new one must at once be put there, 
and for this the rest of the ship is used as support. In this way, by using the old beams 
and driftwood the ship can be shaped entirely anew, but only by gradual 
reconstruction.329 
 
In the thought experiment’s sister incarnation – when it is presented as the “Ship of Theseus” – the 
emphasis is put on the thought-provoking fact that it is not clear whether the ship is the very same 
one once sails, spars, rigging and planks have all been tossed overboard and replaced with 
substitutive material. (About preservation of human identity across time, George Orwell said in the 
essay “England, Your England”: “What have you in common with the child of five whose 
photograph your mother keeps on the mantelpiece? Nothing, except that you happen to be the same 
person.”) Again, in my appropriation of these naval images and metaphors, which is done merely 
for purposes of illustration and is not to be taken as a stab at formal philosophy, we are at once 
Theseus and his ship: Our self needs renovating, and something in us – I have introduced the 
Jungian concept of a “double”, or “Daimon” (in Bloom, “Daemon”) – is capable, if we are 
fortunate, of carrying out the required self-renovation.  
 The metaphor is fairly common across thinkers of self, life, world and meaning. 
Nietzsche engaged the image as laid out by Schopenhauer (in The World as Will and Idea) who had 
observed, appropriately enough, that a boat 
 
provides stability, solace, and a way of rescuing the self from its surrounding tumult. 
In others words, the creation of an object – which is to say, the creation of some thing 
with limits – is the common denominator that unites the objectification of the self (the 
principium individuationis) with the objective world, a world of objects that are 
always (as Protagoras had already argued) true.330 
 
Much could be said about this sentence but beyond its immediately obvious relevance to my 
thoughts on constructing and continually renovating the self, I will only mention that it very 
significantly indicates that a well-functioning self unites us well with the world of objects, and that 
the “rapprochement” is achieved through a creative effort (“the creation of some thing”).331 So, too, 
for the life of selves: Indeed, I consider this the highest, or most central and significant, of the self’s 
potentials and functions. It appears that the theme was intriguing to Nietzsche, who having just read 
                                                 
329 From M. Neurath and Robert S. Cohen, ed., Empiricism and Sociology,199. 
330 Cited in Paul Gordon, Tragedy After Nietzsche: Rapturous Superabundance, 63. 
331 Recall Seamus Heaney’s “scullery bucket” metaphor in footnote 196. 
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Schopenhauer’s The World as Will and Idea wrote: 
 
one might say of Apollo what Schopenhauer says, in the first part of The World as Will 
and Idea, of man caught in the veil of Maya: “Even as on an immense, raging sea, 
assailed by huge wave crests, a man sits in a little rowboat trusting his frail craft, so, 
amidst the furious torments of this, the individual sits tranquilly, supported by the 
principium individuationis and relying on it.”332 
 
Nietzsche goes on to posit that “the shattering of the principium individuationis” is generally 
accompanied by a “a glorious transport . . . aris[ing] in man, even from the very depths of nature”, 
which takes him into considerations of “Dionysian rapture” (where I shall not pursue him). Let me 
return instead to the concept of bringing the self into a condition from which it can bear the trials of 
its immersion in the world of objects. 
 
xv. Rapprochement – World and Self 
 
Henry Miller frequently said that he did not intend to change the world but was rather interested in 
changing himself.333 He admired, as I have mentioned, E. Graham Howe’s War Dance: A Study of 
the Psychology of War for this passage: 
 
Certainly it is true that our attitude towards this ‘real’ external world is determined by our 
attitude towards these forces which exist within ourselves. It is as if in that outer world we 
are seeing ourselves as within a mirror. It is not so objective as it seems: it is as if we change 
the map of life itself by changing our attitudes to it.334 
Goethe is another writer who became aware that if we are to survive on the storm-tossed ocean of 
life then we need a self – a soul, a psychic constitution – that can sustain repeated collisions with 
                                                 
332 Cited in Paul Gordon, Tragedy After Nietzsche: Rapturous Superabundance, 63. 
333 See the quote – referenced in footnote 159 – from Henry Miller, Henry Miller on Writing, 141. Elsewhere Miller 
wrote “The world has not to be put in order: the world is order incarnate. the world is order incarnate. It is for us to 
put ourselves in unison with this order, to know what is the world order in contradistinction to the wishful-thinking 
orders which we seek to impose on one another.” From Henry Miller, The Books in My Life, 363. (Cf. Carl Rogers’s 
words, cited earlier, “[when] we thoroughly accept what we are[, then] change seems to come about almost 
unnoticed.”) Similar to something Proust wrote (see footnote 374), Miller also wrote “One’s destination is never a 
place but rather a new way of looking at things.” From Henry Miller, Big Sur and the Oranges of Hieronymus 
Bosch, 25. 
334 E. Graham Howe, War Dance, 190–191. 
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what Freud called “hostile life”. A “nature” that had mastered that challenge was, in Goethe’s 
terminology, of an “Antique” variety, aside from which quality it was to be understood as 
an unfragmented nature which operates as a whole, knows itself one with the world 
and therefore does not experience the objective external world as something alien, 
which comes to meet the inner world of man, but recognises in it the answering 
counterparts to his own sensations.335 
When previously I stated that human beings are on the whole badly served by not being told – or 
keeping from themselves – the fundamental truth or truths about human existence, I was alluding to 
what Goethe is expressing here: we cannot be well-adapted to reality if reality is inadequately or 
misleadingly represented to us; we grow strong in proportion as we know the truth. Regardless of 
what Santayana actually meant by the word “beauty” in the following, he too was a thinker 
concerned with the possibility for uniting the human self and the real world in a bearable manner: 
“Beauty is a pledge of the possible conformity between the soul and nature, and consequently a 
ground of faith in the supremacy of the good.” As to how that might be done, Santayana offers a 
view on “masks”, which, incidentally, Erving Goffman found very instructive. The quote recalls 
remarks surrounding that metaphor presented earlier in this dissertation. Observe that in our 
common understanding of the word, a mask denotes a consistent, carefully-achieved “pre-emptive” 
attitude of the face inserted in the liminal space between the self and the world. In Santayana’s 
words: 
Masks are arrested expressions and admirable echoes of feeling, at once faithful, 
discreet, and superlative. Living things in contact with the air must acquire a cuticle, 
and it is not urged against cuticles that they are not hearts; yet some philosophers seem 
to be angry with images for not being things, and with words for not being feelings. 
Words and images are like shells, no less integral parts of nature than the substances 
they cover but better addressed to the eye and more open to observation. I would not 
say that substance exists for the sake of appearance, or faces for the sake of masks, or 
the passions for the sake of poetry and virtue. Nothing arises in nature for the sake of 
anything else; all these phases and products are involved equally in the round of 
existence . . .336 
Mask, as the reader will begin to see, is thus my metaphor for the inner constitution, a template for 
wholesome attitudes of the self without which being in the world would be immeasurably harder. 
Masks are crafted, yet they signify to those confronting them a specific psychoemotional 
                                                 
335 Goethe is cited in Wilhelm Worringer, Abstraction and Empathy: A Contribution to the Psychology of Style, 138n14. 
For “answering counterpart”, cf. Bloom’s phrase “answering greatness” in footnote 169. 
336 George Santayana, cited and featured as an epigraph in Erving Goffman, The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life. 
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disposition. Poems, too, are crafted – and in the process of crafting them we might manage to slip 
into doing some psychotherapeutic work of the sort that leaves us better and stronger, the sort that 
has a psychologically ameliorative effect. Harold Bloom, as I have said, introduces the intriguing 
concept of “the influence of a mind upon itself” (it is a recurring phrase in The Daemon Knows). 
 To grossly oversimplify what I am suggesting (and have been suggesting for several 
pages): Due to the continually restless, everchanging nature of the human psyche, it is a possibility 
to move in two directions under one’s own psychic lights. One can either follow imagination in the 
pathological direction toward “insanity . . . and regression” (as Peterson puts it in epigraphic 
perspective 22), or one can aspire with Shelley (see epigraphic perspective 20) to have 
[Imagination act] upon [Reason’s] thoughts so as to colour them with its own light, 
and composing from them as from elements, other thoughts, each containing within 
itself the principle of its own integrity. 
Thus the poet and the reader may both learn “that there is no singing school for his soul except the 
study of the monuments of its own magnificence” (see epigraphic statement 23). Word for word, 
poem for poem, the chaos that would engulf him can be beaten back with – and interspersed by – 
the effort and will to countervail “death [and] entropy” (in Gardner’s phrase), which is a will I have 
characterized as something functionally similar to the divine Logos. Roger Scruton said: 
By speaking in the first person we can make statements about ourselves, answer 
questions, and engage in reasoning and advice in ways that bypass all the normal 
methods of discovery. [We can arrive at] the assurance that, when you and I both 
speak sincerely, what we say is trustworthy[.] . . . [W]e inhabit a life-world that is not 
reducible to the world of nature, any more than the life in a painting is reducible to the 
lines and pigments from which it is composed”.337 
Whitman never doubted that decided “will” to countervail the adverse constitutive elements of our 
environment is critical to the success of the intervention – we must proceed from a first initiative 
arising in decided volition: 
The greatest poet forms the consistence of what is to be from what has been and is. . . . 
He learns the lesson . . . . he places himself where the future becomes present. 
Hypothetically speaking, when the self has learned to tell the two directions apart and begun to 
express loyal dedication to the right one, the self will be on the road to the situation so eloquently 
sketched by Goethe: an integrated (or “whole”) self which no longer finds the objective external 
world alien but “recognises in it the answering counterparts to his own sensations” (see footnote 
                                                 
337 From Roger Scruton, “If We Are Not Just Animals, What Are We?”, in The Stone, March 6, 2017. 
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353). That psychic condition or state – from which living must feel very much like gently streaming 
with and gliding through the contours of the surface of being and “agreeing” in the deepest sense 
with reality338 – was on Jung’s mind as well: 
“All that is outside, also is inside,” we could say with Goethe. But this “inside,” which 
modern rationalism is so eager to derive from “outside,” has an a priori structure of its 
own that antedates all conscious experience. It is quite impossible to conceive how 
“experience” in the widest sense, or, for that matter, anything psychic, could originate 
exclusively in the outside world. The psyche is part of the inmost mystery of life, and 
it has its own peculiar structure and its elements, the archetypes, ever “originated” at 
all it a metaphysical question and therefore unanswerable. The structure is something 
given, the precondition that is found to be present in every case. And this is the 
mother, the matrix—the form into which all experience is poured.339 
Whether Jung read Emerson or not I do not know, but I have found a passage to the same effect 
(even down to the metaphor of “pouring”) in Emerson’s essay “The Transcendentalist”, which also 
deals with the issue of being a self immersed in the world of phenomena: 
All that you call the world is the shadow of that substance which you are, the 
perpetual creation of the powers of thought, of those that are dependent and of those 
that are independent of your will. Do not cumber yourself with fruitless pains to mend 
and remedy remote effects; let the soul be erect, and all things will go well. You think 
me the child of my circumstances: I make my circumstance. Let any thought or motive 
of mine be different from that they are, the difference will transform my condition and 
economy. I—this thought which is called I,—is the mould into which the world is 
poured like melted wax. The mould is invisible, but the world betrays the shape of the 
mould. You call it the power of circumstance, but it is the power of me. Am I in 
harmony with myself? [then] my position will seem to you just and commanding. Am 
I vicious and insane? [then] my fortunes will seem to you obscure and descending.340 
This is naturally an exciting prospect and one that seems to touch on the vocation of mystics, 
ascetics and hermits. Indirectly, it harks back the Frame Problem as well, yet introduces the fact 
(addressed by Kant) that in examining the external world I am necessarily barred from extracting 
the real suchness of its elements. How they appear to me is a partial consequence of my own 
“suchness”, if you will. I said – several pages back – that I would consider the human self a 
“sublime” phenomenon, and I have granted that there are religious overtones to the word “sublime”; 
                                                 
338 Trying to resolve the problem “what is a saint?”, Leonard Cohen in one of his novels describes such a state as well as 
anybody else, in my opinion. I return to his words on an attitude which can be considered “saintly” in chapter 3 
(footnote 382). 
339 Carl Jung, “Psychological Aspects of the Mother Archetype”, in The Archetypes of the Collective Unconscious, 
paragraph 187. 
340 Ralph Waldo Emerson, “The Transcendentalist”, in Lawrence Buell, The American Transcendentalists: Essential 
Writings, 110. 
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hopefully these remarks on the simultaneous participation of and attitudinal distancing from the 
“hostile world” are sufficient substantiation for those stances. (The mysteries of consciousness and 
being lend themselves willingly to the ideas of theologians.)341 
xvi. Natural Self-Attitudes 
Like Goethe and others, Whitman knew that living well depended on achieving a condition of self 
in which the objects of the world did not traumatize him into immobility. I am arguing that writing 
can be crucially useful as a methodology in the process of achieving such a thing – whether we 
prefer the word balance, harmony, wholeness or psychic health. Distancing himself from the themes 
of delirium which he associated with Edgar Allen Poe, he once wrote: 
I wanted, and still want for poetry, the clear sun shining, and fresh air blowing—the 
strength and power of health, not of delirium, even amid the stormiest passions—with 
always the background of the eternal moralities.342 
Similarly, in the 1855 Preface he wrote that “to speak in literature with the perfect rectitude and 
insouciance of the movements of animals, and the unimpeachableness of the sentiment of trees in 
the woods and grass by the roadside, is the flawless triumph of art.”343 The goal was to become 
“self-balanced for contingencies”, not the least of which were those of “night, storms, hunger, 
ridicule, accidents, rebuffs”. He longed to be (and thought it possible to become) “enough for 
myself” in the same way “the fishes and birds are . . . enough for themselves”, and to approach the 
realization of that desire he found it, at least in principle, a promising strategy to emulate such 
attitudes as “the trees and animals” manifested. Indeed, he wrote poems celebrating the being 
manifested by plants (“I Saw in Louisiana a Live-oak Growing”, “This Compost!”) and animals 
                                                 
341 Although not a theologian, consider these pertinent words from Peterson: “The notion that it’s necessary to have an 
individual relationship with the Absolute – with God, for example – is a statement of the fact that we are in fact 
adapted to the nature of reality, and if we draw on everything that is within ourselves without fear then we can 
develop the sorts of personalities that are powerful enough to confront the horrible absolute and to consider that 
justifiable and worthwhile.” From Jordan Peterson, “Say No to Happiness: CBS Ideas” [33:10]. 
 Michael Moon, editor of the Norton Critical Edition of Leaves of Grass, writes that Whitman is poet 
through his life displays a “compassionate involvement in the episodes of human fortitude and faith” (my emphasis). 
From  
342 Walt Whitman, Specimen Days and Collect, 157. On the last page (page 200) of the text of Specimen Days, Whitman 
cites Marcus Aurelius on virtue: “[W]hat is it, only a living and enthusiastic sympathy with Nature?” – to which he 
adds, significantly, “Perhaps indeed the efforts of the true poets, founders, religions, literatures, all ages, have been, and 
ever will be, our time and times to come, essentially the same—to bring people back from their persistent strayings and 
sickly abstractions, to the costless average, divine, original concrete.” Those lines hint – albeit subtly – at the death-and-
rebirth archetype I have indicated pervades Whitman’s work. 
343 From “Preface, 1855”, in Walt Whitman, Specimen Days and Collect, 268.  
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(“Song of Myself”, section 32) as if longing to comprehend their secrets and adopt their existential 
methodology: 
I think I could turn and live with animals, they are so placid and self-contain’d, 
I stand and look at them long and long. 
They do not sweat and whine about their condition, 
They do not lie awake in the dark and weep for their sins, 
They do not make me sick discussing their duty to God, 
Not one is dissatisfied, not one is demented with the mania of owning things, 
Not one kneels to another, nor to his kind that lived thousands of years ago, 
Not one is respectable or unhappy over the whole earth. 
 
So they show their relations to me and I accept them, 
They bring me tokens of myself, they evince them plainly in their possession. 
I wonder where they get those tokens, 
Did I pass that way huge times ago and negligently drop them?344 
 
I shall return to this issue in chapter 5 in a discussion of Jacques Lacan’s Mirror Phase. 
 In Whitman’s America, his biographer David S. Reynolds argues that Whitman helped 
calm his private turbulence by regulating his poetic persona, a claim he expands thus elsewhere: 
“Whitman’s poetic persona was constructed as an absorptive device that could imaginatively defuse 
rancorous sectional quarrels, just as in his private life Whitman cultivated a “superb calm character” 
to ameliorate personal upheavals.”345 (For “poetic persona” I prefer “symbolic self”, on behalf of 
whose ability to instruct and support the actual self I am arguing.) In the just quoted verses, a partial 
constitution for a potential self is reflected: the principles of a symbolic self are set down in writing 
as a shield – “cuirass”, “mask”, “pose” – against the kinds of ill that would put the self in existential 
jeopardy (specifically, in this case, sin, the confusing demands of religion, general unhappiness). To 
return to the naval metaphors for a second, Henry Miller wrote that “Whoever has studied 
Whitman’s life must be amazed at the skill with which he steered his bark through troubled waters. 
He never relinquishes his grasp of the oar, never flinches, never wavers, never compromises”; and 
Whitman himself at times of crisis found similarities between his life and 
                                                 
344 From “Song of Myself”. In “A Song of the Rolling Earth”, he wrote: “No politics, song, religion, behavior, or what 
not, is of account, unless it compare with the amplitude of the earth, / Unless it face the exactness, vitality, 
impartiality, rectitude of the earth.” 
345 From David S. Reynolds’s introduction to David S. Reynolds, ed., A Historical Guide to Walt Whitman, 9. 
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some lengthen’d ship-voyage, wherein more than once the last hour had apparently 
arrived, and we seem’d certainly going down—yet reaching port in a sufficient way 
through all discomfitures at last.346 
He did this, Asselineau records, because despite being “tormented, unstable, storm-tossed[,] his 
work allowed him to recover his equilibrium and achieve serenity. His poetry saved him. By its 
means he gradually escaped the dark and stormy chaos where he had been floundering and emerged 
in an orderly, peaceful universe where light overcame dark.”347 
 
xvii. The Poem as Constitutional Blueprint 
On the ways in which “[h]is poetry saved him” and might save others, I have suggested that the 
poetic creation can be conducive (principally via such pursuits as the crafting of a symbolic self) to 
the development of an actual self fully capable of thriving in the world despite the hostility and 
chaos inherent to the latter – and despite the ineradicable possibility of being swallowed by troubled 
waters. Adopting the attitudes of the symbolic self I have likened to the donning of a mask. The not 
unreasonable accusation that that move has a whiff of inauthenticity about it was one that 
Asselineau pondered: 
In order to resemble the mythical personage of the book, the one Whitman wanted to 
be but was not, he was often obliged to distort the facts somewhat. In particular, in his 
first edition, he completely suppressed his past as a journalist and a man of letters and 
passed himself off as an uneducated but inspired carpenter, as a “rough.” Is it then 
necessary to accuse him of duplicity and imposture, to reproach him for his “pose” as 
Esther Shephard has done? This would be to misconceive the complexity of the 
problem. When Whitman made such affirmations, he was perfectly sincere. He really 
identified himself in imagination with the man he wanted to be. To a certain extent he 
became the ideal being of whom he dreamed and thus lived the part he had written for 
himself. He was so firmly persuaded of his own absolute sincerity that he made 
complete frankness one of the criteria for the recognition of great poets: “The great 
poets are . . . to be known by the absence in them of tricks and by the justification of 
perfect personal candor.” 
  There is no justification for speaking of a “pose” in the 
case of Whitman, for that would be to take up again the whole problem of sincerity 
                                                 
346 From Whitman’s “A Backward Glance O’er Travel’d Roads”. For his preference for this metaphor, cf. his words 
from Democratic Vistas: “We sail a dangerous sea of seething currents, cross and under-currents, vortices—all so 
dark, untried, and whither shall we turn?” In old age, Whitman once exclaimed despairingly to Traubel, “I have 
spent a hard day. Oh! I am tempest-tossed—bound to go down—bound to yield, to give up the struggle, at last!” 
Also, see the very last citation in chapter 1. 
347 Roger Asselineau, The Evolution of Walt Whitman, vol. 1, 16. 
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and to affirm with J. P. Sartre that “a man is never anything but an imposture,” or with 
Valéry that “every work of art is a fake.” Let us say, then, quite simply that Whitman 
wanted to create a book and that in so doing he has created himself.348 
The last line above resonates with what I imagine were the feelings of Lazarus Aaronson when he 
wrote these well-known lines of prayer and poetry: 
All that I am is staked on words. 
Bless their meaning, Lord, or I become 
Slave to the heavy, hollow, mindless drum. 
Make me the maker of my words. 
Let me renew myself in my own speech, 
Till I become at last the thing I teach. 
And let a taste be in my words, 
That men may savour what is man in me, 
And know how much I fail, how little see.349 
By way of closing this chapter, I want to take a closer look at Asselineau’s claim that by creating 
Leaves of Grass “Whitman . . . created himself”. 
 A useful way of emblematizing what I have said about the potential for writing to 
instruct and inform the generation of self is available in another – and rather famous – observation 
from Sartre. In Existentialism Is a Humanism, Sartre explores the origins of a human being with the 
invention and production of certain mundane articles (e.g. tools such as pen-knives). In the case of 
the former, the “essence [of any tool] – that is to say the sum of the formulae and the qualities 
which made its production and its definition possible – precedes its existence” because it was 
“made by an artisan who had a conception of it”. Sartre’s atheistic existentialism (which forbids 
him to assume the existence of some “supernal artisan” in the heavens) then leads him to the 
conclusion that “there is at least one being whose existence comes before its essence, a being which 
exists before it can be defined by any conception of it[ and that that] being is man or, as Heidegger 
has it, the human reality.” In keeping with that, “man first of all exists, encounters himself, surges 
up in the world – and defines himself afterwards . . . and then he will be what he makes of himself.” 
(I am not going to enlarge here on the Lockean tabula rasa nor on the role of a biologically 
determined human nature.) Instead I will at this point return to the main issue: I am going to posit 
that the beleaguered self, despite its understandable fear and trembling, nevertheless confronts the 
                                                 
348 Roger Asselineau, The Evolution of Walt Whitman, vol. 1, 15–16. 
349 This poem, entitled “The Stake”, goes on for three more stanzas. Published in The Homeward Journey and Other 
Poems in 1946. 
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redemptive option of using the word to construct something akin to the Sartrean “essence” which 
hypothetically would have preceded human existence had human beings been the handiwork of 
God. Readers of Sartre sometimes call this “something” I am talking about a “blueprint for human 
beings.”350 In case the argumentative maneuver I have just performed seems to err on the eccentric 
side of academic discourse, let me simply present a textual example which I consider to be 
Whitman’s very overt admission that his poems truly were thought of as something like blueprints 
(or maps) for his self – but let me first suggest that the idea is not as new and exotic as it might 
seem. After all, John Milton proposed in Areopagitica that “Books . . . preserve as in a vial the 
purest efficacy and extractions of that living intellect that bred them”, which seems to establish the 
same intimate link between text and self.351 And Whitman, before setting out to write Leaves of 
Grass, gave himself the injunction, scribbled in a notebook and reiterating what I described as his 
admiration for the qualities of the natural world, to 
Outline sketch of a superb calm character, [one whose] emotions &c are complete in 
himself, irrespective of whether his love, friendship, &c are returned, or not[, who] 
grows, blooms, like some perfect tree or flower, in Nature, whether viewed by 
admiring eyes, or in some wild or wood, entirely unknown [and is] analog[ous with] 
the earth, complete in itself, enfolding in itself all processes of growth effusing life & 
power, for hidden purposes.352 
At the very least this is evidence that his continuous construction of self had a strong written 
dimension (a fact of which he was conscious) – and that the writing was Leaves of Grass.353 
                                                 
350 Cf. David R. Law, Briefly: Sartre's Existentialism and Humanism, 6. 
351 Consider my words on the line “Who touches this [book], touches a man” (above footnote 320). Henry Miller 
indicates a similar relation by pointing out – somewhat cryptically – that a writer’s death “often enables us to see . . . 
that his life and work were one.” From Henry Miller, The Books in My Life, 37. 
 However, Daniel Dennett, whose metaphor for the self (“pandemonium”) has already been mentioned 
and should be borne in mind at this point, makes the more formal argument that “We . . . are almost constantly 
engaged in presenting ourselves to others, and to ourselves, and hence representing ourselves, in language and 
gesture, external and internal . . . Our human environment contains not just food and shelter, enemies to fight or flee, 
and conspecifics with whom to mate, but words, words, words. . . . Our fundamental tactic of self-protection, self-
control, and self-definition is . . . telling stories, and more particularly concocting and controlling the story we tell 
others – and ourselves – about who we are. . . . These strings or streams of narrative issue forth as if from a single 
source – not just in the obvious physical sense of flowing from just one mouth, or one pencil or pen, but in a more 
subtle sense: their effect on any audience is to (try to) posit a unified agent whose words they are, about whom they 
are: in short, to posit a center of narrative gravity.” From Daniel Dennett, Consciousness Explained, 13. 
352 Walt Whitman, Notebooks and Unpublished Prose Manuscripts, vol. 2, Washington, 889. In 1876, he felt he had 
done so, as he said in an interview in the New York paper World. See Roger Asselineau, The Evolution of Walt 
Whitman, vol. 1, 8. 
353 I feel confident stating the latter because it has been well documented that Whitman often mused on upcoming 
changes and additions to Leaves of Grass in his notebooks. Michael Moon writes that “During the crisis years of the 
early 1860s, the poet, deeply perturbed but invincibly hopeful, entered into his notebooks just such adjuration to himself 
[as would later evolve into the poem “Ah Poverties, Wincings, and Sulky Retreats”]”. From an editorial note in Walt 
Whitman, Leaves of Grass, ed. by Michael Moon, 401n7. 
 Ezra Greenspan writes: “Privately, . . . he was pouring his personal thoughts, ideas, opinions, ideals, 
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 Now for what I deem to be Whitman’s unmistakable admission that his poems were 
seen by the poet as forming a kind of personal “constitution”, a series of blueprints for his self; 
significantly, his hand-written signature was affixed to the following poem which was granted the 
unique status of serving as title-page epigraph in three late editions of Leaves of Grass: 
Come, said my Soul, 
Such verses for my Body let us write, (for we are one,) 
That should I [the Soul] after death invisibly return, 
Or, long, long hence, in other spheres, 
There to some group of mates the chants resuming, 
(Tallying Earth’s soil, trees, winds, tumultuous waves,) 
Ever with pleas’d smile I may keep on, 
Ever and ever yet the verses owning—as, first, I here and now, 
Signing for Soul and Body, set to them my name, 
Walt Whitman 
 
PART 2 • WALT WHITMAN 
“Let us stand up”: The Redemptive Functions of Whitman’s Symbolic Self 
Chapter 3. “His thoughts are the hymns of the praise of 
things”: Whitman as Eulogist for the Self 
Chapter summary: Starting from the premise that psychic suffering – whether the source 
thereof is a physical, exterior threat to well-being or some essentially psychological crisis 
(e.g. shame or anxiety) – is a contingent existential possibility from which there is no 
attractive immunity, the question is: Where does that leave the individual self? I have 
already begun to argue that words can be used therapeutically in a number of ways, and in 
the remaining parts of the dissertation I turn to Whitman and show how he exemplifies 
                                                 
hopes, and beliefs into homemade notebooks and into marginal comments he wrote onto the many and varied clippings 
he was collecting from his periodical and book readings. In these various notebooks and marginalia, one can see the 
clearest reflection of Whitman’s self-transformation.” From Ezra Greenspan, Walt Whitman and the American Reader, 
73. 
 Roger Asselineau also discusses the role and use of the poet’s notebooks; see his biography The 
Evolution of Walt Whitman, vol. 1, 69, 186 and 188. 
 Consider again the meaning of this line, deep within Leaves of Grass: “My real self has yet to come forth.” 
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some of them, predominantly in his poetry. In chapter 3, I explore a central issue best 
described as the way in which words – poetry – offer the writing self an opportunity to 
constitutionally compose and inaugurate a symbolic self or persona (or poetic “protagonist” 
in Gregory Orr’s nomenclature) that uniquely possesses the wisdom, personal resources, 
courage and perspective that surviving some particular crisis of being are felt to require 
and which the actual self cannot yet – but may with effort potentially learn to – embody. To 
borrow Timothy Donnelly’s words (see footnote 288), I argue that Walt Whitman’s poetry 
can profitably be thought of as his attempt to investigate possible psychologies rather than 
dramatize his own as presently manifested. I argue too that creating and continually 
recreating a symbolic self in lines represent a convenient way of capturing, honing, 
augmenting and studying present and latent psychic possibilities and potentials. According 
to Asselineau, Whitman’s life is a proof that “creat[ing] a book” and “creat[ing one]self” are 
sometimes mutually sympathetic (or symbiotic) projects and endeavors (see footnote 348). 
Perpetuating the dissertation’s interest in the theme of existential well-being and survival, 
the chapter establishes that survival finally hinges on the self’s ability to, in Montaigne’s 
words, “endure what [it] cannot avoid”, and that includes its own company (which will be 
the theme of chapter 4) and the trials and tribulations of the concrete external world (which 
will concern me in this chapter). For that reason, I look exclusively at those aspects of 
Whitman’s symbolic selves which seem to be of relevance in contexts associated with 
being and living, thriving and surviving. It is a central argument in the chapter that an 
existential disposition or attitude pervaded by “saintly” largeness and affection is a strong 
position from which to confront the reality of being and anticipate and finally welcome 
future threats to being. Such an attitude is defined. Although the sincere promotion of such 
an attitude is clearly theodicial in nature (as Gerald Heard, William James, Jordan 
Peterson and many others have intimated), in using the word “saintly” I intend no 
implications having to do with any deity or institutionalized religion. The argumentation 
learns from Friedrich Nietzsche in a number of ways, which turns out to be interesting 
given both men’s considerable “debt” to the writings of Ralph Waldo Emerson (although 
not to each other). It seems, in the words of Terry Mulcaire, that Whitman found that the 
problems of the human condition “were not finally obstacles to overcome, but potential 
sources of beauty to be incorporated into an aesthetic view of the word, in which suffering, 
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sorrow, and pain will always be essential moments in an endless and ultimately positive 
dialectical progress.” 
* * * 
You are not thrown to the winds, you gather certainly and safely around yourself, 
Yourself! yourself! yourself, for ever and ever! 
. . . 
It is not to diffuse you that you were born of your mother and father, it is to identify you, 
It is not that you should be undecided, but that you should be decided, 
Something long preparing and formless is arrived and form’d in you, 
You are henceforth secure, whatever comes or goes. 
—Walt Whitman, “To Think of Time” 
 
In the previous chapters I have considered many different aspects of existential crisis and countered 
that with the essentially hopeful argument – adopted from Nietzsche and others – that one antidote 
to the difficulty of life is reliably to be located in finding “some meaning in the suffering” (see 
footnote 189). I have also explored one important category of such redemptive meaning and 
suggested that there is absolute (inarguable and non-relative) meaning to be derived from becoming 
conscious of the ways in which one’s crisis and suffering can confer, in Edward Carpenter’s words, 
“power and decisiveness to individuality” (see footnote 134), which is another way of stating the 
potential upside of what at first glance seems unmitigated catastrophe: namely, the emergence of a 
new expression of self. In “Song of Myself”, Whitman reflects on the tangible world “quivering 
[him] to a new identity”; in “Passage to India” he writes, “How should I think, how breathe a single 
breath, how speak, if, out of myself, / I could not launch . . . superior universes?” The emergence of 
the new “superior” self (superior to what confronts and surrounds it in the present moment) is the 
simultaneous transcendence of other inadequate instantiations of self – hence the death-and-rebirth 
metaphor. (The analogy to a Darwinian process of evolution is worth indicating but not worth 
getting caught up in or pursuing.) Whitman indicated his familiarity with the process when he spoke 
of 
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. . . that something in the soul which says [to the sources of suffering], Rage on, Whirl on, I 
tread master here and everywhere, Master of the spasms of the sky and of the shatter of the 
sea, Master of nature and passion and death, And of all terror and all pain.354 
I have cited several thinkers as well as poets to the effect that such an outcome is the only way 
through life’s inevitable catastrophes. And I have said that writing can be of instrumental help in the 
process: 
[T]rauma is, by definition, among the fiercest and most destructive forms disorder can 
take. Trauma, either on an intimate or a collective scale, has the power to annihilate 
the self and shred the web of meanings that support its existence. [Cf. Whitman’s 
phrase “receiving identity through materials” in footnotes 395 and 397.] And yet, the 
evidence of lyric poetry is equally clear—deep in the recesses of the human spirit, 
there is some instinct to rebuild the web of meanings with the same quiet 
determination we witness in the garden spider as it repairs the threads winds and 
weather have torn.355 
Fortunately most of life is not crisis, despair and traumatic catastrophe. My reason for jumping 
straight to and then dwelling on moments where life is acutely imperiled and self severely 
threatened is simply my intuition that the essential things come into focus when the situation 
assumes the characteristics of a life-or-death scenario. I suppose that – at least by analogy – that 
idea is what Hegel aimed at when he wrote “The owl of Minerva takes its flight only when the 
shades of night are gathering” on which he provided the elaboration that “only in the maturity of 
reality does the ideal appear as counterpart to the real.”356 A related reason is captured in these 
considerations: Speaking of the Enûma Eliš (the Balylonian creation myth), Jordan Peterson deems 
it an archetypal motif that “the hero is always born at the time of maximal crisis” (emphasis mine). 
The reason is simple, he adds: “If your culture is dealing well with the forces of the unknown so 
that everything is static but productive [and] so that problems don’t arise, there’s no reason for the 
hero . . . It’s only when crisis beckons that the birth of the hero is necessary.”357 In plainer language, 
I am motivated to look at traumatic situations because, straightforwardly enough, if the considerable 
problem of surviving under unreasonable circumstances can be solved then it seems likely that we 
                                                 
354 From Whitman’s Preface to Leaves of Grass (1855). 
355 Robert Bly, Poetry as Survival, 132. 
356 From G. W. F. Hegel, Preface to Philosophy of Right (1820). 
 When Blake stated that “The road of excess leads to the palace of wisdom”, he may have been trying to 
articulate the same truth (provided we construe “excess” in Pascal’s sense: “Qualities carried to excess are bad for us 
. . .; too much noise deafens us, too much light dazzles”). From Blaise Pascal, Pensées, 63. 
357 Jordan Peterson, “Maps of Meaning: 2 Contending with Chaos (TVO)” [17:30]. 
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shall also know how to solve the incomparably smaller problem of surviving under manageable and 
normal circumstances. On top of that perspective, one does not have to be a decadent or romantic 
poet to notice that the truly valuable lessons in life tend to be accompanied by disagreeable 
moments; Proust writes that 
A woman whom we need and who makes us suffer elicits from us a whole gamut of feelings 
far more profound and vital than does a man of genius who interests us.358 
Once we have recognized that this is simply the nature of things and the unalterable conditions of 
human existence, there is no actual problem here to solve. However, we can learn something about 
the personal attitude associated with survival. Barring a well-timed (but actuarially highly unlikely) 
miracle, the preferable psychic attitude in the midst of an agonizing trial seems to be the one I have 
sketched with reference to Abel in Genesis: the person imbued with an attitude of self that 
cooperatively recognizes that it is necessary to willingly undergo certain adjustments – internal 
“construction” and “reconstruction” work, so to speak – in order to not shatter under the hostile 
forces of the ordeal. This is arguably identical with – or amounts to – a kind of transcendence: self-
transcendence. 
 Whitman, as I have said, even as early as his first edition of Leaves of Grass in 1855, 
was cognizant of the fact that no self could bridge the span of life without undergoing continual and 
frequent adjustment. He also knew, I think, that to the degree he manifested disinterest in his inner 
life and self, adapting to the ever-changing situations that existence threw at him was going to be 
impossible. Perhaps because he was already a writer (he had been a printer’s apprentice in early 
youth and subsequently done much editing, freelance journalism and even fiction writing), quasi-
autobiographical poetry may have seemed the most obvious way of actively taking an interest in the 
state of his self. (Incidentally, not much is known about Whitman’s sudden and apparently 
unforeshadowed transformation from editor and carpenter into poet.)359 At any rate, where the 
                                                 
358 Marcel Proust, In Search of Lost Time, vol. 6, 268. 
359 An alternative theory to the one I have sketched above suggests that the influence of Ralph Waldo Emerson on 
Whitman transformed the young reporter and brought forth the introspective “bard of personality” (Whitman’s 
phrase about himself in “Starting from Paumanok”). His friend Trowbridge recalls the following from a 
conversation with Whitman: “He freely admitted he could never have written his poems if he had not first ‘come to 
himself,’ and that Emerson helped him to ‘find himself’.” From John Townsend Trowbridge, “Reminiscences of 
Walt Whitman”, Atlantic Monthly, 89 (1902): 166. 
 Asselineau writes, “No doubt there is a relation between Whitman’s mystical sense and his poetic 
activity, but this parallelism or coincidence in itself explains nothing. . . . To say that Whitman’s genius was born of 
his mysticism does not solve the problem of its sudden appearance.” From Roger Asselineau, The Evolution of Walt 
Whitman, vol. 1, 50. 
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perilous career of the self is concerned, Charles Hamilton Morgan has noticed that “the archetypal 
pattern of spiritual death and rebirth” is a fairly frequent “structural device” in Leaves of Grass, 
especially after 1860. One finds it in the 1855 and 1856 editions as well, however. Morgan records 
that in “Song of Myself,” “Out of the Cradle Endlessly Rocking,” and “When Lilacs Last in the 
Dooryard Bloom’d”, 
the speaker, in his attempt to assimilate all experience, is overwhelmed by the magnitude of 
the burden he is taking upon himself. In this gathering process there is a rising emotional 
pitch. There follows a period of doubt, despair, self-violation, frustration, and then 
indifference. Rebirth comes when the poet discovers his “mistake,” makes a recovery, and 
moves forward again with his new knowledge and self-awareness.360 
Taking a broader look at literary history, another scholar (Richard P. Adams) has claimed that the 
death-and-rebirth archetype is the “structural pattern of some of the most significant works of 
nineteenth-century English and American literature”361 – evidence, arguably, validating my decision 
to regard it as archetypal in previous chapters. Adams finds Leaves of Grass to be the combination 
of two principles of organization: (1) “unification of individual facts and bits of experience into 
progressively larger and more complex integrations” and (2) “organic growth seen as a pattern of 
death and rebirth.”362 The latter point resonates with Peterson’s inclination to consider “continual 
death and rebirth [a] necessary precondition to proper human adaptation [as well as survival]” 
(footnotes 171 and 313). Morgan agrees with Adams that the two principles work together in Leaves 
of Grass; these are Adams’s words: “The assimilation of the fact of death, the transcendence of the 
feelings of fear and sorrow at the loss it involves, is one of the greatest changes the growing 
organism can undergo.”363 
 Knowing he could write and perhaps sensing he had to write, Whitman started out as a 
poet, as I have said, completely unillusioned about the fact that 
. . . alienation, and more generally the problems of the human condition, were not finally 
obstacles to overcome, but potential sources of beauty to be incorporated into an aesthetic 
                                                 
360 Charles Hamilton Morgan, “A New Look at Whitman’s “Crisis,” 41. 
361 I cite here Morgan’s paraphrase of Adams as that man presents his argument in Richard P. Adams, “Romanticism and 
the American Renaissance,” American Literature, XXIII (January, 1952): 419–432. 
362 Ibid. (Again, the words are Morgan’s paraphrase.) 
363 Richard P. Adams, “Whitman: A Brief Revaluation,” Tulane Studies in English, V (1955): 111–149. See also Daryl 
Sharp’s words in footnote 383. 
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view of the world, in which suffering, sorrow, and pain will always be essential moments in 
an endless and ultimately positive dialectical progress.364 
I have hinted earlier that it occurs to me that Whitman wished more than anything to grow or 
transform himself into a person who could look at the least immediately loveable things in the 
world and nevertheless celebrate them. I have also said that to some degree he succeeded (recall, as 
a minimum, Bucke’s description of his habits and personality (footnote 43) and reflect on the young 
“disciple” (footnote 37) convinced of the legitimacy of comparing Whitman with Jesus Christ). I 
think it was Whitman’s view that the self’s best anticipatory “defense” against a rough world was a 
well-developed resolve – a decisive and voluntary predisposition – to bear, allow, permit (and 
ultimately, when possible, bless) its very roughness and offensiveness. Bearing out that claim, 
Asselineau has said (quite generally really, but with reference to the impact Leaves of Grass had on 
him) that “To avoid moral suffocation it [is] necessary to find . . . some ground for hope and for a 
renewal of faith in mankind” (footnote 306). In other words, I think a pronounced loneliness and 
melancholia is at the heart of what reads like the most involuntarily joyous poetry. Among the 
epigraphic perspectives, I have cited David S. Reynolds to this effect: 
What can be said is that some terrible pain lurks behind his verse. He is, of course, the 
definitive poet of joy. But there are signs of personal trauma even in his most exuberant 
poems.365 
And Whitman had himself said as much in “Song of Myself”: 
The pleasures of heaven are with me and the pains of hell are with me, 
The first I graft and increase upon myself, the latter I translate into a new tongue. 
It is important to reiterate and recognize that the kind of attitude exemplified by such lines is 
precisely and exhaustively accounted for in Frankl’s and Jung’s analyses of what happens to and in 
the self during acute suffering: A personal freedom and autonomy gets generated, ironically, as a 
result of the very factors that are so overwhelmingly antipathetic to freedom and autonomy: 
                                                 
364 From the entry “Dialectic”, written by Terry Mulcaire, in J. R. LeMaster and Donald D. Kummings, eds., The 
Routledge Encyclopedia of Walt Whitman, 239. 
365 David S. Reynolds, Walt Whitman’s America: A Cultural Biography, 52. Note that Henry Alonzo Myers ranks 
Whitman with Sophocles and Shakespeare as the preeminent tragic poets of world literature. Myers’s words (from 
Tragedy: A View of Life) are cited in “Optimism” in J. R. LeMaster and Donald D. Kummings, eds., The Routledge 
Encyclopedia of Walt Whitman, 487. 
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“Through angers, losses, ambition, ignorance, ennui, what you are picks its way.”366 Metaphorically 
speaking, the wound carries its own healing (cf. “in sterquiliniis invenitur”) – but it dwells there in 
latent form; the healing must be unlocked with willed effort undertaken on behalf of the self. The 
emphasis on personal agency as a factor in actual life outcomes is unmistakable: 
After to-day I inure myself to run, leap, swim, wrestle, fight, 
. . . 
And to hold my own in terrible positions, on land and sea.367 
Here is another example: 
(O Mother—O Sisters dear! 
If we are lost, no victor else has destroy’d us, 
It is by ourselves we go down to eternal night.)368 
While on the subject, Reynolds is right to say, “The optimism of Whitman’s poetry, then, was very 
much a willed optimism, one achieved in the face of harsh social conditions and great personal 
challenges.”369 There is good historical evidence supporting the argument that Whitman’s life was 
beset by a wide range of sorrows.370 But even if he were only, in Harold Bloom’s phrase, subject to 
the “pain and suffering of being a natural man or woman living and dying in a natural world”, he 
was nevertheless continually forced to redeem those unbudgeable elements of existential 
discomfort.371 That Whitman suffered seems to me completely undoubtable; but so does the fact 
                                                 
366 From “To You.” 
367 From “Myself and Mine.” 
368 From “By Blue Ontario’s Shore” (emphasis mine). 
369 From David S. Reynolds, “Walt Whitman’s world: America still Needs His Poetry”, July 3, 2005. 
370 Reynolds’s writes: “Whitman’s private life . . . too was stormy. He faced severe family difficulties: the pathetic 
condition of his younger brother Eddy, retarded since birth; the decline of his possibly alcoholic father, who died 
shortly before “Leaves of Grass” came out; the marriage of his unstable sister Hannah to a neurotic Vermont artist, 
whom Walt later called “'a skunk – a bug . . . the bed-buggiest man on earth”; early signs of mental illness in his 
older brother Jesse, whom Walt eventually committed to a lunatic asylum; and, perhaps worst of all, the indifference 
of the whole family (including the “normal” siblings, Jeff, George, and Mary) to his poetry. “Not [one] of my 
people,” as he put it, appreciated his volume.” From David S. Reynolds, “Walt Whitman’s world: America still 
Needs His Poetry”, July 3, 2005. Other biographers have emphasized sexual woes particularly. 
 A good example of Whitman’s suffering from one of the poet’s notebooks is cited by Asselineau and 
dates from 1848 or 1849: “I am not glad to-night. Gloom has gathered round me like a mantle, tightly folded. / The 
oppression of my heart is not fitful and has no pangs; but a torpor like that of some stagnant pool. / . . . / Every 
precious gift to man is linked with a curse—and each pollution has some sparkle from heaven. / The mind, raised 
upward, then holds communion with angels and its reach overtops heaven; yet then it stays in the meshes of the 
world too and is stung by a hundred serpents every day. / . . . / Thus it comes that I am not glad to night.— / I feel 
cramped here in these coarse walls of flesh. / The soul disdains its [incomplete] / O Mystery of Death, I pant for the 
time when I shall solve you!” From Roger Asselineau, The Evolution of Walt Whitman, vol. 1, 69. 
371 From Harold Bloom, The Daemon Knows, 362. 
 On the face of it, Bloom’s words do not seem to identify anything very profound or unique given that 
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that on the whole (although not wholly consistently) he suffered without appearing very alarmed or 
desperate; rather, he bore his cross with determination and courage.372 
Whitman’s great triumph (artistic and psychological), then, is to have nourished in himself such 
qualities and attitudes – and in part via his writing to have brought about such a constitution of self 
– as would render him capable of withstanding the pressures of the human condition: capable of 
remaining “aplomb amid irrational things.”373 
 A few pages back I cited Terry Mulcaire’s words on seeing “the problems of the 
human condition” as providing “potential sources of beauty” and, by that token, regarding it valid 
material for poetry. Here, then, is a clear articulation of how we may say – with reference to Howe, 
Henry Miller, Proust and Coleridge – that the world is transformed as a consequence of the 
individual’s personal transformation (“new eyes”, as Proust puts it).374 Like Mulcaire, Santayana 
too associated the word “beauty” with achieving “harmony between our nature and our experience”. 
So did Blaise Pascal who found that “There is a certain standard of grace and beauty which consists 
in a certain relation between our nature, such as it is, weak or strong, and the thing which pleases 
us.”375 Whitman simply thought that the “greatest poet”, by which he meant a creature animated by 
“beautiful blood and a beautiful brain”, could reliably “indicate the path between reality and [a 
people’s] souls.”376 
 Very simply put, that “path” is shorthand for a self that survives, that reconciles inner 
                                                 
everybody is subject to those same burdens. However, people are undeniably different and are thus disturbed by the 
fundamental conditions of being to varying degrees. A case in point is Somerset Maugham who confessed: “It is one 
of the faults of my nature that I have suffered more from the pains, than I have enjoyed the pleasures of my life.” 
Needless to say that he too became a writer. From W. Somerset Maugham, The Summing Up, 282. 
372 Cf. Roger Asselineau in footnote 307. 
373 From “Me Imperturbe”. These words from Edmund Burke come to mind: “It is wise indeed, considering the many 
positive vexations and the innumerable bitter disappointments of pleasure in the world, to have as many resources of 
satisfaction as possible within one’s power.” Cited in W. E. H. Lecky, The Map of Life: Conduct and Character, 35. 
374 The first two writers have been cited sufficiently copiously already. Proust wrote “The real voyage of discovery . . . / 
consists not is seeking new landscapes, / but in having new eyes.” The line is cited by – and in – David Michalski, 
“Cities Memories Voices Collage”, in Richard Cándida Smith, ed., Text and Image: Art and the Performance of 
Memory, 117. 
 As for Samuel Coleridge, his masterly “Dejection: An Ode” contains these lines (fourth stanza): “O 
Lady! we receive but what we give, / And in our life alone does Nature live: / Ours is her wedding garment, ours her 
shroud! / And would we aught behold, of higher worth, / Than that inanimate cold world allowed / To the poor 
loveless ever-anxious crowd, / Ah! from the soul itself must issue forth / A light, a glory, a fair luminous cloud / 
Enveloping the Earth— / And from the soul itself must there be sent / A sweet and potent voice, of its own birth, / 
Of all sweet sounds the life and element!” See Harold Bloom’s remarks on “convert[ing] opinion into knowledge” 
in footnote 395. 
375 From Blaise Pascal, Pensées. The words in question are cited in Mortimer Jerome Adler and Charles Lincoln Van 
Doren, eds., Great Treasury of Western Thought: A Compendium of Important Statements on Man and His 
Institutions by the Great Thinkers in Western History, 1078. 
376 From Whitman’s 1855 Preface. 
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reality with outer and is ever prepared and ready, in Whitman’s words, “to learn from crises of 
anguish, advancing, grappling with direst fate and recoiling not” (in “Long, too Long America”). In 
moments of deepest doubt – when forced to admit “I do not know what you are for, (I do not know 
what I am for myself, nor what any thing is for,)” – such a self is nevertheless immediately capable 
of adding, “But I will search carefully for it even in being foil’d, / In defeat, poverty, misconception, 
imprisonment—for they too are great / . . . defeat is great, / And . . . death and dismay are great” 
(from “To a Foil’d European Revolutionaire”). 
 The following is a simplified view, but it is nonetheless a useful way of thinking about 
Whitman’s early verses: Having understood the worthwhile and absolutely important objective of 
attempting to meet the challenge of adjusting the self to a degree where it would be “self-balanced 
for contingencies”, Whitman must have begun to see Leaves of Grass take shape conceptually and 
thematically in his head. It is my contention that he felt called upon to try to resolve nothing less 
than the most essential problem: How can the human condition be embraced when suffering is so 
probable and integral to life? “The true question to ask respecting any book,” he argued in 
“Democratic Vistas,” is “has it helped any human soul?” and does it possess the power to “free, 
arouse, dilate” readers?377 
The already-presented notion that poetry could be regarded as the result of giving voice to 
something in the self (the writer’s “Daemon”) that is capable of responding coherently, decisively, 
perhaps even boldly and triumphantly, to trauma does not mean that the voice cannot praise and 
eulogize as well; Kaplan speaks of Whitman’s “dithyrambic” style. The two modes – the two 
extremes of being – are related, as I have tried to show. I have explained that we may have to 
consider that the moment when the self gets conscious of the terrible contingency of existence may 
bring a person, a self, to start “preemptively” nourishing sides of him- or herself capable of 
discovering sufficient compensation among the world’s glorious features for the terrifying fact of its 
awful ones. Freud famously defined anxiety as “being Angst vor etwas, or anxious expectations,” 
Harold Bloom writes, and that observation speaks exactly to my point – the dreaded is always 
around the corner and something to prepare for while there is still time.378 Pascal writes, “Man is 
nothing but a subject full of natural error that cannot be eradicated except through grace,” which too 
serves as a valid commentary on my insistence that Whitman’s work must be considered 
                                                 
377 From Walt Whitman, Democratic Vistas, in Specimen Days and Collect, 252.  
378 Harold Bloom, On the Western Canon: The Books and School of the Ages, 18. 
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compensatory in nature, in the sense here identified.379 It is as if Whitman sensed – to adapt yet 
another quote – that the only way to avoid living as if nothing was a miracle was to cultivate an 
existential attitude and approach to living based in the thought that everything was a miracle.380  
 It is probably fair to point to the clear religious overtones of such an attitude. I do not 
have the credentials or inclination, as I have said, to consider the matter in theological terms, but it 
would be silly to deny the powerful spiritual dimension to selfhood that I attribute to Whitman’s 
perspective. (Again, consider the numinous connotations – “theophany”, “transcendence” – inherent 
in the phrase “the American Sublime”, of which, according to Bloom, Whitman is an exemplar.) 
There is another reason why it is appropriate to think about the attitude of Whitman’s symbolic self 
in terms of a religious or saintly attitude, and the reason is that both (the concept of self and the 
domain of religion) partake of the ideal, by which I mean something glorious and transcendent, 
something which by definition is bound to defeat human aspiration but which should nevertheless 
inform and inspire the human aim.381 The fact that the self is doomed to aspire and devoutly honor 
an ideal – yet never be granted its full and final conquest – is, as far as I can tell, at the heart of the 
psychological function of prayer. Again, without intending any metaphysically religious 
implication, let me in the following then merely nominally portray this interesting ideal or aim as 
“saintly”. 
 In speaking of achieving a psychic condition or state from which one “agrees” with 
reality (and “acquiesce[s] in the inevitable”; cf. footnote 33) in a deep sense and consequently 
seems to stream gently through the psychophenomenal realm of being, I said (in footnote 338) that I 
would return to a passage from a Leonard Cohen novel in which the question “What is a saint?” is 
raised. I feature this passage in full below because of my opinion that it very accurately and 
eloquently doubles as a miniature portrait of the kind of self that Whitman was trying to manifest; I 
have no doubt that Whitman would have praised this picture of sainthood profusely: 
                                                 
379 F. O. Matthiessen notes that Pascal’s exposition of the contradictions existing in human nature and “the paradox of 
its being both vile and sublime” were of interest to Emerson. From F. O. Matthiessen, American Renaissance: Art 
and Expression in the Age of Emerson and Whitman, 181. The Pascal quote above is from his Pensées, 12. 
380 The speaker here is Alfred Einstein, and his words are: “There are only two ways to live your life. One is as though 
nothing is a miracle. The other is as though everything is a miracle.” From Albert Einstein, The Ultimate Quotable 
Einstein, 483. 
381 Whitman greatly admired Emerson’s statement that “Poetry is the only verity—the expression of a sound mind 
speaking after the ideal—and not after the apparent.” In fact, this line from “Poetry and Imagination” had such a 
claim on Whitman that, although he would in later life often try to downplay the influence Emerson had had on him, 
he freely admitted in Specimen Days that he had long ago deemed the line worthy of inclusion in his “old, well-
thumb’d common-place book, [which was] filled with favorite excerpts [to be] absorbed over and over again when 
the mood invited.” From Walt Whitman, Specimen Days and Collect, 183. 
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What is a saint? A saint is someone who has achieved a remote human possibility. It is 
impossible to say what that possibility is. I think it has something to do with the energy of 
love. Contact with this energy results in the exercise of a kind of balance in the chaos of 
existence. A saint does not dissolve the chaos; if he did the world would have changed long 
ago. I do not think that a saint dissolves the chaos even for himself, for there is something 
arrogant and warlike in the notion of a man setting the universe in order. It is a kind of 
balance that is his glory. He rides the drifts like an escaped ski. His course is a caress of the 
hill. His track is a drawing of the snow in a moment of its particular arrangement with wind 
and rock. Something in him so loves the world that he gives himself to the laws of gravity 
and chance. Far from flying with angels, he traces with the fidelity of a seismograph needle 
the state of the solid bloody landscape. His house is dangerous and finite, but he is at home 
in the world. He can love the shapes of human beings, the fine and twisted shapes of the 
heart. It is good to have among us such men, such balancing monsters of love.382 
In an interview on Canadian television, Cohen sensibly conceptualized the obtainment of this 
“remote human possibility” as achieving a “state of grace”. When asked by a sarcastic interviewer 
to more carefully define such a state, another poet (Cohen’s friend Irving Layton) interrupted the 
conversation with the words:  
What Cohen is trying to do right now is to preserve the self; that’s his real concern. And I 
think that is the concern of every poet – to preserve the self in a world that is rapidly 
steamrollering the selves out of existence and establishing a uniform world.383 
Resonating perfectly with this example, I want to argue that Whitman’s poems, specifically those 
partaking of the celebratory existential mode, can be accurately described as having the function of 
prayers, prayers which articulate the poet’s earnest desire to, first of all, “preserve [his] self” and 
survive, but more importantly to preserve it in order to approach and, if lucky and destined to, 
intermittently achieve the “remote human possibilit[ies]” of “love” and “balance” outlined in 
Leaves of Grass. The goal is not to “dissolve the chaos” – or, in Henry Miller’s words, “alter the 
world” – but to begin the process of healing, integrating and redeeming the self – and so “be [one’s 
own] saviour” (Miller) and “[one’s own] priest” (Whitman) – in order that the world may become 
                                                 
382 From Leonard Cohen, Beautiful Losers, 112. 
383 The interview featuring Cohen and Layton is found in the documentary Ladies and Gentlemen, Mr. Leonard Cohen 
[8:00]. Layton’s words are highly pertinent to my argument and commentary on the citations from West and Wundt 
(see footnotes 327 and 328). 
 On the relationship between “preserving the self” and achieving a “state of grace”, Daryl Sharp has 
written: “Psychologically, uniting the opposites [Jung’s constitutive self elements “light” and “shadow”] involves 
first recognizing them in whatever conflict we are engaged in, and then holding the tension between them. The 
extent to which we are successful in this difficult and often lengthy endeavor—the degree of wholeness we 
experience—can be called a manifestation of the Self, or, if one prefers, the grace of God.” From Daryl Sharp, 
Digesting Jung: Food for the Journey, 56. Emphasis mine. Sharp’s words are a commentary on a passage from Jung 
from which my epigraphic perspective 33 is excerpted. 
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like a “home” (Cohen) rather than a chaotic pit in which one can only suffer and die. Cohen’s 
portrait of the saintly attitude rewards close comparison with Bucke’s portrait of Whitman (see 
footnote 43).384 
 As further evidence and indication of the at least quasi-religious psychological make-
up of such a “monster of love”, it is surely no coincidence that the following description of spiritual 
detachment, which echoes it closely, is due to the theologically erudite Alan Watts: 
Detachment means to have neither regrets for the past nor fears for the future; to let life take 
its course without attempting to interfere with its movements and change, neither trying to 
prolong the stay of things pleasant nor to hasten the departure of things unpleasant. To do 
this is to move in time with life, to be in perfect accord with its changing music, and this is 
called Enlightenment.385 
Is there any basis for comparing the act of writing (about what embodied living could potentially be 
like, say) to that of praying (for improvements to embodied living)? Henry Miller certainly thought 
so and found the two easily relatable to each other: 
The act of writing puts a stop to one kind of activity in order to release another. When a 
monk, prayerfully meditating, walks silently down the hall of a temple, and thus walking 
sets in motion one prayerwheel after another, he gives a living illustration of the act of 
sitting down to write. The mind of the writer, no longer preoccupied with observing and 
knowing, wanders meditatively amidst a world of forms which are set spinning by a mere 
brush of his wings. No tyrant, this, wreaking his will upon the subjugated minions of his ill-
gotten kingdom. An explorer, rather, calling to life the slumbering entities of his dream. The 
act of dreaming, like a draft of fresh air in an abandoned house, situates the furniture of the 
mind in a new ambiance. The chairs and tables collaborate; an effluvia is given off, a game 
is begun.386 
In chapter 1, I made reference to Alain de Botton’s de-esotericized and secular definition of “higher 
consciousness” because I saw evidence for believing and stressing that certain pursuits available to 
humans – the properly conducted study of certain works of literature not the least exemplary of 
them – are potentially conducive to the person’s gradually rising awareness of and psychological 
                                                 
384 Borrowing a line from Mircea Eliade’s classic, Shamanism: Archaic Techniques of Ecstasy, Justin Kaplan argues 
that, for Whitman, “the poet was the shaman of modern society, a master of ‘the techniques of ecstasy’.” From Justin 
Kaplan and Rob Couteau, “ ‘The Mystery of the Man’: Justin Kaplan Talks About America’s Greatest Poet”. 
385 Alan Watts, Become What You Are, 10. 
386 Henry Miller, The Henry Miller Reader, ed. by Lawrence Durrell, 363. 
172 
 
resonance with such a state. I stand by that tangential observation which Miller too (a kind of 
Whitman for the twentieth century, thought Lawrence Durrell) found provocative:387 
The great joy of the artist is to become aware of a higher order of things, to recognize by the 
compulsive and spontaneous manipulation of his own impulses the resemblances between 
human creation and what is called “divine” creation. . . . The endless interpretations [of 
“works of fantasy”] which are offered up contribute nothing, except to heighten the 
significance of what is seemingly unintelligible.388 
I bring this cryptic and elusive view because it resonates with my impression that what frequently 
characterizes sublime poetry is its simultaneous emphasis of the world as both unintelligible and 
deeply significant in human eyes. To further underscore my tangential remarks on “higher 
consciousness”, I would add at this point that the opposite stance to the one sketched by Miller 
above (i.e. the feeling that the world is not fundamentally unintelligible and also not significant) 
might cause a person to careen dangerously close to dogmatism and nihilism, respectively, both of 
which seem anathema to sublime poetry. 
 As for the element in poems partaking of the function of prayer, Michael Frayn 
provides a useful account, which I think serves to explain why Whitman’s persistent attempt to 
define an ideal symbolic self on the page – to, as he put it, “Outline [a] sketch of a superb calm 
character”389 – proved effective and positive at the level of his actual being: 
Declarations of faith, like declarations of anything else, are uttered with some purpose in 
mind. This is not usually to catalogue articles of belief out of academic interest, as you 
might list different species of beetle. The intention is to secure an effect, upon others or upon 
oneself. At their lowest and most depressing they have something in common with the 
chants and taunts that supporters utter at football matches, where the intention is not to 
express any particular states of affairs, or hopes for their alteration, but to induce feelings of 
solidarity and right-mindedness among the supporters themselves, and to incense their 
opponents. 
 At their highest, though, I suppose you might understand declarations of faith as being 
like a performance of one of the great heroic parts in the theatre, which offers the possibility 
of expressing human truth by a dramatic fiction. Some of the same difficulties and 
opportunities arise. The believer, like the actor, may impress by the sheer force of difficulty 
overcome. On the other hand he may force his performance, and become unconvincing. The 
                                                 
387 Durrell’s comparison is made in his Introduction to The Henry Miller Reader: “[Like] Whitman or Blake[, Miller 
has] left us, not simply works of art, but a corpus of ideas which motivate and influence a whole cultural pattern.” 
See The Henry Miller Reader, ed. by Lawrence Durrell, ix. 
388 From The Henry Miller Reader, ed. by Lawrence Durrell, 362. Cf. Miller’s words (cited on page 37) that “the 
greatest thing about the universe[ is that ]that it can be altered. . . . Man has a bit of this power in him [this “ability to 
transmute things”]: to take what is lost and failed and convert it into a new and wonderful things.” 
389 See footnote 352. The Michael Frayn quote below is from Michael Frayn, The Human Touch, 263–264 
173 
 
performance may vary from the crude and obvious, with much weeping and tearing of the 
hair, to the subtly understated and inward, with nothing to show on the surface but the 
occasional shadow of emotion passing across the features, a certain way of going about 
things, a style. 
 Whether done well or ill, the believer is exploiting the possibilities offered by this 
thing that he has taken upon himself. Roles and beliefs have lives of their own, implications 
which lead us on to destinations we never dreamt of when we signed the contract for the 
show. (Hence, perhaps, the tendency of actors’ performances to get coarser during a long 
run, and for believers to go off at tangents from one another . . .) 
Almost every element of Frayn’s analysis of the phenomenon of sincere declarations of faith has an 
application in the present exploration of the therapeutic potential of Whitman’s works – initially for 
himself. 
 Whitman was conscious that he contained within him a “latent mine” full of 
“unlaunch’d voices—passionate powers” among which were “Wrath, argument, or praise, or comic 
leer, or prayer devout” (from “A Font of Type”). There is clearly a pronounced tone of prayer to the 
poem “Come, said my soul” (see text following footnote 352), which served as the title-page 
epigraph to several of the post-1876 editions of Leaves of Grass. (It was also the only poem in the 
book which reproduced in ink what – certainly from a graphological perspective – offered 
something of higher personal fidelity than typeset words could achieve, namely a facsimile of 
Whitman’s signature.)390 In this epigraphic poem, the poet’s “Soul” (or Daemon, in Bloom’s 
system) expresses the keen wish that “should [it] after death invisibly return . . . long, long hence” it 
may “Ever with pleas’d smile . . . keep on” “Tallying Earth’s soil, trees, winds, tumultuous waves” 
and also “yet [own] the verses”. It is interesting to unpack what these few lines might reveal about 
the poet. 
 Based on Eric Wilson’s work, I made some remarks on states of intensified sense of 
self earlier. Specifically, I suggested that the alienated and paralyzed person – “Unmoored from” 
and unable to “enjoy a comfortable relationship” to external reality – is “forced to look within [and] 
get in touch with what is most intimate”, which in fortunate cases leads to the discovery: “I am this 
person and no one else.” But there is clearly something stagnant, static or “arrested” about this kind 
of state; it hints at nothing about the next moment and apparently finds the self in a kind of 
suspended animation. (Whitman described that state in a poem apparently representing the plunge 
from a contented state to one of defeat: “Must I change my triumphant songs? said I to myself, / 
                                                 
390 “I was chilled with the cold types, cylinder, wet paper between us. / Male and Female! / I pass so poorly with paper 
and types, I must pass with the contact of bodies and souls.” From the 1855 version of a pome which would in 1881 
receive the title “A Song of Occupations.” 
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Must I indeed learn to chant the cold dirges of the baffled? / And sullen hymns of defeat?) If I may 
borrow a metaphor from the world of modern-day electronics, then, there are times when the self 
has to “reboot” before it can interact normally with the world again; “there are times in one’s life 
when one has to shut down just to regroup.”391 In the epigraphic poem, Whitman’s “Soul” is 
praying that should it be fortunate enough to return after death it will return to a state or condition 
directly opposite that of paralyzed alienation; it prays for a resurrected state associated with high 
spirits (“pleas’d smile”) and engagement with and appetite for the world of phenomena (it desires to 
“tally” a long series of natural phenomenal manifestations. That state – dynamic, animated, 
interactive, wholesome, joyful – was what Henry Miller designated when he pictured the “joy of 
life” as “not static but dynamic.”392 Note that a self characterized by a smiling mien is naturally 
disposed and inclined to confront, accept and celebrate things (in that a smile is psychologically a 
facial gesture signaling welcome, invitation, appeasement) – not pass through the world manifesting 
a “fault-finder’s or rejecter’s gait”.393 In conclusion, Whitman’s brief poem works much like a 
prayer expressing the wish that his Soul can – after death – continue or return to its current state.394 
 Whitman owes some of his literary legend to the fact that he is so consistently 
memorable on that desired state, which William James called “healthy-mindedness” and which has 
much in common with Alain de Botton’s conceptualization of “higher consciousness”. These lines 
find the soul smiling and tallying the object surrounding it without forgetting its own integral part in 
the happy scene: 
O the joy of my soul leaning pois’d on itself, receiving identity through materials[395] and 
loving them, observing characters and absorbing them,  
My soul vibrated back to me from them, from sight, hearing, touch, reason, articulation, 
comparison, memory, and the like 
The real life of my senses and flesh transcending my senses and flesh, 
My body done with materials, my sight done with my material eyes, 
                                                 
391 From Leonard Cohen, Leonard Cohen on Leonard Cohen: Interviews and Encounters, ed. by Jeff Burger, 555. 
392 See footnote 69. 
393 From “Song of Myself”. 
394 Alternatively, the death-and-rebirth archetype allows for a reading in which “death” is not to be taken literally but is 
to be construed merely as a temporary traumatic interruption or break with the preferred state. Sickness, depression, 
loss and thwarted ambitions are occurrences capable of ushering in this painful state, of sending the Soul to the 
archetypal “underworld” for a while.  
395 Elsewhere (in “Song of Myself”) Whitman described this process thus: “Clear and sweet is my soul, and clear and 
sweet is all that is not my soul. // Lack one lacks both, and the unseen [soul] is proved by the seen [world], / Till that 
becomes unseen and receives proof in its turn.” 
 Harold Bloom sees Whitman as an “American variant of [Samuel] Johnson’s quest to convert opinion 
into knowledge. Knowledge of what? If, as Epicurus insisted, the what is unknowable Walt’s knowledge is a 
personal gnosis, in which the knower himself is known by whatever can be known.” From Harold Bloom, The 
Daemon Knows, 53. 
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Proved to me this day beyond cavil that it is not my material eyes which finally see, 
Nor my material body which finally loves, walks, laughs, shouts, embraces, procreates.396 
The melancholy self in Wilson’s description is unmoored from reality to such a degree of 
“lockdown” and immobility of the senses that “receiving identity through materials” is simply 
impossible.397 It has no choice except to attempt to revivify and transform itself internally in the 
hope of becoming again capable of connecting with the world. Whitman dedicated a whole poem 
(“A Noiseless Patient Spider”) to the first shy attempts of the formerly “isolated” “soul” (this time 
he does not capitalize the word) to form a “bridge” or launch an “anchor” in order to become 
moored once more to the world. That poem is heavily characterized by the very human and realistic 
concern that, as Peterson put it, “there’s not very much of you and there’s a lot of everything else” 
(source identified in footnote 55) – the “isolated” spider (or soul) is sustained only by “a little 
promontory” surrounded by the “vacant vast surrounding” – yet at the same time, the poem makes 
clear that there is a universe of things (“measureless oceans of space”) to “catch” and gain hold of 
in the event of the spider’s embodiment of a balanced, wholesome, self-contained mode of being. 
Gregory Orr considers this motif central to Whitman’s works: “Whitman’s transformative genius[ 
is] to be one of the ultimate outsiders in his actual life and yet to create a persona in his poetic life, a 
“Walt Whitman”[,] who is the ultimate insider.”398 A famous line indicating the same schism is the 
very last line in the 1855 Preface: “The proof of a poet is that his country absorbs him as 
affectionately as he has absorbed it.” 
Many of those poems by Whitman that are not reminiscent of prayer in any trivial sense 
nevertheless appropriate language associated with the sacred; they offer something like the 
confident prophetic pronouncements of a sage or oracle. This mode is compatible with the mode of 
a poet who “absorbs” his country “affectionately” because the voice is disposed to celebrate and 
eulogize the ordinary workaday world rather than pay respect to remote ideals and fantasies. I think 
there is a fairly straightforward way to understand how Whitman came to launch from his “latent 
mine” of voices such “passionate . . . praise.” 
 The pronouncements I have described frequently exhibit a certain incantatory effect, 
                                                 
396 From “A Song of Joys”. 
397 For purely philosophical reasons, it is worth considering this Whitman line in the context of Hume’s words “I never 
can catch myself at any time without a perception, and never can observe any thing but the perception.” See footnote 
271. 
398 Gregory Orr, Poetry as Survival, 168. 
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which bears out John Burroughs’s claim that Whitman was inspired by the prophetic books of the 
Bible. Countless scholars, following Burroughs, have emphasized the debt owed by Whitman’s 
prosody to the English Bible.399 As to the incantatory element, Philip H. Round claims that the 
poems’ “syntactic parallelism, repetition, and cataloguing” make for lines that are of an “expansive, 
oracular, and often incantatory” order (“expansive” was a term that William James too preferred, in 
The Varieties of Religious Experience, when it came to visions voiced by Whitman).400 Frank D. 
Casale adds that the “visionary mode” in the poems is inseparable from a style that is “celebratory, 
elevated, verbally ornate.”401 The evidence is very considerable that Whitman intended Leaves of 
Grass to be a sacred work; Thomas Becknell writes that Whitman “in his vision of a nation of 
divine persons, . . . assumes a prophetic voice reminiscent of Old Testament prophets.”402 
 Before I proceed, I would like to reiterate, with Timothy Donnelly, that “How we 
choose [in works of poetry] to . . . investigate a potential psychology may actually reflect a great 
deal on our own psychology” (footnote 288). However, assuming that, it also stands to reason that 
in the case of Whitman we are unlikely ever to “know the complex relationship between the ‘I’ of 
his poetry . . . and the private Whitman.” (see footnote 315). Underscoring the general theme of 
volition, Nietzsche suggested a link between the autobiographical and the aesthetic and creative, 
when he wrote “When one has not had a good father, one must create one.”403 
 Most Whitman biographies establish how rarely Whitman mentions his father in his 
letters and cautiously conclude that Whitman was dissatisfied with his father. His biographers are 
also fairly unanimous in emphasizing how attracted Whitman was to the role of parental comforter. 
David S. Reynolds details how he “showed a distinct parental strain in his own life” and how in his 
poetry he frequently returned to affirmations of procreation and parenthood: 
                                                 
399 See John Burroughs, “His Ruling Ideals and Aims”, in Walt Whitman, ed. by Harold Bloom, 174. Bloom himself 
makes the claim in several different places, for instance in his introduction to Frank D. Casale, Bloom’s How to 
Write about Walt Whitman, vi. Incidentally, Kirsten Silva Gruesz sees “the incantatory phrase” as a hallmark of 
Leaves of Grass. From Kirsten Silva Gruesz’s entry “ “By Blue Ontario’s Shore” (1856)” in in J. R. LeMaster and 
Donald D. Kummings, eds., The Routledge Encyclopedia of Walt Whitman, 91. 
400 From Philip H. Round’s entry “Style and Technique(s)” in J. R. LeMaster and Donald D. Kummings, eds., The 
Routledge Encyclopedia of Walt Whitman, 694. 
401 Frank D. Casale, Bloom’s How to Write about Walt Whitman, 85. 
402 From the entry “The Bible” by Thomas Becknell in J. R. LeMaster and Donald D. Kummings, eds., The Routledge 
Encyclopedia of Walt Whitman, 56. The same source (page 55) notes that Whitman, in one of his notebooks, once 
called Leaves of Grass “the New Bible”. Roger Asselineau adds to that assessment that “[Whitman’s] ambition was 
not to rival the prophets of the Old Testament, but to create a new kind of poetry meant for the eyes of his readers 
rather than for their ears.” From Roger Asselineau, The Evolution of Walt Whitman, vol. 2, 240. 
403 Friedrich Nietzsche, Human, All too Human: A Book for Free Spirits, 381. As is apparent, such a compensatory 
psychological dynamic pervades this dissertation’s central arguments. 
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His siblings became like surrogate children to him, as indicated especially in his 
autobiographical story “My Boys and Girls.” He would assume a parental role with his 
young male friends, many of whom called him Father or Uncle or Old Man. He even had 
what seemed a motherly side. Burroughs noted in him a gentle, tender quality, “something 
indescribable in his look, in his eye, as in that of the mother of many children.” . . . If he 
often played the role of surrogate parent, he also sought to establish links with imagined 
parental figures. The terms “mother” and “father” are scattered liberally throughout his 
poems, applied variously to the earth, the sea, the night, the flag, the Union. . . . Recoiling 
from the restlessness of his childhood, the idiosyncrasies of his parents, and the problems of 
his siblings, he would continue throughout his life to fabricate comforting parental figures, 
including himself.404 
Reynolds is probably right in saying that Whitman’s father, Walter Whitman Sr., has “been treated 
too harshly by biographers.”405 However, by all accounts he was “a moody, taciturn man” who was 
for much of his life dogged by professional ruin.406 Asselineau depicts him as “enigmatic”, a 
“mediocre and dissatisfied farmer” (although he also worked as a carpenter and builder) endowed 
with a “hard, self-contained, independent character.” It has been generally assumed that Whitman 
represents his own father in these famous lines from the autobiographical poem “There Was a Child 
Went Forth”: 
 The father, strong, self-sufficient, manly, mean, anger’d, unjust, 
 The blow, the quick load word, the tight bargain, the crafty lure.407 
Whatever the precise truth of the relationship between son and father, the former evidently preferred 
the women in his family, notes Asselineau.408 
 My argumentation here is not based on so much as accidentally coincidental with 
David Aberbach writes that 
                                                 
404 David S. Reynolds, Walt Whitman’s America: A Cultural Biography, 55. 
 In Specimen Days, he recalls his Civil War experiences among the soldiers in the military hospitals of 
Washington and avows his “fatherly or brotherly interest in them”. From Specimen Days and Collect, 57. 
405 Whitman brother, George Whitman, said that his brother’s “relations with his father were always friendly, always 
good.” See David S. Reynolds, ed., A Historical Guide to Walt Whitman, 16. Also, Whitman would recall in old age: 
“my dear daddy was remarkable everywhere he went for his kindness to the dumb beasts.” From Walt Whitman, 
Intimate with Walt: Selections from Whitman’s Conversations with Horace Traubel 1888–1892, 196. 
406 David S. Reynolds, Walt Whitman’s America: A Cultural Biography, 23. Reynolds also records that Whitman, Jr., 
once told his friend John Burroughs that his father had had periods of heavy drinking. 
407 From “There Was a Child Went Forth”. The suggestion that Walter Whitman, Sr., is the father here depicted is very 
widespread in the literature. However, Gay Wilson Allen has argued on behalf of Whitman’s compulsive interest in 
cruel fathers although its roots are not fully identified. See Gay Wilson Allen, The Solitary Singer: A Critical 
Biography of Walt Whitman, 56. 
408 From Roger Asselineau, The Evolution of Walt Whitman, vol. 1, 18.  
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Whitman’s fame rests almost entirely on . . . Leaves of Grass, which he wrote in his 
Brooklyn home as his father lay dying in another room. (The father died a few days 
after the publication of the first edition . . . in 1855.) It is estimated that a full two-
thirds of Whitman’s output was written in the year before and the year after this loss. 
His poetry evidently serves as a catharsis, a means of working through the grief 
process and of recreating himself. . . . Did the father’s death [in 1855] create 
Whitman’s gift or free it? Whitman’s poetry was bound up with the evolution of his 
new identity during and after the death. In his poetry, as in life, he saw himself as a 
father-healer, and even before the father died he seems to have organized his life 
around a fantasy of being father to his younger brothers and partner to his mother.409 
In a spirit similar to the construction of my earlier arguments in this chapter (and bearing out 
Reynolds in epigraphic perspective 26), I have sketched these biographical facts and inferences 
because I want to argue that Whitman’s oracular, incantatory assertions are best comprehended in 
light of their scarcity and essentiality in his actual – his social – life. Constitutionally and personally 
attracted to the idea of “brighten[ing] up those who suffer”, Whitman must have been attracted to 
the idea of imbuing his symbolic self with the capacity to speak comforting words – like an ideal 
parent – to (what he considered) the noble but troubled children of America. This may be true, and 
yet we should not forget Hesse’s claim that “[the poem always] speaks first of all to the poet 
himself, it is his cry, his scream, his dream, his smile, his whirling fists” (cf. footnote 191). Roger 
Asselineau cites Jean Catel to the effect that Whitman’s early short stories contain “confessions and 
thoughts which foretell Whitman’s masterpiece”, although they are admittedly as “the dawn, not the 
sunrise”.410 The following excerpt from Whitman’s autobiographical (see Reynolds above) 1844 
short story “My Boys and Girls”, in which the loss of innocence is keenly lamented, seems to 
provide a missing piece to an understanding of why Whitman felt himself called upon to be a voice 
of satisfaction and encouragement – one declaring the “unintelligible” cosmos and blindly 
unfolding events good and “significant”, to allude back to Henry Miller – notwithstanding 
undeniable evidence to the contrary. The very evident filial love of this excerpt seems compatible 
with a parental instinct to soothe: 
Blessings on the young! And for those whom I have mentioned in the past lines, oh, may the 
developement [sic] of their existence be spared any sharp stings of grief or pangs of 
remorse! Had I any magic or superhuman power, one of the first means of its use would be 
                                                 
409 David Aberbach Surviving Trauma, 23–24. Aberbach is indebted to C. M. Parkes’s Bereavement: Studies in Grief in 
Adult Life (1986), wherein it is argued that to gain a new identity after a loss is an integral part of the grief process; 
Aberbach concludes that “there is no doubt that Whitman’s poetry illustrates and, indeed, enacts such a 
transformation.” 
410 From Roger Asselineau, The Evolution of Walt Whitman, vol. 1, 46. 
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to insure the brightness and beauty of their lives. Alas! that there should be sin, and pain, 
and agony so abundantly in the world!—that these young creatures—wild, frolocksome 
[sic], and fair—so dear to me all of them, those connected by blood, and those whom I like 
for themselves alone—alas, that they should merge in manhood and womanhood the 
fragrance and purity of their youth!411 
I shall shortly provide a few examples illustrating more precisely what form his lines of 
encouragement – his attempts to “insure the brightness and beauty of . . . lives” – took. But first – 
inspired by the idea that a writer is necessarily and always, in a profound sense, aiming his writing 
at himself, let me speak briefly of the German art historian Wilhelm Worringer. In a treatise on the 
aesthetics of sculpture and design as well as on the themes of empathy, enjoyment and psychic 
needs, Worringer sketches an intriguing answer to why people have different artistic preferences 
and aesthetic weaknesses. He initially posits that art is, in a sense, an “exchange”: “Every sensuous 
object [work of art], in so far as it exists for me, is always the product of two components, of that 
which is sensuously given and of my apperceptive activity.” He then goes on to explain: 
The value of a work of art, what we call its beauty, lies, generally speaking, in its power to 
bestow happiness. The values of this power naturally stand in a causal relation to the psychic 
needs which they satisfy. Thus the ‘absolute artistic volition’ is the gauge for the quality of 
these psychic needs. . . . No psychology of the need for art—in the terms of our modern 
standpoint: of the need for style—has yet been written. It would be a history of the feeling 
about the world and, as such, would stand alongside the history of religion as its equal. By 
the feeling about the world I mean the psychic state in which, at any given time, mankind 
found itself in relation to the cosmos, in relation to the phenomena of the external world. 
This psychic state is disclosed in the quality of psychic needs, i.e. in the constitution of the 
absolute artistic volition, and bears outward fruit in the work of art, to be exact in the style 
of the latter, the specific nature of which is simply the specific nature of the psychic 
needs.412 
The idea that the value, utility or profundity of an aesthetic work varies according to and is 
dependent on the psychic state of the person evaluating it whether its creator or not is indirectly 
captured in Whitman’s words from “A Backward Glance O’er Travel’d Roads” about Leaves of 
Grass: “My book . . . has been the comfort of my life since it was originally commenced”. In other 
words, as a finished book it elicits the creator’s own satisfaction and is found satisfactory by him 
due to its function vis-à-vis a psychic situation obtaining beyond and separate from the book – in 
the poet himself and (by virtue of a literary conceit) in those he imagined himself talking to. David 
                                                 
411 The story is available at the online Walt Whitman Archive and has Whitman Archive ID “per.00333”. 
412 From Wilhelm Worringer, Abstraction and Empathy, 13. 
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S. Reynolds is justified in locating “a recipe for healing” in the poems (footnote 316), and Whitman 
himself may claim that their speaker is often “bringing hope”, because the spirit in which they are 
uttered is squarely “against” (as Gardner would say) psychic pain and hopelessness.413 The poet’s 
Daemon is so painfully conscious of such woes – from first-hand personal experience but also 
simply as forces endemic to human existence – that it feels called upon to counter them in a spirit 
analogous to the one suggested by the familiar prayer: 
Lord, make me an instrument of Thy peace. Where there is hatred, let me sow love. 
Where there is injury, pardon. Where there is discord, unity. 
Where there is doubt, faith. Where there is error, truth. 
Where there is despair, hope. Where there is sadness, joy. Where there is darkness, 
light. 
O divine master, grant that I may not so much seek to be consoled, as to console. 
To be understood, as to understand. To be loved, as to love. 
For it is in giving, that we receive. It is in pardoning, that we are pardoned. 
It is in dying, that we are born to eternal life.414 
 
The principle I am distilling here agrees with Worringer’s theory and pays homage to John 
Gardner’s ideas about morality in art. It also seems to speak to Asselineau’s words that in Whitman 
“an obscure feeling of inferiority” may have been what gave rise to something “superb”; or, as 
Whitman put it, “I will make the poems of materials, for I think they are to be the most spiritual 
poems, / And I will make the poems of my body and of mortality, / For I think I shall then supply 
myself with the poems of my soul and of immortality.” The “argument from inferiority”, so to 
speak, corresponds too with Robert Bly’s observation, derived from his analysis of the Brothers 
Grimm’s fairy-tale “Iron John”, that “where a man’s wound is that is where his genius will be.”415 
That duality is noted too by Harold Bloom who considers Whitman equally “[o]ur prime celebrant” 
and “our greatest elegist for the self, for the daemon errant in time’s wastages.”416 “In his poetry, as 
                                                 
413 Henry Miller’s understanding is compatible with such an interpretation of the psychic dynamics behind Whitman’s 
verse, for he asserts that it was as a consequence of the poems’ expansiveness that Whitman was able to “march[] 
on, calm, steady, sure of himself, certain of ultimate victory.” See footnote 314. 
414 The prayer is associated with St. Francis of Assissi. See Kenneth W. Osbeck, 101 Hymn Stories, 20. 
415 From Roger Asselineau, The Evolution of Walt Whitman, vol. 1, 181; and Robert Bly, Iron John, 42. The reader 
should bear the idea that “where a man’s wound is that is where his genius will be” in mind when reading my 
chapter on shadow integration in chapter 4. The analogy between “wound” and “shadow” is profound and deserves 
to be recognized. 
   It seems of relevance to note that Stendhal wrote in his journal that “A man must heal himself of 
enthusiasm for the happiness that he lacks”, which distills and presents the same dichotomy of opposites while 
indicating that will to heal is required in order to cope with “lack” and enable endurable being. Cited in Matthew 
Josephson, Stendhal; or, The Pursuit of Happiness, 123. See my words on “will to health” in footnote 166. On “will 
to meaning” (central to Franklean logotherapy), see footnote 189. 
416 From Harold Bloom, The Daemon Knows, 28.  
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in his life,” writes David Aberbach, “[Whitman] saw himself as a father-healer [whose] poetry is a 
prescription of health and Eros and an antidote to disease and Thanatos.”417 It seems 
uncontroversial to state that a father – or any parent, male or female – is a person that a child may 
depend upon for nurture, comfort, teaching, protection (the list goes on); in other words, the 
parental duty is to be, when possible, a positive and “orderly” force against the corresponding 
“chaotic” negatives suggested by hunger, despair, ignorance, danger and so on. Tragically, perhaps, 
there are moments in life when a person has little choice but to try to carry out some of those offices 
for him- or herself. A strong articulation of such a situation was described by the psychoanalyst 
Melanie Klein, although I shall do no more than merely indicate her argument.418 
 Some of Whitman’s best lines have the feel and structure of responses to the needs of 
someone in direst despair and danger. Many of these emphasize the solidity, nobility, integrity, 
beauty and endless resources and of the individual self (cf. the Emersonian “infinitude of the private 
man” in footnote 273). The first few lines in the first poem in the first edition of Leaves of Grass – 
 
I celebrate myself, 
And what I assume you shall assume, 
For every atom belonging to me as good belongs to you. 
 
– recommend that we consider (1) that all selves are entities worth celebrating (this teaching is 
conveyed by example), (2) that the “good news” known by the symbolic self justifying his self-
celebration might apply to the reader too so that (3) celebration of selves can occur communally and 
openly, not in the dark. Those readers who contemplated the 1855 Preface before turning to the first 
poem (then entitled “Leaves of Grass” but eventually entitled “Song of Myself”) may have already 
picked up such a sentiment. In a passage in the Preface detailing the poet’s aesthetic ambitions, 
Whitman writes 
 
What I tell I tell for precisely what it is. Let who may exalt or startle or fascinate or sooth I 
                                                 
417 From David Aberdach, Surviving Trauma, 24,  
418 Bearing out my overall argument on behalf of the property inherent in each person’s self to creatively synthesize 
order out of chaos as well as my claim (derived from Frankl) that a person is free to choose his or her response to 
suffering when subject to it, I am obliged to at least mention Melanie Klein’s claim that a self-parenting ability 
might be something like an innate skill: “The baby’s impulses and feelings are accompanied by a kind of mental 
activity which I take to be the most primitive one: that is phantasy-building, or more colloquially, imaginative 
thinking. For instance, the baby who feels a craving for his mother’s breast when it is not there may imagine it to be 
there, i.e. he may imagine the satisfaction which he derives from it. Such primitive phantasying is the earliest form 
of the capacity which later develops into the more elaborate workings of the imagination.” From the title essay in 
Melanie Klein, Love, Guilt and Reparation: And Other Works 1921–1945, 308. See Harold Bloom in epigraphic 
perspective 18. 
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will have purposes as health or heat or snow has and be as regardless of observation. What I 
experience or portray shall go from my composition without a shred of my composition. You 
shall stand by my side and look in the mirror with me. 
 
The notion that the self is inherently worthy of attention and enthusiasm – and that, rather than 
advocate secrecy about that, the self may appropriately be validated and celebrated in the presence 
of others – is conveyed here too (“by my side”). A little earlier in the Preface, the detailed 
description of the genius of “the greatest poet” or “artist” (which we are led to infer informs and 
pervades the ensuing verses) contains mention of qualities of a Messianic quality: 
 
The greatest poet hardly knows pettiness or triviality. If he breathes into any thing that was 
before thought small it dilates with the grandeur and life of the universe. He is a seer . . . . he 
is individual . . . he is complete in himself . . . . the others are as good as he, only he sees it 
and they do not. 
 
As for “seer”, Harold Bloom calls Whitman a “poet-prophet”.419 Equality between this “seer” and 
everybody else (the Preface refers frequently to “people” and, less frequently, to “folks”) is 
emphasized in other ways elsewhere in the Preface: “The poet sees for a certainty how one not a 
great artist may be just as sacred and perfect as the greatest artist.” So what sets this “equalizer of . . 
. age and land” apart and makes him deserving of words like “sacred and perfect”? We learn that he 
has broken away and liberated himself from things and status, bread, circuses, to be no longer a 
“slave[] of pleasure” (see footnote 47), which is interesting insofar as it suggests that the array of 
unique qualities are the product of decisive resolve and initiative, not providence or anything 
resembling numinous decree: “He is not one of the chorus . . . . he does not stop for any 
regulation . . . he is the president of regulation.” This position does indeed sounds reassuringly 
optional. If he has a precursor in literature, it would be Emerson’s self-reliant nonconformist.420 
Alternatively, it would be Thomas Carlyle’s “hero.”421 
 The central character of the Preface is one overflowing with individual possibility, 
autonomy, freedom, exuberance and exhilaration. Yet despite that character’s arguably Messianic 
proportions, the attainment of these things depends on efforts that are apparently within everybody 
                                                 
419 Harold Bloom calls Whitman “poet-prophet” in “Trust the Tale, not the Teller: Hans Christian Andersen”, in J. C. 
Hallman, ed., The Story About the Story: Great Writers Explore Great Literature, vol. 2, 298. 
420 See footnote 340 and 442. 
421 In “Whitman’s Poet-Prophet and Carlyle’s Hero”, Fred Manning Smith argues that Carlyle is key to understanding 
and tracing the sentiments in Whitman’s Preface. The Carlyle text in question is Heroes and Hero-Worship, which 
contains a chapter entitled “The Hero as Man of Letters”. Asselineau concludes that both Carlyle and Emerson are 
certainly influences on Whitman but that there are others too. See Roger Asselineau, The Evolution of Walt 
Whitman, vol. 1, 55. 
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reach. This is made clear when – apparently in a moment of uncontained joy and existential 
exuberance – the voice of the Preface betrays its confidence that readers will be eager to emulate it 
themselves and therefore curious about the necessary character-forming program (“recipe for 
healing” in Reynolds’s phrase). Equivalent to my own words following footnote 138 – where I posit 
that because one is oneself part and parcel of the problem of one’s suffering, one is also part of the 
solution (see text coming up to footnote 457) – the program is offered on the heels of the premise or 
principle that “If the greatnesses are in conjunction in a man or woman it is enough . . . the gaggery 
and gilt of a million years will not prevail.” (Notice that the presence of “greatnesses” is silently 
assumed and taken for granted; it is the configuration of this potential that is the issue; the bit about 
“gaggery and gilt”, incidentally, is analogous to how I conceptualized “cure”, exterior and 
instrumentally applied as distinct from organically occurring “healing” – see text anticipating 
footnote 96.) With no further ado, and without a shred of doubt or uncertainty, Whitman lays out 
“what you shall do:” 
 
Love the earth and sun and the animals, despise riches, give alms to every one that asks, 
stand up for the stupid and crazy, devote your income and labor to others, hate tyrants, argue 
not concerning God, have patience and indulgence toward the people, take off your hat to 
nothing known or unknown or to any man or number of men, go freely with powerful 
uneducated persons and with the young and with the mothers of families, read these leaves 
in the open air every season of every year of your life, re examine all you have been told at 
school or church or in any book, dismiss whatever insults your own soul, and your very 
flesh shall be a great poem and have the richest fluency not only in its words but in the silent 
lines of its lips and face and between the lashes of your eyes and in every motion and joint 
of your body. 
 
To stress that “greatness” is a latent possibility which the human self can accrue by volition might 
seem a philosophically tangled way of convincing those tormented by existential misgiving that 
their despair is finally unfounded; but it is arguably the only way available to someone intent on 
avoiding specious cant and happiness by decree, which seems chimerical. A gesture of that sort (i.e. 
the insistence that dedicated effort is the only difference between the unrealized and realized 
individual) seems inseparable in nature from a parent’s fully owned and overt trust that a child will 
be able to bear the burden of existence and make the necessary choices in a satisfactory – perhaps 
even praiseworthy – fashion. It is a profoundly “democratic” and anti-elitist stance – as Thoreau 
recognized: He said of Leaves of Grass that “it puts me into a liberal frame of mind prepared to see 
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wonders. . . . He is apparently the greatest democrat the world has seen.”422 
 Again, it is the fact that achieving Whitman’s “remote possibility” (to use Cohen’s 
phrase) is in principle an achievement open and available to all that makes the sentiment 
redemptive and revelatory, even Messianic or saintly – and finds Whitman most unrestrainedly 
celebrating selfhood. Of course, it is possible to quibble about the practicality and utility of specific 
details in Whitman’s program, but it would be hard to deny that the passage does lay out the 
possibility for existential renewal and a “rebooting” of the self in clear and unmistakable terms. 
Similarly, it would of course be possible to accuse the program of arbitrary dogmatism; but I 
venture that this is beside the point for the following reason: The value of the piece is significantly 
not intended to inhere in its technical utility as proved by practical application (note that “your very 
flesh shall be a great poem” is hardly meant to be taken literally) but rather in what issuing such 
straightforward dicta suggests about the potentials of the human self and about human being. And 
the human self’s potential upper limits and capabilities – particularly the psychological ones – are 
not easily defined or “capped”.423 
 In the phrase “dismiss whatever insults your own soul”, which immediately precedes a 
description of the saintly state, reappear the freedom on behalf of the individual that I have tried to 
sketch in preceding chapters. The very ability to “dismiss” is similar in nature to the biblical Logos 
that Peterson and Henry Miller attributes to the human self. Reality can be “edited”: As John 
Cowper Powys puts it, “To analyse this “objective” world is all very well, as long as you don’t 
forget that the power to rebuild it by emphasis and rejection is synonymous with your being 
alive.”424 Whitman’s point is that although reality seem forbidding and alienating at first glance, we 
must not accord first appearances eternal significance. The previously-cited insights from Nietzsche 
(“To live is to suffer, to survive is to find some meaning in the suffering”) and Jung (“A life without 
inner contradiction is either only half a life”) lead us to conclude that a world in which we are asked 
to do nothing about our suffering – about our sense of “inner contradiction”, about our “insult[ed 
]soul” – would indeed be an impoverished world (even though we might think we should like it 
more than one demanding our constant and patient “editing” or “co-authoring” offices). (Thus, both 
                                                 
422 Milton Meltzer, Henry David Thoreau: A Biography, 119. 
423 As I write in the abstract and have hopefully demonstrated several times already, I am determined to approach the 
texts in a spirit that does not preemptively deconstruct or negate the spirit in which they seem to have been written. 
Although there are doubtless times when stern neutrality and skepticism is of the essence, I am not convinced that 
the best way to approach literature is by adopting the role of deconstructing diagnostician intent on exposing 
contradictions, biases and weak points. See epigraphic perspective 28. 
424 John Cowper Powys, Autobiography, 626. See also epigraphic perspective 17. 
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self and world are celebrated, or redeemed, in the Preface.) Whitman promises – metaphorically, it 
would seem – that we can each of us become “a great poem and have the richest fluency [in our 
words and] in the silent lines”; that metaphor is hospitable to what I here call our ability to “edit” 
life, and it retraces the point from Blixen that we can choose to have a part of our being incorporate 
aesthetic dimensions (we achieve that by telling stories, writing poems or thinking imaginatively 
about our trials). To the degree we do that, we may derive or tap into a freedom generally absent 
from life. All these textual instances of and references to latent human autonomy or “will” (and 
many more that I have mentioned previously) indicate each other in my reading of Whitman. Singly 
and jointly I find that they cohere to make possible the interpretation I am presenting which – 
whether made overt (as here by me) or not – is the active and central element in Whitman’s “recipe 
for healing.” 
 There is a passage in Nietzsche – on “will” (I have alluded to it in footnote 252) – 
which is relevant to the present discussion: 
 
     ‘And how could I bear to be human if the human being were not also a composer-poet 
and riddle-guesser and the redeemer of coincidence! 
     ‘To redeem that which has passed away and to re-create all “It was” into a “Thus I willed 
it!”—that alone should I call redemption! 
     ‘Will—that is the liberator and joy-bringer: that is what I taught you, my friends! . . .’425 
 
Simon May sheds light on the passage by commenting that “what is painful about the past . . . 
becomes redeemed when we will, which means when we affirm, that past.”426 The symbolic self in 
many of Whitman’s poems (including those written after 1855) seems engaged in similar 
determined attempts to “will the past” – to take past events and redeem them by turning them from 
their status of “It was” into their new status of “Thus I willed [them]!”. This is similar to 
“dismiss[ing] whatever insults [one’s] own soul” in that it is a mental operation undertaken for 
purposes of healing (through the amelioration of one’s whole existential situation) and to which a 
person’s aesthetic and linguistic faculties can usefully be harnessed.427 (Cf. Jung in footnote 53: 
“Only what is really oneself has the power to heal”.) There is also a quasi-religious attitude at play 
here, for seeking to “will the past” is arguably analogous to attempting a Kierkegaardian leap of 
                                                 
425 Friedrich Nietzsche, Thus Spake Zarathustra: A Book for Everyone and Nobody, 121. 
426 From Simon May, Nietzsche’s On the Genealogy of Morality: A Critical Guide, 99 
427 Incidentally, I am not the first to notice a certain affinity between Thus Spake Zarathustra and Whitman. Nils Åke 
Nilsson has located a number of things in the former which “seem to develop some ideas in Whitman’s work 
(although there is no evidence of any direct influence of Whitman on Nietzsche . . .)”. Nilsson is a contributor to Jan 
van der Eng and Willem G. Weststeijn, ed., Avant Garde: Interdisciplinary and International Review, 52. 
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faith; the leap consists in the individual’s willingness to accede that his or her evaluation of the 
fairness of events is necessarily limited and therefore perhaps ultimately not worth defending. 
 Exemplifying “will[ing] the past”, Whitman writes, for instance: 
 
I assert that all past days were what they must have been, 
And that they could no-how have been better than they were, 
And that to-day is what it must be, and that America is, 
And that to-day and America could no-how be better than they are.428 
 
And in a passage from “Song of Myself” that rewards cross-comparison, he writes 
 
This minute that comes to me over the past decillions, 
There is no better than it and now. 
 
What behaved well in the past or behaves well today is not such a wonder, 
The wonder is always and always how there can be a mean man or an infidel.429 
 
In these examples, the self appears determined to accede (on no very obvious authority, hence leap 
of faith) that no current state of affairs should be met with the self’s condemnation or grief but must 
rather be patiently accepted in spite of the difficulty or discomfort plausibly associated with 
acceptance. The emerging attitude has much in common with the one expressed by Boethius: “All 
fortune is good fortune; for it either rewards, disciplines, amends, or punishes, and so is either 
useful or just” (see footnote 132). The crux is that while there might be many different responses to 
life (depending on scenario-specific details), there are only two directions in which to slide: towards 
unconditional acceptance or towards unconditional rejection. Alternatively, these might be 
conceptualized as, respectively, flight to or flight from the saintly perspective. Einstein is 
establishing or invoking the same linear spectrum when he delineates the only “two ways to live 
your life” (see footnote 380).430 In another poem, where Whitman envisages the concept of a “true 
poem of riches”, the way he talks about it suggests that he knows that determination and 
decisiveness – i.e. “will” – are key to the work of bringing it about: 
  
I will make the true poem of riches, 
To earn for the body and the mind whatever adheres and goes forward and is not dropt by 
                                                 
428 From “With Antecedents.” 
429 From “Song of Myself,” section 22. 
430 Apropos Einstein’s words, in the poem I turn to next (“Starting from Paumanok”) Whitman expresses his intention to 
show that “all the things of the universe are perfect miracles, each as profound as any.” 
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death; 
I will effuse egotism and show it underlying all, and I will be the bard of personality, 
And I will show of male and female that either is but the equal of the other, 
And sexual organs and acts! do you concentrate in me, for I am determin’d to tell you with 
courageous clear voice to prove you illustrious, 
And I will show that there is no imperfection in the present, and can be none in the future, 
And I will show that whatever happens to anybody it may be turn’d to beautiful results 
. . .431 
 
I have argued that Leaves of Grass is a book in which Whitman via art pursues, hones and to some 
degree starts self-adopting an existential attitude that renders him capable of withstanding the 
pressures of the human condition – makes him “balanced for contingencies”. Predominantly, it is a 
transformative attitude: Under its force, “imperfection”, “sexual organs and acts”, “male and 
female” and everything else reappear in a new and better light. As a result of the archetypally 
heroic, psycholinguistic retrieval and rescue (from undifferentiated chaos into orderly, structured 
conceptualization) of the idea of self-redemption as a practical possibility, ideas that are of a piece 
with “whatever happens to anybody it may be turn’d to beautiful results” gain credence and 
plausibility. Ideational coherence has at least thus been demonstrated linguistically, which brings 
them that much closer to mental recognition. In other words: Although I keep suggesting there is 
much we do not understand about human being and potential, it seems we are justified in holding 
that in order for something to be practically achievable, it should also be available or hospitable to 
straightforward theoretical presentation.432 It is as if, because the vision that self-redemption is a 
practical possibility is so obviously beautiful (I assume that news of redemption is always 
inherently welcome), by merely showing ourselves able to partake of that vision on behalf of the 
self, we inch closer to proving it vision believable. After all, despite all the trials and tribulations of 
one’s life, that life has now brought us to an encounter with a transcendental vision for selves like 
our own, and from that perspective it becomes – hypothetically – possible to partake for a while of 
the symbolic self’s conviction that literally anything can “be turn’d to beautiful results”. Insofar as 
one agrees with Jaron Lanier that “Being a person is not a pat formula, but a quest, a mystery, a leap 
of faith”, it certainly seems a logical possibility.433 For his part, Viktor Frankl, plunged in the most 
heinous degradation and agony, involuntarily turned what happened to him into the “beautiful 
                                                 
431 From “Starting from Paumanok”. 
432 As for what that might mean for a reader, consider Fitzgerald in epigraphic perspective 11. 
433 At any rate, we seem to be coming up against the psychological notion of redescription (see footnote 277). Within 
that context, Adam Phillips has said that “It may not be that all accidents are meaningful, but that meaning is made 
out of accidents.” From Adam Phillips, On Flirtation, 11. I cite Lanier in footnote 69. 
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result” of being able to report to all of humanity that “a vestige of spiritual freedom, of 
independence of mind” may float free of the most destructive attempts to quell it.434 
 These consideration grew out of the Nietzschean “Thus I willed it”; Whitman 
transformed himself by “willing” a redemptive attitude into being. He did so by using poetry 
“instrumentally” – by “capturing” his ideal linguistically and “arresting” it poetically on paper. In 
my assessment, there is a profound psychological and existential lesson in that. 
The lines immediately following “whatever happens . . . it may be turn’d to beautiful 
results” in “Starting from Paumanok” are as follows: 
 
And I will show that nothing can happen more beautiful than death, 
And I will thread a thread through my poems that time and events are compact, 
And that all the things of the universe are perfect miracles, each as profound as any. 
 
I will not make poems with reference to parts, 
But I will make poems, songs, thoughts, with reference to ensemble, 
And I will not sing with reference to a day, but with reference to all days, 
And I will not make a poem nor the least part of a poem but has reference to the soul, 
Because having look’d at the objects of the universe, I find there is no one nor any particle 
of one but has reference to the soul. 
 
This passage is telling in a different way. Whitman writes that he will “not make poems with 
reference to parts” nor “with reference to a day, but with reference to all days”. Many of his poems 
– most notably those featuring so-called Whitmanian “catalogues” – subsume or dissolve the 
particular in what seems like the infinite or unbounded and achieve, finds John B. Mason, an 
“expansive, exhilarating” effects.435 Mason adds that the catalogues are “a device through which 
Whitman expresses his faith in the expansiveness and all-inclusiveness of American democracy” 
and “extends himself out into the universe”. In “Song of Myself”, Whitman himself describes the 
cataloguing poet – that is to say, himself – as a “caresser of life”. In my estimation, the catalogues 
exemplify a variant of the aforementioned willed affirmation, and like the affirmation associated 
with the redemption of past events, this phenomenon too is cogently outlined by Nietzsche. In the 
passage below from Twilight of the Idols, Nietzsche is admittedly talking about Goethe – a figure 
greatly admired, as it happens, by both Nietzsche and Whitman – but it so aptly describes a 
perspective characteristic (also) of Whitman that it merits our attention. In other words, we can 
                                                 
434 From Viktor Frankl, Man’s Search for Meaning, 65. 
435 From John B. Mason’s entry “Catalogues” in J. R. LeMaster and Donald D. Kummings, eds., The Routledge 
Encyclopedia of Walt Whitman, 107–108. 
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approach it as a general psychological description of a different (albeit related) “remote possibility” 
(to reference Cohen again); the passage I have underscored is particularly relevant to a discussion of 
Whitman: 
 
[W]hat he wanted was totality; . . . he disciplined himself into wholeness, he created himself 
. . . [He conceived] the man of tolerance, not from weakness but from strength because he 
knows how to use to his advantage even that from which the average nature would perish;436 
the man for whom there is no longer anything that is forbidden unless it be weakness, 
whether called vice or virtue.437 Such a spirit who has become free stands amid the cosmos 
with a joyous and trusting fatalism, in the faith that only the particular is loathsome, and that 
all is redeemed and affirmed in the whole—he does not negate anymore.438 Such a faith, 
however, is the highest of all possible faiths.439 
 
The excerpt finds several striking counterpart instances in Whitman (some of which I have 
indicated in footnotes within Nietzsche’s text itself). The underscored sentence can be said to speak 
with especial fidelity for these lines from Whitman: “Copious as you are [you orbs, growths, 
mountains, brutes], I absorb you all in myself, and become the master Myself.” Here, the speaking 
symbolic self (and arguably eventually the actual self) assumes and adopts the function of 
Nietzsche’s “whole”, i.e. something endowed with the power to “defang” and redeem threat and 
adversity. 
 Leaving aside the fact that Nietzsche is writing about another great poet – Goethe – 
the thematic and personal similarities between Nietzsche and Whitman (who both admired Goethe) 
come as less of a surprise when one takes into account that both men were heavily influenced by R. 
W. Emerson.440 Although, as I say in footnote 427, there is no evidence of Whitman directly 
influencing Nietzsche, 1964 saw the publication of C. N. Stavrou’s Whitman and Nietzsche: A 
                                                 
436 Cf. Whitman from his 1855 Preface: “He consumes an eternal passion and is indifferent which chance happens and 
which possible contingency of fortune or misfortune and persuades daily and hourly his delicious pay. What balks or 
breaks others is fuel for his burning progress to contact and amorous joy.” 
437 Cf. “What blurt is this about virtue and about vice? / Evil propels me, and reform of evil propels me, I stand 
indifferent, / My gait is no fault-finder’s or rejecter’s gait, / I moisten the roots of all that has grown.” From 
Whitman’s “Song of Myself”. It goes without saying that Whitman was not a moral relativist. But he was no 
defender of dogmatism, whether on behalf of or against morality. 
438 Cf. “Henceforth I whimper no more, postpone no more, need nothing, / Done with indoor complaints, libraries, 
querulous criticisms, / Strong and content I travel the open road.” “And henceforth I will go celebrate any thing I see 
or am, / And sing and laugh and deny nothing.” From Whitman’s “Song of the Open Road” and “All Is Truth”, 
respectively. 
439 Cf. “My faith is the greatest of faiths and the least of faiths.” From Whitman’s “Song of Myself”. 
 The Nietzsche excerpt is from Twilight of the Idols, chapter 9, paragraph 49. It is cited in Walter A. 
Kaufmann, Nietzsche: Philosopher, Psychologist, Antichrist, 281 (italicized emphasis in original; underscore added). 
440 “Emerson at one time influenced Nietzsche very deeply”, writes Josiah Royce and adds: “With Walt Whitman he has 
not a few features of ideal and doctrine in common.” From Daniel W. Conway and Peter S. Groff, eds., Nietzsche: 
Critical Assessments, vol. 3, 270 
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Comparative Study of Their Thought, which contains a detailed analysis of the two authors’ works, 
which Stavrou find convergent in many relevant aspects. Not the least point of convergence is both 
men’s conceptions of what constitutes an ideal man, a hero, an Übermensch. As I have said, 
Nietzsche held Goethe in great esteem (and he called Eckermann’s Words of Goethe “the best 
German book there is”).441 At the risk of confusing my reader by alluding too frequently to German 
literature and thought, let me “come full circle” and bring it all back home with these words from 
Emerson. The sage of New England here talks about poetry and about coming to terms with 
debased and warped landscapes; the passage resonates with Nietzsche’s remarks on Goethe – and, 
by proxy as I have claimed, with Whitman – which is understandable in light of the respect 
Emerson and Whitman had for each other: 
 
[As] it is dislocation and detachment . . . that makes things ugly, the poet, who 
reattaches things to nature and the Whole,—reattaching even artificial things, and 
violations of nature, to nature, by a deeper insight,—disposes very easily of the most 
disagreeable facts. Readers of poetry see the factory-village and the railway, and fancy 
that the poetry of the landscape is broken up by these; for these works of art are not 
yet consecrated in their reading; but the poet seem them fall within the great Order not 
less than the beehive or the spider’s geometrical web.442 
 
Asselineau notes that Emerson himself never had the courage of his convictions to the same degree 
as Whitman who incorporated (“absorbed”) prosaic motifs and workaday themes into Leaves of 
Grass much more “intrepidly” than Emerson.443 
 I said above that Whitman sometimes expresses himself in a style that would be 
appropriate for a sage or oracle. But language which tends in a “spiritual” direction without the 
mandate of the underlying sentiments is unlikely to keep from degenerating into a kind of poetic 
“virtue signaling”. Howsoever that may be, Whitman’s insistence on affirming reality (regardless of 
whether it strikes us immediately as unsightly or lovely) presents an attitude described by Gerald 
Heard under the rubric of “gratitude”. The British-born author and philosopher, who became a 
friend of Aldous Huxley and of the other mystically inclined English intellectuals who settled in 
California during the 1930s, sees such a psychological state as being proportionate to a person’s 
growing “creative insight” – in the direction of gratitude (a term related to “celebration”, I would 
                                                 
441 I mention Words of Goethe in footnote 51. Nietzsche’s praise is cited in Ernst Bertram, Nietzsche: Attempt at a 
Mythology, 158. 
442 From Emerson’s essay “The Poet”, in Ralph Waldo Emerson, Essays & Lectures, 455. The excerpt rewards 
comparison with that from “The Transcendentalist” in footnote 333. 
443 Roger Asselineau, The Evolution of Walt Whitman, vol. 2, 193. 
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venture). Having obtained such a state, reality’s “ugly colour” and “muddled design” are 
transformed into “opportunities for interpretation” from formerly being causes for condemnation. 
The interpretation I am trying to describe carries out a certain holistic operation effecting absorption 
of elements into wholeness. (Recall the Frame Problem of chapter 2: The Frame Problem is the 
formal articulation of what is at the center of Heard’s, Nietzsche’s, Watts’s, Whitman’s and others’ 
psychologically inflected ideas in the present context.)444 Heard continues: 
 
The disappointment and the pain—these, too, enrich, not frustrate, the whole, when 
we can accept them, not grudgingly but with gratitude. The gratitude that at first only 
gave thanks for all the obvious (and superficial) goods, is crowned in the end by the 
creative insight.445 
 
We have seen Thoreau say that the tools of “the imagination and fancy and reason” can carve out “a 
new creation, independent of the world, and a possession forever”, which could be likened to 
“cleared . . . wilderness.” (See footnote 187.) Essentially the same thing is captured in Nietzsche’s 
and Heard’s passages where the particular is only “loathsome” when it is not (yet) “affirmed in the 
whole” or seen as “opportunities” for the “tool” of “interpretation” and “creative insight”. A 
wonderful passage from William James establishes that the loathsome and offensive element could 
in theory be no less than “Satan” himself, “the negative or tragic principle”, which is a notion that 
usefully anticipates my discussion of the Jungian shadow in the next chapter:446 
 
[In] its most characteristic embodiments, religious happiness is no mere feeling of 
escape. It cares no longer to escape.[447] It consents to the evil outwardly as a form of 
                                                 
444 Note also in this context the significance of the philosophy of phenomenology, which Stephen de Paul describes 
thus: “Central to [phenomenology] is the notion that the world of appearing things [unsightly as well as beautiful] is 
governed, ordered and given meaning by consciousness itself.” From Stephen de Paul, “Phenomenological criticism”, 
in Irena R. Makaryk, ed., Encyclopedia of Contemporary Literary Theory. 139. 
 Peterson is a thinker who agrees that “consciousness plays a centrally important role in the generation 
of the predictable and comprehended world from the domain of the unexpected.” A few lines from Whitman capture the 
same beautifully: “We consider bibles and religions divine—I do not say they are not divine, / I say they have all grown 
out of you, and may grow out of you still, / It is not they who give the life, it is you who give the life, / Leaves are not 
more shed from the trees, or trees from the earth, than they are shed out of you.” From “A Song for Occupations”. 
Peterson’s words are from Jordan Peterson, Maps of Meaning, 52 
445 From Gerald Heard, Prayers and Meditations: Selections by Gerald Heard, Aldous Huxley, and Others, 88. That 
perspective was what J. B. Beresford was articulating (and giving a religious context) in the epigraph to his 1918 
novel God’s Counterpoint: “All apparent discords and ugliness are but accentuations of the eternal rhythm ; the 
necessary beat of an undertone ; God’s counterpoint . . .”. 
446 James talks about “religion consciousness” and “happiness”, it is true, but the religious experience is equally a 
psychological state – again, I intend no mystification or superstition – and therefore eligible for attention in this 
context. 
447 Cf. “Henceforth I ask not good-fortune, I myself am good-fortune, / Henceforth I whimper no more, postpone no 
more, need nothing, / Done with indoor complaints, libraries, querulous criticisms, / Strong and content I travel the 
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sacrifice—inwardly it knows it to be permanently overcome. If you ask how religion 
thus falls on the thorns and faces death, and in the very act annuls annihilation, I 
cannot explain the matter, for it is religion’s secret . . . [It is a] complex sacrificial 
constitution, in which a higher happiness holds a lower unhappiness in check. In the 
Louvre there is a picture, by Guido Reni, of St. Michael with his foot on Satan’s neck. 
The richness of the picture is in large part due to the fiend’s figure being there. The 
richness of its allegorical meaning also is due to his being there—that is, the world is 
all the richer for having a devil in it, so long as we keep our foot upon his neck. . . . 
 
One term that seems indicated and comes to mind when reading these perspectives is holism, which 
is interesting for two (related) reasons. (The reader should also recall and reflect here on the 
remarks in footnote 80 on “quality of being” being dependent on balancing chaos and order.) I have 
previously clarified the etymological affinity between the words “hale”, “heal”, “health”, 
“wholesome”, “whole” and “holy”. Although “holism” is evidently a coined word from 1926, it can 
be said to be derived from the Greek “holos”, which means “whole” – appropriately enough.448 The 
other interesting thing worth mentioning is predominantly a coincidence (implausible but, for all 
that, very satisfying): It turns out that the man who coined the word “holism” was none other than 
Jan Christian Smuts, the South African and British Commonwealth statesman and Whitman 
specialist (born 1870) whom I mentioned in the Preface (footnote 16). “Holism”, which Smuts 
preferred to capitalize, is central to his 1927 mystically speculative book Holism and Evolution.449 
 
Having said what I can about the role played by volition, effort, determination, will and resolve in 
crises of being, it remains, of course, an ultimately intractable problem – a humbling mystery – why 
some people come to find their existence fatally unbearable when others would consider a life 
haunted by the very same – or, for that matter, worse – scourges and ills perfectly tolerable, perhaps 
even conducive to their happiness and flourishing. I cited Stanley Cavell in footnote 90 – “Man is 
the animal for whom to be or not to be is the question: its resolution therefore must have the form of 
an answer” – which, alas, suggests that there is something existentially extreme or precarious about 
the human condition (Camus, Kafka, Kierkegaard, Freud, Jung and many others thought exactly 
that). Peterson suggested as much, too, when he stated that there are episodes in life that challenges 
our present understanding and ideas about the world so profoundly that not only must “part of the 
                                                 
open road.” From Whitman’s “Song of the Open Road”. 
448 The resource I draw on is www.etymonline.com. 
449 To reiterate: Smuts is of interest to Whitman scholars because he wrote a book length study on Whitman, published 
posthumously in 1973, entitled Walt Whitman: A Study in the Evolution of Personality. In the manuscript to that 
book, which predates Holism and Evolution, Smuts introduces concepts and theories which his later wide-ranging 
philosophy of holism evolved and complicated. 
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“stupid old you” [perish]” but such “an awful lot of you” gets destabilized “that you just die; you 
just can’t handle it.”450 (Let us at this stage not forget that the problem seems inextricably linked to 
the mystery of consciousness, which I have flagged a few times above, insofar as it appears to be 
the case that living organisms need to be conscious in order to suffer; and rather mysteriously in that 
context, it seems equally true that consciousness is no prerequisite for life at all – much of nature 
appears to be doing fine without it.) But if I confess myself defeated and uneasy before the concept 
and problem of psychic suffering, at least I am not alone. Adam Phillips cites Beckett in whose 
1957 radio play All That Fall a character, Mrs Rooney, describes “a little girl, very strange and 
unhappy in her ways” whose critical condition completely stumps what Mrs Rooney calls “one of 
these new mind doctors”: 
 
He could find nothing wrong with her . . . The only thing wrong with her as far as he 
could see was that she was dying . . . it was just something he said, and the way he 
said it that have haunted me ever since . . . When he had done with the little girl he 
stood there motionless for some time . . . Then he suddenly raised his head and 
explained, as if he had had a revelation. ‘The trouble with her was that had never 
really been born!’451 
 
There is, then, much in this domain which eludes confident and robust explanation. If one decides 
to take me at my word, I have extracted the lesson and made a case for the no doubt immediately 
curious – and probably provocative (if not offensive) – idea that it is in principle possible to tolerate 
any scenario whatsoever. (Derived from Frankl’s Holocaust experience, I did, it is true, 
circumspectly appropriate this idea as a conditional premise.) I do not deny, of course, that 
circumstances can be – can grow – technically unbearable and insufferable. Shelly Kagan takes 
great pains to argue – convincingly – that suffering can assume such severity and chronicity that 
staying alive would result in a worse outcome than having life terminated.452 But I am not primarily 
concerned with such cases; I own that we are fragile, mortal entities. Rather, I appeal to the words I 
offered at the outset – that “Life is a problem which has for each an individual solution” (see 
footnote 24) – from which insight I try to defend the notion that, plausibly as a result of the high 
standard of living in the West, we might each of us be very inadequately informed about the limits 
of our psychic endurance, resources and genius for “rebirth”. Unless we are clinically depressed to a 
                                                 
450 The full quote is given in footnote 313. 
451 The excerpt is cited in Adam Phillips, Unforbidden Pleasures, 190. James Knowlson adds that the story “derives 
from a lecture given by the psychologist C. G. Jung, in the mid-thirties, that Beckett attended while he was staying 
in London.” From S. E. Gontarski, ed., On Beckett: Essays and Criticism, 268. 
452 See Shelly Kagan, Death, chapter 15 (on suicide). 
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degree demanding prompt medical attention, a positive option (such as some form of therapy, 
including those enhanced by aesthetic activity) should not be sacrificed for the perverse temptation 
to capitulate immediately.453 Adam Phillips writes that “the self is constituted partly by its 
unattained self, or selves,” and partly by what is already manifest.454 Ready access to the former 
would seem to be a great boon, but even so there is no escaping the awful human recognition that 
“to be or not to be” is a question we must answer performatively each moment of our lives. 
 As I say, ponderous discourse seems largely ineffective in this domain: When 
someone is about to fatally go under, it is such a delicate situation yet such an emergency that a fine 
philosophical point is really too late. Simon Blackburn has written about this, i.e. about the 
unwisdom of “prescribing” abstract thinking to the suicidal and those plunged in keenest distress: 
“In [certain] moods, however, everything goes leaden. Like Hamlet, we are determined to skulk at 
the edge of the carnival, seeing nothing but the skull beneath the skin. It is sad when we become 
like that, and once more we need a tonic more than an argument.”455 
 I find that there are both romantic and classical (specifically Stoical) overtones to the 
idea that any crisis can in principle be endured, any amount of suffering transcended, and that a 
person’s fate is written in his or her heart, so to speak, by which I mean that it is not the result of 
some actuarial calculus representing exterior events. Thoreau seems to have taken this heartening 
view: 
 
The fault-finder will find faults even in paradise. Love your life, poor as it is. You may 
perhaps have some pleasant, thrilling, glorious hours, even in a poor-house. The 
setting sun is reflected from the windows of the alms-house as brightly as from the 
rich man’s abode; the snow melts before its door as early in the spring. I do not see 
but a quiet mind may live as contentedly there, and have as cheering thoughts, as in a 
palace.456 
 
To Thoreau, love of life is dependent on sheer determination to do so, irrespective of the inherent 
actual value of life. Emerson posited similarly romantic claims: He insisted that “we are wiser than 
we think” and that “[t]he soul refuses limits, and always affirms an Optimism, never a Pessimism,” 
                                                 
453 Speaking of depression, Neel Burton has said that with the exception of “the more severe intractable cases that are 
treated by hospital psychiatrists”, the “vast majority” of cases can be understood in terms of “life problems, human 
nature or the human condition.” From Neel Burton, Growing from Depression, 31. 
454 From Adam Phillips, Unforbidden Pleasures, 188. 
455 Simon Blackburn, Being Good, 80. 
456 Thoreau, Walden, 345. However, Thoreau does not consider whether all are in fact equally free to choose to “love 
[their] life.” 
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which suggests that the unknowable things about us (essential to us) work in our favor and can (at 
least potentially) come to our aid in an emergency.457 But poverty is one category of adversity; pain 
and evil are others and generally not easily tolerated by the subject they torment and afflict. If there 
seems to be a glib residual quality, then, to the perhaps indefensibly sunny, romantic lesson I have 
extracted and defended, I would merely add this: From a certain perspective, such a conclusion is 
the only one that a person can legitimately get behind (that is to say, if what we are after is one 
conclusion – not multiple ones). This is because the opposite one will simply not do: One cannot 
coherently and defensibly advocate capitulation to adversity or validate as a good the fatal 
desperation which drive sufferers to self-abnegation and insanity – not when better, more valuable 
and constructive stances and perspectives might be adopted, despite being, in light of the actual 
facts and by any reasonable standard, deeply “illogical” and unusual. After all, for every Frankl and 
Solzhenitsyn who made it out of the hellish camps during World War II, thousands, if not millions, 
did not and could not. Though I have defended as noble and legitimate the Franklean freedom to 
choose a psychological attitude regardless of circumstances, then, there sometimes sadly is no 
choice at all. There is something miraculous and extraordinary (almost romantic and heroic) about 
“Frank’s freedom”, and that should not surprise us for there is something miraculous – I have used 
the word “saintly” – about transforming any process towards evil and being able to “will” it in the 
present and in hindsight. By the same rationale, genius such as Whitman’s is exceptional, and so 
(incidentally) was the physical stamina and longevity he manifested. The very opposite of nihilistic, 
his was a condition in which he could, in Cavell’s words, “at once want the world and want it to 
change – even change it, as the apple changes the earth, though we say the apple falls. (Nietzsche’s 
word for the spreading inability to want the world is nihilism.)”458 These fine things as exemplified 
by Whitman’s “condition” are, as I say, not likely. But I stand by what I have said (at the bottom of 
page 5): The human self’s potential upper limits and capabilities – particularly the psychological 
ones – are not easily defined, and it seem wicked to rush to insist that were are powerless on all 
fronts.459 
                                                 
457 The two lines are from Emerson’s essays “The Over-Soul” and “Compensation”, respectively. 
458 Appropriately enough, perhaps, Cavell calls the condition in question “Emersonian perfectionism.” From Stanley 
Cavell, Cities of Words: Pedagogical Letters on a Register of the Moral Life, 18. 
459 As regards Whitman’s stamina: Following the very lengthy list of issues revealed by an autopsy conducted of 
Whitman’s body, his friend R. M. Bucke was led to say this: “Another would have died much earlier with one-half 
of the pathological changes which existed in his body.” To this, Asselineau adds: “Only his indomitable will had 
enabled him to live so long in spite of all these maladies. The poet of perfect health had fought off illness and had 
finally been overcome by a combination of diseases the least of which would have been enough to kill another 
man.” From Roger Asselineau, The Evolution of Walt Whitman, vol. 1, 268. 
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 The mystery, of course – and it is a psychological mystery before it is a philosophical 
mystery, as far as I am concerned – is that human beings ever will or allow their own destruction 
and death, that they sometimes perversely desire to fall apart under the weight of burdens that 
would have been no match at another point in life or that others might gladly take on. I am unable to 
say much more about psychic distress of life-threatening magnitude. I remain someone who, with 
everybody who considers the matter honestly, stands in awe before the human mind which in 
internal complexity exceeds any other object in the universe. It is a valuable insight to this 
discussion perhaps that it is biologically evolved but that is not, in my opinion, sufficient to get a 
handle on all the problems and questions the human mind manifests and raises.  
 This dissertation is not a psychiatric investigation, and there would be no point in 
taking on problems that humble and defeat my intellectual abilities. What motivates me is merely 
showing, thinking about and learning from some of the intuitions and efforts that appear to have 
sheltered Whitman from ruin and carried him through the particular crises and traumas of his life. It 
is not that Whitman devotedly practiced seeing half-empty glasses as half-full.460 That pose – 
prosaic and superficial – we could all pull off to varying degrees of credibility, and occasionally it is 
probably appropriate. But it is much more interesting to evaluate his genius for looking squarely at 
“chaos and death” and via the poem (here “Song of Myself”) transform them into causes for 
celebration: 
 
Do you see O my brothers and sisters? 
It is not chaos or death—it is form, union, plan—it is eternal life—it is Happiness. 
 
Something about that transformation is mystical, saintly, religious (provided we make sure we know 
what we mean by such words). This is naturally exciting. But it also compels me to say, in the 
words of John Gardner: “A great deal more might be said on this subject, but not by me.”461 
 
 
                                                 
460 In some areas of life, however, he did just that – and found the approach worth the effort. Confined by ill health in 
the last years of his life, he said: “It is wearisome, almost sad, to be confined in this way, imprisoned for days, 
months, years. Yet I have made up my mind to be cheerful.” What I am getting at above is, however, attitudes that 
significantly transform the experiential side of being. Cf. my words on Kenneth Burke and “whistling in the dark” in 
footnote 185.  
461 John Gardner, On Moral Fiction, 197. 
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Chapter 4. “The wolf, the snake, the hog, not wanting in 
me”: Poet of Light and Shadow 
Chapter summary: Stable tolerable selfhood over time is predicated on the self’s ability to 
endure its own psychic “company” and will its own continuation. According to all believable 
evidence, Whitman was for most of his life troubled and tormented by his sexual desires 
and longing for a number of men few of whom were ever able to approve or return the 
poet’s ardour. Not surprisingly given Whitman’s general post-1855 indifference to his 
culture’s widely-held opinions of what exactly constituted poetry (and complicated feelings 
vis-à-vis the bodies of men and women were far from unanimously considered something 
a poet ought to explore), one finds in the poems ample evidence darkly suggesting that 
something was not quite right: The poems’ pained meditations on love and male friendship 
are full of heartache, self-ambivalence, loneliness and frustration, while the passages of 
shameful confession apparently come close to naming and revealing the painful reality of 
something quasi-diabolic and criminal in the poet’s heart. (Needless to say, sodomy laws 
in the US made homosexuality, which the poems never overtly mention, a felony 
punishable by imprisonment or death; these laws were not repealed until the second half 
of the twentieth century.) But despite his deteriorating health following a serious stroke in 
1873, Whitman’s conversations with Horace Traubel in the late 1880 and early 1890s 
reveal a person for whom it seems profoundly and accurately self-evident that “whatever 
happens to anybody it may be turn’d to beautiful results” (“Starting from Paumanok”); other 
writings, such as the 1889 essay “A Backward Glance O’er Travel’d Roads”, support such 
a reading. In this chapter I explain what function the poetry is likely to have had in terms of 
enabling Whitman to endure and redeem the “presence of evil within him”, to quote 
Asselineau (even if that presence certainly does not merit the word “evil” by contemporary 
standards). The same writer suggests that “the serenity of his old age” was the result of a 
“continual struggle”, and I nuance that picture by arguing that the “struggle” is best 
understood in Jungian terms, specifically as a patient attempt to integrate the “shadow” 
(short for the Jungian shadow aspects of the psyche). To be precise, I claim that the poetic 
effort directed towards a full integration of the shadow is methodologically similar – similar 
in nature – to the approach explored in the previous chapter: The alienating aspect must 
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be named (a “story [must] be told about it”, as Blixen woud say; cf. footnote 251) if its 
threatening import and menacing presence are to be transformed and redeemed. It has 
been claimed by Carl Martin Lindner that Whitman anticipates Jung (born when Whitman 
was in his mid-50s) regarding the shadow aspects of the psyche, “aspects which must be 
acknowledged if the individual is to progress toward wholeness or integrity”, but a proper 
explication of that foreshadowing has not been offered. This dissertation begins to redress 
that oversight. 
* * * 
 
Nor is it you alone who know what it is to be evil, 
I am he who knew what it was to be evil, 
I too knitted the old knot of contrariety, 
Blabb’d, blush’d, resented, lied, stole, grudg’d, 
Had guile, anger, lust, hot wishes I dared not speak, 
Was wayward, vain, greedy, shallow, sly, cowardly, malignant, 
The wolf, the snake, the hog, not wanting in me, 
The cheating look, the frivolous word, the adulterous wish, not wanting, 
Refusals, hates, postponements, meanness, laziness, none of these wanting . . . 
—Walt Whitman, “Crossing Brooklyn Ferry” 
 
How America illustrates birth, muscular youth, the promise, the sure 
fulfilment, the absolute success, despite of people— illustrates evil as well as good, 
The vehement struggle so fierce for unity in one’s-self; 
—Walt Whitman, “Thoughts” 
 
In the previous chapter I have explored the philosophically inflected and psychologically searching 
aesthetic of Leaves of Grass. I consider that aesthetic the work’s dominant mode and central to 
whatever claim it has to being considered a work of sublime, quasi-religious self-transcendence. 
One of the – to me – most fascinating things about Whitman and his iconic book is how unlikely it 
can seem that a man so psychically troubled and so dogged by ill fortune (see footnote 370) could 
produce a work so abundantly charged with the spirit of celebration and enthusiasm (see epigraphic 
perspective 26). I have made the point more than once that I consider it essential to the most 
fleeting understanding of Leaves of Grass that one gains a real appreciation for and sense of how 
vast a psychic gap it spans for its author.462 In this chapter, I make the claim that the book is a 
                                                 
462 Similarly, Harry James Cook has said that “Any valid interpretation of Whitman’s poetry must be in large part 
autobiographical.” From Harry James Cook, “The Individuation of a Poet: The Process of Becoming in 
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profound literary achievement precisely because it served instrumentally as a piece of bridging 
infrastructure within – and for the benefit of – a more than commonly divided self. In other words, 
this chapter is about the healing of internal psychic fracture via writing. At the end of the last 
chapter I implied the concept of dividedness by reiterating my assumption that we can for the sake 
of argument simplify the picture of psychic health thus: There are just two ways or directions in 
which psychic health can alter or “slide” – it can progress towards psychic wholeness and health 
(hence a “wholesome” state or, at least etymologically, “holy” state), or it can regress towards 
deterioration of psychic health, signaling a state of increased psychic dislocation and suffering.463 
Harold Bloom invokes a “gap” metaphor similar to mine above (“bridging”) when he characterizes 
Leaves of Grass as the outgrowth of 
 
the mask “Walt Whitman, an American, one of the roughs, a kosmos,” who could not 
reconcile his soul and his true self and so took up the middle ground between them.464 
 
Very close to the spirit of this dissertation is Kinzie’s insistence that a great work of literary art must 
reply to the “need for coherence in a human life”, “reflect[] the facts of experiential complexity” 
and “speak memorably about our great anxieties—affliction, injustice, death.” It is on a view like 
that that I base my own proposition (see footnote 63) that a poet can hardly be of great import if he 
or she is without an unillusioned attitude to human beings, in the form of a Terence-esque tolerance 
and sympathy in the face of the bizarre, the impossible and the exceptional. Whitman writes: 
 
I see all the prisoners in the prisons, 
I see the defective human bodies of the earth, 
The blind, the deaf and dumb, idiots, hunchbacks, lunatics, 
The pirates, thieves, betrayers, murderers, slave-makers of the earth, 
. . . 
I see male and female everywhere, 
I see the serene brotherhood of philosophs, 
I see the constructiveness of my race, 
I see the results of the perseverance and industry of my race, 
                                                 
Whitman’s ‘The Sleepers’,” 102. 
463 Clearly my concern is not with a very precise definition of these states; I consider them intuitive enough to suffice in 
lieu of actual clinical definitions. (In other words, to respectfully misquote Leonard Cohen: “If your apparatus for 
comprehending [psychic states] has collapsed to such a degree where you ask me for a definition of [psychic health] 
then you are beyond my therapy.” From Leonard Cohen, “Leonard Cohen in 1964 – On being a Jewish writer, a 
Canadian and a seeker of G-d” [17:02].) 
464 Harold Bloom, The Daemon Knows, 57 (emphasis mine). Although I shall in the following not adopt Bloom’s 
psychological model and nomenclature, his words (pertinent though they were to my remarks on “masks” in chapter 
3) are nevertheless of metaphoric value to me here insofar as they correctly indicate the psychologically healing 
bridging function of the poetry. 
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I see ranks, colors, barbarisms, civilizations, I go among them, I mix indiscriminately, 
And I salute all the inhabitants of the earth.465 
 
If a poet, I venture, is caught up in dogma and ideology to a degree that makes him or her unable to 
say, with Terence, “Homo sum, humani nihil a me alienum puto” [I am a man, I consider nothing 
that is human alien to me], he is, it would seem, rather badly equipped to reply to the need for 
coherence in life and in the world (which comes down to the same thing finally); he would be unfit 
to be, in Shelley’s phrase, an “unacknowledged legislator[] of the world” – but would probably do 
very well as an actual legislator or legal official employed by – and therefore necessarily speaking 
only for – a subsection of “the world”.466 (Recall that Paz calls Whitman “the only great modern 
poet who does not seem to experience inconformity vis-à-vis his world”.) Admittedly, such 
thoughts are romantic and quaint by today’s standards, but Terence’s “idea” or position, which Jung 
updates with his work on the human shadow, has, it seems to me, an unchallengeable and timeless 
claim on our existential, psychological and therefore also aesthetic positions. (I have made 
reference to Jung several times already, and shall introduce his shadow concept shortly.) Concurring 
with the essentiality of artistically promoting coherence and dissolving the “barriers, 
differentiations, diversions that we manage to construct for ourselves”, Leonard Cohen too had 
some thoughts about the differences between artists and those furthering more officially sanctioned 
agendas: 
 
[It] is important to understand the difference between an artist and a theologian, or a 
politician. To me an artist does not have a platform, does not have a message, does not 
have a party. His only message, his only party, is the dissolution of differences. And 
we have to leave it to these other kinds of experts to get us all inflamed about one 
particular view or another. But in the moment of a song or a poem – or an embrace 
between a man or a woman, or a handshake between two people – in that moment 
things are dissolved, and that’s the art’s realm.467 
                                                 
465 From “Song of Myself”, these lines also exemplify the mode of absorption into wholeness that I explored in the 
previous chapter. 
 In the 1855 Preface, Whitman enjoins his readers to “stand up for the stupid”. It is also worth observing 
that a reviewer of Leaves of Grass (either the first or second edition – I am unsure) felt it incumbent on him to 
“mildly suggest that the author should be sent to a lunatic asylum, and the mercenary publishers to the penitentiary 
for pandering to the prurient tastes of morbid sensualists.” The anonymous review is available at the online Walt 
Whitman Archive and has Whitman Archive ID “anc.00030”. 
466 This might sound cantankerous vis-à-vis government and formalized organization; it is not. When a legislator 
“contradicts [him]self” (to borrow the famous phrase from “Song of Myself”, he is incompetent. Contrariwise, the 
interesting “self-contradiction” at the heart of Whitman’s poetic attitude enables the creation of important poetry – 
inclusive, ecumenical and “catholic” (a word the poet favored). In short, art and politics are categorically different 
things. 
467 From Leonard Cohen, “Leonard Cohen on a tour bus (1979)” [0:20]. 
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To regard heightened aesthetic experience in the metaphoric terms of an embrace or physical 
contact between two people was not far from Whitman’s mind either: 
 
Camerado, this is no book, 
Who touches this touches a man, 
(Is it night? are we here together alone?) 
It is I you hold and who holds you, 
I spring from the pages into your arms . . . 
 
Without moments like these, Cohen adds, when “distinctions are dissolved” and secret anguish 
addressed and redeemed, “you become a very narrow, bitter, prejudiced, dogmatic kind of 
individual.” I have cited Octavio Paz to the effect that Whitman may have discovered a coping 
strategy for his frequently acute loneliness (to which his private correspondence is ample testimony) 
in making “his monologue [be] a vast chorus.” Paz writes: “Doubtless there are, at least, two 
persons in him: the public poet and the private person, who conceals his real erotic inclinations” 
(see footnote 319). I have written above of “rapprochement” (in the context of equalizing or 
harmonizing the undeniable tension and contradistinction manifest in self versus not-self). Here, 
again, something very similar goes on: A degree of “coherence” is won, in and by the poet, by 
virtue of his unification – his recasting of multiple voices – into one. Consider the last line of the 
excerpt from “Thoughts” above. 
 Whitman’s work would be remarkable, I think, even if it were not deepened, 
blackened and scarred by an element of grave psychological torment, which can best be 
characterized as suggesting the poet’s evident abhorrence of and disgust with himself. I shall look 
into these apparently lamentable or untoward psychological states in the following. 
 I agree with Harold Bloom that Leaves of Grass is not primarily mystically or 
psychosexually motivated, and so I shall steer clear of a unidimensional identification of the poet’s 
motivations with his apparent homoerotic orientation.468 But I do not doubt at all that Whitman’s 
sexual longing and – let us assume – the impossibility of reconciling his desire with the rest of his 
life was a source of suffering, a cause for despair (Asselineau has uncovered textual evidence from 
1860 that the poet’s “obsession with evil” is related to his sexual life resulting in self-torment).469 I 
merely choose to emphasize the pain itself, not its origins, in order to raise and remove the work 
                                                 
468 Cf. the introduction to Harold Bloom, ed., Walt Whitman, 9. 
469 Roger Asselineau, The Evolution of Walt Whitman, vol. 1, 128. 
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from the fraught and academically confused domain of gender and identity politics.470 As James E. 
Miller writes, Jr., writes: 
 
[Not] all critics [are] ready to accept the assumption that such seismic chasms divide 
readers as implied by such ponderous sexual labeling. There remains the fact that 
innumerable “heterosexual” readers, both men and women, have felt the power, sexual 
and other, of Whitman’s Leaves. His appeal is universal, not exclusive. Sexual labels 
are simplistic, distorting as they do the complexity of any “real” individual’s sexuality. 
In short, all readers can share consciously and/or unconsciously, Whitman’s 
omnisexual vision—omnisexual in the all-encompassing sense of embracing auto-, 
homo-, and hetero-erotic impulses.471 
 
Speaking not to the cultural reception but to the qualitative merit and interest of the poems 
themselves, Judith Harris is a strong ally. She finds that  
 
Whitman’s lines resonate with life regardless of the facts of his situation in life. A poet 
must bring sadness or lament into the reader’s heart. Where else does the meaning and 
value of poetry, if not of all writing, lie but in the reader’s ability to embrace the 
writer’s deepest convictions? The reader of Whitman patterns his own suffering after 
the poet’s and more important, on Whitman’s convincing claim that he is able to bear 
it and to feel empathy for others.472 
 
At a time when (in Ed Folsom’s words) “dissembling or circumventing or euphemizing” was the 
consensual attitude among critics, i.e. mid-twentieth century, Asselineau is unique for cutting to the 
chase and calling Whitman’s “wild homosexual desires” his “most difficult battle”.473 The desires 
                                                 
470 In Harold Bloom’s opinion, Whitman deserves our interest and admiration for his “extraordinary sense of how 
complex human sexuality is.” And then: “[T]hese days (and I find this very tedious) most Whitman scholarship and 
criticism and most Whitman teaching that goes on in the university is gay, gay, gay, gay. This is really very 
tiresome.” From Harold Bloom, “Harold Bloom on Whitman and Jazz” [12:31]. 
 Those interested in gay criticism may turn to Robert K. Martin’s work The Homosexual Tradition in 
American Poetry (1979) in which Whitman is a seminal figure. Works bearing the imprint of queer theory and 
gender studies include Disseminating Whitman: Revision and Corporeality in Leaves of Grass (1991) by Michael 
Moon (who considers Whitman’s homosexuality a cultural and political fact rather than merely as a biographical 
datum), The Erotic Whitman (2000) by Vivian Pollak, Word, Birth, and Culture: The Poetry of Poe, Whitman, and 
Dickinson (2002) by Daneen Wardrop and Leaving the M/other: Whitman, Kristeva and Leaves of Grass (2002) by 
Beth Jensen. 
471 From James E. Miller, Jr.’s entry “Sex and Sexuality” in J. R. LeMaster and Donald D. Kummings, eds., The 
Routledge Encyclopedia of Walt Whitman, 631. 
472 Judith Harris, Signifying Pain: Constructing and Healing the Self through Writing, 5. 
473 From Ed Folsom’s foreword to Roger Asselineau, The Evolution of Walt Whitman, xii. 
 To be fair, Asselineau himself singles out the German critic Eduard Bertz as the first to frankly discuss 
the problem posed by “Calamus”. I return to this in chapter 5. 
 The Whitman biographer Justin Kaplan is not convinced that Whitman was ever intimate with another 
man. A friend of Ginsberg’s, Kaplan tells this story: “For several years, every time I saw him [Allen Ginsberg], we 
argued over the same stupid point. You want to hear what it was? I’m quoting him: “You’ve got to listen to this! 
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“never left him at peace and constantly menaced his balance”.474 Asselineau grounds “Whitman’s 
poetry in the poet’s body”, as Folsom writes – and of course desire is both a physiological and 
psychological phenomenon. I shall now, before bringing in Jung, try to characterize the poet’s 
evidently unabated crisis. 
 
As Asselineau notes in the chapter “Sex Life”, if Leaves of Grass is like a rich and fragrant meadow 
of grass, 
 
there rise here and there high tufts of calamus or sweet-flag with long pointed leaves, 
yellow-ish green spikes (or spadices), and huge snaky rhizomes, mysterious and 
troubling phallic symbols. 
 
Michael Moon explains that the natural objects evoked in the second line below – 
 
If I worship one thing more than another it shall be the spread of my own body, or any 
part of it, 
. . . 
Root of wash’d sweet-flag! timorous pond-snipe! nest of guarded duplicate eggs! it 
shall be you!475 
 
– “suggest the shape of the male genitals”. “Sweet-flag” (or “Calamus”), as Whitman explains for 
the benefit of his English editor W. M. Rosetti, is “the very large & aromatic grass, or rush, growing 
about water-ponds in the valleys—spears about three feet high . . . [the plant represents] the biggest 
& hardiest kind of spears of grass—and the fresh, acquatic, pungent bouquet.”476 The poet’s 
explanation is called for insofar as the third edition of Leaves of Grass (1860) had grown to include 
a whole group of poems gathered together as “Calamus”. In the first of these poems, “In Paths 
Untrodden”, the poet offers what Moon considers a resolute announcement, namely that 
 
[it is] clear to me that my soul, 
That the soul of the man I speak for rejoices in comrades, 
                                                 
There’s a letter from John Burroughs, or one of those people, one of those associates of Whitman, saying: ‘Last 
night, I slept with Walt.’ And so, doesn’t that speak for itself?” [Laughs] And then, my side of the argument was: 
“Remember, when people visited in, let’s say, the 1870s, they didn’t have Motel 6”.” From Kaplan, Justin, and Rob 
Couteau, “ ‘The Mystery of the Man’: Justin Kaplan Talks About America’s Greatest Poet”. 
474 From Ed Folsom’s foreword to Roger Asselineau, The Evolution of Walt Whitman, xii. The quotes in this line are 
Asselineau’s, however, not Folsom’s. 
475 From “Song of Myself”, section 24. 
476 The 1867 letter is included in Walt Whitman, Selected Letters of Walt Whitman, 128. 
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And a few lines further on, we find the poet or symbolic self “Resolv’d to sing no songs to-day but 
those of manly attachment.” Whitman, however, would never openly validate his reader’s inevitable 
conclusions. As Moon writes: 
 
In response to John Addington Symonds’s implicitly hopeful inquiry about whether 
the “Calamus” sentiment might be homoerotic, the aged WW [then 71] may have 
protested too much, emphatically denying the possibility, and attempting to quiet any 
doubts about his heterosexuality by claiming to have fathered six children (no trace of 
whom has ever otherwise manifested itself).477 
 Both in Democratic Vistas and in his 1876 Preface to LG, WW was at 
pains to insist that the meaning of “Calamus” resides mainly in its political 
significance,—e.g. “It is to the development, identification, and general prevalence of 
that fervid comradeship, (the adhesive love, at least rivalling the amative love hitherto 
possessing imaginative literature, if not going beyond it,) that I look for the 
counterbalance and offset of our materialistic and vulgar American democracy, and for 
the spiritualization thereof.”478 
 
Presenting ample textual evidence from Leaves of Grass, Asselineau notes that Whitman 
 
glides just to the brink of confession, but suddenly regains his self-control and keeps 
to himself the great secret to which he has nevertheless drawn our attention. One feels 
that he would like to tell us all, but that, for some reason or other, he cannot – a 
disconcerting and unexpected attitude on the part of a poet who is at first sight so open 
and exuberant.479 
 
More than the aborted confessions precisely, the degree and nature of his suffering are what 
interests me here. Orr makes the claim that what Whitman endured was severe enough to merit the 
word “trauma” (incidentally, that word seems not once to have crept into Whitman’s letters or 
poems). What Orr says next happens to usefully add a dimension to the death-and-rebirth archetype 
I have been indicating along the way. Asking himself whether the “exuberant”, “optimistic” and 
“healthy-minded” Whitman is really eligible for inclusion in a book on “hero-poets who have 
transformed trauma into visions of human possibility”, Orr writes: 
 
We need to remember that a poet’s poems are his or her self-creation [the reader 
                                                 
477 Symonds was the first to suggest it in Whitman’s own lifetime. Whitman appears to have not appreciated the 
curiosity. I return to this in chapter 5 (footnote 518). Symonds’s words are cited in Walt Whitman, The 
Correspondence, vol. 5, 72n18. 
478 From Michael Moon’s annotation in Walt Whitman, Leaves of Grass and Other Writings, 96–97. 
479 Roger Asselineau, The Evolution of Walt Whitman, vol. 2, 109–110. 
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should reread that line till it is properly understood – there are two literal senses]; [we 
need to remember] that the self we meet in the poems is often the newly created self 
that has replaced the shattered and traumatized self of lived experience.[480] The 
Whitman we meet in the pages of Leaves of Grass [in this case, the 1855 Preface] is 
“a man cohered out of tumult and chaos,” even if that new man is reticent about the 
tumult and trauma that engendered him. 
 But what is the chaos from which the new self is born? What trauma 
precedes the magnificent act of self-creation that is Whitman’s poetry? 
 
Orr adds that Whitman was inclined to “hint that something major and transformative happened to 
him, but he never told what it was”, which leads me to conclude that by 2002 Orr has probably not 
read Davis. S. Reynolds’s 1996 Walt Whitman’s America: A Cultural Biography. The reason I can 
posit that is that Reynolds’s book identifies a particularly horrible trauma (probably occurring in 
January 1841) which Whitman seems to have never mentioned – but which roughly coincides with 
his outward transformation from resentful school teacher at Woodbury to young man of letters (he 
transformed himself into a New York reporter and flaneur before becoming the working-class 
“rough” and free-verse bard capable of writing Leaves of Grass).481 
 As far as Orr is concerned, Whitman’s trauma is due to his being gay in a time and 
place when it was “far less safe to be homosexual than it is now”, when it was “both illegal and 
dangerous to overtly profess such a sexual orientation”.482 Undoubtedly a culture so horrified by 
non-standard sexual orientation inevitably instills or catalyzes at least some self-disgust in the non-
conforming individual. Adam Phillips observes that, quite in general, “If what we want is what we 
must not have we are going to be, to put it as mildly as possible, divided against ourselves.”483 
Despite the apparently confident and cheerful timbre in some (not all) of the Calamus poems, 
“It is doubtful that Whitman was comfortable with his own sexual orientation; certainly the culture 
surrounding him would have been outraged at it.”484 I am going to assume that Whitman was, as a 
minimum, divided about his libido, and I am going to help myself to the claim that when we are 
divided about something our judgements about it – and therefore our general confidence and full 
psychic situation – is contingent, fluctuating, unstable. It is possible to catch Whitman very deep in 
thought and dejection (this poem, which I give in its entirety, is also from the “Calamus” section): 
                                                 
480 Cf. “I, now thirty-seven years old in perfect health begin, / Hoping to cease not till death.” Emphases mine. Notice 
that the line juxtaposes metaphoric rebirth (“begin”) with awareness of death and of having already lived (i.e. 
reached a moment when rebirth is necessary). From “Song of Myself”. 
481 For Reynolds’s words on the scandal involving charges of sodomy and the violent wrath of countless townsmen, see 
Walt Whitman’s America, 70–74. 
482 From Gregory Orr, Poetry as Survival, 167. 
483 From Adam Phillips, Side Effects, 6. 
484 From Gregory Orr, Poetry as Survival, 168.  
206 
 
 
 HOURS continuing long, sore and heavy-hearted, 
Hours of the dusk, when I withdraw to a lonesome and unfrequented spot, seating 
myself, leaning my face in my hands; 
Hours sleepless, deep in the night, when I go forth, speeding swiftly the country roads, 
or through the city streets, or pacing miles and miles, stifling plaintive cries; 
Hours discouraged, distracted—for the one I cannot content myself without, soon I 
saw him content himself without me; 
Hours when I am forgotten, (O weeks and months are passing, but I believe I am 
never to forget!) 
Sullen and suffering hours! (I am ashamed—but it is useless—I am what I am;) 
Hours of my torment—I wonder if other men ever have the like, out of the like 
feelings? 
Is there even one other like me—distracted—his friend, his lover, lost to him? 
Is he too as I am now? Does he still rise in the morning, dejected, thinking who is lost 
to him? and at night, awaking, think who is lost? 
Does he too harbor his friendship silent and endless? harbor his anguish and passion? 
Does some stray reminder, or the casual mention of a name, bring the fit back upon 
him, taciturn and deprest? 
Does he see himself reflected in me? In these hours, does he see the face of his hours 
reflected?485 
 
“I am ashamed—but it is useless—I am what I am.” Is seems safe to assume that this is one of those 
poems Asselineau considers practically a confession. Edward Carpenter, on his part, notes that this 
“remarkable” 1860 poem was omitted from subsequent editions of Leaves of Grass “perhaps as 
being too personal.”486 The poem introduces the feeling of shame and immediately links it to an 
essential, unalterable characteristic that he is condemned to lament. The accepting, even-keel tone 
in “I am what I am” is not enough, of course, to buffer against loneliness, grief and a sense of being 
anomalous: “I wonder if other men ever have the like, out of the like feelings? / Is there even one 
other like me—distracted—his friend, his lover, lost to him?” One can only speculate on whether it 
was dropped from Leaves of Grass because Whitman grew to think he had said too much – owned 
his pain too frankly – failed to transform it or give it a direction. In the words of Richard Raleigh, 
“Rarely does Whitman make it so clear that the object of his love is another man, or share his 
vulnerability and sense of abandonment so candidly.”487 To be sure, it is a deeply affecting poem – 
part love poem in its own way – about which much more could be said. 
                                                 
485 The poem, published as number “9” in the “Calamus” cluster of the third edition of Leaves of Grass (1860), was 
dropped from all subsequent editions. 
486 From Edward Carpenter, Days with Walt Whitman – with some Notes on his Life and Work (New York: The 
Macmillan Company: 1906), 56. 
487 From Carl Martin Lindner’s entry “Freedom” in J. R. LeMaster and Donald D. Kummings, eds., The Routledge 
Encyclopedia of Walt Whitman, 239. 
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 There is similar self-despair and self-conviction at play in a poem (from which, by and 
by, the first eight lines were eventually dropped) known today as “You Felons on Trial in Courts” 
(the first line in later versions of the poem). The original first line (“O bitter sprig! . . .”) reveals 
with perfect clarity that the poet – or speaker or symbolic self (to be circumspect) – had things to 
confess too: 
 
 O BITTER sprig! Confession sprig! 
In the bouquet I give you place also—I bind you in, 
Proceeding no further till, humbled publicly, 
I give fair warning, once for all. 
 
I own that I have been sly, thievish, mean, a prevaricator, greedy, derelict, 
And I own that I remain so yet. 
 
What foul thought but I think it—or have in me the stuff out of which it is thought? 
What in darkness in bed at night, alone or with a companion? 
 
You felons on trials in courts, 
You convicts in prison cells—you sentenced assassins, chained and handcuffed with 
iron, 
Who am I, that I am not on trial, or in prison? 
Me, ruthless and devilish as any, that my wrists are not chained with iron, or my 
ankles with iron? 
 
You prostitutes flaunting over the trottoirs, or obscene in your rooms, 
Who am I, that I should call you more obscene than myself? 
 
O culpable! O traitor! 
O I acknowledge—I exposé! 
(O admirers! praise not me! compliment not me! you make me wince, 
I see what you do not—I know what you do not;) 
Inside these breast-bones I lie smutch’d and choked, 
Beneath this face that appears so impassive, hell’s tides continually run, 
Lusts and wickedness are acceptable to me, 
I walk with delinquents with passionate love, 
I feel I am of them—I belong to those convicts and prostitutes myself, 
And henceforth I will not deny them—for how can I deny myself? 
 
Now it is time to bring in Carl Jung, which only few Whitman scholars have so far found 
instructive.488 One (Carl Martin Lindner) does, however, present the view that “Whitman anticipates 
                                                 
488 Neither Stephen A. Black’s Whitman’s Journeys into Chaos: A Psychoanalytic Study of the Creative Process nor 
Edwin Haviland Miller’s Walt Whitman’s Poetry: a Psychological Journey mention Jung. Harold Aspiz’s So Long!: 
Walt Whitman’s Poetry of Death makes one very peripheral mention of Jung. The major psychologically shrewd 
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Freud regarding the unhealthiness of sexual repression” in the same way he “anticipates Jung 
regarding the shadow aspects of the psyche, aspects which must be acknowledged if the individual 
is to progress toward wholeness or integrity.” Also of value is Lindner’s observation that Whitman 
dramatized “the courage necessary to [translate freedom into action] in his art and his life.”489 And 
Anne Gilchrist, whose 1870 “A Woman’s Estimate of Walt Whitman” obviously predated Jung, 
nevertheless “foreshadows” Jungian thought by referencing “the dark and light aspects of 
personality”.490 However, Verdino-Süllwold and Hampson clarify that Gilchrist’s “actual point of 
reference was William Blake’s doctrine of contraries: those opposing dynamic forces whose 
counterpoint becomes a holistic coexistence when man is prepared to set aside what Blake 
considered the hypocritical dualism of Christianity: good vs. evil, body vs. soul.” Certainly, Jung 
would have appreciated a certain passage from “A Woman’s Estimate of Walt Whitman” where 
Gilchrist commends Whitman for the quality with which I opened this chapter, namely his 
acceptance and welcome of those individuals about whom the majority view tends to be – 
invariably and predictably – denunciatory: 
 
If he feared to stretch out the hand, not of condescending pity, but of fellowship, to the 
degraded, criminal, foolish, despised, knowing that they are only laggards in “the 
great procession winding along the roads of the universe,” . . . how could he roll the 
stone of contempt off the heart as he does, and cut the strangling knot of the problem 
of inherited viciousness and degradation? And, if he were not bold and true to the 
utmost, and did not own in himself the threads of darkness mixed in with the threads 
of light, and own it with the same strength and directness that he tells of the light, and 
not in those vague generalities that everybody uses, and nobody means, . . . the 
brotherhood of the human race would be a mere flourish of rhetoric.491 
 
Gilchrist stresses that there are deep and moral reasons why Whitman should “own in himself the 
threads of darkness mixed in with the threads of light”. Original sin (as I suppose some would call 
it) or, in Gilchrist’s phrase, “the problem of inherited viciousness and degradation” would simply be 
unmanageable, unbearable sources of misery if the person had not “made peace”, so to speak, with 
                                                 
biographies (Reynolds, Kaplan, Asselineau) are also silent on Jung as is The Routledge Encyclopedia of Walt 
Whitman (with one exception due to Carl Martin Lindner). 
489 From Carl Martin Lindner’s entry “Freedom” in J. R. LeMaster and Donald D. Kummings, eds., The Routledge 
Encyclopedia of Walt Whitman, 239. 
490 From Carla M. Verdino-Süllwold and Thomas Hampson, “ “The Frailest Leaves of Me”: A Study of the Text and 
Music for Whitman’s “To What You Said”,” 144. 
491 From Anne Gilchrist, “A Woman’s Estimate of Walt Whitman,” in Anne Gilchrist, Anne Gilchrist: Her Life and 
Writings, 296–297. Jung wrote: “When you accept the fact of your inferiority, it lives with you; you are it too, but 
not exclusively. You are not only white, one part is black, but both make the whole man.” From Carl Jung, Visions: 
Notes of the Seminar Given in 1930–1934, vol. 1, 391. To “threads of darkness [and] light”, compare the phrase 
“strongest lights and shades” in footnote 151. 
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the “darkness”. Gilchrist’s metaphor “mixed in with” has a faint echo in Whitman’s bitter 
“bouquet” of confession but not only confession: 
 
O BITTER sprig! Confession sprig! 
In the bouquet I give you place also—I bind you in, 
Proceeding no further till, humbled publicly, 
I give fair warning, once for all. 
 
When Whitman promised his readers in the 1855 Preface that “What I tell I tell for precisely what it 
is” and added “You shall stand by my side and look in the mirror with me”, he may have promised 
more than readers assumed. “You Felons on Trial in Courts” complicates the picture of the poet’s 
self which at first seemed so obviously and consistently to invite spontaneous celebration. Now it 
appears that the mirror – in addition to confirming our good opinion of ourselves – can shatter it if 
we look closely enough at ourselves: “compliment not me! you make me wince, / I see what you do 
not—I know what you do not”. 
 Jung held that the shadow “forms, as it were, the centre of the field of consciousness”, 
and that only a “personal unconscious” (as opposed to an “impersonal unconscious”) will “enable 
us to recognize the shadow”.492 The shadow is “a living part of the personality and therefore wants 
to live with it in some form.” Yet, it “cannot be argued out of existence or rationalized into 
harmlessness.”493 More disturbingly still, Jung warns against ignoring and neglecting to integrate 
the shadow in this passage: 
 
[W]hen one tries desperately to be good and wonderful and perfect, then all the more 
the shadow develops a definite will to be black and evil and destructive. People cannot 
see that; they are always striving to be marvellous, and then they discover that terrible 
destructive things happen which they cannot understand, and they either deny that 
such facts have anything to do with them, or if they admit them, they take them for 
natural afflictions, or they try to minimize them and to shift the responsibility 
elsewhere. The fact is that if one tries beyond one’s capacity to be perfect, the shadow 
descends into hell and becomes the devil. For it is just as sinful from the standpoint of 
nature and of truth to be above oneself as to be below oneself. It is surely not the 
divine will in man that he should be something which he is not, for when one looks 
                                                 
492 From Carl Jung, Aion, paragraphs 1 and 261, respectively. 
493 Carl Jung, “Psychological Aspects of the Mother Archetype”, in The Archetypes of the Collective Unconscious, 
paragraph 44. To diverge from the primary sources for a second, let me feature Jung’s biographer’s Frank McLynn’s 
precis: “The shadow is the sum of those characteristics we wish to conceal not only from the world but from 
ourselves; the classic example comes in Roberg Luis Stevenson’s Dr Jekyll and Mr Hyde. Mostly the shadow is 
projected so that we see our own dark side in others; hence scapegoatism.” Jung’s theory stretches to and includes 
the persona, but I shall not engage that concept for my present purposes. 
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into nature, one sees that it is most definitely the divine will that everything should be 
what it is.494 
 
And finally: 
 
The shadow is a moral problem that challenges the whole ego-personality, for no one 
can become conscious of the shadow without considerable moral effort. To become 
conscious of it involves recognizing the dark aspects of the personality as present and 
real. This act is the essential condition for any kind of self-knowledge, and it 
therefore, as a rule, meets with considerable resistance. Indeed, self-knowledge as a 
psychotherapeutic measure frequently requires much painstaking work extended over 
a long period.495 
 
That Whitman was conscious early in life that the human self could harbor (and often did harbor) 
latent evil of baffling magnitude is clear from something he wrote for the Long-Island Democrat in 
1840 when he was only 21 years old. Musing on the feelings and thoughts of mourners at a funeral, 
Whitman states that, first of all, nobody living is exempt from error in action: 
 
[W]e are well aware that men who have lived a length of time in the world, must have 
committed many little meannesses—must have done wrong on various occasions—
must have had the fine bloom of simplicity and nature nearly rubbed off—and must 
have been connected with much that would sully that healthiness and freshness of 
character, which almost every body has for the first few years of life.496 
 
But more sinisterly, he had this to say about what could be called inner error: 
When a man dies, who can say what deep stains may have rested, at one time or 
another, upon his soul? what crimes (untouchable, perhaps, by the laws of men or the 
rules of society) he has committed, either in evil wishes or in reality? How many 
persons go down to the grave, praised by the world and pointed to as examples, who 
were still far, very far, from good men! They may have respected custom, honored the 
government, followed the fashion, paid to public charity every cent which the law 
demanded, kept clear of glaring transgressions, stood up or bowed down their heads in 
houses of worship just at the due time, and still, if we could open their hearts and see 
what went on there we should be sickened and amazed! It is a true saying, that we can 
never, in the great drama of life, pronounce judgment upon the good or ill 
performance of his part by a fellow creature, until the last act and the last scene are 
                                                 
494 From Carl Jung, Visions: Notes of the Seminar Given in 1930–1934, vol. 1, 569. 
495 From Carl Jung, Aion, paragraph 14. 
496 The piece is entitled “From the Desk of a Schoolmaster” and is the 6th of the so-called Sun-Down Papers. It is 
available at the online Walt Whitman Archive and has Whitman Archive ID “per.00306”. 
 “Little meannesses” brings this list from “You Felons on Trial in Courts” to mind: “I have been sly, 
thievish, mean, a prevaricator, greedy, derelict.” 
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over, the bell rung, and the curtain dropped.497 
 
Whitman is clearly troubled by the coexistence of the self’s shadow elements with more acceptable 
personality traits. Perhaps he is troubled too that the bad and evil sides of men are so easily kept 
from sight by a bit of careful deception. Something about that picture seems not quite right or just, 
and yet Whitman is in the piece above forced to accept this metaphysical fact about the world. This 
is a world, in other words, where the “guilty” (and of course, everything hinges on this word) are 
not offered swift justice in the form of cosmic retribution or at the hands of some omniscient deity – 
instead they must go on living, to some degree shielding a difficult truth. 
 In virtually all aspects of his life (certainly as the historical data present it), there is 
ample evidence that Whitman was a person who preferred to speak freely and sincerely, not 
painstakingly or circumspectly, certainly not deceivingly; the word “lied” is in the past tense in 
“Crossing Brooklyn Ferry” (see the beginning of this chapter).498 In his 1855 Preface, he had 
written that the great poets are to be known by 
 
the absence in them of tricks and by the justification of perfect personal candor. Then 
folks echo a new cheap joy and a divine voice leaping from their brains: How 
beautiful is candor! All faults may be forgiven of him who has perfect candor. 
Henceforth let no man of us lie, for we have seen that openness wins the inner and 
outer world and that there is no single exception, and that never since our earth 
gathered itself in a mass have deceit or subterfuge or prevarication attracted its 
smallest particle or the faintest tinge of a shade—and that through the enveloping 
wealth and rank of a state or the whole republic of states a sneak or sly person shall be 
discovered and despised . . . . and that the soul has never been once fooled and never 
can be fooled. 
 
“Candor” in this context should be considered as having the same kind of function as the function 
described in the context of the “divine Logos”; I am describing truthful sincere utterances that begin 
the work of linguistically and psychologically reflecting and tolerating the undifferentiated chaos 
that makes up reality. 
 Also, to almost greater effect, he had written in his book’s first poem (“Song of 
Myself”, as it came to be known): 
                                                 
497 Ibid. 
498 It was forever an embarrassment to him that he had accepted the seventy-five dollars offered him in 1842 for writing 
a rather dubious temperance novel, Franklin Evans; or The Inebriate. Whitman, who was “so hard up at the time”, 
claims to have completed the hypocritical novel in three days – fortified with “gin cocktails”. In 1888, Whitman 
called the novel “damned rot—rot of the worst sort”. See William G. Lulloff’s entry “Franklin Evans” in J. R. 
LeMaster and Donald D. Kummings, eds., The Routledge Encyclopedia of Walt Whitman, 234. 
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I am the poet of commonsense and of the demonstrable and of immortality; 
And am not the poet of goodness only . . . . I do not decline to be the poet of 
wickedness also. 
. . . 
. . . 
What blurt is it about virtue and about vice? 
Evil propels me, and reform of evil propels me . . . . I stand indifferent, 
My gait is no faultfinder’s or rejecter’s gait, 
I moisten the roots of all that has grown. 
  
This passage (and passages similar to it) must have been on Gilchrist’s mind when she declared 
Whitman “bold and true to the utmost, and [determined to] own in himself the threads of darkness 
mixed in with the threads of light, and own it with the same strength and directness that he tells of 
the light”. By suggesting that only good things come from integrating those things in us we initially 
find deeply dismaying, Gilchrist brilliantly – in a stroke – foreshadows current widely accepted 
therapeutic insights. As Jung would later put it: It “is a therapeutic necessity, indeed, the first 
requisite of any thorough psychological method, for consciousness to confront its shadow.”499 
Naturally, the temptation not to do so – to “misrecognize” interior shadow elements – can be great. 
But the path of squeamish denial – inherent in declining, in Whitman’s case, “to be the poet of 
wickedness” – is neither commendable nor recommendable. Although, to be sure, facing up to all 
the disagreeable aspects of the shadow is generally a process attended by anxiety, André Green 
sides with Jung in proclaiming it is the proper way to proceed. “Misrecognition and recognition” (of 
any psychic issue, as a matter of fact) must, rather, be brought into a fruitful psychic dialectic: 
 
[Misrecogntion] touches upon the essence of man, who, in order to construct an 
acceptable image of himself, is obliged to deny or misrecognize the essential aspects 
of it via a process of occultation with a view to avoiding anxiety. [This process erases] 
the frontiers between the different sectors of pathology, . . . [and] between the normal 
and the pathological, the divine and the infernal.500 
 
What is so interesting about “You Felons on Trial in Courts” is the baffling directness and audacity 
with which Whitman “publicly” (his word) highlights the frontiers between the “divine and the 
infernal” (in Green’s phrase). One can all too easily imagine that this edition of Leaves of Grass no 
                                                 
499 Carl Jung, Mysterium Coniunctionis: An Inquiry into the Separation and Synthesis of Psychic Opposites in Alchemy, 
paragraph 514. 
500 André Green, Key Ideas for a Contemporary Psychoanalysis: Misrecognition and Recognition of the Unconscious, 
109. 
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less than the 1855 or 1856 edition, would make certain reviewers – blithely unaware of any shadow 
in themselves perhaps – “mildly suggest that the author should be sent to a lunatic asylum” (see 
footnote 465). And Jung’s chilling assertion that “if one tries beyond one’s capacity to be perfect, 
the shadow descends into hell and becomes the devil” (my emphasis) is borne out by Whitman’s 
infernal imagery (my emphases): 
 
Who am I, that I am not on trial, or in prison? 
Me, ruthless and devilish as any, that my wrists are not chained with iron, or my 
ankles with iron? 
. . . 
. . . 
Inside these breast-bones I lie smutch’d and choked, 
Beneath this face that appears so impassive, hell’s tides continually run.  
 
When he writes “O admirers! praise not me! compliment not me! you make me wince”, we can only 
infer (from “wince”, specifically) that there is painful discomfort associated with permitting (or 
tolerating) the lie which admirers’ compliments effectively become to one who sees and knows 
“what [they] do not”. A plausible reason would seem to be that accepting undeserved praise undoes 
or impedes (throws a preventive spanner in the works of) the self’s necessary shadow-integration. 
(Recall that Bucke said that “[Whitman] always justified, sometimes playfully, sometimes quite 
seriously, those who spoke harshly of himself or his writings, and I often thought he even took 
pleasure in the opposition of enemies” (footnote 43).) True, the shadow-integration is frequently 
visited by discomfort (“anxieties and doubts”, in Asselineau), but having set his eyes on being 
“candid” there really is no alternative to go on owning the “presence of evil within” (cf. footnote 
307). Peterson writes that 
 
Individuality—which is the ability to establish a realm of experience that is unique to 
the self; the capacity for the creation of purely subjective experience—also means 
acceptance of vulnerability and mortality [and all the shadow’s criminality, we might 
add]. The creative capacity is the divine Logos, which in the course of its development 
necessitates recognition of the inevitability of failure and death.501 
 
It really seems that Whitman recognized the necessity of the interplay between light and dark, as it 
were. In a conversation with Traubel in 1889, he said: 
 
                                                 
501 Jordan Peterson, Maps of Meaning, 325. 
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I am a great contender for the world as it is—the ill along with the good. Indeed, I am 
more and more persuaded that the ill, too, has its part to subserve—its important 
role—that if ill did not exist, it would be a hopeless world and we would all go to the 
bad.502 
 
Thirty-four years earlier he had written – perhaps at that time passionately willing or desiring it to 
be true (rather than being philosophically “persuaded” of its truth): 
 
Great is goodness; 
I do not know what it is any more than I know what health is . . . . but I know it is 
great. 
 
Great is wickedness . . . . I find I often admire it just as much as I admire goodness: 
Do you call that a paradox? It certainly is a paradox. 
 
The eternal equilibrium of things is great, and the eternal overthrow of things is great, 
And there is another paradox.503 
 
Nietzsche asked “Who alone has reason to lie himself out of actuality?” and answered, “He who 
suffers from it” (footnote 227). Whitman seems to have been consistently aware of – and wary of – 
his moments of less than fully-realized authenticity, and probably found that they amounted to a 
kind of lie capable of warping his interior integrity. (Once senses why Green would speak of a 
“dialectic” here.) Dissembling for purposes of social acceptance – in order to endure “actuality”, in 
other words – appears to have been counterproductive to healing suffering: One cannot go through 
life wincing. 
 As for becoming aware of the incorrectness and incompatibility of aspects of 
“actuality” and the soul, let us go back to the 1860 poem “In Paths Untrodden” (the first poem in 
the “Calamus” cluster). In the opening lines of this poem – whose title (like Robert Frost’s “The 
Road not Taken”) seems to hint at untried but achievable nonconformist possibilities – Whitman 
writes  
 
 In paths untrodden, 
                                                 
502 Cited in Walt Whitman, Intimate with Walt: Selections from Whitman’s Conversations with Horace Traubel 1888–
1892, 61. 
503 Known today as “Great Are the Myths”, the poem underwent many changes but was dropped from Leaves of Grass 
after 1881. It also contains these lines amounting to a kind of collective confession: “Great are Yourself and Myself, 
/ We are just as good and bad as the oldest and youngest or any, / What the best and worst did, we could do, / What 
they felt, do not we feel it in ourselves?” The Nietzsche quote (“Who alone has . . .”) is cited in Jordan Peterson, 
Maps of Meaning, 324. 
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 In the growths by margins of pond-waters 
 Escaped from the life that exhibits itself, 
 From all the standards hitherto publish’d, from the pleasures, profits, conformities, 
 Which too long I was offering to feed my soul, 
 Clear to me now standards not yet publish’d . . . 
 
But the dawning realization that there was no way around confessing fully and indiscriminately “I 
am what I am” – which, of course, necessarily had to be based on purely subjective perceptions of 
interior characteristics – seems to have stirred in Whitman (“possess[ing]” him; see below) for years 
before 1860. In late life he recalled: 
 
After continued personal ambition and effort, as a young fellow, to enter with the rest 
into competition for the usual rewards, business, political, literary, &c.—to take part 
in the great mèlée, both for victory’s prize itself and to do some good—After years of 
those aims and pursuits, I found myself remaining possess’d, at the age of thirty-one 
to thirty-three, with a special desire and conviction. Or rather, to be quite exact, a 
desire that had been flitting through my previous life, or hovering on the flanks, 
mostly indefinite hitherto, had steadily advanced to the front, defined itself, and 
finally dominated everything else. This was a feeling or ambition to articulate and 
faithfully express in literary or poetic form, and uncompromisingly, my own physical, 
emotional, moral, intellectual, and ӕsthetic Personality, in the midst of, and tallying, 
the momentous spirit and facts of its immediate days, and of current America—and to 
exploit that Personality, identified with place and date, in a far more candid and 
comprehensive sense than any hitherto poem or book. 
Perhaps this is in brief, or suggests, all I have sought to do.504 
 
I am arguing that by “faithfully express[ing] in literary or poetic form, and uncompromisingly” his 
“emotional, moral” uneasiness and mortification, what Whitman achieved besides creating – an 
important work of literature – was an integration of his shadow in the Jungian sense. Archetypally 
speaking, such an integration amounts to a rebirth insofar as a rebirth can be conceptualized as a 
moment when the “tormented, unstable, storm-tossed” self achieves “equilibrium and . . . 
serenity”.505 Aspiz writes: 
 
Like Dante, who was “midway upon the journey of our life” when he entered the 
darkened woods, Whitman launched his poetic excursion in midcareer. When Leaves 
of Grass appeared in 1855 he was thirty-six years old, halfway through his allotted life 
span. A young man’s fancy may turn lightly to thoughts of love, but middle-age fancy 
becomes tempered by thoughts of death. Carl Jung’s dictum that a philosophical 
acceptance of death invigorates the second half of one's existence certainly applies to 
                                                 
504 From “Backward Glance O’er Travel’d Roads” (emphasis mine).  
505 From Roger Asselineau, The Evolution of Walt Whitman, vol. 1, 16. 
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the fashioning of Whitman’s literary career. “From the middle of life onward,” says 
Jung, “only he remains vitally alive who is ready to die with life.”506 
 
Exactly what had to die in Whitman’s case? It seems that the poet realized that he had to execute – 
by blunt, abrasive exposure – the lie that he was not acutely troubled internally and always by 
aspects of himself which – being common to the human race – Jung would classify as shadow 
aspects. By “recreating himself as the bold protagonist of compelling poems”, as Orr puts it, as well 
as owning his deep occasional distress, he was able to unburden himself of – and gain release from 
– flattering lies about him (“O admirers! praise not me! . . . I see what you do not”). And by 
sacrificing those lies in the bright light of art, language and confession, what was true about him 
could, so it seems, to precisely that extent, live on that much lighter. 
 
Chapter 5. “The pleasures of heaven . . . and the pains of 
hell are with me”: Trauma, Empathy and Self Psychology 
Chapter summary: This chapter opens by repeating some of the previous chapters’ most 
salient points and findings before noting that despite the considerable differences between 
schools of psychoanalytic thought, psychological treatments and insights from health 
professionals in general, there is relatively litte ambiguity about what constitutes a person’s 
psychic improvement. What this means is that because all the major psychological 
theoretical systems are undoubtedly motivated by the desire to alleviate suffering and help 
people get better, they may – at least for the purposes of an abstract explication (as 
opposed to a therapy context) – be less irreconcilable than scholars generally seem to 
think. The chapter therefore, after an overview of the currently available psychological or 
psychoanalytically-informed scholarship on Whitman, zeroes in on a number of important 
thinkers’ works: Kohut and Lacan, in particular. It also references empirical research on 
PTSD and considers the scholarship of several major Whitman scholars (among them 
Edwin Haviland Miller, David Cavitch and Stephen A. Black), all of whom adopt a 
psychological perspective. Central to the chapter is the paradoxical idea – explored in 
                                                 
506 From Harold Aspiz, So Long!: Whitman’s Poetry of Death, 33. 
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previous chapters – that desirable states of being can be arrived at from existential 
conditions that appear wildly contradictory to it. At the heart of the chapter is an 
engagement with the Austrian-American psychoanalyst Heinz Kohut whose theory 
concerning compensatory structures proves useful in describing therapeutic and 
redemptive writing. His ideas about empathy are of similar, if not greater, utility in this 
context and are intriguingly compatible with other concepts useful for talking about 
suffering and the deterioration of mental health. Descriptive words such as “cohesive” and 
“continuous” (both central to Kohutean self psychology) or “multiple” and “fragmented” 
prove especially useful in this dissertation given Whitman’s versatility, paradoxality and 
profound psychic evolution. Employing the theoretical framework of this chapter, his line “I 
am large, I contain multitudes” can be taken in many different interesting directions, some 
of which are revealed. The chapter also explores Lacanian Mirrors and presents textual 
evidence supporting the claim that Whitman’s poetry – if not his actual real-life being – 
anticipates Lacan’s theory to a remarkable degree. Particularly the poem “There Was a 
Child Went Forth” seems to exhibit an impressive comprehension of the 
imaginary unification at the heart of Lacan’s intersubjective theory. Again, as before, the 
emphasis is on getting better and surviving, and theory and primary text bear each other 
out very well with respect to that telos. In part because human beings have experienced 
mental suffering long before Whitman’s century and continue to do so to this day, it is 
interesting to ask whether Whitman (who was evidently capable of saving himself from his 
most difficult bouts) can be turned to for insights about post-traumatic stress disorder. After 
exploring Julian Rotter’s work on internal versus external locus of control work, the chapter 
answers in the affirmative and presents textual evidence for Whitman’s internal locus of 
control. 
* * * 
All forces have been steadily employ’d to complete and delight me, 
Now on this spot I stand with my robust soul. 
—Walt Whitman, “Song of Myself” 
In the previous chapters I have considered Whitman’s work exemplary of redemptive or 
psychologically healing writing and accepted that the biographical details of his life bear this out 
sufficiently. Drawing on a number of diverse thinkers and disciplines, I have argued for the 
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essentiality of truthful and sincere utterance, not as a guaranteed and surefire solution to crisis in all 
cases but as – at the very least – an eminently useful starting point. Focusing on states of acute or 
mild psychic distress, I have tried to defend the therapeutic utility in using language in a way that is 
analogous to a foreign correspondent or journalist reporting back from a site of anomaly in order 
that readers back home may gain a sense of the scale of the suffering. Language intended to capture 
the state of internal affairs may, I suggest, freely synthesize modes of writing commonly allied to 
literature (of the aesthetic type), philosophy, psychology, religion and more. Because human being 
is literally a multifaceted enterprise (by which I mean that it expresses itself across a wide range of 
domains), a too-faithful adherence to one domain’s internal logic runs the risk of sacrificing to a 
fatal degree insights appropriate to other domains.507 My argument rests on the irreducible premise 
that every moment of life finds us confronting systems the behavior and nature of which we can 
neither predict nor ultimately comprehend. Sometimes, this is no problem, but when it is it could be 
a terrible problem if we did not have, at least, the option of reflecting coherently (note that language 
manifests an obvious internal coherence) on our own roles in the world’s frequently anxiety-
provoking chaos. Such reflections come with the recommendation that they might reveal something 
worth knowing about ourselves, our psychic resources, courage levels, tolerance for emotional pain 
and capacity for psychic death and rebirth (self-transcendence). 
 I have previously registered my presupposition that psychic health can simplistically 
but profitably be thought of in binary terms, that is in direct contradistinction to psychic suffering. 
On this picture (metaphorically speaking), the psychically wholesome person is, in the poet and 
novelist Robert Nye’s words, simply “someone who – against all the odds and in spite of most of 
the evidence – says ‘More’ to life”. Corresponding well to Jung’s aphorism that “No tree . . . can 
grow to heaven unless its roots reach down to hell”,  Nye sees this “quality of joy” as an attitude 
existing “on the far side of despair”.508 However, one is conversely led to conclude that when the 
despair is sufficiently unmitigated, when no hope of redeeming it is forthcoming, the person may 
grow fatally disinclined to say “More” to life and will increasingly confront life with a world-weary 
“Less”.  
 In his 1855 Preface to Leaves of Grass, often appropriately considered a poetic 
manifesto inaugurating a new life and a new man, Whitman delineates several succinct 
                                                 
507 The Whitman scholar Stephen A. Black makes this point, as I show below. 
508 Robert Nye, Introduction to Henry Miller, Tropic of Capricorn, 5. For the Jung quotation, see Carl Jung, Aion, 
chapter 5. 
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characteristics of the man and character whose exceptional qualities he invites us to join him in 
praising: 
He consumes an eternal passion and is indifferent which chance happens and which possible 
contingency of fortune or misfortune and persuades daily and hourly his delicious pay. What 
balks or breaks others is fuel for his burning progress to contact and amorous joy. Other 
proportions of the reception of pleasure dwindle to nothing to his proportions. All expected 
from heaven or from the highest he is rapport with in the sight of the daybreak or a scene of 
the winter woods or the presence of children playing or with his arm round the neck of a 
man or woman. His love above all love has leisure and expanse . . . . he leaves room ahead 
of himself. He is no irresolute or suspicious lover . . . he is sure . . . he scorns intervals. His 
experience and the showers and thrills are not for nothing. Nothing can jar him . . . . 
suffering and darkness cannot—death and fear cannot. To him complaint and jealousy and 
envy are corpses buried and rotten in the earth . . . . he saw them buried. The sea is not surer 
of the shore or the shore of the sea than he is of the fruition of his love and of all perfection 
and beauty.509 
This portrait is rich with textual evidence that the state of being most desirable to the poet (the 
aforementioned state of psychological health and well-being) can, perhaps must, be arrived at from 
existential conditions that appear wildly contradictory to it. “What balks or breaks others” 
(presumably the “suffering and darkness” or “death and fear” mentioned later), is to Whitman’s 
poet precisely the means to achieving “amorous joy”. Corresponding well to Nye’s redemption 
emerging only “on far side of despair”, it is fitting too that we learn that a certain process unique to 
the poet’s own soul (or mind) has to take place. That process (“progress” in the text) involves 
“burning”, a both quasi-alchemical, cleansing and revitalizing kind of transformation. That 
metaphor is retraced in a poem written five years later: 
I will therefore let flame from me the burning fires that were threatening to consume me, 
I will lift what has too long kept down those smouldering fires, 
I will give them complete abandonment, 
I will write the evangel-poem of comrades and of love.510 
The state of being that is thus made possible is similar to what I shall later in this chapter describe 
as “self-contained” – or from having, in Kohutean terms, a “cohesive” and “continuous” self.511 The 
                                                 
509 From the 1855 Preface. 
510 Composed in 1860 (or shortly before), these lines would end up in section 6 of “Starting from Paumanok”, which 
achieved its final form in 1881. 
511 “Cohesion” and “continuousness” are concepts central to Kohut’s self psychology. See, for instance, Heinz Kohut, 
The Restoration of the Self, 156. 
 In How Does Analysis Cure, Kohut characterizes “the psyche of modern man—the psyche described by 
Kafka and Proust and Joyce—[as] enfeebled, multifragmented (vertically split), and disharmonious.” Although these 
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psychological work or effort on which the realization of the self-contained state depends, I see as a 
kind of “compensatory” process, insofar as it teleologically aims at something whose benefit is 
ample enough to transform the adverse initial state. 
 Elsewhere in the Preface – this time in the context of morals (for which reason the 
example is merely analogous to the mental health issue) – Whitman offers other indications that he 
too imagines mental states to unfold along a continuum, and that both extremes of it are involved in 
synthesizing a happy outcome: 
The soul . . . has sympathy as measureless as its pride and the one balances the other and 
neither can stretch too far while it stretches in company with the other. The inmost secret of 
art sleep with the twain. The greatest poet has lain in close betwixt both and they are vital in 
his style and thoughts.512 
In this chapter, I am going to first give a brief overview of the psychological or psychoanalytically 
informed scholarship on Whitman. Following that, I shall explore a number of psychoanalytical 
theories whose usefulness in the context of Whitman has so far not been sufficiently explored. 
From the opening inauguration in “Song of Myself” of the theme of self-celebration and the line 
“what I assume you shall assume”, it is clear that Whitman is a friend of being – human being – in 
general. A line like “I keep as delicate around the bowels as around the head and heart” must be 
heard as coming from a man wishing the best for human lives and human bodies, his own as well as 
those of everyone else. So must the lines “If I worship any particular thing it shall be some of the 
spread of my body, / . . . / Hands I have taken, face I have kissed, mortal I have ever touched, it 
shall be you.”513 That benevolent wish coincides neatly, at least in principle, with that of therapists, 
doctors, psychologists and, in principle, all other health professionals, which means that 
teleologically speaking there is agreement, in the following paragraphs, between the involved 
                                                 
writers are significantly younger than Whitman, all their lives have some historical overlap. See Heinz Kohut, How 
Does Analysis Cure?, 60. 
 The terms “multiple” and “fragmented” are useful approximate antonyms to “continuous” and 
“cohesive”, as Judith Guss Teicholz points out in “The Analyst’s Empathy, Subjectivity, and Authenticity: Affect as 
the Common Denominator”, which appears in Arnold I. Goldberg, ed., How Responsive Should We Be: Progress in 
Self Psychology, vol. 16, 38. 
512 Notice that the word “continuum” is in perfect semantic accord with the adjective “coherent” (as well as, of course, 
“continuous”). In other words, the self-contained self is apparently able to run the whole gamut of mental states 
without getting stuck in any position or direction. 
513 Once “Song of Myself” acquired its 52 numbered sections, these lines would appear in section 24. 
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parties – i.e. poem and secondary or theoretical material. Every approach, then, to comprehending 
being, self, world, suffering, remedy, strategy etc. is predicated on a shared desire to bring about 
improvement. This is by definition going to take the form of helping a person strengthen or recover 
the inclination to say “more” to life and try to engage with being in a sustainable manner. The 
implication of Whitman’s insistence that “the writing and rounding of L of G has been to me the 
reason-for-being, & life comfort” and that it “has been the comfort of my life since it was originally 
commenced” (see page 134) is therefore that we are justified in looking for parallels and similarities 
between different psychological scholars’ theories concerning how and why he survived his trials 
and suffering – and inspiringly distilled existential “comfort” out of himself. 
 I have cited David S. Reynolds a number of times above and drawn especial attention 
to his observation that though Whitman “is, of course, the definitive poet of joy[,] there are signs of 
personal trauma even in his most exuberant poems.” Although formally psychological approaches 
to Whitman were not widespread before the middle of the twentieth century, that particular theme 
actually goes back to the first book in which an expert on – and fond friend of – Whitman tapped 
into psychological contemplation. The book is Carpenter’s Days with Walt Whitman (1906) wherein 
Carpenter makes the claim that beneath Whitman’s “ample and loving humanity” lay “a great tragic 
element in his nature”. Carpenter takes stock of the poet’s “cussedness” and suggests that his 
“contrary moods, [his] spirit of refusal, [and his] willfulness” may have been the reason why he was 
apparently never “happy in love affairs.”514 The portrait reveals a complex man who “celebrates in 
his poems the fluid, all-solvent disposition” while being himself, incongruously, a “fixed, silent” 
person and “less the river than the rock”. In the arboreal metaphor of which Nietzsche (and, as 
mentioned, Jung) was fond, Whitman’s “leaves” were reaching in the exact opposite direction of his 
subterranean (psychic) roots.515 I shall return to trees (as Lacanian mirror object) once I have 
concluded my overview of the psychological scholarship Whitman has occasioned. 
 Although 1906 also saw the publication of the excellent literary biography Walt 
Whitman: His Life and Work by Bliss Perry, this work is not sufficiently rich in psychological 
material to receive attention here. All I ought to mention is that Perry, after conducting several frank 
interviews with Whitman’s disciples John Burroughs, Traubel and R. M. Bucke, wrote that “as far 
as I know there has never been the slightest evidence that Whitman practiced homo-sexuality.”516 
                                                 
514 Edward Carpenter, Days with Walt Whitman, 47. 
515 “One can dispose of one’s drives like a gardener and, though few know it, cultivate the shoots of anger, pity, 
curiosity, vanity as productively and profitably as a beautiful fruit tree on a trellis.” From Friedrich Nietzsche, 
Daybreak: Thoughts on the Prejudices of Morality, 225. 
516 See Bliss Perry, Walt Whitman: His Life and Work, 55–56. Of these three men, only Burroughs was not a literary 
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Evidence to the contrary did, however, eventually surface, with the publication of Gavin Arthur’s 
The Circle of Sex sixty years later. In that work, Gavin quotes Edward Carpenter who in the 1920s 
had revealed to Arthur that his visits to Whitman in 1877 and 1884 (on which Days with Walt 
Whitman is based) did indeed have a sexual dimension (see footnote 473).517 
 In 1929, the first full-length psychobiography of the poet was published. Walt 
Whitman: La naissance du poète, by the French scholar Jean Catel, was the result of a careful study 
of rough drafts preceding the 1855 edition of Leaves of Grass. Catel, who (controversially and, 
some say, erroneously) sees pre-1855 Whitman as an introverted and maladjusted man, concludes 
that poetry for Whitman offered a means of compensating for professional failures and personal 
difficulties and thus had a therapeutic value. Significantly, the book is the first to argue that Leaves 
of Grass liberated Whitman’s homosexual eroticism (as a significant number of his disciples had 
probably long perceived) as well as other aspects of his identity that had suffered similar societal 
repression.518 The theme of autoeroticism is also noted by Catel, which is a trend that continues to 
this day. Less controversially, Catel demonstrates how Emerson’s Transcendentalism was 
instrumental in allowing Whitman to spiritualize the physical world in his poems in a process that 
drew heavily on Whitman’s imagination. Other themes explored by Catel are Whitman’s surrealism 
(arguably a concept of deep psychological interest), his sense of identity, concept of the soul and 
use of “I”-narration. 
 In 1968, Edwin Haviland Miller published the influential monograph Whitman’s 
Poetry: A Psychological Journey, unanimously admired among Whitman scholars. The author 
observes that by the late sixties, the Beat Generation was responsible for a renewed interest in 
Whitman who had suffered a partial eclipse during the era of New Criticism. Miller uses that 
opportunity to embark on an exploration into the psychic sources of Whitman’s verse. From the 
fairly straight-forward observation that Whitman’s verse is greatly autobiographical, Miller 
                                                 
executor to Whitman after his death. 
517 See Gavin Arthur, The Circle of Sex (New Hyde Park, N.Y.: University Books, 1966), 135–136. Another Whitman 
scholar (Emory Holloway, whose strong work on Whitman’s prose and journalism earned him a position on the 
faculty of Queens College, New York) was repeatedly compelled to justify his views on Whitman’s sexuality. In 
1960, Holloway argues that Whitman was bisexual and was attempting to imagine an androgynous position from 
which to see the world and write about it. See Emory Holloway, Free and Lonesome Heart: The Secret of Walt 
Whitman, 16. 
518 As to his disciples’ suspicion: In 1890, John Addington Symonds (1840–1893), an English literary critic well-known 
for his homoerotic poetry, angered Whitman (whom he had first corresponded with in 1871) by directly asking the 
dying poet about the homosexual content of the “Calamus” poems. Fiercely upset, Whitman hotly denied Symonds’ 
“morbid inferences” (which of course invites the response from scholars that he “protested too much”) and in his 
reply claimed (artfully but implausibly) to have fathered six children two of whom had perished. Three years later, 
Symonds’ Walt Whitman: A Study was published (1893). See Gary Smidgall’s introduction to Walt Whitman, 
Intimate with Walt: Selections from Whitman’s Conversations with Horace Traubel 1888–1892, xiv. 
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concludes that the material of Leaves of Grass has its origins in unconscious and infantile sources, 
which is reflected by the fact that the poetry exhibits regressive imagery, fantasy and is often 
concerned with infantile longings. Crucially to what I shall say later in this chapter, Miller suggests 
that composing the poems seems to have had a palpable psychic effect on Whitman himself, one 
entailing a felt decrease in the importance of the external world (including its baffling and 
disorienting aspects, which is essential within this dissertation – a soothing effect consequently).519 
Miller’s notion that “tensions and conflicts” in Whitman find “resolution or release” in his verse 
restates classic psychoanalytic theory, complete with the obvious therapeutic rewards of that 
process. Miller argues that “genius reveals itself not only by the profundity of its intuitive insights 
but also by its ability to put into artistic order what remains inarticulate and formless for lesser 
minds and sensibilities.”520 Agreeing with Reynolds (as cited earlier in this chapter) and the 
emerging model of the paradoxical nature of psychic health, Miller uncovers evidence that 
“Whitman from almost the beginning of his career was aware . . . that his poetry compensated for 
almost intolerable personal frustration.”521 
 The originality of Stephen A. Black’s psychoanalytic study Whitman’s Journeys into 
Chaos: A Psychoanalytic Study of the Poetic Process (1975) rests fundamentally on its central 
thesis that the poems constituting Leaves of Grass “do not chronicle events: they are themselves the 
events”.522 In other words, Black argues (from the standpoint of ego psychology) that poetic 
composition was the crucial emotional activity of Whitman’s life during the rich period between the 
early 1850s and 1860. Central to the theoretical approach is also Black’s insistence on the 
inseparability of the artist’s life (especially his unconscious life), his work and the process by which 
his work is done. Though the book acknowledges poems written as “late” as 1865, Black considers 
that “almost all of the important poems” predate 1860. His explanation for the decline in quality as 
the Civil War in coming on is the poet’s decreasing inclination or willingness to return to the 
                                                 
519 Another Whitman scholar, David Cavitch, who draws on both Miller and Stephen A. Black, concurs with Miller on 
this and suggests that “Whitman seemed to learn at an early age that he could survive by detaching himself from the 
life around him.” Indeed, the poet himself knew and confessed in 1856 that he was “a man pre-occupied of his own 
soul” and – for that reason, the poem suggests – “need[ed] no assurances” (“Assurances”). For the Cavitch quote, 
see David Cavitch, My Soul and I: The Inner Life of Walt Whitman, 12. 
520 Edwin Haviland Miller, Walt Whitman’s Poetry: A Psychological Journey, viii. 
521 Edwin Haviland Miller, Walt Whitman’s Poetry: A Psychological Journey, 138. 
522 Incidentally, Black clashes with Miller somewhat over the issue of homosexual desire. In Miller’s estimation, 
Whitman’s homoeroticism was conscious and overt since his youth. Black, on the other hand, develops his position 
by taking issue with Catel whose view of Whitman as inherently autoerotic he modifies before arguing instead that 
Whitman’s consciousness of physical homosexual desire was repressed until some crisis in the late 1850s. In 
keeping with the central drift of his theory, Black supposes that the crisis may have been the very act of writing the 
“Calamus” poems (see chapter 4 of this dissertation).  
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psychic sources of his poetry which may only be accessed via a casting off of inhibitions 
(conventional thought and language patterns, chiefly).523 
A powerful leitmotif is discernible when one reads across these Whitman scholars’ works: a process 
of psychological compensation catalyzed by the writing of poetry. Variations of this term appear in 
the précis of both Catel and Miller above. Let me add to those the fact that Roger Asselineau (to 
whom I have referred especially frequently in previous chapters) sees Whitman as unstable and 
tormented yet able to use his poetry in a compensatory fashion, i.e. he was able to make the verse 
serve as a therapeutic substitute for what was missing from his life, something for which his longing 
was an abiding source of suffering.524 As I have pointed out, Carpenter’s and Reynolds’s works 
contain strikingly congruous observations. 
 Central to the Austrian-American self psychologist and psychoanalyst Heinz Kohut’s 
programme was the concept of “compensatory” intrapsychic structures. In the opening pages of The 
Restoration of the Self (1977), Kohut (postponing, for the nonce, a necessary explication of the 
“bipolar nature of the self” necessary for an understanding of psychoanalytic approaches to 
narcissistic personality disorder) jumps right into his new subject: 
I call a structure compensatory when, rather than merely covering a defect in the self, it 
compensates for this effect. Undergoing a development of its own, it brings about a 
functional rehabilitation of the self by making up for the weakness in one pole of the self 
through the strengthening of the other pole. . . . [The] phase of termination of the analysis of 
a narcissistic personality disorder has been reached when [either] the primary defect in the 
self has been exposed . . . the sufficiently filled out so that the formerly defective structures 
of the self have now become functionally reliable [or] the compensatory structures have now 
become functionally reliable, independent of the area in which this success was achieved.525 
The second and last of the two indicators above that treatment may be terminated is, where 
Whitman is concerned, the more interesting. Note, however, that I am not at this point suggesting 
that Whitman is exactly the kind of suffering patient Kohut imagines in this passage in order to 
explicate compensatory structures. The crucial issue for me at this stage of the argument is that 
Kohut recognizes that an adverse psychic condition need not define a person in any final sense nor 
                                                 
523 In the following I refer to and engage even more recent scholarship on Whitman while pursuing my own arguments. 
524 Certainly, he felt his book uniquely contained and presented its readers with something hard to come by yet 
necessary: “Shut not your doors to me proud libraries, / For that which was lacking on all your well-fill’d shelves, 
yet needed most, I bring, / Forth from the war emerging, a book I have made, / The words of my book nothing, the 
drift of it every thing,” he writes in “Shut not Your Doors”.  
525 Heinz Kohut, The Restoration of the Self, 3–4. 
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have the last word on the wellbeing of that person’s self. The mental pain, unpleasant and 
overwhelming though it may be, may nevertheless turn out to shrink in significance as a 
consequence of the patient’s successful implementation of one or more compensatory structures. 
Mario Jacoby appreciates Kohut’s point that “in the final phase of analysis creative activities or new 
life ideals may manifest, which provide the patient with a certain amount of inner satisfaction” 
(italics mine) – perhaps even a satisfactory amount, which was definitely true of Whitman as I have 
shown in previous chapters.526 An admirable realism and resistance to unchecked optimism makes 
Kohut an ally of my own conceptualization of human striving for mental health. Kohut writes, for 
instance, that in some cases it must be accepted that therapy cannot produce a completely 
transformed and irreversibly healed individual but merely an “analysand[ who has] at 
least preliminarily determined the mode by which the self will from now on attempt to ensure its 
cohesion.”527 Whitman seems exemplary of that state of healing in these lines: 
You broken resolutions, you racking angers, you smother’d ennuis; 
Ah, think not you finally triumph—My real self has yet to come forth; 
It shall yet march forth o'ermastering, till all lies beneath me; 
It shall yet stand up the soldier of unquestion’d victory.528 
It seems possible to make the argument that Whitman effected a series of intrapsychic therapeutic 
changes in a manner that is compatible with the overall shape and import of Kohut’s theory.529 It 
seems he reaped the welcome psychological fruits of repeatedly trying to catch himself and his 
experiences in the net of language. He tells us in the 1855 Preface that he is a man “cohered out of 
tumult and chaos”, and I shall suggest that “cohered” is approximately synonymous with “come 
forth” (cf. the verse fragment cited immediately above). Haviland Miller makes the valuable 
argument that the “coherence” of Whitman’s self resulted from his exploration in poetry of the 
                                                 
526 Mario Jacoby, Individuation and Narcissism: The Psychology of Self in Jung and Kohut, 183–184. 
527 Heinz Kohut, The Restoration of the Self, 38. 
 Such modesty and cautious gratitude is surely wise in issues as delicately unpredictable as mental 
health. Cf. Jacoby: “Kohut is modest enough to see the limits of what analysis can reach and declares himself 
satisfied if the ‘compensatory structures’ of the patient are improved, while the primary defect in the self may often 
not– or at least not completely – be healed.” From Mario Jacoby, Individuation and Narcissism: The Psychology of 
Self in Jung and Kohut, 183. 
528 From “Ah Poverties, Wincings, and Sulky Retreats” (italics mine, composed in 1865–66). 
529 Allen M. Siegel validates this by seeing a Kohutean compensatory structure as “a talent, skill or even a relationship 
that is reliable and may function . . . as a source of healthy self-esteem.” From Heinz Kohut and the Psychology of 
the Self, chapter 9 (no pagination in online version). 
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“nature of the soul”, which was motivated by a hunger “not for intellectual consistency but for 
emotional security.”530 
Do I contradict myself? 
Very well then I contradict myself, 
(I am large, I contain multitudes.) 
In exploring the “nature of the soul” – his own soul, specifically – Whitman finds that it “contains 
multitudes” which are not easily reconcilable. Their mutual incompatibility seems to run counter to 
the idea that the self is a homogenous, tension-free unity. There are no doubt countless ways in 
which “I am large, I contain multitudes” – Whitman’s perhaps best-loved and most often-quoted 
line – can be interpreted. By drawing on Kohut and Lacan, I shall try to suggest and shed a little 
light on some of them in the following. 
 First, let me indicate David Cavitch’s interesting response to a question which has 
haunted countless Whitman biographers: How could a man as apparently ordinary as Walt Whitman 
become such a great poet? Cavitch, building on Miller and Black, comes up with the interesting 
answer that Whitman’s poetry is in large part the surprising consequence of his discovery that an 
ordinary man may represent everyone else. I think, in brief, that the successful integration of his 
own multitudinous contradictory psychological subelements, which he achieved through 
compensatory poetic labour, is to be understood as indistinguishable psychologically from his 
discovery that he “may represent everyone else.” An old proverb compares ruling a city with ruling 
oneself, and it is this same distinction – between a psychic and a social domain – I am addressing 
here. I have said that Thoreau deemed Whitman “apparently the greatest democrat the world has 
seen”, and it should be increasingly clear how that is a defensible characterization. Cavitch 
substantiates Thoreau’s observation by elaborating on “Whitman’s wide-ranging sympathy for all 
life”: 
After stanzas of absorbing other people, Whitman emerges in stanza 18 [of “Song of 
Myself”] as a militant champion of oppressed humanity . . . His procession is like a 
triumphal approach to a city that will receive him as a reconciler of age-old conflicts. [After 
quoting ll. 361–371, Cavitch goes on:] He offers dignity to the defeated because he believes 
that equality of spirit is ordained by nature and should be brought openly into modern 
civilization, in the form of democracy. His internal struggle gave him the moral sensitivity to 
                                                 
530 Edwin Haviland Miller, Walt Whitman’s Poetry: A Psychological Journey, vii. 
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uphold democracy as the naturally evolving perfection of social order and to celebrate the 
egalitarianism of the United States over the hierarchies of Europe.531 
Psychologists sometimes speak about the Fascist (versus Democratic) state of mind. In the 
Fascist state of mind doubts are expelled because they immediately reverberate weakness of 
spirit and all weaknesses are considered as something very negative. A unidimensional mind 
is formed and any other external counterviews completely disregarded and eliminated. 
Slogans, rhetoric, violent fallacious argumentations, icons and so on substantiate (also 
suitably stored in external materialities) the totality of the ideology/morality at play.532 
Whitman’s art seems to bear out Freud’s insistence in epigraphic perspective 12 that “all genuinely 
creative writings are the product of more than a single impulse in the poet’s mind”. However, Freud 
adds that one implication of this is that they are thus “open to more than a single interpretation.” 
Suppose that part of the impetus for writing autobiographically is the uncovering of a stable and 
unequivocal scan of the writer’s self, then there is something unsettling about a text that remains 
open to an unknown number of different interpretations. From that perspective, it must take courage 
or resolve for an individual to defend and cultivate “democracy of mind”, so to speak. This is 
because tolerating – as opposed to suppressing – internal dissent, whether psychic or social, is 
clearly the less squeamish, less paranoid attitude. While in Whitman’s case, it allowed him to relate 
to and identify with in principle every other human being, it was at the cost of having to 
acknowledge aspects of his own self which seemed unworthy of celebration, to say nothing of the 
fact that it made him internally contradictory. To the latter, admirably, he was able to say “Very 
well . . . I am large” – and thus he redeemed himself, transcended psychic Fascisms and laid the 
foundation for self-containment or cohesion. 
 I think Whitman was able to extend that self-redeeming courtesy to himself, on which 
mental health may in large part be predicated, for two reasons: (1) because of a fundamental 
empathy with his own situation and suffering and (2) because he observed that most objects in the 
natural world (of which he was instinctively fond) manifested a similarly various (contradictory and 
paradoxical) internal structure: “[The greatest poet] has a perfect sense of the oneness of nature and 
the propriety of the same spirit applied to human affairs,” he writes in the 1855 Preface. And yet, 
significantly, the Preface shows us that nature’s “oneness” is an emergent (not essential) property, 
                                                 
531 David Cavitch, My Soul and I: The Inner Life of Walt Whitman, 52–53. 
532 Lorenzo Magnani, Understanding Violence: The Intertwining of Morality, Religion and Violence: A Philosophical 
Stance, 207. 
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so to speak, resulting from the perfect cooperation of myriad constitutive elements. Both reasons – 
(1) and (2) – are reflected in his verse and can therefore, on the strength of my argumentation 
above, be thought of as Kohutean compensatory structures or tactics.533 
 Kohut provides important psychoanalytic insights on the phenomenon of empathy 
which he conceptualizes as 
the mode by which one gathers psychological data about other people and, when they 
say what they think and feel, imagines their inner experience even though it is not 
open to direct observation. Through empathy we aim at discerning . . . complex 
psychological configurations which we could either define only through the laborious 
presentation of a host of details or which it may even be beyond our ability to 
define.534 
Empathy is, Kohut argues, a kind of analgesic when one suffers “hurts to one’s pride, injuries to 
one’s prestige needs, interferences with conscious, preconscious, or unconscious fantasies 
concerning one’s greatness, power, and specialness.”535 Though Kohut specifies “other people” in 
the first sentence of the block citation above, the second contains no emphasis on interpersonal 
relationship and might arguably obtain intrapsychically, i.e. in cases when the self contemplates 
itself in solitude. The benevolent curiosity, so to speak, at the heart of empathy can – may 
reasonably – be directed at one’s own self: “And nothing, not God, is greater to one than one’s self 
is” (“Song of Myself”). Self-scrutiny, self-therapy, self-investigation seem to be, in principle, 
followable pursuits. “You shall stand by my side and look in the mirror with me,” Whitman 
informed his earliest readers, and I shall return to that metaphor in my words on Lacan below.536 
That the trope of directing empathy toward the self is of momentous significance to Whitman is 
even more conclusively reflected in the bluntly addressed and entitled poem “To You”: 
I will leave all and come and make the hymns of you, 
None has understood you, but I understand you, 
None has done justice to you, you have not done justice to yourself, 
None but has found you imperfect, I only find no imperfection in you, 
None but would subordinate you, I only am he who will never consent to subordinate 
you, 
                                                 
533 It is, I suppose, possible that point (1) is the corollary of point (2). 
534 Heinz Kohut, “Forms and Transformation of Narcissism,” 262. 
535 Heinz Kohut, The Search for the Self: Selected Writings of Heinz Kohut 1978–1981, 773. 
536 From the 1855 Preface. 
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I only am he who places over you no master, owner, better, God, beyond what waits 
intrinsically in yourself. 
The third line above is particularly revelatory here: You (meaning we – the multitudinous plurality 
of people) are tragically capable of withholding a fair treatment of yourself from yourself, but may 
learn to recognize such unjust moment by appeal to no authority except “what waits intrinsically in 
yourself.” And elsewhere: “Once more I enforce you to give play to yourself—and not depend on 
me, or on any one but yourself.”537 
 It is beyond question that Leaves of Grass is permeated throughout with the spirit of 
psychic redemption, no doubt most memorably (to most readers) when it takes the form of the poet 
sincerely assuring his reader that he will never abandon the lonely, never qualify his loyalty to the 
defeated, never cease trying to cheer up the sick, buoy up the dying, and so forth. The opposite side 
of the empathic nexus is also clearly featured however, which makes it, in principle, possible to 
carry out a neatly binary categorization of Whitman’s crisis-ridden lines. Several lines – in fact, 
several entire poems, as we have seen – lend themselves to being read as pleas for emotional rescue 
or relief (empathy desired), which on it face of it appears the very opposite attitude to offering 
service and compassion to the desperate (empathy extended). 
 My point in noting this is that Kohut’s emphasis of empathy as crucial to 
psychological healing is borne out by the adoption of the view that Leaves of Grass is a work in 
which a poet explores, distills, cultivates and self-applies an empathic approach to suffering – 
regardless of the identity of the sufferer. Like John Milton before him who sought to justify it, 
Whitman is confounded by human suffering in the abstract, and his writing reveals it. Though there 
are no guarantees ever in the complex psychodynamic realm, it ought not to surprise us greatly that 
the compensatory activity he undertook, to use Kohut’s term, seems to have elicited a therapeutic 
effect on the practitioner himself. I am suggesting that he sometimes imagined his reader to be his 
analysand or client, sometimes his personal therapist.538 Faced with and troubled by his complicated 
and incohesive self, he seems to have achieved the kind of solution which psychoanalysis, in Adam 
Phillips assessment, is uniquely capable of providing: Psychoanalysis, writes Phillips (see footnote 
103), “doesn’t cure people so much as show them what it is about themselves that is incurable.”  
                                                 
537 These words from the 1860 version of “So Long!” Ten lines earlier, Whitman writes: “let none be content with me, / 
I myself seek a man better than I am, or a woman better than I am.” 
538 A brief 1860 poem entitled “To You” includes the invitation: “Come! vouchsafe to me what has yet been vouchsafed 
to none—Tell me the whole story, / Tell me what you would not tell your brother, wife, husband, or physician.” 
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 It is of interest – and will serve as a segue to Lacan – that Jung proposes empathy to 
be based on projection and introjection. By way of clarifying the latter concept, Jung explains: 
[Empathy] brings the object into intimate relation with the subject. In order to 
establish this relationship, the subject detaches a content – a feeling, for instance – 
from himself, lodges it in the object, thereby animating it, and in this way draws the 
object into the sphere of the subject.539 
This kind of dynamic informs much psychoanalytic theory. In his book Risky Writing: Self-
disclosure and Self-transformation in the Classroom, Jeffrey Berman discusses Kohutean empathy 
and presents the observation from Walter Jackson Bate that it is 
one of the common tenets of English romantic criticism that the imagination is 
capable, through an effort of sympathetic intuition, of identifying itself with its object; 
and, by means of this identification, the sympathetic imagination grasps, through a 
kind of direct experience and feeling, the distinctive nature, identity, or ‘truth’ of the 
object of its contemplation.540 
I think Whitman would, were he able, have heartily agreed. After all, name-checking Schelling and 
Fichte, he wrote in Specimen Days: 
[P]leasantly imprison’d here under the big oak—the rain dripping, and the sky cover’d 
with leaden clouds—nothing but the pond on one side, and the other a spread of grass, 
spotted with the milky blossoms of the wild carrot— . . . why am I so (almost) happy 
here and alone? Why would any intrusion, even from people I like, spoil the charm? 
But am I alone? Doubtless there comes a time—perhaps it has come to me—when one 
feels through his whole being, and pronouncedly the emotional part, that identity 
between himself subjectively and Nature objectively which Schelling and Fichte are so 
fond of pressing. How it is I know not, but I often realize a presence here—in clear 
moods I am certain of it, and neither chemistry nor reasoning nor esthetics will give 
the least explanation. All the past two summers it has been strengthening and 
nourishing my sick body and soul, as never before. Thanks, invisible physician, for 
thy silent delicious medicine, thy day and night, thy waters and thy airs, the banks, the 
grass, the trees, and e’en the weeds!541 
                                                 
539 Carl Jung, Psychological Types, paragraph 784. 
540 Walter Jackson Bate, From Classic to Romantic: Premises of Taste in Eighteenth-Century England, 132. 
 David Klugman writes that “Kohut’s recognition of the role of empathy in the analytic process parallels 
the Romantic recognition of the role of the imagination in perception and experience”, which is so apropos as to 
require no elaboration. From David Klugman, “Empathy’s Romantic Dialectic: Self Psychology, Intersubjectivity, 
and Imagination,” 700. 
541 From Specimen Days and Collect, 105 (italics mine). I mention Fichte in a related context in footnote 195. 
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The passage involves much of what has been addressed throughout this dissertation: the will to 
health (a theoretical issue I associate with Otto Rank, Thomas S. Szasz and Carl Rogers), objects 
relations, the creation of a literary voice celebrating being and the attendant benefit for psychic 
(indeed, psychophysical) health. I shall argue that observing and psychically interacting with the 
living (yet stable), coherent (yet multifarious), inscrutable yet undeniable objects with which the 
natural world is rife had an instructing effect on his own psychic integrity, and that this subject-
object interaction is compatible with Lacan’s Mirror theory. (The reader should recall the 
connection back to empathy outlined by the Jung above (footnote 539; Goethe’s words in footnote 
335, anticipating the point I shall make, merit attention too). 
 Speaking specifically about child development, it was Lacan’s proposition that a child 
will at a certain stage of development before the age of 2 – the “Mirror Phase” – naturally identify 
with an image or other outside itself.542 As a consequence of such identification, the child will 
perceive an apparent completeness of self – an imaginary construct behind which the real subject 
resides – as well as attain some mastery over its body. The latter increase in motor coordination is, I 
think, is a phenomenal testament to a shift towards higher psychic sophistication. And higher 
psychic sophistication is, as far as I can see, synonymous with psychic health – certainly if it be 
assumed, as I think it should be, that the excellence or success of the self’s outward being (its 
motoric manifestation) is predicated on its sense a possessing a cohesive self within.543 Lacan 
appeals to examples from biology (pigeons and locusts) to argue – in general – that one or more 
necessary changes are elicited when (in principle) any biological body is exposed “at a certain 
stage, to the exclusively visual action of a similar image, provided it is animated by movements of a 
style sufficiently close to that characteristic of the species.”544 This is the narrowly-formulated 
empirical example, but I see no reason why variations and derivations of the same dynamic might 
not inform and characterize the ongoing process of adaptation and self-acclimatization to reality 
which (up to a point) all individuals must – lest they perish – perform. Like Freud and the 
preponderance of scientists to this day, Lacan accepts that the human being is born “prematurely,” 
                                                 
542 One of Lacan’s earliest contributions, the Mirror Phase theory was first presented in 1936. An English translation of 
the famous paper (“The Mirror Stage as Formative of the Function of the I as Revealed in Psychoanalytic 
Experience”) is contained in Jacques Lacan, Écrits: A Selection, trans. Alan Sheridan, 1–7. 
543 Note that Lacan speaks of “ego”, not self. I am unable here to adequately address the issue of reconciling Lacan’s 
and Kohut’s systems of terminology. 
 Judith Guss Teicholz suggests that Kohut’s self is haunted by “conceptual complexities, multiple 
meanings, and ambiguities” while noting its commonality with the relational view of subjectivity. See Teicholz’s 
article “The Analyst’s Empathy, Subjectivity, and Authenticity: Affect as the Common Denominator,” in Arnold I. 
Goldberg, ed., How Responsive Should We Be: Progress in Self Psychology, vol. 16, 38. 
544 From Jacques Lacan, Écrits: A Selection, 3. 
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which leaves the infant fundamentally incomplete. My argument, radical though it may sound at 
first blush, is that human beings are by definition psychologically “incomplete” – always – for the 
simple reason that there would be no motivation for personal development if they were not 
incomplete, but such a condition would equal stagnation which is obviously unsustainable within a 
constantly changing environment. Sheer being in the world leaves thus us effectively “incomplete” 
because we are forced to evolve along with the environment in which we find ourselves. 
 The child of Whitman’s “There Was a Child Went Forth” beautifully illustrates the 
imaginary unification at the heart of Lacan’s intersubjective theory – and makes the point which I 
just mentioned that the process continues beyond the years of earliest developments: 
There was a child went forth every day, 
And the first object he looked upon and received with wonder, pity, love, or dread, 
that object he became, 
And that object became part of him for the day, or a certain part of the day, or for 
many years, or stretching cycles of years. 
The early lilacs became part of this child, 
And grass, and white and red morning-glories, and white and red clover, and the song 
of the phœbe-bird, 
. . . 
And the water-plants with their graceful flat heads—all became part of him. 
. . . 
These became part of that child who went forth every day, and who now goes, and 
will always go forth every day, 
And these become part of him or her that peruses them here.545 
I can offer no better elaboration on these lines than entreat the reader to go back to and reread the 
quotes by Bate and Jung (footnotes 539 and 540), which connect such a process to the phenomenon 
of empathy.546 
 Another early and famous passage charged with Lacanian Mirror significance and 
exemplifying an intersubjective relationship with nature is section 32 of “Song of Myself” (“I think 
I could turn and live with animals”), which I cited earlier (footnote 344). 
                                                 
545 This early poem was part of every edition of Leaves of Grass from 1855 and onwards.  
546 Whether the empathy be directed at self or imaginary other may – in light of Bate’s “sympathetic imagination” point 
– in the final psychological analysis be a trivial distinction; however, the argumentation required for directly arguing 
so would take more space than is practical here. 
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This picture of being in the world – a situation in which objects “looked upon” are “received with 
wonder, pity, love, or dread” and psychically accommodated to lodge and reverberate in the self 
potentially “for many years” – feels realistic and coherent because it enables one to account 
plausibly for the wide divergence characterizing human lives. In other words, it is readily believable 
that the degrees to which one must receive wonder, pity, love and dread will have an effect on one’s 
emergent perspective on life, say, as well undoubtedly as one’s mental health. A self forced to 
receive the world with unchecked degrees of dread, for instance, might emerge scarred, wizened, 
exhausted or traumatized. 
 When Whitman helped out in the military hospitals in Washington between 1862 and 
1865, he exposed himself to a health-compromising strain and ordeal which presumably aged him 
prematurely.547 Aware of the importance of appearing unaffected and cheerful while visiting the 
wounded, Whitman soon realized that being exposed day out and day in to “death and sickness and 
hard marching and hard fighting” was not only “bec[oming] part of him for the day”, to cite from 
the poem, but, as it turned out, “for many years, or stretching cycles of years.”548 As he wrote his 
mother: 
It is curious: when I am present at the most appalling things, deaths, operations, 
sickening wounds (perhaps full of maggots), I keep cool and do not give out or budge, 
although my sympathies are very much excited; but often, hours afterward, perhaps 
when I am home, or out walking alone, I feel sick, and actually tremble, when I recall 
the case again before me.549 
33 years after the Civil War, in 1888, Whitman hands Traubel the manuscript draft of a letter written 
by the poet in August 1863, addressed to the parents of a soldier who had died in Washington’s 
Armory Square Hospital. He tells Traubel: 
[T]hey died all about us there just about in the same way—noble, sturdy, loyal boys. I 
always kept an outward calm in going among them—I had to, it was necessary, I 
would have been useless if I hadn’t—but no one could tell what I felt underneath it 
                                                 
547 It has been noted by several biographers that Whitman seemed to age prematurely. While the process may, as I say 
have been accelerated by the intense strain of his Civil War volunteering, Garrett Peck notes that “[h]is beard began 
graying in his twenties, and his hair soon followed” making him look “prematurely aged, like a vigorous older 
man.” See Garrett Peck, Walt Whitman in Washington: The Civil War and America’s Great Poet, 21. 
548 This line’s first quote is from a letter to his mother dated December 29, 1862. See Walt Whitman, The 
Correspondence, vol. 1, 58–60. 
549 From a letter to his mother dated October 6, 1863. See Walt Whitman, The Correspondence, vol. 1, 156–158. 
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all—how hard it was for me to keep down the fierce flood that always seemed 
threatening to break loose –550 
– to which Traubel asks whether Whitman often returns in thought to those days. His response: “I 
do not need to. I have never left them. They are here, now, while we are talking together—real, 
terrible, beautiful days!” 
 An argument can be made that Whitman spent most of his adult life recovering from 
what would today be called post-traumatic stress – whether he contracted the condition during the 
1860s’ hospital years, as a result of inner despair around the issue of sex or as early as 1841 during 
the mysterious Woodbury scandal.551 Similarly, it is possible to argue that Whitman’s ways of 
effecting self-transcendence via his poems anticipate some of the current approaches to treating 
post-traumatic stress disorder. By the sheer fact of his rather impressive longevity (see my words on 
his autopsy in footnote 459), he is arguably a model of survival. But knowing how – or rather, being 
in a position to infer and argue how – he enabled his survival, I am able to declare him an exemplar 
of what Richard Tedeschi and others have called “post-traumatic growth”.552 The phrase indicates 
that something desirable and useful may arise from catastrophe, which is a motif we have seen 
reflected in the archetype of death and rebirth, in the alchemical phrase “In sterquiliniis invenitur” 
(see footnotes 132 and 133) and echoed in several writers’ and philosophers’ words, including 
Whitman’s: “I will show that whatever happens to anybody it may be turn’d to beautiful results.”553 
The poem “Wandering at Morn” sees the poet “Emerging from the night from gloomy thoughts” to 
utter to the troubled United States the same insight: 
 If worms, snakes, loathsome grubs, may to sweet spiritual songs be turn’d, 
If vermin so transposed, so used and bless’d may be, 
Then may I trust in you, your fortunes, your days, my country. 
It is Tedeschi’s (et al.) argument that a positive redefinition of threatening experiences tends to 
emerge from “see[ing] the threat as an opportunity to change”.554 This dynamic too has been 
addressed a number of times above, for instance in my argument for the necessity of continual 
change or in Adam Phillips’s claim that by merely articulating problems with a psychoanalyst one 
                                                 
550 Walt Whitman, With Walt Whitman in Camden, vol. 1, 115. 
551 I have alluded to this in footnote 481. 
552 See Richard G. Tedeschi, Crystal L. Park and Lawrence G. Calhoun, eds., Posttraumatic Growth: Positive Changes 
in the Aftermath of Crisis. 
553 From “Starting from Paumanok.” 
554 Richard G. Tedeschi et al., eds., Posttraumatic Growth: Positive Changes in the Aftermath of Crisis, 71. 
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may achieve a redescription of a problem, which is sometimes one’s best option, particularly when 
no “treatment” exists (cf. footnote 277). Interestingly, Whitman tells us that he discovered that 
poetry could be instrumental in the pursuit of the indicated kind of redescription. In this line from 
“Song of Myself”, what needs to be redescribed (note my italics) is the kind of Dionysian impulses 
I addressed in chapter 4: 
Through me forbidden voices, 
Voices of sexes and lusts, voices veil’d and I remove the veil, 
Voices indecent by me clarified and transfigur’d.  
Even more succinctly, he describes the same process in the second half of each of these two lines, 
again from “Song of Myself”:  
The pleasures of heaven are with me and the pains of hell are with me, 
The first I graft and increase upon myself, the latter I translate into a new tongue. 
Another variant of posttraumatic growth unfolding through writing is exemplified by Whitman’s 
frequent and sincere attempts to conceive or contrive his self in writing (symbolic self, I have called 
it in previous chapters), complete with a detailed delineation of attitudes and inclinations (generally 
either sublimely admirable or admirably honest). Some psychologists would, with good reason, 
describe this activity as having the effect of internalizing the self’s “Locus of Control of 
Reinforcement” (the latter two words are typically omitted nowadays). Developed by the American 
psychologist Julian Rotter in the 1950s, the concept concerns a person’s sense of having the ability 
to influence outcomes and events that affect the person.555 While those with an internal locus of 
control believe that they have control over reinforcing events in their lives and will attribute 
changes to themselves, those with external Locus of Control feel that most of what happens to them 
is beyond their control and ability to affect. In “The Resilient Trauma Survivor”, John P. Wilson and 
Christine E. Agaibi write: 
In studies of trauma, PTSD and coping with stress, an internal locus of control has 
been associated with effective adaptation to stress . . . Persons with an internal locus 
                                                 
555 See Julian Rotter, “Generalized Expectancies for Internal vs. External Control of Reinforcement,” 1–7. Cf. Miller’s 
argument earlier in this chapter that Whitman, as a result of his writing, felt a decrease in the importance of the 
external world’s negative import. 
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of control tend to exhibit less PTSD, psychopathology, and have better overall 
adjustment than persons with an external locus of control.556 
As for personal factors that negatively predict developing post-traumatic stress from crisis 
exposure, the authors list: “personality coherence,” “family cohesion” and “social support,” as well 
as having personal autonomy, self-esteem, self-efficacy, good temperament and a positive social 
outlook. In other words, all these factors tend to make the individual psychologically resilient. 
 A famous passage from “Song of Myself” seems with particular clarity to describe the 
sense of having an internal locus of control – with the negligible exception that it does not seem to 
be interior to the body in any spatial sense: 
Trippers and askers surround me, 
People I meet, the effect upon me of my early life or the ward and city I live in, or the 
nation, 
The latest dates, discoveries, inventions, societies, authors old and new, 
My dinner, dress, associates, looks, compliments, dues, 
The real or fancied indifference of some man or woman I love, 
The sickness of one of my folks or of myself, or ill-doing or loss or lack of money, or 
depressions or exaltations, 
Battles, the horrors of fratricidal war, the fever of doubtful news, the fitful events; 
These come to me days and nights and go from me again, 
But they are not the Me myself. 
Apart from the pulling and hauling stands what I am, 
Stands amused, complacent, compassionating, idle, unitary, 
Looks down, is erect, or bends an arm on an impalpable certain rest, 
Looking with side-curved head curious what will come next, 
Both in and out of the game and watching and wondering at it. 
These lines anticipate Rotter’s construct (here in its internal version) with surprising accuracy. It is 
evident that it is the portrait of a man whose psychological state permits his dynamic interaction 
with the external world and his sustainable and not unpleasant being in the world (cf. “These come 
to me . . . and go from me again” and “Both in and out of the game”). 
 Reading Leaves of Grass is exciting because one gets the sense occasionally that 
Whitman knows things he does not know he knows until he discovers that he knows them. Maybe 
this is why he kept writing and rewriting it all his life. 
                                                 
556 John P. Wilson, ed., The Posttraumatic Self: Restoring Meaning and Wholeness to Personality, 382. 
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Conclusion 
This dissertation offers new ways of evaluating the therapeutic, autobiographical and self-
transcending aspects of Walt Whitman’s poetry. Seeking to clarify both (1) Whitman’s personal 
experiences as a beleaguered self reacting to life’s challenges through his poetry as well as (2) the 
general potentials of the written word for everybody who puts pen to paper, the dissertation 
considers poems and to lesser degree other writings from across Whitman’s career in the light of 
different theoretical contexts. These include existentialism, phenomenology, Franklean logotherapy, 
psychoanalysis (including trauma theory) and also makes reference to the philosophy of religion. 
 The central arguments of the dissertation are all nested inside and methodologically 
motivated by the claim that the arts in general, and literature in particular, suffer a degree of 
unnecessary obscuration if their implications for generalized human being are not to some degree 
acknowledged and considered. In other words, it is a premise for the dissertation that because the 
human condition is determined by certain existential constants (as well as many variables, of 
course), any work of autobiographical poetry is likely to explore aspects of being that poet and 
reader are going to have in common. Such experiences – timeless and culturally independent – I call 
archetypal in the Jungian sense, and I conclude that phenomenological and narratological 
approaches to expressing them represent the only viable approaches (both of these can be harnessed 
in the lyrical poem). Given the archetypal parallelism and overlap between all lives, I construct the 
argument that when the receptive reader enters into and shares the poet’s experience in a linguistic 
sense, he or she may access experiences that transcend merely linguistic ones. The Whitman 
literature is full of reported instances of psychoemotional “rapport” where readers state they have 
been able to adopt and apply to their own lives the poet’s poetically evident genius for seeing, 
thinking about, enduring and redeeming a number of archetypal situations (from becoming 
conscious of selfhood and acknowledging its precariousness to crises of despair and self-
abnegation). It was Whitman’s explicitly stated hope that this kind of literary rapport and exchange 
would occur, and it appears that to a degree it did for his best readers (I refer throughout to Henry 
Miller, Horace Traubel, Anne Gilchrist, Robert Louis Stevenson, Roger Asselineau, Harold Bloom 
and others). 
The dissertation commences by investigating and detailing the human condition in its fundamental, 
archetypal structure. For that purpose, the writings of both existentialist philosophers, 
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psychoanalysts, scientists and other writers are considered. Based on a number of textual 
perspectives, I conclude that the fact of life’s inherent contingency leaves the individual with no 
viable alternative but to enthusiastically welcome any source of respite, consolation and existential 
perspective that is forthcoming. While human relationships and the company of friends have no 
doubt historically provided effective buffers against all sorts of suffering, loyal relatives and 
sympathizing allies are not always to hand when the individual encounters crisis and psychic 
malaise. For the individual whom crisis catches alone this means, quite logically, that an intimate 
familiarity with the workings of the psyche – whether achieved and nourished via “expressive 
emotions therapy”, “art-as-therapy”, “redemptive” writing methods or psychoanalysis – can be a 
valuable thing regardless of whether the crisis is a present reality or a future likelihood or certainty. 
 Psychologically speaking, the best cuirass from within which to confront what Freud 
called “hostile life” seems to be an unterrified personal affirmation – an abiding acceptance – of the 
current (as well as timeless and universal) facts comprising our reality. Carl Jung used the word 
“wisdom” in this context, and along with Friedrich Nietzsche, Viktor Frankl and others he 
emphasized that the person’s survival and flourishing had to be predicated on willing – or affirming 
and agreeing with – the facts, including the grimmest facts. However, it turns out that the individual 
can discover a degree of freedom in the act of coming to terms with these facts. Analogous to the 
biblical “divine Logos” which calls forth order out of chaos, the dissertation argues that the person 
can marshal the written word for similar purposes. Thomas Szasz and Jordan Peterson present and 
promote such an argument. 
 Becoming aware of psychic suffering – whether the source thereof is a physical, 
exterior threat to well-being or some essentially psychological crisis – the word can be used 
therapeutically in roughly two ways. Whitman is an exemplar of both of them: It can (1) make 
possible the constitution and inauguration of a symbolic self or persona (“protagonist” in Gregory 
Orr’s nomenclature) uniquely possessing the wisdom, personal resources, courage or perspective 
that surviving the actual predicament seems to require and which the actual self presently lacks but 
may with effort grow into actually embodying; and it can (2) serve as a useful vehicle for 
confession, prayer and sublime lament. Harnessing the truthful written word for purposes of prayer 
amounts to willing something unrealized into psychic reality for a while; harnessing it for purposes 
of confession and lament amounts to (paradoxically) affirming something that weighs on and pains 
the psyche. In both cases, the effect seems to be – in psychoanalytic terms – integrative and 
unifying. Tormenting or lamentable aspects of either the self’s being or the self itself (as it appears 
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to itself) emerge transformed for the better once the aspects have been given linguistic incarnation 
in this way. Interior tension, conflict, shame, want, regret and sorrow are not magically dispelled, of 
course, but redeemed to an extent that may make the unbearable bearable. Such poems are literally 
the concrete product or reflection of the self’s triumph over adversity, and may (in Henry 
Wadsworth Longfellow’s phrase from “A Psalm of Life”) be likened to footsteps that a victor leaves 
behind, “Footsteps, that perhaps another, / Sailing o’er life’s solemn main, / A forlorn and 
shipwrecked brother, / Seeing, shall take heart again.” Such thoughts are borne out by the fact that 
Whitman (according to David S. Reynolds) was given to “assume a parental role with his young 
male friends” and appears to have been happy to be “To young men my problems offering” and “To 
women certain whispers of myself bequeathing.” Inspired by the epilogue to Moby Dick, I have 
compared that poetic mode to the line in the Book of Job “I only am escaped alone to tell thee.” 
Starting from the premise that psychic suffering – whether the source thereof is a physical, exterior 
threat to well-being or some essentially psychological crisis (e.g. shame or anxiety) – is a 
contingent possibility from which there is no attractive immunity, the question is: Where does that 
leave the individual self? Having addressed the fundamental conditions of selfhood and being as 
they are likely to appear to an imagined self in the world, I proceed in chapter 3, intrigued by the 
ways in which words can be used therapeutically, to address Whitman more closely. I explore a 
central issue (of which Whitman’s poetry is exemplary) which is best described as the way in which 
words – poetry – offer the writing self an opportunity to constitutionally compose and inaugurate a 
symbolic self or persona (or “protagonist” in Gregory Orr’s nomenclature) that uniquely possesses 
the wisdom, personal resources, courage and perspective that surviving some particular crisis of 
being seems to require and which the actual self cannot yet – but may with effort potentially – 
embody. To borrow Timothy Donnelly’s words (see footnote 288), I have argued that Whitman’s 
poetry can profitably be thought of as his attempt to investigate possible psychologies rather than 
straightforwardly dramatize his own as it is presently manifested. I have said too that creating and 
continually recreating a symbolic self in lines represent a convenient way of capturing, honing, 
augmenting and studying present and latent psychic possibilities and potentials. According to 
Asselineau, Whitman’s life is a proof that “creat[ing] a book” and “creat[ing one]self” are 
sometimes mutually sympathetic (or symbiotic) projects and endeavors (see footnote 348). 
Perpetuating the dissertation’s interest in the theme of existential well-being and survival, I 
conclude that survival finally hinges on the self’s ability to, in Montaigne’s words, “endure what [it] 
cannot avoid”, and that includes the trials and tribulations inherent in embodied selfhood in the 
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midst of the concrete external world. I have detailed specifically those aspects of Whitman’s 
symbolic selves which seem to be of relevance in contexts associated with being and living, thriving 
and surviving. It is a central argument in the dissertation that an existential disposition or attitude 
pervaded by “saintly” largeness and affection is a strong position from which to confront the reality 
of being and anticipate and finally welcome future threats to being. I have defined such a position 
with reference to a number of writers concerned with being in ways similar to those of Whitman. 
Although the sincere promotion of such an attitude is clearly theodicial in nature, I do not, in using 
the word “saintly”, intend any implications having to do with a deity or with institutional religion. 
The argumentation learns from Friedrich Nietzsche in a number of ways, which I find interesting 
(but of course not especially surprising) given both men’s considerable “debt” to the writings of 
Ralph Waldo Emerson (although not to each other). It concludes (with Terry Mulcaire) that 
Whitman’s triumph is to have found that the problems of the human condition “were not finally 
obstacles to overcome, but potential sources of beauty to be incorporated into an aesthetic view of 
the word, in which suffering, sorrow, and pain will always be essential moments in an endless and 
ultimately positive dialectical progress.” 
In addition to locating a way of being a sustainable self in the world, tolerable selfhood over time is 
predicated too on the self’s ability to endure its own psychic “company” and will its own 
continuation. According to all believable evidence, Whitman was for most of his life troubled and 
tormented by his sexual desires for a number of men few of whom were ever able to approve or 
return the poet’s ardour. Not surprisingly given Whitman’s general post-1855 indifference to his 
culture’s widely-held opinions of what exactly constituted poetry (and complicated feelings vis-à-
vis the bodies of men and women were far from unanimously considered something a poet ought to 
explore), one finds in the poems ample evidence darkly suggesting that something was not quite 
right: The poems’ pained meditations on love and male friendship are full of heartache, self-
ambivalence, loneliness and frustration, while the passages of shameful confession apparently come 
close to naming and revealing the painful reality of something quasi-diabolic and criminal in the 
poet’s heart. (Needless to say, nineteenth-century US sodomy laws made homosexuality, which the 
poems never overtly mention, a felony punishable by imprisonment or death; these laws were not 
repealed until the second half of the twentieth century.) But despite his deteriorating health 
following a serious stroke in 1873, Whitman’s conversations with Horace Traubel in the late 1880 
and early 1890s reveal a person for whom it seems profoundly and accurately self-evident that 
“whatever happens to anybody [including psychic malaise] it may be turn’d to beautiful results” 
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(“Starting from Paumanok”). Other writings, such as the 1889 essay “A Backward Glance O’er 
Travel’d Roads”, support such a reading. I have shown that his poetry may have enabled Whitman 
to endure and redeem the “presence of evil within him”, to quote Asselineau. I have also argued that 
the serenity Whitman achieved in his old age was the result of a “continual struggle” (Asselineau), 
and I have added to that picture by arguing that the “struggle” is best understood in Jungian terms, 
specifically as a patient attempt to integrate the “shadow”. To be precise, I have argued that the 
poetic effort directed towards a full integration of the shadow is methodologically similar – similar 
in nature – to the approach explored in chapter 3. In other words, the alienating aspect must be 
named (a “story [must] be told about it”, as Blixen woud say; cf. footnote 251) if its threatening 
import is to be redeemed and transformed. It has been claimed by Carl Martin Lindner that 
Whitman anticipates Jung (born when Whitman was in his mid-50s) regarding the shadow aspects 
of the psyche, “aspects which must be acknowledged if the individual is to progress toward 
wholeness or integrity”, but a proper explication of that foreshadowing has not been offered. This 
dissertation begins to redress that oversight. 
The dissertation agrees with Harry James Cook, that any “valid interpretation of Whitman’s poetry 
must be in large part autobiographical”. It seems that any scholarly position that rejects Cook’s 
insistence is liable to miss the overall import and profound implication of Whitman’s work, namely 
the fact that his oft-admired signature “optimism” (this word is rather inadequate but will suffice) is 
a quality achieved wholly in spite of the odds. As David S. Reynolds puts it, “some terrible pain 
lurks behind his verse”, and several biographers have carefully chronicled the different catastrophes 
haunting his life: familial, sexual, social, cultural, economic and psychological. Given the 
prevalence of both necessary and unnecessary suffering in the world today it seems an unfortunate 
oversight to not try to learn from Whitman’s example which is – among many different things – the 
example of a modern individual who, amid circumstances not particularly conducive to his 
happiness or hospitable to his full character, nevertheless managed proactively and retroactively to 
distill meaning and cheer from experiences which would have elicited disappointment and regret in 
many. To quote David Aberbach, amid deeply disheartening circumstances Whitman turned himself 
into “a father-healer” offering prescriptions of “health and Eros” and antidotes to “disease and 
Thanatos”. 
Given the considerable variety evident in even a small group of individuals, it would be ludicrous to 
insist that Whitman’s example should be considered as a model delineating some kind of normative 
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ideal; that would be idolatry and dogmatism, as Horace Traubel reminded the poet’s admirer in 
1919 at the centenary of his birth: 
I know you can tell me how old Walt Whitman is this year. But how old are you? 
That’s more important. How many years old or young are you? How many years 
sensible or senseless? How many years merciful or malignant? How many years 
illuminated or blind? It don’t matter so much whether he served or not. Have you 
served? Are you serving? Can you really tell your own age? You think you’ve done 
enough when you’ve told about him. But you haven’t. Not till you’ve told about 
yourself. You speak of honoring him with celebrations. You don’t, you can’t, honor 
him. You honor yourselves. His account is closed. Yours is still open. Tell your own 
story. Not mostly of what you’ve done. Chiefly of what you are. How old were you on 
your first birthday? Are you any older now? I hear the sayers say they’ve lived 
through so many noble years. How many noble years have the sayers lived through? 
He wasn’t perfect. Nor are you or we. We’d be afraid of each other if we were. We 
don’t have to romance about him or ourselves. The truth’s good enough. Light enough 
and shadow enough. It’s too late to pace him. Now we must pace ourselves. It’s all 
right to indicate his loyalties. But what of our own? I’ve said at Whitman meetings: 
“We’ll never have a real Whitman day till we come together to celebrate ourselves not 
him.”557 
Yet there is one insight – pervading the poet’s works and life and securing his genius in my opinion 
– which we reject at our peril, and that is the insight that each person is a co-creator of his or her 
experience. “You must change your life”, Rilke wrote, and it seems nothing short of a kind of 
premature death to embody and self-impose an existential outlook or nourish a Weltanschauung 
which deliberately negates Rilke’s injunction and considers it expressive of a metaphysical 
impossibility. Whitman said of Leaves of Grass that it aimed to be the literary distillation of “a new 
breath of life” and that it contained “a basic model or portrait of personality for general use”. It is 
the existential, psycho-metaphysical principle illustrated by such a model, not the qualitative 
particularities of its content, to which we should attend lest we prefer to survive on the breath of life 
we inhaled yesterday. Traubel once told the poet: “I think I know how you are bound to be regarded 
                                                 
557 From Walt Whitman, Intimate with Walt: Selections from Whitman’s Conversations with Horace Traubel 1888–
1892, 294. See also footnote 50. 
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in the future—not as a man above other men but as one of the spokesmen of a new movement of the 
spirit”.558 Purposely ignoring all associations related to cultish affiliation, I claim that central to 
such a “movement of the spirit” would be the notion that being – in order to evolve and grow at all 
– must submit and devote itself to change (whether actively sought or passively suffered) and to the 
idea that change is, in Peterson’s archetypally charged phrase, “endless micro-deaths and renewal”. 
That survival has to do with “spirit”, in Traubel’s term, was essentially what Viktor Frankl 
discovered too, when from a life of security and happiness in the 1930s he was violently hurled by 
murderous Nazi ideologues into the most hellish experiences imaginable. 
Towards the end of the dissertation (chapter 5) I explore a number of concepts from the Austrian-
American psychoanalyst Heinz Kohut whose theory concerning compensatory structures is highly 
instructive in describing therapeutic and redemptive writing. His ideas about empathy are equally 
useful in this context and prove intriguingly compatible with other concepts useful for talking about 
suffering and the deterioration of mental health. Kohutean descriptions of selves such as “cohesive” 
and “continuous” (as apposed to “multiple” and “fragmented”) prove especially useful in this 
dissertation given Whitman’s versatility, paradoxality and profound psychic evolution towards a 
self-contained self: “Now on this spot I stand with my robust soul” (“Song of Myself”). I also show 
that the line “I am large, I contain multitudes” can be explored in several different ways, some of 
which I elucidate. Despite some minor terminological confusion, Lacan’s and Kohut’s view of the 
self turn out to compliment each other fairly well. I present textual evidence supporting the claim 
that Whitman’s poetry – if not his actual real-life being – anticipates the concept of Lacan’s Mirror 
to a remarkable degree. I find that particularly the poem “There Was a Child Went Forth” exhibits 
an impressive comprehension of the imaginary unification at the heart of Lacan’s intersubjective 
theory. In part because human beings have experienced mental suffering long before Whitman’s 
century and continue to do so to this day, it is interesting to ask whether Whitman (who was 
evidently capable of saving himself from his most difficult bouts) can be turned to for insights about 
post-traumatic stress disorder. After perusing Julian Rotter’s work on internal versus external locus 
of control, the chapter answers in the affirmative while presenting textual evidence for Whitman’s 
internal locus of control. 
                                                 
558 From Walt Whitman, Intimate with Walt: Selections from Whitman’s Conversations with Horace Traubel 1888–
1892, xx. 
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It seems to me an insight eternally worth stating and exploring that our psyche is an actively 
cooperating and co-authoring aspect of our experience – whether the particular experience strikes us 
as momentous and grand or trivial and forgettable. Whitman’s admiration for Friedrich Schiller is 
interesting in this context. Being himself generally “more interested in poets’ biographies than in 
their poetry”, as R. W. French has observed, Whitman wrote in Specimen Days that Schiller 
admirably represented a person in whom “the perfect character, the good, the heroic, although never 
attain’d, is never lost sight of, but through failures, sorrows, temporary downfalls, is return’d to 
again and again.”559 Along similar lines, I argue that there is good reason to study Whitman’s life as 
well as his works – not because they are categorically the same “thing”, but because one grew out of 
and had an evident, discussable and arguably very positive effect on the other. I have therefore 
argued that it is appropriate to have a modicum of appreciation for Whitman’s request that his verse 
be viewed not “as a literary performance, or attempt at such performance, or as aiming mainly 
toward art or ӕstheticism.” We may think we do justice to aesthetic creations by subjecting them to 
clinically precise and impeccably rational scrutiny, but the problem is that it is hard to remain alive 
to the humanity of the spirit in which, for instance, a poem is composed if we do not meet that spirit 
halfway in our analytical stance or attitude. That is the spirit in which I have here attempted to read 
and discuss Whitman’s life and works. 
Kasper Guldberg 
March 2018 
  
                                                 
559 See R. W. French’s entry on “British Romantic Poets” in J. R. LeMaster and Donald D. Kummings, eds., The 
Routledge Encyclopedia of Walt Whitman, 76. The section of Specimen Days from which Whitman’s words are 
taken is entitled “Edgar Poe’s Significance”. 
245 
 
Bibliography 
 
Aberbach, David, Surviving Trauma. New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1989. 
Adams, Richard P., “Romanticism and the American Renaissance,” American Literature, XXIII 
(January, 1952): 419–432. 
Adams, Richard P., “Whitman: A Brief Revaluation,” Tulane Studies in English, V (1955): 111–149. 
Adler, Mortimer Jerome, and Charles Lincoln Van Doren, eds., Great Treasury of Western Thought: 
A Compendium of Important Statements on Man and His Institutions by the Great Thinkers in 
Western History. New York: Bowker, 1977. 
Alcaro, Marion Walker, Walt Whitman’s Mrs. G: A Biography of Anne Gilchrist. Madison, N. J.: 
Fairleigh Dickinson University Press, 1991. 
Aldous Huxley, The Doors of Perception. New York: Harper Collins, 2009. 
Allen, Gay Wilson, The Solitary Singer: A Critical Biography of Walt Whitman. New York: 
Macmillan, 1955. 
Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 2nd ed., ed. by Terence Irwin. Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing, 
1999. 
Arnold, Matthew, Culture and Anarchy, ed. by Jane Garnett. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2006. 
Aspiz, Harold, So Long!: Walt Whitman’s Poetry of Death. Tuscaloosa, AL: University of Alabama 
Press, 2004. 
Asselineau, Roger, The Evolution of Walt Whitman, 2 vols.. Iowa: University of Iowa Press, 1999. 
Astley, Neil, ed., Staying Alive: Real Poems for Unreal Times. New York: Miramax Books, 2003. 
Auden, W. H., Collected Shorter Poems 1927–1957. London: Faber and Faber, 1969. 
Aurelius, Marcus, Meditations. New York: Dover Publications, 1997. 
Auster, Paul, Winter Journal. New York: Faber and Faber, 2012. 
Bartley, Grant, et al., Philosophy Now, “The Tragedy of Life” (podcast), 
https://philosophynow.org/podcasts/The_Tragedy_of_Life, accessed January 10, 2017. 
Bassin, Donna, Female Sexuality: Contemporary Engagements. Northvale, NJ: J. Aronson, 1999. 
Bate, Walter Jackson. From Classic to Romantic: Premises of Taste in Eighteenth-Century England. 
Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1946. 
Bauerlein, Mark, “The Written Orator of “Song of Myself”: A Recent Trend in Whitman Criticism”, 
Walt Whitman Quarterly Review, vol. 3, no. 3 (1986): 1–14. 
Berman, Jeffrey, Death in the Classroom: Writing about Love and Loss. Albany: SUNY Press, 
2009. 
Bertram, Ernst, Nietzsche: Attempt at a Mythology, trans. Robert E. Norton. Urbana: University of 
Illinois Press, 2010. 
Black, S. A., Whitman’s Journeys into Chaos: A Psychoanalytic Study of the Creative Process. 
Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975. 
Blackburn, Simon, Mirror, Mirror: The Uses and Abuses of Self-love. Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 2014. 
Blackburn, Simon, “The Seat of Knowledge: Smart and Comfortable”, in Times Higher Education, 
https://www.timeshighereducation.com/features/the-seat-of-knowledge-smart-and-
comfortable/416157.article, May 19, 2001, accessed January 10, 2017. 
Blackburn, Simon, Think. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999. 
Bloom, Harold, ed., Walt Whitman. Philadelphia: Chelsea House Publishers, 1999. 
Bloom, Harold, On the Western Canon: The Books and School of the Ages. London: Macmillan, 
1994. 
Bloom, Harold, “Harold Bloom on Whitman and Jazz”, 
246 
 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=AI8BNADM6-E, accessed January 10, 2017. 
Bloom, Harold, The Anatomy of Influence: Literature as a Way of Life. New Haven, CT: Yale 
University Press, 2011. 
Bloom, Harold, The Daemon Knows. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015. 
Bloom, Paul, “3. Foundations: Freud”, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7emS3ye3cVU, 
accessed January 10, 2017. 
Bloom, Paul, Descartes’ Baby: How the Science of Child Development Explains What Makes Us 
Human. New York: Random House, 2011. 
Bly, Robert, Iron John. New York: Da Capo Press, 2005. 
Boethius, The Consolation of Philosophy of Boethius, trans. Henry Rosher James. Los Angeles: 
Enhanced Media, 2016. 
Botton, Alain de, Religion for Atheists. London: Penguin, 2012. 
Botton, Alain de and Chris Hedges, “Chris Hedges: What Can Atheists Learn from Religion? 
Interview with Alain de Botton (2012)” (interview), 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5p8UuZuhaWo, accessed January 10, 2017. 
Botton, Alain de, “How Proust Can Change Your Life” (video essay), 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-C8cD_uYKK8, accessed November 3, 2016. 
Botton, Alain de, “On Higher Consciousness”, in The Book of Life, 
http://www.thebookoflife.org/on-higher-consciousness/, accessed January 10, 2017. 
Botton, Alain de, “Talent will not be wasted for much longer”, 
http://www.changeboard.com/content/4806/talent-will-not-be-wasted-for-much-longer-alain-de-
botton/, accessed January 10, 2017. 
Botton, Alain de, “What Is Literature for?” (video essay), 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4RCFLobfqcw, accessed January 10, 2017. 
Botton, Alain de, “WPP: Alain De Botton speaks at Powell’s Books 6/23/16” (presentation), 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xV7sluqU3O4, accessed January 10, 2017. 
Botton, Alain de, How Proust Can Change Your Life. New York: Pantheon, 1997. 
Botton, Alain de, The Consolations of Philosophy. New York: Knopf Doubleday. 2013. 
Brombert, Victor, Musings on Mortality: From Tolstoy to Primo Levi. Chicago, IL: University of 
Chicago Press, 2013. 
Brooks, Van Wick, The Times of Melville and Whitman. New York: E. P. Dutton and Co., 1947. 
Bucke, Richard Maurice, Cosmic Consciousness: A Study in the Evolution of the Human Mind. 
Wisconsin: Innes & Sons, 1905), 181. 
Buell, Lawrence, The American Transcendentalists: Essential Writings. New York: Modern Library, 
2006. 
Burke, Kenneth, On Human Nature: A Gathering While Everything Flows, 1967–1984, ed. by 
William H. Rueckert and Angelo Bonadonna. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2003. 
Burkeman, Oliver, The Antidote. New York: Faber and Faber, 2012. 
Burroughs, John, “His Ruling Ideals and Aims”, in Harold Bloom, ed. Walt Whitman. Philadelphia: 
Chelsea House Publishers, 1999. 
Burton, Neel, Growing from Depression, 2nd ed. Devon: Acheron Press, 2017. 
Caldwell, Roger, “Nietzsche and Morality” (essay), 
https://philosophynow.org/issues/70/Nietzsche_and_Morality, accessed January 10, 2017. 
Carpenter, Edward, The Art of Creation: Essays on the Self and Its Powers. London: George Allen 
& Unwin, 1904. 
Carpenter, Edward, The Drama of Love and Death. New York and London: Mitchell Kennerley, 
1912. 
Caruth, Cathy, ed., Trauma: Explorations in Memory. Baltimore and London: Johns Hopkins 
247 
 
University Press, 1995. 
Caruth, Cathy, Unclaimed Experience: Trauma, Narrative, and History. Baltimore and London: John 
Hopkins University Press, 1996. 
Casale, Frank D., Bloom’s How to Write about Walt Whitman. New York: Infobase Publishing, 
2010. 
Casaliggi, Carmen, and Paul March-Russell, eds., Legacies of Romanticism: Literature, Culture, 
Aesthetics. New York: Routledge, 2012. 
Cavell, Stanley, Must We Mean What We Say. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976. 
Cavell, Stanley, Cities of Words: Pedagogical Letters on a Register of the Moral Life. Cambridge, 
MA: Harvard University Press, 2005. 
Cavitch, David. My Soul and I: The Inner Life of Walt Whitman. Boston: Beacon Press, 1985. 
Chadwick, Frank, How Dark the World Becomes. Riverdale, NY: Baen Publishing, 2013. 
Churchill, Ward, Wielding Words Like Weapons: Selected Essays in Indigenism, 1995–2005. 
Oakland, CA: PM Press, 2017. 
Cioran, Emil, The Trouble with Being Born. New York: Viking Press, 1976. 
Cohen, Leonard, “Leonard Cohen in 1964 – On being a Jewish writer, a Canadian and a seeker of 
G-d” (presentation), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HwUtZGWaePo, accessed January 10, 
2017. 
Cohen, Leonard, Beautiful Losers. London, England: Harper Collins UK, 2009. 
Cohen, Leonard, Leonard Cohen on Leonard Cohen: Interviews and Encounters. Chicago: Chicago 
Review Press, 2014. 
Cohen, Leonard, “Leonard Cohen on a tour bus (1979)”, 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=uFOjTVCPBjY, accessed January 10, 2017. 
Cohen, Leonard, The Favourite Game. London: Jonathan Cape Ltd., 1970. 
Collins, Floyd, Seamus Heaney: The Crisis of Identity. Newark: University of Delaware Press, 
2003. 
Conway, Daniel W., and Peter S. Groff, eds., Nietzsche: Critical Assessments, vol. 3, On Morality 
and the Order of Rank. London and New York: Routledge, 2003. 
Cook, Harry James, “The Individuation of a Poet: The Process of Becoming in Whitman’s ‘The 
Sleepers’,” in Walt Whitman Review, vol. 21 (1975): 101–110. 
Dennett, Daniel, Consciousness Explained. London: Hachette UK, 2017. 
Dickinson, Emily, Letters of Emily Dickinson, ed. by Mabel Loomis Todd. Mineola, NY: Dover 
Publications, 2003. 
Dixon, W. MacNeile. The Human Situation. Worcestershire: Read Books Ltd., 2013. 
Donnelly, Timothy et al., “What Happens in a Poem” (plenary seminar), 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fkF6JHwGbp0, accessed January 10, 2017. 
Dresser, Horatio W., The Power of Silence: An Interpretation of Life in its Relation to Health and 
Happiness. New York: Cosimo, 2007. 
Echevarría, Roberto González, Cervantes’ “Don Quixote”. New Haven and London: Yale 
University Press, 2015. 
Edgar, Christopher, and Gary Lenhart, eds., The Teachers & Writers Guide to Classic American 
Literature. New York: Teachers & Writers Collaborative, 2001. 
Einstein, Albert, The Ultimate Quotable Einstein, ed. by Alice Calaprice. Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 2010. 
Elliott, Stephen, “Stephen Elliott on John Williams’ Stoner”, in Maud Newton, 26 November 2007, 
http://maudnewton.com/blog/steve-elliott-on-john-williams-stoner/, accessed January 10, 2017. 
Emerson, Ralph Waldo, Essays & Lectures. New York: Library of American, 1983. 
Eng, Jan van der, and Willem G. Weststeijn, eds., Avant Garde: Interdisciplinary and International 
248 
 
Review. Atlanta, GA: Rodopi, 1991. 
Epictetus, The Enchiridion. New York: The Liberal Arts Press, 1955. 
Emerson, Ralph Waldo, Essays: First Series. Boston: James Munroe, 1850. 
Fishkin, Shelley Fisher, From Fact to Fiction: Journalism & Imaginative Writing in America. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988. 
Folsom, Ed and Kenneth M. Price, eds., The Walt Whitman Archive, www.whitmanarchive.org/ 
Forster, E. M., “What I Believe”, http://spichtinger.net/otexts/believe.html, accessed January 10, 
2017. 
Fosdick, Harry Emerson, Answers to Real Problems: Harry Emerson Fosdick Speaks to Our Time: 
Selected Sermons of Harry Emerson Fosdick, ed. by Mark E. Yurs. Eugene, OR: Wipf and Stock 
Publishers, 2008. 
Fox, John, Poetic Medicine: The Healing Art of Poem-Making. New York: Penguin Putnam Inc., 
1997. 
Frankl, Viktor, Man’s Search for Meaning. Boston: Beacon Press, 2006. 
Frayn, Michael, The Human Touch: Our Part in the Creation of a Universe. London: Faber and 
Faber, 2007. 
Freud, Sigmund, “The Poet and Day-Dreaming”, in On Creativity and the Unconscious: The 
Psychology of Art, Literature, Love, and Religion. New York: Harper Collins, 2009. 
Freud, Sigmund, Civilisation and Its Discontents. New York: Norton, 1961. 
Freud, Sigmund, Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego, trans. James Strachey. London and 
Vienna: The International Psycho-Analytical Press, 1922. 
Freud, Sigmund, On Freud’s “Future of an Illusions”, ed. by Salman Akhtar and Mary Kay O’Neil. 
London: Karnac Books, 2009. 
Freud, Sigmund, The Interpretation of Dreams, ed. and trans. James Strachey. New York: Basic 
Books, 2010. 
Freud, Sigmund, The Psychopathology of Everyday Life, trans. James Strachey. London: The 
Hogarth Press, 1960. 
Frye, Northrop, Anatomy of Criticism: Four Essays. Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1973. 
Frye, Paul H., Theory of Literature. New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2012. 
Gale Group, The, A Study Guide for Psychologists and Their Theories for Students: Carl Ransom 
Rogers. Farmington Hills, MI: Gale: Cengage Learning, 2015. 
Gardner, John, On Moral Fiction. New York: Basic Books, 1978. 
Gay, Volney P., Freud on Sublimation: Reconsiderations. New York: SUNY Press, 1992. 
Gilchrist, Anne, “A Woman’s Estimate of Walt Whitman,” in Anne Gilchrist, Anne Gilchrist: Her 
Life and Writings, ed. by Herbert Harlakenden Gilchrist. London: T. Fisher Unwin, 1887. 
Ginsberg, Allen, “Face to Face with Allen Ginsberg (part 1)”, 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NoevVtG-Gh8, accessed January 10, 2017. 
Goethe, Johann Wolfgang von, Words of Goethe: Being the Conversations of Johann Wolfgang von 
Goethe, ed. by Johann Peter Eckermann. New York: Tudor, 1949. 
Goffman, Erving, The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life. Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1959. 
Goldberg, Arnold I., ed. How Responsive Should We Be: Progress in Self Psychology, vol. 16. 
Hillsdale, NJ: The Analytic Press, 2000. 
Gontarski, S. E., On Beckett: Essays and Criticism. New York: Anthem Press, 2014. 
Gordon, Paul, Tragedy After Nietzsche: Rapturous Superabundance. Urbana: University of Illinois 
Press, 2001. 
Graham, Sheilah, Beloved Infidel. New York: Bantam Books, 1962. 
Gray, John. Two Faces of Liberalism. New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 2000. 
Grayling, Anthony Clifford, ed., Philosophy: A Guide through the Subject. New York: Oxford 
249 
 
University Press, 1995. 
Green, André, Key Ideas for a Contemporary Psychoanalysis: Misrecognition and Recognition of 
the Unconscious, trans. Andrew Weller. New York: Routledge, 2005. 
Greenspan, Ezra, Walt Whitman and the American Reader. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1990. 
Hallman, J. C., The Story About the Story: Great Writers Explore Great Literature. Portland, OR: 
Tin House Books, 2013.  
Hamilton, Christopher, A Philosophy of Tragedy. London: Reaktion Books, 2016. 
Hancock, W. K., Smuts: The Sanguine Years, 1870–1919. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1962. 
Harris, Judith, Signifying Pain: Constructing and Healing the Self through Writing. Albany: State 
University of NYP, 2003. 
Harrower, Molly, The Therapy of Poetry. Springfield, IL: Charles C. Thomas, 1972. 
Heard, Gerald, Prayers and Meditations: Selections by Gerald Heard, Aldous Huxley, and Others. 
Eugene, OR: Wipf and Stock Publishers, 2008. 
Hegel, G. W. F., Philosophy of Right. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1965. 
Hertel, Ralf, and David Malcolm, On John Berger: Telling Stories. Boston: BRILL, 2015. 
Heti, Sheila, Introduction, in Alain de Botton, Essays in Love. London: Pan Macmillan, 2015. 
Holloway, Emory. Free and Lonesome Heart: The Secret of Walt Whitman. New York: Vantage, 
1960. 
Hoswell, Timb, Phenomenology and The Ghost in The Machine: An Investigation into Wilfrid 
Sellars, Jean--Paul Sartre, Gilbert Ryle and The Concept of Mind. Sydney, Australia: The 7th House 
of Cult Literature, 2016. 
Hobson, Allan, Psychodynamic Neurology: Dreams, Consciousness, and Virtual Reality. New York: 
CRC Press, 2014. 
Horace, Satires, in The Works of Horace: Translated into English Prose, ed. by William Crakelt, 
trans. David Watson. London: T. Longman, 1792. 
Howe, E. Graham, War Dance: A Study of the Psychology of War. London, Faber & Faber, 1937. 
Hume, David, A Treatise of Human Nature, ed. by David Fate and Mary J. Norton, The Clarendon 
Edition of the Works of David Hume, 2 vols.. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007. 
Hume, David, Political Essays, ed. by Knud Haakonssen. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1994. 
Huxley, Aldous, “Beliefs”, in Aldous Huxley, The Perennial Philosophy. New York: Harper Collins, 
2009. 
Jacoby, Mario. Individuation and Narcissism: The Psychology of Self in Jung and Kohut. New 
York: Routledge, 2016. 
James, William, The Varieties of Religious Experience, ed. by Wayne Proudfoot. New York: Barnes 
and Noble Classics, 2004. 
James, William, Varieties of Religious Experience. New York: Dover Publications, Inc., 2002. 
Johnson, Robert L., Counter Culture and the Vision of God. Minneapolis: Augsburg Publishing 
House, 1971. 
Johnson, Samuel, The History of Rasselas, Prince of Abissinia, in Samuel Johnson, Selected 
Writings, ed. Peter Martin. Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press. 
Joseph, Lawrence A., “Catherine Pozzi’s “Agnes”: Writing as Self-Construction”, Biography, vol. 
11 (Winter 1988): 47–58. 
Josephson, Matthew, Stendhal; or, The Pursuit of Happiness. New York: Doubleday, 1946. 
Jung, Carl, Jung on Christianity, ed. by Murray Stein. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999. 
Jung, Carl, Aion, in Carl Jung, Collected Works, vol. 9ii of 20, ed. by William McGuire et al. 
250 
 
Princeton: Princeton University Press: 1953–1979. 
Jung, Carl, The Relations between the Ego and the Unconscious, in Carl Jung, Collected Works, vol. 
7 of 20, ed. by William McGuire et al. Princeton: Princeton University Press: 1953–1979. 
Jung, Carl, Visions: Notes of the Seminar Given in 1930–1934, 2 vols., ed. by Claire Douglas. 
Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997. 
Jung, Carl, C. G. Jung Letters, ed. by Gerhard Adler and Aniela Jaffe, trans. R. F. C. Hull, 2 vols. 
Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1973 and 1976. 
Jung, Carl, Mysterium Coniunctionis: An Inquiry into the Separation and Synthesis of Psychic 
Opposites in Alchemy, in Carl Jung, Collected Works, vol. 14 of 20, ed. by William McGuire et al. 
Princeton: Princeton University Press: 1953–1979. 
Jung, Carl, Psychological Types, in Carl Jung, Collected Works, vol. 6 of 20, ed. by William 
McGuire et al. Princeton: Princeton University Press: 1953–1979. 
Jung, Carl, The Archetypes of the Collective Unconscious, in Collected Works, vol. 9i of 20, ed. by 
William McGuire et al. Princeton: Princeton University Press: 1953–1979. 
Jung, Carl, The Structure and Dynamics of the Psyche, in Carl Jung, Collected Works, vol. 8 of 20, 
ed. by William McGuire et al. Princeton: Princeton University Press: 1953–1979. 
Kafka, Franz, Diaries, trans. Kresh and M. Greenberg. New York: Schocken Books, 1976. 
Kagan, Shelly, and N. T. Wright, “Living Well in the Light of Death – NT Wright and Shelly Kagan 
at Yale”, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=c4uEEpd3vEc, accessed January 10, 2017. 
Kagan, Shelly, Death. New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2012. 
Kagan, Shelly, The Limits of Morality. New York: Oxford University Press, 1989. 
Kalaidjian, Walter, The Edge of Modernism: American Poetry and the Traumatic Past. Baltimore, 
MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2006. 
Kashima, Yoshihisa, Margaret Foddy and Michael Platow, eds., Self and Identity: Personal, Social, 
and Symbolic. Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 2002. 
Kaplan, Justin, and Rob Couteau, “ ‘The Mystery of the Man’: Justin Kaplan Talks About 
America’s Greatest Poet”, http://robcouteau.com/justinkaplaninterview.htm, accessed January 10, 
2017. 
Kaufmann, Walter A., Nietzsche: Philosopher, Psychologist, Antichrist. Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 2013. 
Keane, Patrick J., Emerson, Romanticism, and Intuitive Reason: The Transatlantic “Light of All 
Our Day”. Columbia, MO: University of Missouri Press, 2005. 
Kinzie, Mary, The Cure of Poetry in an Age of Prose: Moral Essays on the Poet’s Calling. Chicago: 
Chicago University Press, 1993. 
Klein, Melanie, Love, Guilt and Reparation: And Other Works 1921–1945. New York: The Free 
Press, 1984. 
Klugman, David. “Empathy’s Romantic Dialectic: Self Psychology, Intersubjectivity, and 
Imagination.” Psychoanalytic Psychology 18 (2001): 684–704. 
Koestler, Arthur, The Ghost in the Machine. New York: Macmillan, 1968. 
Kohut, Heinz. The Search for the Self: Selected Writings of Heinz Kohut 1978–1981. London: 
Karnac Books, 2011. 
Kohut, Heinz. “Forms and Transformation of Narcissism,” Journal of the American Psychoanalytic 
Association 14 (1966): 243–272. 
Kohut, Heinz. The Restoration of the Self. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2009. 
Kohut, Heinz. How Does Analysis Cure?, ed. by Arnold I. Goldberg. Chicago: The University of 
Chicago Press, 1984. 
Krystal, Arthur, This Thing We Call Literature. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016. 
Kuhn, Thomas Samuel, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. Chicago: Chicago University Press, 
251 
 
1970. 
Lacan, Jacques. Écrits: A Selection. Trans. Alan Sheridan. New York: Norton, 1977. 
Lanier, Jaron, You Are not a Gadget. New York: Vintage Books, 2011. 
Law, David R., Briefly: Sartre’s Existentialism and Humanism. London: SCM, 2007. 
Lawrence, D. H., “Morality and the Novel”, in Carl E. Bain, Jerome Beaty and J. Paul Hunter, The 
Norton Introduction to Literature, 2nd ed. New York: N. N. Norton and Company, 1976. 
Lawrence, D. H., “Why the Novel Matters”, in Carl E. Bain, Jerome Beaty and J. Paul Hunter, The 
Norton Introduction to Literature, 2nd ed. New York: N. N. Norton and Company, 1976. 
Lear, Jonathan, Freud. London: Routledge, 2006. 
Lebell, Sharon, The Art of Living: The Classical Manual on Virtue, Happiness, and Effectiveness: A 
New Interpretation [of Epictetus’s Enchiridion]. New York: Harper Collins, 1994. 
Lecky, William Edward Hartpole, The Map of Life: Conduct and Character. London: Longmans, 
Green, and Co., 1909. 
LeMaster, J. R. and Donald D. Kummings, eds. The Routledge Encyclopedia of Walt Whitman. New 
York: Routledge, 1998. 
Lewis, C. S., Mere Christianity. New York: Harper Collins, 2001. 
Lock, Charles J. S., “Development of Style in the Writings of John Cowper Powys, 1915–29”. 
DPhil diss.; University of Oxford, 1981. 
Locke, John, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding. London: T. Tegg and Son, 1836. 
Magnani, Lorenzo. Understanding Violence: The Intertwining of Morality, Religion and Violence: A 
Philosophical Stance. Berlin: Springer Science & Business Media, 2011. 
Miller, Edwin Haviland. Walt Whitman’s Poetry: A Psychological Journey. New York: Houghton 
Mifflin, 1968. 
Milton, John, Paradise Lost. New York: W. W. Norton, 2005. 
Makaryk, Irena R., ed., Encyclopedia of Contemporary Literary Theory: Approaches, Scholars, 
Terms. Toronto/Buffalo/London: University of Toronto Press, 1993. 
Mamunes, George, “So has a Daisy vanished”: Emily Dickinson and Tuberculosis. Jefferson, NC: 
McFarland & Co., 2008. 
Mann, Thomas, “Tonio Kröger”, in Thomas Mann, Death in Venice: and Seven Other Stories. 
Toronto: Vintage International, 1989. 
Matthiessen, F. O., American Renaissance: Art and Expression in the Age of Emerson and Whitman. 
London: Oxford University Press, 1941. 
Maugham, W. Somerset, The Summing Up. London: Vintage Books, 2001. 
May, Simon, Nietzsche’s On the Genealogy of Morality: A Critical Guide. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2011. 
May, Simon, “Nihilism and the Free Self”, in Ken Gemes and Simon May, eds., Nietzsche on 
Freedom and Autonomy. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009. 
May, Simon, “Simon May – Nietzsche and the Affirmation of Life (05/12/2014)” 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jU6LOMvzGBE, accessed January 10, 2017. 
Mazza, Nicholas, Poetry Therapy: Theory and Practice. New York: Brunner-Routledge, 2003. 
McCarthy, Cormac, All the Pretty Horses, vol. 1. London: Picador, 1994. 
McKenna, Terence, “Terence McKenna – Carl Jung & Psychic Archetypes (Lecture)”, 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=SNl9FVJIPyY, accessed January 10, 2017. 
Meltzer, Milton, Henry David Thoreau: A Biography. Minneapolis: Twenty-First Century Books, 
2007. 
Melville, Herman, Moby Dick. New York: W. W. Norton, 1967. 
Merton, Thomas, No Man Is an Island. New York: Doubleday, 1955. 
Michalski, David, “Cities Memories Voices Collage”, in Richard Cándida Smith, ed., Text and 
252 
 
Image: Art and the Performance of Memory. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction, 2006. 
Miller, Edwin Haviland, Walt Whitman’s Poetry: a Psychological Journey. Boston: Houghton 
Mifflin, 1968. 
Miller, Henry, Big Sur and the Oranges of Hieronymus Bosch. New York: New Directions 
Publishing Corporation, 1957. 
Miller, Henry, Genius and Lust: A Journey through the Major Writings of Henry Miller, ed. by 
Norman Mailer. New York: Grove Press, 1976.  
Miller, Henry, Henry Miller on Writing, ed. by Thomas H. Moore. New York: New Directions 
Publishing Corporation, 1964. 
Miller, Henry, My Life and Times. Chicago: Playboy Press, 1972. 
Miller, Henry, The Books in My Life. New York: New Directions, l969. 
Miller, Henry, The Colossus of Maroussi. New York: New Directions, 2010. 
Miller, Henry, The Henry Miller Reader, ed. by Lawrence Durrell. New York: New Directions, 
1959. 
Miller, Henry. Tropic of Capricorn. London: Harper Perennial, 2005. 
Mochulsky, Konstantin, Dostoevsky: His Life and Work, trans. Michael A. Minihan. Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1967. 
Montaigne, Michel de, The Complete Essays, ed. by M. A. Screech. New York: Penguin, 2003. 
Montapert, Alfred Armand, ed., Words of Wisdom to Live by: An Encyclopedia of Wisdom in 
Condensed Form. Pennsylvania: Books of Value, 1986. 
Morgan, Charles Hamilton, “A New Look at Whitman’s “Crisis”,” South Atlantic Bulletin, vol. 36, 
no. 2 (March, 1971): 41–52. 
Nabokov, Vladimir, Pale Fire. New York: Vintage International, 1989. 
Nelson, James, ed., Wisdom: Conversations with the Elder Wise Men of Our Day. New York: 
Norton, 1958. 
Neurath, M., and Robert S. Cohen, eds., Empiricism and Sociology. Boston: D. Reidel Publishing 
Company, 2012. 
Nietzsche, Friedrich, “On Truth and Lie in an Extra-Moral Sense” (1873), 
http://oregonstate.edu/instruct/phl201/modules/Philosophers/Nietzsche/Truth_and_Lie_in_an_Extra
-Moral_Sense.htm, accessed January 10, 2017. 
Nietzsche, Friedrich. Daybreak: Thoughts on the Prejudices of Morality, ed. Maudemarie Clark and 
Brian Leiter, trans. R. J. Hollingdale, Cambridge Texts in the History of Philosophy. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1997. 
Nietzsche, Friedrich, Human, All too Human: A Book for Free Spirits. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1996. 
Nietzsche, Friedrich, The Gay Science: With a Prelude of German Rhymes and an Appendix of 
Songs, ed. by Bernard Williams, trans. Josefine Nauckhoff. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2001. 
Nietzsche, Friedrich, Thus Spake Zarathustra: A Book for Everyone and Nobody, trans. Graham 
Parkes. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005. 
Norquay, Glenda, ed., R. L. Stevenson on Fiction: An Anthology of Literary and Critical Essays. 
Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1999. 
O’Hear, Anthony, The Great Books: A Journey Through 2,500 Years of the West’s Classic 
Literature. Wilmington, DE: ISI Books, 2009.  
Oates, Joyce Carol, Where I’ve Been, and where I’m Going: Essays, Reviews, and Prose. New York: 
Plume, 1999. 
Orhan Pamuk, “My Father’s Suitcase” (Nobel Lecture), 
253 
 
https://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/literature/laureates/2006/pamuk-lecture_en.html, accessed 
January 10, 2017. 
Orr, Gregory, Poetry as Survival. London: The University of Georgia Press, 2002. 
Osbeck, Kenneth W., 101 Hymn Stories. Grand Rapids: Kregel Publications, 1982. 
Owen, Don and Donald Brittain (film directors), Ladies and Gentlemen, Mr. Leonard Cohen, 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_GvTeMdmdCI, accessed January 10, 2017. 
Paglia, Camille, Sex, Art, and American Culture: Essays. New York: Knopf Doubleday. 2011. 
Parnia, Sam and Robert Lawrence, interview in the series Closer to Truth, 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Qnri6SLyDDA, accessed January 10, 2017. 
Pascal, Blaise, Pensées, trans. A. J. Krailsheimer. New York: Penguin, 1966. 
Paz, Octavio, The Bow and the Lyre: The Poem, The Poetic Revelation, Poetry and History. Austin: 
University of Texas Press, 1987. 
Peck, Garrett. Walt Whitman in Washington: The Civil War and America’s Great Poet. Charleston, 
SC: Arcadia Publishing, 2015. 
Pennebaker, James W., “Writing & Health” (faculty and research webpage), 
https://liberalarts.utexas.edu/psychology/faculty/pennebak#writing-health, accessed January 10, 
2017. 
Perlman, Jim, Ed Folsom and Dan Campion, eds., Walt Whitman: The Measure of His Song. 
Minneapolis: Holy Cow! Press, 1981. 
Perry, Bliss. Walt Whitman: His Life and Work. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1906. 
Perry, John, A Dialogue on Personal Identity and Immortality. Indianapolis: Hackett, 1978. 
Peterson, Jordan, “2015 Maps of Meaning Lecture 02: Object and Meaning (Part 1)”, 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mO9LUWs5M60, accessed January 10, 2017. 
Peterson, Jordan, “2017 Maps of Meaning 2: Marionettes & Individuals (Part 1)”, 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=EN2lyN7rM4E, accessed January 10, 2017. 
Peterson, Jordan, “2017/03/12: Strengthen the Individual: A counterpoint to Post Modern Political 
Correctness”, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=CwcVLETRBjg, accessed January 10, 2017. 
Peterson, Jordan, “Biblical Series II: Genesis 1: Chaos & Order”, 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hdrLQ7DpiWs, accessed January 10, 2017. 
Peterson, Jordan, “Biblical Series III: God and the Hierarchy of Authority”, 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=R_GPAl_q2QQ, accessed January 10, 2017. 
Peterson, Jordan, “Introduction to the Idea of God”, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=f-
wWBGo6a2w, accessed January 10, 2017. 
Peterson, Jordan, “Jordan Peterson: Why We Suffer”, 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=iPJ_ZLpBTMY, accessed January 10, 2017. 
Peterson, Jordan, “Maps of Meaning: 1 Monsters of Our Own Making (TVO)”, 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=knEZN9U-9xc, accessed January 10, 2017. 
Peterson, Jordan, “Maps of Meaning: 13 The Force Within (TVO)”, 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pzhsiOwZabM&list=PL22J3VaeABQC6oShltYc6rMUDAGJ7
_G5e&index=13, accessed January 10, 2017. 
Peterson, Jordan, “Maps of Meaning: 2 Contending with Chaos (TVO)”, 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lT8TeVvBkgA, accessed January 10, 2017. 
Peterson, Jordan, “Maps of Meaning: 4 Games People Must Play (TVO)”, 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GOcNihk09YM, accessed January 10, 2017. 
Peterson, Jordan, “Music and the Patterns of Mind and World”, 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HeUjYzyh5v8, accessed January 10, 2017. 
Peterson, Jordan, “Potential: Jordan Peterson at TEDxUofT”, 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=tLteWutitFM, accessed January 10, 2017. 
254 
 
Peterson, Jordan, “Psychology of Redemption in Christianity”, 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=DtiRzQMgBDM, accessed January 10, 2017. 
Peterson, Jordan, “Reality and the Sacred”, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2c3m0tt5KcE, 
accessed January 10, 2017. 
Peterson, Jordan, “Say No to Happiness: CBS Ideas”, 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=N6KQpw945GY, accessed January 10, 2017. 
Peterson, Jordan, “TEDxToronto – Dr. Jordan B. Peterson—Redefining Reality”, 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WOgSqHtTtHY, accessed January 10, 2017. 
Peterson, Jordan, “The Necessity of Virtue – Jordan B. Peterson”, 
https://memoirsofanamnesic.wordpress.com/2013/10/24/the-necessity-of-virtue-jordan-b-peterson/, 
accessed January 10, 2017. 
Peterson, Jordan, Maps of Meaning: The Architecture of Belief. New York: Routledge, 1991. 
Phillips, Adam, “Adam Phillips – ‘On Being Too Much for Ourselves’ – BBC Radio4 – The Essay – 
Part 4”, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=EQ3PNd7nv54, accessed January 10, 2017. 
Phillips, Adam, “Adam Phillips: ‘Against Self-Criticism’ (with Q&A)”, 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=a8mcaCWGFmg, accessed January 10, 2017. 
Phillips, Adam, “RSA Replay: One Way and Another”, 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2WMHswoSE20, accessed January 10, 2017. 
Phillips, Adam, On Flirtation. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1994. 
Phillips, Adam, Missing Out: In Praise of the Unlived Life. London: Penguin, 2012. 
Phillips, Adam, On Balance. London: Penguin, 2010. 
Phillips, Adam, Side Effects. London: Penguin, 2006. 
Pinker, Steven, How the Mind Works. New York: W. W. Norton and Company, 1997. 
Popoff, Alexandra, The Wives: The Women Behind Russia’s Literary Giants. New York: Open Road 
Media, 2012. 
Powys , John Cowper, One Hundred Best Books, with Commentary and an Essay on Books and 
Reading. New York: G. A. Shaw, 1916. 
Powys, John Cowper, A Philosophy of Solitude. Marlborough, NY: Village Press, 1933. 
Powys, John Cowper, Autobiography. Suffolk: Picador, 1982. 
Powys, John Cowper, The Meaning of Culture. New York: Faber and Faber, 2010. 
Price, Kenneth M., ed., Walt Whitman: The Contemporary Reviews. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1996. 
Proust, Marcel. Remembrance of Things Past. Trans. C. K. Scott Moncrieff and Terence Kilmartin. 
3. vols. New York: Vintage Random, 1982. 
Reeve, C. D. C., Love’s Confusions. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2005. 
Reynolds, David S., “Walt Whitman’s World: America Still Needs His Poetry”, in The Boston 
Globe, July 3, 2005, 
http://archive.boston.com/news/globe/editorial_opinion/oped/articles/2005/07/03/walt_whitmans_w
orld/, accessed January 10, 2017. 
Reynolds, David S., ed., A Historical Guide to Walt Whitman. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2000. 
Reynolds, David S., Walt Whitman’s America: A Cultural Biograph. New York: Vintage Books, 
1996. 
Ricks, Christopher, Poems and Critics: An Anthology of Poetry and Criticism from Shakespeare to 
Hardy. London: Fontana, 1972. 
Rogers, Carl, On Becoming a Person: A Therapist’s View of Psychotherapy. Boston: Houghton 
Mifflin, 1961. 
Rogers, Carl. “The necessary and sufficient conditions of therapeutic personality change”, Journal 
255 
 
of Consulting Psychology, vol. 21 (1957): 95–103. 
Rogers, Carl, The Carl Rogers Reader, ed. by Howard Kirschenbaum and Valerie Henderson. 
Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1989. 
Rollins, Wayne, Jung and the Bible. Atlanta, GA: John Knox Press, 1983. 
Rotter, Julian. “Generalized Expectancies for Internal vs. External Control of Reinforcement.” 
Psychological Monographs 80 (1966): 1–28. 
Rowland, Susan, ed., Psyche and the Arts: Jungian Approaches to Music, Architecture, Literature, 
Painting and Film. New York: Routledge, 2008. 
Rozsa, Ameni, “An Average Sadness”, in Paul Auster, ed., True Tales of American Life. New York, 
Faber and Faber, 2002. 
Runco, Mark A. and Steven R. Pritzker, Encyclopedia of Creativity, Two-Volume Set. London: 
Academic Press, 1999. 
Schloss, Dietmar, Culture and Criticism in Henry James. Tübingen: Gunter Narr Verlag Tübingen, 
1992. 
Schwab, Gabriele, Haunting Legacies: Violent Histories and Transgenerational Trauma. New York: 
Columbia University Press, 2010. 
Schwerdt, Lisa M., Isherwood’s Fiction: The Self and Technique. New York: Springer, 2016. 
Scruton, Roger, “If We Are Not Just Animals, What Are We?”, in The Stone, March 6, 2017. 
Sharp, Daryl, Digesting Jung: Food for the Journey. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1980. 
Shelley, Percy Bysshe, Selected Poems and Prose, ed. by Jack Donovan and Cian Duffy. New York: 
Penguins Books, 2017. 
Shields, David and Shane Salerno, Salinger. New York: Simon & Schuster, 2014. 
Siegel, Allen M. Heinz Kohut and the Psychology of the Self. New York: Routledge, 2008. 
Simmons, Sylvie, I’m Your Man: The Life of Leonard Cohen. New York: Random House, 2012. 
Singer, Peter, Practical Ethics, 3rd ed. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011. 
Skura, Meredith Anne, The Literary Use of the Psychoanalytic Process. New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 1981. 
Smith, Adam, The Theory of Moral Sentiments. Mineola, NY: Dover Publications, Inc., 2006. 
Smith, Logan Pearsall, and George Santayana, Little Essay Drawn from the Writings of George 
Santayana. New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1934. 
Solzhenitsyn, Aleksandr, The Gulag Archipelago, vol. 2, An Experiment in Literary Investigation. 
New York: Harper Perennial, 2007. 
Sowder, Michael, Whitman’s Ecstatic Union: Conversion and Ideology in Leaves of Grass. New 
York: Routledge, 2005. 
Stachel, John, Einstein from ‘B’ to ‘Z’. Boston: Birkhäuser, 2002. 
Stavrou, C. N., Whitman and Nietzsche: A Comparative Study of Their Thought. Chapel Hill: 
University of North Carolina Press, 1964. 
Symonds, John Addington, Walt Whitman: A Study. London: George Routledge, 1893. 
Szasz, Thomas S., Ideology and Insanity: Essays on the Psychiatric Dehumanization of Man. 
Garden City: Anchor Books, 1970. 
Tedeschi, Richard G., Crystal L. Park and Lawrence G. Calhoun, eds. Posttraumatic Growth: 
Positive Changes in the Aftermath of Crisis. New York: Routledge, 1998. 
Thompson, David L., Daniel Dennett. London: Bloomsbury Publishing, 2009. 
Thoreau, Henry David, The Quotable Thoreay, ed. by Jeffery S. Cramer. Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 2011. 
Thoreau, Henry David, I to Myself: An Annotated Selection from the Journal of Henry D. Thoreau, 
ed. by Jeffrey S. Cramer. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2007. 
Thoreau, Henry David, Walden. London: CRW Publishing, 2004. 
256 
 
Tolstoy, Lev, My Confession, 
https://archive.org/stream/myconfessionands00tolsuoft/myconfessionands00tolsuoft_djvu.txt, 
accessed January 10, 2017. 
Tolstoy, Lev, Death and the Meaning of Life, trans. Maureen Cote. New York: Troitsa Books, 2000. 
Tompkins, Jane P., ed., Reader Response Criticism: From Formalism to Post-Structuralism. 
London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1980. 
Trowbridge, John Townsend, “Reminiscences of Walt Whitman”, Atlantic Monthly, 89 (1902): 163–
175. 
Vamvacas, Constantine J., The Founders of Western Thought – The Presocratics: A diachronic 
parallelism between Presocratic Thought and Philosophy and the Natural Sciences, trans. Robert 
Christ. Herakleion, Greece: Springer, 2009. 
Verdino-Süllwold, Carla M. and and Thomas Hampson, “ “The Frailest Leaves of Me”: A Study of 
the Text and Music for Whitman’s “To What You Said”,” Walt Whitman Quarterly Review 12 
(Winter 1995): 133–149. 
Vonnegut, Kurt, Mother Night. New York: Library of America, 2012. 
Vonnegut, Kurt, Palm Sunday, in Welcome To The Monkey House and Palm Sunday: An 
Autobiographical Collage. London: Vintage, 1994. 
Watts, Alan, “Alan Watts[:] How To Enjoy Yourself Successfully”, 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8aUkulXLZ3Q, accessed January 10, 2017. 
Watts, Alan, Alan Watts – In the Academy: Essays and Lectures, ed. by Peter J. Columbus and 
Donadrian L. Rice. New York: State University of New York Press, 2017. 
Watts, Alan, Become What You Are. Boston: Shambhala, 2003. 
Watts, Alan, Eastern Wisdom, Modern Life: Collected Talks: 1960–1969. Novato, CA: New World 
Library, 2006. 
Watts, Alan, In My Own Way: An Autobiography 1915–1965. Novato, CA: New World Library, 
1973. 
Watts, Alan, Tao: The Water-Course Way. New York: Pantheon Books, 1975. 
Watts, Alan, The Wisdom of Insecurity. New York: Pantheon Books, 1951. 
Watts, Alan, The Book: On the Taboo against Knowing Who You Are. London: Souvenir Press, 
2011. 
Watts, Alan, What Is Tao? Novato, CA: New World Library, 2000. 
Whitman, Walt, An American Primer by Walt Whitman: With Facsimiles of the Original 
Manuscript, ed. by Horace Traubel. Stevens Point, WI: Holy Cow! Press, 1987. 
Whitman, Walt, Intimate with Walt: Selections from Whitman’s Conversations with Horace Traubel 
1888–1892, eds. by Gary Schmidgall and Horace Traubel. Iowa City: University of Iowa Press, 
2001. 
Whitman, Walt, Leaves of Grass and Other Writings, ed. by Michael Moon. New York: W. W. 
Norton & Company, 2002. 
Whitman, Walt, Leaves of Grass, ed. by David S. Reynolds. New York: Oxford University Press, 
2005. 
Whitman, Walt, Manly Health and Training, ed. by Zachary Turpin, Walt Whitman Quarterly 
Review, vol. 33 (2016): 184–310. 
Whitman, Walt, Notebooks and Unpublished Prose Manuscripts, ed. by Edward F. Grier, vol. 2, 
Washington. New York: New York University Press, 1984. 
Whitman, Walt, Selected Letters of Walt Whitman, ed. by Edwin Haviland Miller. Iowa City: 
University of Iowa Press, 1990. 
Whitman, Walt, Selected Poems 1855–1892, ed. by Gary Schmidgall. New York: St. Martin’s 
Griffin, 1999. 
257 
 
Whitman, Walt, Specimen Days and Collect. Glasgow: Wilson and McCormick, 1882–1883. 
Whitman, Walt, The Correspondence, ed. by Edwin Haviland Miller, 7 vols. New York: New York 
University Press, 1961–1977. 
Whitman, Walt, The Portable Walt Whitman, ed. by Mark van Doren. New York: Penguin, 1973. 
Whitman, Walt, With Walt Whitman in Camden, ed. by Horace Traubel, vol. 1. Boston: Small, 
Maynard, 1906. 
Whitman, Walt, With Walt Whitman in Camden, ed. by Gertrude Traubel and William White, vol. 6. 
Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1982. 
Whitman, Walt, With Walt Whitman in Camden, ed. by Horace Traubel, vol. 9. Oregon House, CA: 
W. L. Bentley, 1996. 
Wilde, Oscar, “The Decay of Lying”, in Oscar Wilde – The Major Works, ed. by Isobel Murray. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000. 
Wilson, Eric G., Against Happiness. New York: Sarah Crichton Books, 2008. 
Wilson, John P., ed. The Posttraumatic Self: Restoring Meaning and Wholeness to Personality. New 
York: Routledge, 2006. 
Worringer, Wilhelm, Abstraction and Empathy: A Contribution to the Psychology of Style, trans. 
Michael Bullock. New York: International Universities Press, 1953. 
Zachary Turpin, Introduction to Walt Whitman’s “Manly Health and Training”,” Walt Whitman 
Quarterly Review 33 (2016): 147–183. 
Zalta, Edward N., ed. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, https://plato.stanford.edu/, 
accessed January 10, 2017. 
 
ISSN (online): 2246-123X
ISBN (online): 978-87-7210-065-4
W
A
LT W
H
ITM
A
N
’S
 TH
E
R
A
P
E
U
TIC
 V
IS
TA
S
: O
N
 TH
E
 P
O
E
T’S
 D
IS
C
O
V
E
R
Y 
O
F LITE
R
ATU
R
E
’S
 R
E
D
E
M
P
TIV
E
 A
N
D
 S
E
LFR
E
N
O
VATIN
G
 P
O
TE
N
TIA
L
K
A
SPER
 R
U
ESK
O
V G
U
LD
B
ER
G
